Beijing's Latest Offensive in Latin America: The New Cooperation Plan and the Immediate Risks of Predatory Economics, Espionage, and Sabotage

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region historically considered the security perimeter and exclusive sphere of influence of the United States, has become the main theater of strategic competition for the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the last two decades. Beijing's commitment, which has evolved beyond the mere pursuit of commercial opportunities, has transformed into a multidimensional and deeply geopolitical strategy that aims to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and challenge the international order based on liberal democracies. This meticulously orchestrated penetration is the direct and tangible expression of the revisionist will of Xi Jinping's regime.

Map and Flag of the People's Republic of China - GettyImages

China's latest and most authoritative policy statement on the LAC region is the third policy document published by the Chinese government on December 10, 2025. This strategic update is not merely an economic cooperation plan, but a geopolitical manifesto framed within Beijing's broader communication playbook aimed at redefining global narratives.

The document articulates a long-term vision centered on "building a China-LAC community with a shared future" and proposes the implementation of five fundamental programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and Connectivity. The language chosen is key to deciphering China's strategy of manipulating international discourse. Emphatic statements such as China's commitment to "promote a fair and orderly multipolar world by opposing unilateral bullying that undermines international peace and security" are precalculated rhetorical moves. This narrative aims to position Beijing not as an expanding revisionist power, but as the defender of sovereignty and multilateralism for the "Global South," countering perceived US hegemony and unilateralism. The ultimate goal of this discourse is to gain the legitimacy and diplomatic support necessary for its geopolitical agenda and the expansion of its influence in a traditionally hostile area.

The Economic Offensive, Vertical Resource Control, and Commercial Dominance by Country

Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in LAC are highly focused, centering on a rigorous strategy of vertical control of supply chains in crucial sectors: energy, metals, transport, and agriculture. This model aims to guarantee China's internal economic security by securing a dominant position across the entire production chain.

Brazil The Commercial, Financial, and Security Architecture

Relations with Brazil constitute the cornerstone of China's economic penetration. China is Brazil's largest trading partner. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $188.17 billion, with the balance heavily skewed in Brazil's favor due to immense Chinese imports of raw materials like iron ore, soybeans, crude oil, and cellulose. Chinese exports focus on high-tech products like machinery, IT equipment, and transport vehicles.

Chinese investments cover the entire energy, mining, agriculture, and strategic infrastructure sectors, with Beijing involved in building thermal power plants and ultra-high voltage transmission lines. This cooperation was formalized through the China-Brazil Production Capacity Cooperation Fund (May 2017) and institutionalized by the "Cooperation Plan" of November 2024, aligning the BRI with Brazilian development plans. Financially, the agreement for RMB compensation (early 2023) promotes the use of local currencies for bilateral trade settlement, boosting the RMB's role in Latin America.

The partnership extends to science and technology, with the successful joint satellite development project for earth resources (five launched) and Brazil hosting the largest number of joint laboratories in Latin America. Military relations between the Chinese and Brazilian armed forces are consolidated, with military attaché offices established since 1984 and frequent reciprocal visits.

Peru Total Dependence, the Chancay Megaport, and the Farshoring Strategy

Peru is China's fourth-largest trading partner in LAC, but for Peru, China is the top global trading partner, export market, and import source (36% of total exports in 2023). In 2024, bilateral trade reached $43.36 billion. The Free Trade Agreement (in force since 2010) was updated in November 2024 with the signing of a Protocol and a joint BRI Cooperation Plan.

The Chancay Megaport is the emblem of this dependence and the dual-use strategy. The port was inaugurated on November 14, 2024, with the participation of Presidents Xi Jinping and Dina Boluarte. The total investment of $3.5 billion and the 30-year concession to COSCO Shipping Ports (a Chinese SOE) position the port as South America's main Pacific logistics hub. The deep draft of 17.8 meters makes the port suitable not only for the largest container ships but also for Chinese warships, configuring a clear dual-use risk, a concern explicitly raised by high-ranking U.S. officials like Admiral Craig Faller and Commander Laura Richardson.

Peru's technological dependence is strategic, relying on ZPMC cranes, Nuctech scanners, and Huawei 5G systems. These technologies, often linked to the CCP, create critical vulnerabilities for espionage and potential sabotage under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law. President Boluarte reinforced this dependence by asking Xi Jinping for an additional $31 billion in Chinese investment for railway projects. The project aligns with Beijing's Farshoring strategy, aimed at funding a new Pacific-Atlantic trade corridor that could bypass a potential U.S. naval blockade of the Panama Canal and reorient Latin America toward Asia. Locally, the landslide in May 2025 at the Chancay tunnel and the subsequent Peruvian Prosecutor's investigation into COSCO highlighted issues with Chinese execution standards.

