Beyond the Horizon: America's Space Warfare Preparation and the Challenge of China

The competition for space dominance is redefining global security, with the United States transforming its Space Command into a combat-oriented force, developing offensive capabilities, and strengthening alliances for deterrence. At the same time, China is making astonishing advances in its military space capabilities, from advanced targeting systems to counter-space weapons and integration with conventional forces, accelerating the "kill chain" of modern warfare. This space arms race, also fueled by China's dual-use commercial sector, raises profound concerns about international stability and the risk of conflicts that could have devastating repercussions on global civilian infrastructure.

The end of last year saw a joint operation Of great strategic significance: two military satellites, one American and one French, performed a rendezvous and proximity operation (RPO) in the vicinity of an unspecified adversary satellite. This maneuver, described as a "delicate orbital minuet," represented a milestone. It was the first RPO of its kind conducted by the United States with a country outside the alliance. Five Eyes and the first to be "specially planned" rather than a response to sudden events. The General Stephen Whiting U.S. Space Command's chief of staff highlighted how this exercise demonstrated the joint ability to maneuver satellites in close proximity to those of other nations, signaling a more vigorous American approach to space dominance.

This strategic evolution is motivated by two main factors. First, the U.S. military's reliance on satellites has "increased exponentially," as demonstrated by the American attack on Iran in June, where much of the operation was "enabled from space." Second, the government perceives a significant shift in the threat. Since 2015, China's satellite launch activity has increased eightfold, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has honed its space operations capabilities, including in-orbit electronic warfare, surpassing Russia. China, Russia, and India conducted destructive anti-satellite weapons tests in 2007, 2021, and 2022, respectively, and the United States accuses Russia of developing an orbital nuclear weapon capable of simultaneously destroying thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO).

In response to this dynamic environment, the reestablished United States Space Command in 2019 has radically altered its posture. From a primarily support role, it has transformed into a "combatant command focused on warfare" in space, as General Whiting stated. This new approach includes the adoption of advanced operational concepts such as RPOs, the development of offensive and defensive space capabilities, and greater integration with allies. While Space Command was previously reluctant to discuss its offensive capabilities, it is now openly embracing the idea, with General Whiting declaring the need for "space-based missiles and weapons systems" and "orbital interceptors.""There has never been a war in space; and we don't want a war to start in space or spread to space... but we have to do everything we can to be ready,"specified Whiting.

Allies, such as Britain, are also developing anti-satellite weapons to be deployed on Earth and in orbit. America is leading the Operation Olympic Defender, a collaboration with six countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom) to "deter hostile acts in space," which achieved "initial operational capability" in April.

Space Command is also addressing the tactical demands of warfare, recognizing that satellites can no longer be considered "one-man fortresses" with fixed positions. Solutions include satellites with increased fuel, in-orbit refueling capability (already demonstrated by China in June), and the management of "proliferated" constellations in LEO, where individual satellites can be considered "expendable." The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has launched over 200 satellites since 2023, with more launches planned. A fourth approach is the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) aboard satellites to enable autonomous detection of "nefarious" objects and evasive maneuvers. AI is also being used on the ground with tools such as "SpaceBot," an extensive language model that assists officers in planning and responding to space attacks, dramatically reducing analysis times.

At the same time, China has made astonishing progress in its military space capabilities. Beijing has developed sophisticated space-based targeting systems, a diverse portfolio of counter-space weapons, and deeply integrated these assets into its conventional forces, making them "more lethal, more precise, and with greater range." The reorganization of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) into the new Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF), and Information Support Force (ISF), directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the highest body of the Armed Forces—underscores an institutionalized commitment to space and information warfare. China's commercial space sector, deeply intertwined with the state, contributes significantly to this rapid growth, providing dual-use capabilities and projecting global influence.

These developments are redefining the "kill chain" in modern warfare, making control of space a fundamental pillar of military superiority. The geostrategic implications are profound, particularly for potential flashpoints like Taiwan, and broader risks include the proliferation of space debris and the potential impact on global civilian infrastructure. In this era, space expertise is no longer an option, but a crucial component of military power, with profound implications for international stability and the global balance of power.

U.S. Space Command's Evolving Warfighting Posture

• Re-establishment and transition to a war command

The United States Space Command (USSC) was reestablished in 2019 during Donald Trump's first term. In the years since, attention has focused on building its headquarters and training personnel. Now, the USSC is declared "ready." General Stephen Whiting emphasized this transformation, stating that "we now have a combatant command focused on warfare" in space.

