The PLA at the Crossroads: Intelligentized Doctrine Between Centralism and Operational Necessity

Simplified and Detailed Preface

This report analyzes how the Chinese Army (PLA) is transforming its Command and Control (C2) system, a shift driven by Intelligentized Warfare (which heavily utilizes AI).

Our analysis integrates two key sources, offering a Western perspective on the PLA's dilemma:

1. External Strategic Observations: A summary of an article published on November 21, 2025, which highlights the tension between the need for Mission Command delegation and the Total Centralized Control of the CCP (the Command Paradox).

2. Internal Operational Evidence: News from the PLA Daily (December 1, 2025) showing the PLA's concrete effort to train Battalion Commanders as autonomous "Joint Commanders," capable of integrating inter-service elements and making independent judgments in the field.

The report examines how the PLA intends to achieve cognitive superiority and dominance in the Electromagnetic Space Warfare (ESW) and presents recommendations to the DoD to actively exploit the fundamental contradiction between political rigidity and military adaptation.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

1. The Strategic Challenge: The Paradoxical Constraint

Western analysis focuses on the Command Paradox: the fundamental contradiction between the operational philosophy necessary for modern warfare and the political orthodoxy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

• The Ideological Brake: The "Five Principles" establish the unconditional supremacy of the CMC Chairman (Xi Jinping). This requirement guarantees Total Centralized Control, but, as noted by Extrema Ratio, risks replicating historical decision-making sluggishness that disadvantages centrally concentrated command systems.

• The Operational Necessity: Intelligentized Warfare is based on the Trinitarian Formula (Large Model, Knowledge, Algorithm) and aims for cognitive superiority. To translate this advantage into rapid action, the PLA requires a distributed, self-adaptive, and self-organizing C2, mandating the implementation of Mission Command (delegation of decision authority in the field).

• Asymmetrical Advantage: The PLA's goal is to achieve an asymmetrical decision advantage by imposing complexity on the adversary and contesting the Electromagnetic Domain (ED) through Electromagnetic Space Warfare (ESW). This strategy aims to paralyze U.S. C2 (MDO/JADC2) with attacks that are not just technical, but also cognitive warfare (data contamination).

The Western View: The unresolved nature of this paradox increases the risk of "crises and unauthorized actions" (Extrema Ratio), as frontline forces might act independently out of operational necessity, lacking clear central directives.

2. The Doctrinal Response: The PLA's Tactical Evolution

The PLA Daily article from December 1, 2025, demonstrates that the PLA is actively attempting to overcome the "Paradox" at the tactical level through a massive training overhaul.

2.1. The Rise of the Battalion "Joint Commander"

The most significant change is the expansion of Joint Command below the brigade level:

• Decentralization of Tactical Authority: Battalion Commanders are now trained to command and mobilize elements from different military branches (aviation, long-range artillery, special forces) to deliver a "combined strike."

• Independent Judgment: In exercises, units perform independent judgments and actions, the clearest sign yet of an attempt to instill the Mission Command philosophy in the "nerve endings" of the combat system, as defined by the PLA itself.

• Systemic Thinking: Training promotes a shift from "endpoint thinking" to "systemic thinking." Battalion commanders must master inter-service knowledge (naval charts, air/naval coordination) essential for joint operations.

2.2. Implications for Operational Doctrine

This push for grassroots joint competence is a necessary, direct response to the Intelligentized doctrine:

• Resilience to ESW: To operate in highly degraded environments where central C2 connectivity is severed, only competent, autonomous, and jointly trained inter-service commanders can ensure the combat system does not collapse.

• Combating Complexity: A commander's ability to "plug-and-play" and coordinate various combat elements in real-time is vital to impose complexity on the adversary.

3. Strategic Recommendations for the DoD: The Western Countermove

The following recommendations are the necessary strategic response to neutralize the PLA's potential asymmetrical decision advantage.

3.1. Prioritize C2 Resilience (Anti-ESW)

This is the direct operational countermeasure to the Total ED Dominance sought by the PLA.

• Focus: Invest in highly resilient and decentralized C2 architectures (aligned with Mission Command) that can successfully operate even in degraded ED environments.

• Doctrinal Countermeasure: The DoD must accelerate its own Mission Command implementation to maintain an advantage. If both sides decentralize, the contest will shift to who has the most reliable systems and the most competent cadres in autonomous decision-making.

3.2. Defense Against Cognitive Warfare

The response to the PLA's Trinitarian Formula and deception warfare must be cognitive as well as technical.

• Focus: Develop active and passive defenses against cognitive and deception warfare.

• Objective: Ensure U.S. decision systems (JADC2) are not blinded by false or contaminated data. The DoD must develop AI filters and verification protocols to maintain data integrity and the cognitive resilience of commanders, which is crucial in a compromised "trust in data" environment.

3.3. Exploit the PLA's Internal Paradox

This recommendation focuses on leveraging the PLA's intrinsic systemic weakness.

• Focus: Continuously monitor the uneven implementation of Mission Command and the tension between tactical autonomy and absolute political control.

• Objective: During a conflict, the DoD must focus kinetic and information warfare efforts to increase operational stress in the field. This will exacerbate the internal contradiction, forcing Chinese units to choose between political obedience (slowness) and effective military action (disobedience), increasing the risk of strategic-tactical misalignment.

4. Conclusion: A System in Transition

The strategic competition is not merely technological; it is a race between the political rigidity of the CCP and the military need for adaptation in the PLA. The PLA's success will depend on its ability to resolve the tension between ideological centralism and the operational demand for delegation. Western strategy must aim to make our system more adaptive and trustworthy than the rigid system the CCP can afford to deploy.