Europe's “Soft Underbelly”: Why Sánchez's Spain Has Become a Gateway for Chinese Influence

In the new world order, the concept of economic freedom has been profoundly redefined: a truly free market cannot exist without a secure economy. The United States and China have already internalized this dogma, moving toward a paradigm where national security is the fundamental prerequisite for any commercial move.

While Washington protects its economic freedom through "de-risking" and the Inflation Reduction Act, and Beijing utilizes massive subsidies to dominate global value chains, Europe appears fragmented. In this scenario, the Spain of Pedro Sánchez emerges as the continent’s true "soft underbelly": a nation that, by ignoring the link between security and the market, is bartering its technological sovereignty for high-risk Chinese investments.

On April 14, Ming Yang Group Founder and Chairman Zhang Chuanwei held a meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez during his visit to China. Credit Ming Yang.

The Sánchez-Mingyang Pact: Spain as Beijing’s Bridgehead

The most glaring example of this drift is the red carpet Sánchez has rolled out for Mingyang Smart Energy. The Spanish Prime Minister has decided to transform the country into the preferred logistical and production hub for the Chinese giant in Europe, openly defying the security line adopted by key NATO allies. Despite Mingyang having already been effectively expelled from the German and UK markets due to grave national security risks, Sánchez institutionalized the relationship through a Permanent Strategic Dialogue signed in April 2026. Sánchez promised "full support" for the company’s localization, offering China the gateway to critical European infrastructure that Berlin and London have bolted shut.

Who is Mingyang and Why It Represents a Military-Civilian Risk

Mingyang is not a simple turbine manufacturer; it is a pillar of Beijing’s "military-civilian fusion" strategy. Founded by Zhang Chuanwei, a veteran of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the company operates under the obligation of China's National Intelligence Law (NIL), which mandates every Chinese entity to cooperate with state intelligence services. Its turbines are essentially data hubs: sophisticated sensors can map seabeds and intercept naval movements in strategic areas. For this reason:

• Germany. The Ministry of Defense (BMVg) raised a veto on the Waterkant project, forcing the developer Luxcara to replace Mingyang with the German-Spanish firm Siemens Gamesa.

• United Kingdom. London rejected Mingyang’s £1.5 billion investment in the Port of Ardersier, Scotland, prioritizing national defense and pivoting toward the Danish firm Vestas.

  
  

The Diplomacy of Compromise: The Outcome of the Four Sánchez-Xi Summits and the Agreements with Beijing

​In a context marked by political fragility, Sánchez has used international diplomacy as a shield, positioning himself before the Chinese regime as the most open European interlocutor. This strategy has led the Spanish leader to meet President Xi Jinping four times in just four years, culminating in the official visit of April 2026, during which a relationship that the Chinese leader defined as being on the right side of history was institutionalized.

​During this period, nineteen bilateral agreements were signed, ranging from education to heavy industry. While Madrid's propaganda emphasized obtaining new licenses for the export of agricultural products such as pistachios, dried figs, and pork, the true terms of the understanding concerned high technology and energy. Sánchez has indeed guaranteed facilitated access for Chinese capital from companies such as Mingyang, CATL, and Chery, accepting protocols that favor Beijing’s industrial localization on Spanish soil. This policy led to the creation of a Permanent Strategic Dialogue that ensures China a preferential channel with Spain, often bypassing European coordination on security and ignoring the risks of technological dependency that Washington, London, and Berlin are instead forcefully trying to counter. In exchange for low-value agrifood concessions, the Spanish government has effectively opened its doors to giants linked to the Chinese military apparatus, creating a deep rift with the defense line of Western allies.

Macroeconomic Imbalance: The Numbers of a Dangerous Dependency

Sánchez’s policies are fueling a commercial asymmetry that undermines Spanish resilience (2026 data).

• Record Trade Deficit. Spain records a €42.3 billion deficit toward Beijing, which drains 74% of Spain’s entire external deficit.

• Predatory Imports. Chinese imports are growing by 11%, while Spanish exports remain anchored to low-value-added sectors (such as the pork industry), used by Beijing as political leverage for tariff retaliation.

• Input Vulnerability. Madrid depends on Beijing for 80% of its pharmaceutical products and 60% of its electronics.

  
  

Industrial Substitution and Data Security: The Huawei and COSCO Cases

In the logistical sector, COSCO Shipping Ports already holds a 51% controlling stake in Noatum Ports, effectively managing the Port of Valencia, the Mediterranean’s primary container hub and a critical node for European trade. This physical control over supply chains is mirrored in the digital sphere by the Huawei case; between 2021 and 2025, the Spanish government entrusted the Chinese telecom giant with the storage and management of sensitive judicial data. This decision directly ignored NATO warnings regarding the National Intelligence Law (NIL), which mandates that Chinese companies assist state espionage. By trading technological and infrastructural sovereignty for the promise of industrial localization from firms like CATL, Envision, and Chery, Sánchez has created a deep rift with the defense strategies of Washington and Berlin, effectively turning Spain into a technological colony where the integrity of national data and logistics is secondary to short-term political alignment with Beijing.

Energy Hysteria: The Genesis of the Surrender

At the root of this drift lies Brussels’ energy hysteria. The ideological rush to reach extreme climate goals has pushed the EU to dismantle its own industry before having an alternative, paving the way for Chinese dumping. While the USA responds with muscular policies to protect its economic freedom, Sánchez’s Spain acts in the opposite direction, making the country a technological colony of Beijing at the expense of European collective security.

The European Context

On 3 February 2026, the European Commission decided to initiate an in-depth investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) to assess the activities of a company headquartered in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Commission raised preliminary concerns that the Company has been granted foreign subsidies that could distort the internal market of the European Union.

The Commission started this investigation on its own initiative (ex officio) in April 2024 in the EU wind sector, where the Company is predominantly active in wind turbine manufacturing, research and development, and sales and servicing. Based on its preliminary investigation, the Commission found sufficient indications that the Company may have been granted by the PRC: (i) direct financial contributions, including grants, capital injections, and debt write-off grants; (ii) preferential tax measures in the form of a reduction of corporate income tax and value-added-tax refunds; and (iii) preferential financing in the form of loans. The Commission considers that these foreign subsidies may improve the Company’s competitive position in the EU internal market, thereby negatively affecting competition for the supply of wind turbines and related services in the European Union. In particular, the Commission indicated that the foreign subsidies may have enabled the Company to offer lower prices than its competitors, thereby winning more wind project tenders than it would have done in the absence of those foreign subsidies.

In its in-depth investigation, the Commission will assess whether the preliminary findings are confirmed. The Commission has also invited third parties to submit their comments within one month following the date of the publication of the summary notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. The summary notice was published on 18 February 2026.

This investigation follows a similar trajectory to the Commission’s investigation into another Chinese manufacturer of threat detection systems, against which the Commission opened an in-depth investigation on 11 December 2025. Both investigations were initiated by the Commission ex officio in April 2024 and involve Chinese-owned companies. These cases illustrate that the Commission is intensifying its use of the FSR’s ex officio procedure to tackle perceived distortions caused by foreign subsidies.