This reestablishment and subsequent maturation signal a profound shift in US strategic thinking regarding space. It is moving away from a primarily defensive or support role to explicitly recognizing space as a contested warfare domain. The emphasis on being a "war-focused combatant command" signals a proactive and assertive posture, preparing the ground for potential conflicts rather than simply responding to events. This transparency about US warfare posture in space serves as a form of deterrence, aiming to deter potential adversaries by demonstrating capability and resolve. This shift is a direct response to the "exponential" increase in US military reliance on satellites and the perceived "changing threat" from emerging space powers such as China and Russia. The growing reliance on space assets for US military operations, as exemplified by the June attack on Iran, and the growing counter-space capabilities of adversaries, necessitate this reorganization of the USSC. The United States is adapting its command structure to protect its critical space infrastructure and effectively project power in a contested environment. This also signals to U.S. allies its commitment to defending shared space interests and capabilities.

• Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO): A Tool for Deterrence and Cooperation

As mentioned, toward the end of last year, two military satellites, one American and the other French, prepared for a delicate "orbital minuet." They were about to conduct a so-called Rendezvous and Proximity Operation (RPO)—in which one or more satellites approach another to inspect or manipulate it—near an unspecified "enemy" satellite. This exercise was a milestone: the first time America had conducted such an RPO with a country outside the Five Eyes (a spy pact whose members cooperate closely in space) and also the first to be conducted as a "specially planned" operation, rather than in response to events. General Whiting stated that the maneuver "signaled our ability to work well together" and was so successful that it is planned to be repeated later this year.

RPO capabilities are inherently dual-use: they can be used for benign purposes such as inspection or maintenance, but also for hostile actions such as interference or attack. The joint US-French exercise, being pre-planned and publicly disclosed, constitutes a deliberate demonstration of this capability, transforming a technical maneuver into a strategic signal. The "orbital minuet" suggests a highly precise and controlled maneuver, showcasing advanced technical capabilities. The "signaling" aspect is crucial: this RPO is not just a technical exercise, but a strategic communication to potential adversaries. By demonstrating the ability to approach and operate near another satellite, the United States and its allies implicitly demonstrate the ability to manipulate, inspect, or even engage in kinetic interference. This blurs the lines between defensive and offensive capabilities in space, enhancing deterrence through ambiguity and demonstrated prowess. The French criticism of Russian maneuvers near French satellites likely served as a direct impetus for this joint exercise, indicating a collective response to perceived threats and a desire to project combined force. The success of this operation directly led to plans for repetition, reinforcing its value as a deterrent and a mechanism for deepening allied operational integration. This public demonstration of RPO capabilities with allies sets a precedent for future joint space operations and potentially more complex and integrated exercises. It also contributes to the evolution of norms of behavior in space, where such maneuvers, while potentially escalatory, are now openly demonstrated as tools of strategic communication.

• The adoption of offensive capabilities: from space missiles to orbital interceptors

A few years ago, the Space Command was reluctant to talk about their offensive capabilities. Now, the idea is fully embraced. General Whiting declared in April: "It's time to clearly say we need space-based missiles and weapons systems. We need orbital interceptors." He referred to Trump's Golden Dome plan for a missile defense shield, which includes space-based interceptors designed to destroy enemy missiles. In theory, the same weapons could also target enemy satellites. One official affirmed that "space-to-space, space-to-ground, ground-to-space" capabilities would all play a role in achieving the "lethality necessary to achieve... deterrence."

This represents a significant shift in U.S. public policy and strategic communication regarding space. Historically, the United States has emphasized the peaceful uses of space, often downplaying or euphemizing offensive capabilities. The current position reflects a direct recognition of space as a potential warfighting domain in which offensive tools are necessary for deterrence and defense. This shift toward explicit transparency about offensive space weapons is a deliberate policy choice aimed at strengthening deterrence. By clearly articulating its intention to develop and deploy such capabilities, the United States seeks to deter potential adversaries by demonstrating a credible threat of retaliation or preemption. The multi-domain lethality concept of "space-to-space, space-to-ground, ground-to-space" indicates a comprehensive approach to space warfare, in which targets can be engaged from multiple domains and in multiple domains, providing flexible response options. The main driver of this policy shift is the perceived "threat shift" by China and Russia, particularly their development and testing of destructive ASAT weapons (China in 2007, Russia in 2021, India in 2022) and the alleged development of Russia's pursuit of an orbital nuclear weapon. The United States perceives the need to match or surpass these capabilities to maintain a credible deterrent posture. Although intended for deterrence, the open pursuit and deployment of offensive space weapons could intensify the arms race in space, potentially leading to a more volatile dominance. The explicit labeling of these systems as "weapons" could lower the psychological threshold for their use in a conflict, increasing the risk of rapid escalation in space.

