Australia, an Unforgivable Betrayal: Canberra Sacrifices Security for Chinese Illusions - Analysis
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 21 lug
- Tempo di lettura: 13 min
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's visit to China in July 2025, and the joint statement that emerged outlining an ambitious cooperation program, are in fact a shocking and irresponsible capitulation that jeopardizes Australia's national security and the integrity of the "Five Eyes" alliance.
While the United States and other Western partners are adopting drastic measures, such as the new Data Security Program (DSP) of the U.S. Department of Justice, to shield their sensitive information from adversaries like China, Canberra has carelessly entered into collaboration agreements in artificial intelligence, health innovation, and the digital economy.
This short-sighted move not only opens the door to systematic intellectual property theft and Chinese espionage, which aims to boost its military and surveillance apparatus, but also exposes Australia to extremely serious biosecurity and ethical risks, in a context of complete lack of reciprocity from Beijing.
It is an act of abysmal political naivety that erodes the trust of allies and hands a decisive strategic advantage to an authoritarian and predatory regime, ignoring unequivocal warnings and the proven aggressive nature of the Chinese Communist Party.
A Geopolitical Contradiction: Canberra's Myopia and the AUKUS Alliance
This step, far from being a mere diplomatic reopening, is a profoundly risky move set within an already tense geopolitical context. At a time when Western democracies, led by the United States, are seeking to contain China's technological and military influence through strategic alliances like AUKUS – of which Australia is a fundamental pillar for security and defense in the Indo-Pacific – Canberra appears to be sending a contradictory, if not openly hostile, signal. Cooperation with Beijing in such critical sectors as AI and biotechnologies not only undermines trust among "Five Eyes" allies but also risks compromising collective efforts to safeguard Western security and innovation. Australia, a key country for intelligence sharing, is playing a dangerous game, with evident naivety that could strengthen a strategic competitor instead of protecting its own interests and those of its most trusted partners.
Canberra's Dangerous Turn: Beyond Traditional Trade
Trade relations between Australia and China have historically been dominated by raw materials. However, Albanese's visit marked a decisive shift towards high-value-added and strategic sectors. The joint statement highlighted artificial intelligence (AI), health innovation, and the digital economy as key areas for bilateral cooperation. At first glance, this might seem like a pragmatic move to diversify the Australian economy. But, given China's predatory nature and strategic agenda, this expansion is anything but harmless. The inclusion of Chengdu in the Prime Minister's itinerary, beyond the traditional coastal hubs, signals Australia's further and dangerous willingness to penetrate deeper into the Chinese market, ignoring the growing risks.
Artificial Intelligence: A Golden Bridge for Surveillance and Chinese Hegemony
The potential establishment of joint research laboratories between universities and industry in AI, in areas such as autonomous driving, predictive analytics, and intelligent resource management, is extremely concerning. While Australia boasts strengths in applied research, particularly in the mining, agricultural, and logistics sectors, China is an undisputed leader in the development of digital platforms and infrastructure, with an agenda of total control.
The idea that Australian technology companies could benefit from "larger datasets" and "large-scale experimentation" is not only naive but dangerously self-destructive. Chinese legislation, including the National Security Law (2015) and the National Intelligence Law (2017), obliges all entities and citizens in China to cooperate with state intelligence agencies. This means that any data, technology, or research developed jointly, or even simply accessible through Chinese platforms, could easily be exploited by the CCP for internal surveillance purposes (as demonstrated by the ruthless social credit system), economic espionage, or, worse, to enhance its military and global control capabilities.
China has demonstrated a systemic propensity for cyber-expropriation of technology and big data, stealing technological innovation and trade secrets on a global scale. The FBI opens a new counterintelligence investigation related to China every 12 hours, and intellectual property theft costs the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Collaborating with a regime that employs "the largest hacking program of all other major nations combined" is an act of profound irresponsibility for a "Five Eyes" country like Australia. Instead of "improving compatibility with future Chinese regulations," Australia is legitimizing abusive practices and exposing its innovators to a hostile and manipulative regulatory environment.