Chile and Bolivia The Lithium Front and Strategic Influence

Chile is China's third-largest trading partner in LAC and its main source of copper imports. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $61.58 billion. Chile was the first Latin American country to sign an FTA with China (2006) and recognize it as a market economy. Beijing established the first RMB clearing bank in Latin America in Chile (2016), and the country joined the AIIB. China is active in lithium carbonate extraction and has deep scientific cooperation, supporting Antarctic research and astronomy with the creation of the South American Astronomical Research Center (2013). Formal military relations have been active since 1972.

Bolivia is crucial for its position within the "Lithium Triangle," with reserves estimated at 23 million tons. The Bolivian government selected Chinese consortia like CATL BRUNP & CMOC (CBC) for direct lithium extraction, with an estimated $14 billion investment. This preference raises alarms over Chinese companies' low environmental and regulatory standards and allegations linking the CATL consortium to potential Uyghur forced labor in Xinjiang. In the tech sector, China successfully launched Bolivia's first communications satellite, "Tupak Katari," in December 2013. Overall, through these acquisitions, China has consolidated control over more than 59% of global lithium production.

Transnational Threats: IUU Fishing and Military Footholds

At the transnational level, the threat to maritime sovereignty is posed by Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing conducted by Chinese high-seas fleets. An Oceana study documented that between July and August 2020, approximately 99% of vessels suspected of IUU fishing near the Galapagos Islands were of Chinese nationality. The PLA's military expansion is confirmed by a 70% increase in PLAN naval visits over the last five years and the presence of footholds like the Las Lajas space monitoring station in Argentina (operational since 2018).

The Panama Canal The Center of the US-China Confrontation

The Panama Canal, a geopolitical choke point through which approximately 6% of global trade and 57.5% of container cargo between Asia and the U.S. East Coast passes, is the focus of strategic confrontation in the hemisphere.

As early as March 2024, Professor Euclides Tapia of the University of Panama warned that China had turned the country into a "strategic hub for its political, commercial, and military advance in the region" and that Beijing's primary objective was to "control the canal". Tapia argued that Panamanian economic elites "underestimate the power China has through legal means to get what they want" and that Panama is the "lamb negotiating with the tiger" in this strategic context.

Chinese influence in the Canal dates back to 1997 with the agreement with the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Holdings to manage the Balboa and Cristóbal terminals. This presence, viewed as a serious national security threat, led to direct U.S. intervention. The Trump administration openly claimed the structure was under Beijing's influence, ultimately pressuring Hutchison to sell the terminals to a consortium led by the U.S. company BlackRock.

The diplomatic escalation culminated on February 3, 2025, when Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino announced the country's official withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) following a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Despite this pro-U.S. move, Canal Administrator Ricaurte Vásquez confirmed on November 26, 2025, that China would be allowed to participate in tenders for the construction of two new ports on the Panama Canal, demonstrating Chinese persistence and Panamanian reluctance to exclude such a major economic partner.

Ideological Penetration and the Export of Digital Authoritarianism

Chinese influence extends to the political and ideological software, configuring a true war of ideas. As highlighted in the analysis of the book The China of Xi Jinping, the model of governance exported by Beijing promotes the unconditional supremacy of "Sovereign Rights" of the Party-State over individual "Human Rights". This vision is actively promoted by Beijing to replace the current international order. The CCP leverages economic power to secure diplomatic support for this alternative vision: authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, along with small Caribbean nations, have signed joint declarations at the UN defending China's conduct in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

A factor of extreme concern for democracy is the export of digital authoritarianism tools. Chinese companies like ZTE have collaborated with the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela to develop surveillance and social control systems like the Fatherland Card. This social credit system prototype allows the government to track voting, ration supplies, and monitor online activity, a clear example of digital totalitarian control that Beijing aims to make the standard in the Global South. Similar surveillance contracts have been implemented in the past in Ecuador and Bolivia, confirming China's intent to export not only capital but also its model of political and social control.

In conclusion, the Chinese presence in Latin America and the Caribbean is a systemic, holistic, and deeply strategic phenomenon. Every action, from financing a port to signing a lithium agreement, is part of a broader plan aimed at consolidating China's revisionist position globally and undermining U.S. influence in its most sensitive security perimeter. The necessity for Western democracies to articulate a coordinated response and urgently implement rigorous regulations for screening strategic investments and critical Chinese technologies is fundamental to defending democratic values and strategic security in the Western Hemisphere.