• Strategic alliances and joint operations: the "Olympic Defender" initiative

American allies are also becoming more open about this issue. In a defense review published this year, Britain declared for the first time that it would develop anti-satellite weapons to be deployed on Earth and in orbit [User Query]. America leads a small but close-knit group of space allies. In Operation Olympic Defender, the Space Command is working with six countries to "deter hostile acts in space." In April, the initiative achieved "Initial Operational Capability," with all seven countries having signed a joint campaign plan, the details of which will be finalized this summer.

This highlights a multilateral approach to space security, extending beyond traditional intelligence-sharing pacts like the Five Eyes to include operational cooperation aimed at deterring aggression in space. Public statements by key allies like the United Kingdom mirror the shift in the United States, indicating a broader Western alignment on the militarization of space. The formation of Operation Olympic Defender with the stated goal of "deterring hostile acts" signifies a collective security approach to space. The United Kingdom's independent decision to develop ASAT, which mirrors the United States' position, indicates a convergence of strategic perspectives among key allies. This collective action aims to establish a de facto norm against aggressive behavior in space, backed by a credible threat of collective responseThe move from "initial operational capability" to a "joint campaign plan" indicates a progression towards joint planning and deeper and more integrated operational execution among alliesThe growing threat from adversaries' counter-space capabilities is a direct catalyst for allies to pool resources, align strategies, and present a united front. The US-French RPO exercise serves as a practical demonstration of the type of operational integration that can be expanded through initiatives like Olympic Defender. This alliance-building is crucial for burden-sharing and amplifying deterrence signals in the space domain. However, it also risks solidifying geopolitical blocs in space, potentially exacerbating tensions with non-aligned space powers and hindering efforts towards universal space governance and arms control.

• Adaptation to tactical needs: fuel, in-orbit refueling and proliferated constellations

General Whiting notes that, although "everything in space moves," America has traditionally conceived of its satellites as "individual forts" stationed in a single location. This is problematic because moving a satellite requires fuel, which can reduce its lifespan. He identifies three solutions:

• satellites that carry the most fuel;

• in-orbit refueling, a capability China demonstrated in June, giving them a potential military advantage and necessitating the United States' acquisition of this capability;

• and the management of so many satellites that each one can be "expendable" (constellations proliferated in low Earth orbit, LEO, such as SpaceX's Starlink). The U.S. National Radiological Research Organization (NRO), which operates classified spy satellites, has launched more than 200 of them since 2023, with a dozen launches planned for this year alone. Rumour mill also has it that SpaceX is leading the way in building a constellation of 450 satellites that will eventually transmit missile tracking and other sensor data to interceptors and weapons.

Traditional satellite design prioritized longevity and fixed orbits. However, in a contested domain where maneuverability and resilience to attack are critical, these designs are vulnerable. The United States is adapting its satellite architecture to address these tactical challenges. The shift from "individual fortresses" to maneuverable or proliferated constellations reflects a strategic adaptation to a dynamic and contested space environment. In-orbit refueling, demonstrated by China, represents a game-changer for extending satellites operational life and enabling sustained maneuverability, directly impacting military utility in a contested environment. The "expendable" nature of proliferated LEO constellations, such as the NRO's classified satellites and SpaceX's alleged military constellation, is a key resilience strategy: it significantly increases the cost and complexity for an adversary to disable an entire network, making a "Space Pearl Harbor" less feasible and improving the overall robustness of the system. The growing threat of counter-space weapons and the demonstrated capabilities of adversaries, such as China's in-orbit refueling, directly drive the urgent need for these resilience measures. The success of commercial mega-constellations, such as Starlink, provides a proven model for rapid military deployment and scalability. This trend points to a future of highly dynamic, interconnected, and potentially autonomous satellite networks. Reliance on commercial entities like SpaceX for military-grade constellations also means deeper private sector integration into national space security, raising complex issues of control, security, and the blurring of the lines between civilian and military assets. This commercialization can accelerate deployment, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities and political considerations.

• Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Space Operations (Onboard and Ground)

A fourth method to improve the resilience of satellites could be to make them "smarter". General Whiting expresses the desire to have artificial intelligence (AI) aboard satellites to enable them to detect "nefarious" objects nearby and navigate autonomously without human intervention. Major Christopher Huynh of the US Space Force suggests that, over time, AI-equipped satellites could fly in close formation, meaning they could act as "defensive satellites to protect high-value assets in orbit." For now, AI is primarily used on the ground. In recent months, General Whiting has affirmed that his staff has developed a large language model, "SpaceBot," trained on all the command's threat and planning data. Officers can query SpaceBot about gaps in their knowledge or how to respond to a space attack, whether fictitious or real. He suggests that what "once would have taken ten people five hours to do" can now be done "at machine speed: a space-age achievement."