Health and Biopharmaceuticals: Fertile Ground for Biosecurity and Espionage Risks
The identification of the health and biopharmaceutical sectors as high-potential areas for collaboration is equally alarming. Although shared demographic challenges and the demand for medical innovation are real, China's rapid and uncontrolled progress in biotechnology, fueled by massive state investments and integration with AI, represents one of the most significant geopolitical challenges.
Biotechnology, defined as the "new strategic frontier," has profound implications for defense, health, agriculture, and manufacturing. China has invested over $100 billion in biotechnology research and development, considering it a priority sector in its five-year plans (e.g., Made in China 2025, 14th Five-Year Plan), aiming not only for self-sufficiency but to dominate global research and development. The application of AI to biology and genomics, with Chinese companies like BioMap (Baidu) and BGI at the forefront, is drastically accelerating biotechnology discovery. China is a pioneer in the application of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, with the highest number of ongoing clinical trials worldwide, despite controversial ethical implications.
Collaborating in this sector means exposing oneself to an extremely high "dual-use" risk. Biotechnology can be used for military purposes, from the development of pathogens and biological weapons to the creation of genetically modified "super soldiers" enhanced by AI. Appalling cases like that of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg (Canada), where it was discovered that Chinese scientists and military personnel had penetrated the biosafety level 4 laboratory, with alleged transfers of sensitive information and collaborations on biotechnologies and biological weapons, should serve as a warning to any sensible nation.
Australia, with its strengths in clinical rigor, medical research, and intellectual property protection, is diving headfirst into a partnership with a nation that has a proven strategy of "steal, expand, strangle" to achieve market dominance. Intellectual property theft through both legal channels (mergers/acquisitions, like ChemChina's acquisition of Syngenta in 2017) and illegal ones (cyber espionage and human espionage) is a well-established practice of the CCP. Companies like WuXi AppTec, with billions in revenue and 79% of U.S. biopharmaceutical companies relying on them for production, demonstrate how heavily subsidized Chinese "national champions" can come to control global supply chains. Exposing R&D pipelines, patient data, and medical technologies to this reality is an unacceptable gamble that undermines Australia's biosecurity and research integrity. The potential harmonization of regulatory processes with China, far from being an advantage, could become an open door for the expansion of Chinese control and unauthorized access to sensitive information. Allegations against GenScript Biotechnology Co. of potential U.S. IP transfer to China reinforce these horrifying concerns.
The Hidden Cost: Dependence and Loss of Competitiveness
Beyond the immediate risks of espionage, this collaboration carries a heavy long-term economic burden for Australia. By acquiring Australian intellectual property, China not only erodes the competitive advantage of Australian companies in global markets but also risks creating a dangerous technological dependence. Australia could find itself tied to Chinese platforms and systems, limiting its ability to innovate independently and dictate its own technological future. Furthermore, Western markets, increasingly wary of China, may perceive Australia as a less reliable partner, discouraging crucial collaborations and investments due to the increased risk of intellectual property theft. The short-term profits sought by the Albanese government could prove to be a very costly deal, sacrificing the country's economic prosperity and strategic independence.
Ethical and Human Implications of Collaboration
Cooperation with China in sectors such as AI and biotechnology raises profound ethical and human rights issues. China has a documented history of using technology for mass surveillance and social control, as demonstrated by the social credit system and repression in Xinjiang, where genomic surveillance is used to identify, track, and control Uyghur Muslims. China has accumulated the world's largest genomic database, even collecting data from abroad. AI developed jointly, even if initially for civilian purposes, could easily be co-opted by the CCP to strengthen these repressive mechanisms. Similarly, biotechnology collaboration risks involving Australia in controversial practices such as the accumulation of massive genomic databases for population control or the development of genetically modified "super soldiers" enhanced by AI as part of the PLA's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy. Allowing the exchange of know-how in these areas not only contradicts the democratic values and fundamental human rights that Australia claims to uphold but also risks making it complicit, albeit unintentionally, in a regime that abuses such technologies to maintain power.
The Chinese Espionage Network and Western Naivety: Alarming Examples
Collaboration with China, especially in strategic sectors, exposes Australia to a sophisticated and pervasive espionage network. The CCP employs government agencies, organizations, commercial entities, individual entrepreneurs, Chinese expatriates, and Chinese and foreign researchers to steal technology and data. The National Intelligence Law of 2017 obliges all Chinese citizens to disclose trade secrets and contribute to intelligence gathering efforts, threatening them with severe penalties for non-compliance.