AI is rapidly emerging as a transformative technology across all military domains. In space, it offers the potential for unprecedented speed in decision-making, autonomous operations, and greater resilience against threats too rapid or complex for human operators alone. Onboard AI for autonomous maneuverability directly addresses the challenges of operating in a dynamic and contested space environment, optimizing evasive actions and extending the satellite's utility without constant human supervision. The concept of AI-equipped "defensive satellites" flying in "close formation" suggests a future of highly integrated, self-organizing defensive swarms, potentially capable of active threat defense. Ground-based AI such as "SpaceBot" significantly shortens the "Observe-Orient-Decide-Act" (OODA) cycle for human operators, enabling near-instantaneous analysis of complex threat data and response planning, which is crucial in a domain where reaction times are measured in seconds. The growing complexity, speed, and volume of potential threats in space, such as sophisticated counter-space weapons and rapid maneuvers by adversary satellites, necessitate autonomous or AI-assisted responses that human reaction times and processing capabilities cannot match. The enormous volume of space domain awareness data also requires AI for efficient processing and threat identification. The integration of AI into space operations raises profound ethical and strategic questions regarding autonomous decision-making in warfare, the potential for inadvertent escalation, and the future role of human operators in a highly automated battlefield. It also signals a new frontier in the space arms race, where AI superiority could provide a decisive advantage in terms of speed, resilience, and operational effectiveness.

China's Rapid Rise in Military Space Capabilities

• Overview of China's strategic ambitions and plan for space dominance

Chinese leaders consider Space prominence is an important component of a strong country, a source of national pride, and the key to a prosperous nation. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Writings of 2013 describe space capabilities as strategically important to winning what the PLA calls "information wars." Since then, China has designated space as a warfighting domain and has "developed its military space and counter-space capabilities at a breathtaking pace." Beijing aims to establish itself as a leading space power by 2045, with milestones including landing astronauts on the Moon by 2030 and developing a nuclear-powered spacecraft by 2040. China has demonstrated a solid track record of consistently achieving its goals.

Beijing's approach to space is holistic and integrates civilian, economic, and military objectives under a single long-term national strategy. The explicit designation of space as a "warfighting domain" and the focus on "information warfare" signify a fundamental doctrinal shift in which space capabilities are seen as central to modern conflict. The "breathtaking pace" and the consistent achievement of goals demonstrate not only ambition, but also highly effective centralized planning, resource allocation, and a top-down drive to achieve space dominance. This integrated, long-term vision allows China to leverage all elements of national power—including state-owned enterprises, civilian research, and military planning—to achieve its space goals, creating a synergistic effect that accelerates progress across multiple sectors. This contrasts sharply with the often more fragmented or market-driven approaches of Western democracies. China's integrated, state-led strategy therefore represents a significant competitive challenge, as it enables sustained investment and rapid iteration across various space sectors, potentially allowing it to outpace competitors in critical areas despite starting from a smaller base.

• Advanced Space Targeting Systems: Beijing's Eyes in the Indo-Pacific

Beijing's space-based targeting system may be used to "track and target U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific." General Anthony Mastalir underlines that China's long-range weapons, including those specifically targeting the United States and its allies, "depend on space" to "close their kill chain" and strike targets precisely. As of late last year, China possessed over 500 satellites capable of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Over the past decade, Beijing has launched nearly 900 satellites into orbit, including 260 last year alone, 67 of which were ISR-capable. Over the past eight years, China has increased its ISR satellites by about sixfold, including a significant 17-fold increase in commercial ISR satellites, which has boosted ISR capability and improved revisit rates. Beijing also manages the only synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite based in geostationary orbit (GEO), which likely provides China with persistent, all-weather, day-or-night imaging capabilities for surveillance of U.S. Navy assets operating in the region.

L'Aerospace Force (ASF), formerly known as the Space Systems Department (SSD) of the disbanded Strategic Support Force (SSF), is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space surveillance and space information support. According to the Pentagon, the ASF aims to improve the PLA's C2 (Command and Control) for joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system. Beijing is also increasing the number and capabilities of its space systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well as the BeiDou satellite navigation system. The ASF manages at least eight bases, including those whose primary missions are the launch, tracking, research and development, and operation of satellites vital to China's airborne C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) architecture.

ISR satellites are critical to modern military operations, providing the critical “find,” “fix,” and “track” phases of the kill chain. China's rapid expansion in this area directly supports its strategy Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, particularly with regard to potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific. The volume and increasing sophistication of China's ISR satellites, combined with its unique GEO SAR capability, provide Beijing with unprecedented "eyes" on critical operational areas such as the Indo-Pacific. This directly enables "over-the-horizon" precision strikes, turning theoretical long-range weapons into actionable threats. The rapid growth, particularly in commercial ISR satellites, suggests a deliberate dual-use strategy in which commercial capabilities can be rapidly repurposed or integrated for military intelligence, improving overall capacity and revisit rates for persistent surveillance. This expansion of ISR capabilities is a direct enabler of China's broader military modernization goals, particularly the development of long-range precision strike capabilities (e.g., the Dong Feng missile series). It allows Beijing to project power and execute its A2/AD strategy, making it significantly more difficult for U.S. and allied forces to operate freely and effectively in the region. China's advanced targeting systems significantly reduce the operational sanctuary for U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific, forcing them to adopt more distributed, resilient, and potentially evasive tactics. This capability directly shortens the "find-fix-track" phases of China's kill chain, increasing the speed and precision of its potential attacks.

The following is a table summarizing the growth and capabilities of China's ISR satellite constellations.

Table 1: Growth and capabilities of China's ISR satellite constellations

Metrics	Value
Total ISR satellites (end of last year)	Over 500
Total satellites launched in the last decade	About 900
Total satellites launched last year	260
ISR satellites launched last year	67
Increase in total ISR satellites (last 8 years)	Factor 6
Increase in commercial ISR satellites (last 8 years)	17 times
Unique Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite in geostationary orbit (GEO)	Yes

• Sophisticated counter-space weapons: disrupting adversary space operations

China is progressing rapidly in developing counter-space weapons, designed to destroy or disrupt other satellites, whether launched from the ground or from space. These include "reversible cyberattacks, jamming of Satcom [satellite communications] and GPS," high-energy lasers, direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles (DA-ASAT), and co-orbital ASATs. Co-orbital ASATs are satellites placed in orbit with the purpose of threatening other satellites. China demonstrated a DA-ASAT missile capability for kinetic attacks against satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) as early as 2007, and now has a ground-based operational system that the PLA is training to operate. In 2013, China launched a ballistic object at an altitude near GEO, which could indicate a future DA-ASAT capability for satellites in higher orbits. In March 2024, the US Space Force reported that the Chinese satellites were performing "controlled synchronized maneuvers" – satellites moving around each other in orbit in formation. General Michael A. Guetlein said these are tests of "air combat" maneuvers. Beijing is known to have between one and three such programs, which can also be used to launch kinetic energy vehicles (weapons based purely on their own kinetic energy) to strike objects in space or coordinate collisions. While destroying satellites in orbit risks creating debris fields that are dangerous for other satellites, jamming can be used to disrupt capabilities without creating physical dangers by targeting the electronic link between a satellite and its user. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China owns several ground-based laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites. The DIA also indicates that the PLA regularly incorporates electronic warfare into its exercises, with the intent of denying communications, radar systems, and PNT support to force movements and degrading precision-guided munitions.

L'Aerospace Force (ASF) And responsible for space warfare operations. TheCyberspace Force (CSF), formerly known as the Network Systems Department (NSD) of the dissolved SSF, is responsible for information warfare, which includes cyber warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological operations. The CSF operates several theater-aligned technical reconnaissance bases, signals intelligence offices, and research institutes, providing intelligence support to theater commands through a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection assets. The CSF also performs missions associated with the PLA concept of the "Three Wars" (psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare).

China is also actively developing reusable spacecraft technology, part of President Xi Jinping's national strategy to achieve space superiority and billed as reflecting the PRC's peaceful use of space. The CASC (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation), a state-owned enterprise, is leading the development and launch of reusable space launch vehicles (SLVs) for future space missions by 2025. Chinese commercial companies such as iSpace (with Hyperbola-2Y, launched on November 2, 2023, and plans for Hyperbola-3 in 2025) and Landspace (with Zhuque-3, scheduled for 2025) are launching reusable SLVs, with heavy-lift versions such as Hyperbola-3B (similar to SpaceX's Falcon 9) scheduled for 2030. Spaceplanes are another form of reusable technology, characterized by increased maneuverability, making them unique for certain missions. The PRC's reusable spaceplane launches in 2020, 2022, and December 2023 have tested flight time to orbit, maneuverability, system operations, and the ability to carry and deploy onboard payloads. China is developing the Shenlong and Tengyun spaceplanes, with the former said to be similar in size to the US X-37B spaceplane.