Past examples should make the Australian government reflect:
The Scottish renewable materials company: After a visit from a Chinese delegation, laptops were stolen, and shortly thereafter a Chinese company produced a virtually identical device, leading to the demise of the British company.
Smiths (Harlow) Limited: An £8 million deal with a Chinese company turned into a disaster, with sensitive details shared, the remaining agreed amount unpaid, and the subsequent administration of the British company, also losing its license to produce military equipment for Western powers.
The GE Aviation employee: Recruited by a Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) official, he attempted to steal the company's file directory before being arrested.
The Chinese wind turbine manufacturer: Convicted of stealing trade secrets from a U.S. semiconductor company, causing billions in capital losses and hundreds of job losses.
The U.S. agrochemical and biotechnology company employee: Attempted to flee to China with stolen intellectual property from his company after contacts with CCP officials.
These cases are not isolated but are part of an aggressive strategy of "cyber-expropriation of technology and big data." China is "the author of the most severe damage globally," and its hacking program is "larger than all other major nations combined."
Alarms Ignored and Insufficient Measures: The West Lagging, Australia Adrift
Australia's decision appears even more reckless considering the explicit warnings and countermeasures adopted by other Western actors. The United States, for example, has implemented concrete measures such as the BIOSECURE Act, aimed at limiting collaboration with Chinese biotechnology companies deemed a national security risk. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has repeatedly warned about the pervasive threat of Chinese intellectual property theft, highlighting the systemic and state-sponsored nature of such operations.
Adding to this is a glaring lack of reciprocity: Chinese regulations prevent foreigners from freely accessing and transferring genetic data and biological samples from China, while Chinese entities have access to health data in many Western countries, creating a significant and dangerous imbalance. This double standard allows Beijing to gain an unprecedented strategic advantage.
In the face of this escalating threat, the United States has responded with drastic and timely measures. On July 9, 2025, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") initiated enforcement of its new Data Security Program ("DSP") to prevent foreign adversaries from accessing sensitive U.S. data. Created earlier this year, the program aims to block access to U.S. government-related data and certain categories of sensitive U.S. personal data by Countries of Concern such as China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as foreign entities or individuals with significant ties to these countries. It is crucial to emphasize that the rules apply "regardless of whether the data is anonymized, pseudonymized, de-identified, or encrypted," recognizing adversaries' ability to de-anonymize and exploit even seemingly innocuous data. According to the DOJ, the threat of foreign adversaries collecting and weaponizing U.S. data has become "increasingly urgent, and ensuring timely compliance with DSP requirements is critical to responding to the administration's priorities and disrupting the flow of sensitive U.S. personal data and government data to Countries of Concern." The severity of any infraction is reflected in the stringent civil and criminal penalties provided: violators of the DSP could face fines of up to $368,136 per violation, or double the value of each violating transaction, whichever is greater; intentional violators could face imprisonment for up to 20 years and a $1 million fine.
Despite these unequivocal warnings and the proactive efforts of its allies, experts believe that current global countermeasures are still insufficient to fully counter China's aggressive advance. Australia, with its latest move, appears to be culpably ignoring these danger signals, exposing itself to vulnerabilities that its allies are actively seeking to mitigate.
A Danger to "Five Eyes" and Global Security
Australia is a crucial member of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), based on the sharing of sensitive information and mutual trust in security matters. Canberra's decision to deepen cooperation with China in such sensitive sectors as AI and biotechnology risks irreparably compromising this fundamental trust. An Australia that opens its doors to Chinese technology and allows access to strategic data and research, even indirectly, becomes a potential weak point for the entire alliance—a Trojan horse for Chinese intelligence.
The Albanese government, acting with evident political myopia and alarming strategic naivety, is jeopardizing its own technological sovereignty, the security of its businesses, and the protection of its citizens' data. It is inadvertently contributing to the rise of an authoritarian power that does not hesitate to exploit every opportunity for its strategic purposes, including the modernization of its military apparatus (PLA) and the expansion of its control over the population.