Counter-space capabilities are designed to deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary's space assets, thereby crippling its ability to wage modern warfare. Beijing's diverse and rapidly expanding portfolio of these capabilities indicates a comprehensive strategy to achieve space superiority by undermining an adversary's space-enabled operations. China's broad array of counter-space capabilities, ranging from reversible cyberattacks and jamming to destructive kinetic attacks, indicates a sophisticated and layered approach to space denial. The PLA is provided with a "flexible toolkit" for crisis and escalation management, allowing them to choose responses ranging from non-destructive disruption to total destruction. Jamming, for example, offers a way to "destroy capabilities without creating danger," providing a less escalatory option than destructive ASATs that generate long-term debris. The "air combat experimental satellites (Shiyan-24C, Shijian-6) suggest the intention to develop close-range orbital combat capabilities, which could be used for both offensive (inspection, manipulation, kinetic attack) and defensive (interception) purposes. China's substantial investment in this diverse portfolio is driven by the recognition of its growing military dependence on space, both its own and that of its adversaries. By developing multiple ways to disrupt space operations, Beijing aims to create complex dilemmas for adversaries and control the scale of escalation in a potential space conflict. This comprehensive counter-space arsenal poses a serious threat to U.S. and allied space assets, potentially crippling their ability to conduct modern warfare by interrupting their kill chain. This forces the United States and its allies to invest heavily in resilience and defense measures, significantly contributing to the ongoing space arms race. The existence of reversible options suggests that initial space conflicts could involve non-destructive means, but the presence of kinetic capabilities means that the potential of rapid and severe escalation remains high.

The following is a table summarizing China's counterspace arsenal and its potential effects.

Table 2: China's counter-space arsenal and their potential effects

Type of Weapon	Description	Demonstrated/Operational Status	Effect
Direct-Assist Anti-Satellite Missiles (DA-ASAT)	Ground-launched missiles designed to intercept and destroy orbiting satellites.	Demonstrated in 2007 (LEO); a ground-based operational system exists. The launch of a ballistic object in 2013 suggests the potential for higher-orbit capabilities (GEO).	Kinetic destruction of the target satellite, creates significant space debris.
Co-orbital ASAT / Dual-Purpose Orbital Inspection/Repair Satellites (e.g. Shijian-21, Shijian-25, Shiyan-24C, Shijian-6 series)	Satellites capable of close-range maneuvering, inspection, manipulation, refueling, or kinetic attack against other satellites.	Shijian-21 towed a disabled satellite (2022); Shijian-25 refueled a satellite (2025). "Synchronized controlled" maneuvers ("dogfight") demonstrated in 2024. China has 1-3 such programs.	It can be reversible (e.g., reorienting a satellite, interrupting its link) or irreversible (e.g., physical damage, kinetic kill, collision coordination). It can also be used defensively.
Ground-Based Laser Weapons	Lasers launched from Earth to hit satellites.	There are multiple systems.	They destroy, degrade, or physically damage satellite sensors or components.
Electronic Warfare (EW) / Jamming	Technologies that aim to electronically connect a satellite to its user, disrupting communications or navigation signals.	Regularly incorporated into PLA exercises (e.g. jamming of satellite communications (SATCOM) and GPS).	Denies communications, radar, and PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) support. Degrades precision-guided munitions. Destroys capabilities without physically destroying the satellite or creating debris.
Reversible Cyberattacks	Digital attacks designed to disrupt or degrade satellite systems.	Mentioned as part of China's counter-space weapons portfolio.	Disrupts, degrades, or denies satellite services without physical destruction.
Reusable Spacecraft / Space Planes	Reusable launch vehicles and spaceplanes with increased maneuverability and payload capacity.	Reusable SLV launches by commercial companies (iSpace, Landspace) from 2023, with plans through 2030. Reusable spaceplane launches in 2020, 2022, 2023.	They improve launch flexibility, in-orbit maneuverability, and the ability to deploy payloads, potentially for counter-space or support missions.

• Integrating Space Capabilities into Conventional Forces: Improving Lethality and Range

General Whiting has affirmed that, through the "use of space services," Beijing has made its armed forces "more lethal, more precise, and with greater range."

On April 19, 2024, China announced the establishment of a new PLA force, theInformation Support Force (ISF), and the subsequent dissolution of theStrategic Support Force (SSF)The SSF was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA's strategic missions and capabilities in space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare, reporting to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and supporting the entire PLA. With the dissolution of the SSF, two previously subordinate departments at the theater command level – the Aerospace Force (ASF) and the Cyberspace Force (CSF)– have been realigned directly under the CMC. The ASF is responsible for military space and counterspace operations, while the CSF is responsible for information warfare, including technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and psychological operations. The ISF, also subordinate to the CMC, coordinates the development and application of the PLA's networked information systems and provides communications support. The PLA has identified an updated organizational structure with the ASF, CSF, ISF, and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) serving as the PLA's four service "arms."

The ASF is responsible for nearly all of the PLA's space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, telemetry, space tracking and control (TT&C), and space warfare. The ASF operates at least eight bases, including those whose primary missions are the launch, tracking, research and development, and operation of satellites vital to the PRC's airborne C4ISR architecture. The ASF operates TT&C stations in multiple locations around the world to guide space missions around the Earth, as well as in cislunar and deep space. The CSF provides intelligence support to theater commands by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection assets to provide a common operational view to geographically dispersed operational units.

Until its dissolution, the SSF regularly participated in joint PLA exercises and training, likely to evaluate and improve its ability to provide a variety of support functions for joint operations. During the exercises, the SSF provided reconnaissance support from space and ground sensors, established and maintained command and communications posts, and conducted electronic jamming to enhance training realism during simulated combat scenarios. The SSF is likely to have participated in additional joint training exercises in support of conventional air, sea, and missile operations, including precision strikes, throughout 2023.

All these developments suggest that Beijing is rapidly catching up with America in terms of military satellites; while the United States is estimated to have about 8,000 satellites in space compared to China's 1,000, each nation has about 250 military satellites. General Guetlein clarified "This once-enormous gap has narrowed significantly. If we don't change our approach to space operations, we risk seeing this gap reverse, putting us at a disadvantage." Space infrastructure is seen as the "central pillar" for joint operations between the different branches of the PLA. Space capabilities are also important for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and are critical for long-range precision strikes.

The true military value of space assets lies not only in their individual capabilities, but in their seamless integration with ground forces, enabling a synergistic effect that amplifies combat power across all domains. China's organizational changes and doctrinal emphasis reflect a deep and institutionalized commitment to this integration. The organizational restructuring of the SSF into distinct and specialized forces directly subordinated to the Central Military Commission (CMC) signifies a formal and institutionalized commitment to multi-domain integration. It's not just about acquiring technology, but about deeply incorporating space capabilities into military doctrine, command structures, and operational planning. Space is explicitly seen as a force multiplier, which allows greater coordination in "information-enabled conflicts" and extends the range and precision of conventional weapons. The decreasing gap in military satellites is a quantitative indicator of this successful integration. China's perceived lack of recent combat experience in conducting complex joint operations is a key factor in this integration, as space-enabled communications, ISR, and precision targeting are seen as crucial solutions for improving coordination and effectiveness in modern conflicts. This integration is essential to achieving China's ambitious goal of becoming a "world-class" military force by 2049, with intermediate milestones of 2027 and 2035. This deep integration means that any future conflict with Beijing would inherently be a "space-enabled" conflict, where the disruption of space assets would have immediate and severe impacts on ground operations. The decreasing gap in military satellites further highlights the urgency for the United States to maintain its qualitative advantage and improve the resilience of its space architecture to prevent a disadvantage.

• The interconnected nature of China's commercial and military space sectors

Unlike the United States, where private space companies operate with significant independence, China's commercial space sector is deeply intertwined with the state, with private companies largely state-backed and government contracts serving as the primary source of funding. The BeiDou satellite navigation system, developed as a rival to the US Global Positioning System (GPS), is a clear example of China's technological progress. BeiDou's satellite constellation is nearly double that of GPS, with 56 satellites in orbit, and its global network of tracking stations is also more extensive, improving the availability of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) data. This provides greater accuracy than GPS in some regions and features a two-way messaging capability lacking in GPS, offering significant advantages for both civilian and military applications. The BeiDou system, along with the Guowang and Qianfen constellations, is part of a broader strategy to ensure technological and strategic autonomy from foreign networks such as Starlink. China is also actively working to expand space partnerships in the Global South, establishing minilateral space initiatives such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation and the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), to drive global demand for Chinese technologies.

China's space program includes organizations in the military, civilian, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the main space contractors in the PRC, China is placing greater emphasis on decentralization and the growth of the commercial space sector to increase competition and enhance innovation. The State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the State Council is the primary civilian organization coordinating and managing the PRC's space activities, including the allocation of funds for space research and development, and maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees military procurement. The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, leads China's civilian space efforts, including human spaceflight to the Chinese space station, lunar missions, and interplanetary missions. CNSA's efforts strengthen relations with countries around the world, particularly through its "Space Information Corridor" and "International Lunar Research Station" (ILRS) initiatives linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing opportunities for cooperation on space issues. Space exploration and leadership are key elements of Beijing's strategy to demonstrate its great power status.