In an era of increasing geopolitical and technological competition, cooperation with China in high-risk sectors is not just a commercial choice, but a geopolitical statement that can have disastrous long-term consequences. Australia must urgently reconsider this dangerous trajectory and realign its priorities with the imperatives of national security and the interests of its democratic allies.
Final Recommendations: The West's Response to the Chinese Tech Challenge
The preceding analysis has outlined the speed and depth of China's advancements in biotechnologies, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy, driven by massive state investments and the integration between these areas. The implications for world order, security, and the economy are profound and demand a strategic and cohesive response from the West. Merely acknowledging the threat is no longer enough; it is imperative to act decisively and with foresight.
Here are the final recommendations for addressing the Chinese technological challenge, with a specific focus on how governments and private companies can protect themselves in this complex environment:
Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection and Sensitive Data Security:
IP theft and unauthorized access to sensitive data, particularly genetic information and strategic digital data (AI algorithms, trade secrets in the digital economy), remain critical threats. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under General Secretary Xi Jinping, has enacted and integrated various laws and regulations since 2015 concerning national security, cybersecurity, and data privacy. These measures significantly broaden government surveillance over domestic and foreign companies (including Italian ones) operating in China. Beijing views inadequate government control over information within its borders—and its outward flows—as a national security risk.
General Risk Framework:
They provide the government with a broader legal basis for accessing and controlling data held by foreign companies in China.
Such companies may face sanctions for engaging in traditional commercial activities now deemed espionage by Beijing, or for conduct perceived as assisting foreign sanctions against China.
This regulatory framework can compel Chinese citizens employed locally by foreign companies to aid the CCP's intelligence efforts.
Key Laws and Their Implications (applicable across all digital and biotech sectors):
Update to the Anti-Espionage Law (2023): Significantly expands the definition of espionage and introduces an erga omnes obligation to cooperate with state intelligence, even for entities residing outside national borders. This makes all entities and persons potential extensions of Chinese state intelligence.
Cybersecurity Vulnerability Reporting Law (2021): Imposes stricter rules for disclosing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in China, including mandatory disclosure to state authorities, potentially allowing Chinese authorities to exploit system flaws before they are publicly known. Particularly relevant for software development, AI platforms, and digital infrastructure.
Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) (2021): While seemingly similar to GDPR, its ambiguities and extraterritorial scope, rooted in national security interests, can limit companies' ability to collect and retain personal data and authorize the Chinese government to collect personal data for actions deemed to be in the public interest. Crucial for health data and user data in the digital economy.
Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) (2021): Authorizes Beijing to take action against individuals or entities that implement or assist foreign sanctions against China, creating uncertainty and potentially forcing foreign companies to comply with Chinese regulations over those of their home country.
Data Security Law (DSL) (2021): Establishes a framework for classifying data collected and stored in China based on its potential impact on Chinese national security, regulating its storage and transfer with severe penalties for violations. Direct impact on all big data generated in the digital economy and by AI.
National Intelligence Law (NIL) (2017): Mandates that all Chinese organizations and citizens collaborate with the government on security matters, which can include subsidiaries of Chinese groups even outside China and Chinese citizens employed locally in foreign companies.
Cybersecurity Law (CSL) (2017): Imposes basic data protection and cybersecurity obligations, establishes a regulatory framework for critical information infrastructure, and requires data collected to be protected and potentially accessible to intelligence services. Fundamental for the security of digital networks and systems.
National Security Law (2015): Obliges all Chinese citizens and private organizations to assist the central government and intelligence services on security matters when ordered.
For Governments and Private Companies (Enhanced Protection across all sectors):
Deep Due Diligence on Partners: Conduct extremely thorough due diligence on all potential partners, investors, and suppliers, particularly those based in or linked to China. This must go beyond financial checks to include their governmental affiliations, IP track record, and compliance with Chinese national security laws.
Geographic IP Strategy (Excluding China for Sensitive IP): Focus on rigorously securing and defending IP in jurisdictions that offer robust legal protections and where core markets reside. For critical, proprietary technologies, AI algorithms, and digital trade secrets, consider if operating or holding IP in China is an acceptable risk given the legislative landscape.
Robust Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) and Contracts: Utilize detailed, legally binding NDAs and comprehensive contracts for all external collaborations (suppliers, research partners, employees, consultants). Ensure these agreements explicitly address IP ownership and data handling, and seek legal counsel on their enforceability in relevant jurisdictions outside of China.
Advanced Cybersecurity and Data Segmentation: Implement state-of-the-art cybersecurity measures, including advanced encryption for sensitive data, multi-factor authentication, continuous threat monitoring, and regular backups. Crucially, segment data infrastructure, ensuring that AI algorithms, source code, strategic digital trade secrets, and personal data of non-Chinese citizens are stored on servers outside of China and are not accessible from within the country's networks. Train all staff on the risks of phishing, social engineering, and state-sponsored cyber-espionage.
Strict Internal Access Controls and Employee Screening: Limit access to sensitive information to only strictly necessary personnel. Implement rigorous background checks for employees, particularly those with access to IP or data, and regularly review their access privileges. Educate staff on the implications of Chinese national security laws and the potential for forced cooperation.
Resilient Supply Chain Diversification: Actively work to reduce reliance on single-source suppliers in China for critical components, hardware, software, APIs, reagents, and digital/biotech equipment. Diversify supply chains through partnerships with trusted entities in allied countries to mitigate risks of disruption or coercive measures.
Legal Counsel and Risk Assessments: Regularly consult with legal experts specializing in Chinese law and international IP law to understand the evolving regulatory landscape and its specific implications for business, across all technological sectors.
Promote Domestic Innovation and Strategic Self-Sufficiency:
To compete effectively, the West cannot merely defend itself; it must accelerate its own innovative capacity.
Massive R&D Investments: Governments must significantly increase public funding for basic and applied research in biotechnology, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and key sectors of the digital economy, focusing on areas with high dual-use potential (civilian and military). Creating a robust and diverse research ecosystem is fundamental.
Talent Training and Retention: Invest in training skilled scientists, engineers, bioinformaticians, and AI and cybersecurity specialists. Create conditions that attract and retain top talent, preventing "brain drain" to rival nations.
Develop Resilient Supply Chains: Reduce reliance on foreign manufacturers, particularly Chinese ones, for critical active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), reagents, materials, hardware, software, and digital/biotech equipment. Incentivize domestic production and diversify supply sources through partnerships with allied countries.
Foster Academic and Industrial Collaboration: Encourage the creation of centers of excellence, public-private partnerships, and research consortia that can accelerate the translation of scientific and technological discoveries into concrete applications.
Recalibrate Economic Relations and Partnerships:
A more critical and strategic approach to economic interactions with China in all key technology sectors is necessary.
Review Inbound and Outbound Investments: Implement more stringent screening mechanisms for Chinese investments in Western biotech, AI, and digital tech companies, especially those that develop critical or dual-use technologies. Simultaneously, assess the risks associated with Western investments in China, particularly when these could inadvertently contribute to Beijing's military or surveillance capabilities.
Principle of Reciprocity: Demand genuine reciprocity in market access, data sharing, and scientific and digital collaborations. If China imposes severe restrictions on foreign operators, Western countries should consider similar measures to protect their own interests.
Collaboration with Allied Countries: Strengthen alliances with nations that share the same democratic values and strategic interests in key technology sectors. Share intelligence, coordinate R&D policies, and harmonize regulations to create a united front.
Address Ethical and Biosecurity Implications:
The acceleration of technologies, including AI, requires a robust ethical and biosecurity framework, essential for maintaining public trust.
Develop Global Ethical Standards: Promote international discussion and the adoption of stringent ethical standards for human genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and the use of AI in all its applications, from surveillance to defense.
Strengthen Biosecurity and Biodefense: Invest in the prevention, rapid detection, and response to potential biological threats, whether natural, accidental, or malicious. This includes developing rapid vaccines and therapies, and enhancing pandemic early warning systems.
Transparency and Accountability: Encourage transparency in research and development, especially in areas with potential dual-use implications, and promote accountability for the ethical use of technologies.
Technological competition, across all its sectors, is no longer a distant concern but a reality that is redefining global power. Ignoring or underestimating it would mean ceding a decisive strategic advantage to an adversary that has demonstrated the will to exploit these technologies for its own purposes. The time to act is now, both at the governmental level and for individual private companies.
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