Many space technologies can serve both civilian and military purposes, and China emphasizes "military-civilian fusion," a concept that refers to the use of civilian technologies, resources, and organizations for military and modernization purposes. The SSF has partnered with Beijing universities and research organizations to incorporate civilian support into military efforts to access high-demand aerospace talent and research and development. China has a growing commercial space sector that supports government objectives, including remote sensing, launch, and communications services. Beijing has more than 100 space-related cooperation agreements with more than three dozen countries and four international organizations and is an exporter of satellites and space technology. China is inviting countries to participate in the Chinese space station or the International Lunar Research Station, which is jointly led by Beijing and Moscow and has sold satellite launch services and ground stations to countries around the world. China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral organization with rotating leadership, which includes members such as Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members. Supervises a network of space-based surveillance telescopes with observation data channeled through the National Astronomical Observatory of China of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

While the distinction between civilian and military space programs is often blurred globally, in China, this interconnection is a deliberate and fundamental strategic choice. It allows the state to directly leverage commercial innovation and the agility of the private sector for national security and strategic objectives. This state-backed model provides streamlined decision-making, guaranteed funding, and a direct channel for military integration, accelerating the development and deployment of dual-use technologies. BeiDou's advanced capabilities, such as two-way messaging and superior precision in certain regions, and its extensive global network are not limited to civilian navigation but are crucial for establishing an independent and resilient PNT and communications infrastructure that can serve military purposes and reduce dependence on US-controlled systems such as GPS. The active expansion of partnerships in the Global South is a deliberate strategy to create a global market and foster dependence on Chinese space technologies, thus projecting soft power and strategic influence. The Chinese Communist Party's overarching desire for "technological and strategic autonomy" and its long-term vision for global leadership directly drive this state-led commercial integration. The success and strategic utility of systems like BeiDou reinforce the effectiveness of this model, encouraging further investment. This integrated approach allows China to rapidly scale its space capabilities, potentially overcoming the United States' initial advantage in some areas. It also poses a challenge to international norms, as civilian technologies can be rapidly militarized and deployed for strategic advantage. The global proliferation of Chinese space technology through these partnerships could create a network of dependencies that could be exploited for strategic advantage in future geopolitical or military contexts.

The "Kill Chain" in the Space Domain: A Critical Analysis

• Deconstruction of the F2T2EA model and the crucial role of space

The conceptThe "kill chain" model emerges as a central element in understanding the dynamics of modern warfare. This sequence of steps—from target identification to engagement—is increasingly intertwined with space capabilities. The most common kill chain model is F2T2EA, which breaks down into six main phases: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess.

The kill chain provides a fundamental conceptual framework for analyzing the sequence of actions required to identify, locate, track, select, engage, and evaluate a target. In contemporary warfare, space assets are no longer merely supporting, but are increasingly integral to every stage of this chain, acting as critical enablers. Space capabilities function as the "nervous system" of modern military operations. They provide essential sensory input (Find, Fix, Track) for battlefield awareness, enable cognitive processing and decision-making (Target) through data fusion and rapid communication, facilitate motor function (Engage) through precision guidance, and complete the feedback loop (Evaluate) for post-attack assessment. Without robust and resilient space capabilities, the entire kill chain becomes significantly degraded or even interrupted, rendering conventional forces far less effective and precise. The exponential increase in military reliance on space, as highlighted in the introduction, directly underscores the indispensable role of space at every stage of the kill chain. Adversaries recognize this dependency, making space assets prime targets for disruption or destruction. This means that future conflicts will almost certainly involve significant counter-space operations aimed at interrupting an adversary's kill chain. The ability to protect one's space assets while simultaneously degrading an adversary's will be a decisive factor in determining battlefield outcomes and achieving military superiority.

• China's strategic leverage of space capabilities at every stage of the kill chain

China's recent and rapid progress in the space sector is not only redefining the balance of power but also raising profound concerns about global security. Beijing is leveraging space to refine its military capabilities, making them "more lethal, more precise, and with greater range." General Stephen Whiting has identified three key areas where China has made rapid and worrying progress: its space-based targeting systems, its counter-space weapons, and the integration of its space capabilities with its conventional forces.

• Find. Chinese ISR satellites are the primary "eyes" at this stage, with China owning hundreds of them for global surveillance. The Aerospace Force (ASF) is responsible for space surveillance and space information support, contributing to a broad and persistent collection of information to identify potential targets.

• Fixed (Fix). Chinese global positioning systems, such as BeiDou, are essential to obtain precise coordinates derived from satellites. Their extensive constellation and greater precision in some regions ensure accurate target fixation.

• Track. Chinese satellite constellations, especially those in low Earth orbit(LEO), are ideal for continuously tracking a moving target. Their proliferation and frequent revisiting capability enable persistent tracking. The ASF opera Tracking, Telemetry, and Command (TT&C) stations in multiple locations around the world to guide space missions.

• Target. Chinese satellite communications (SATCOM) are vital for the rapid transmission of targeting data to conventional weapons systems, enabling appropriate weapon selection and target assessment via command and control. The ASF seeks to improve PLA C2 for joint operations and to establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system.

• Engage. Satellites can provide navigation and final guidance support for missiles. Chinese counter-space weapons, such as GPS jamming or SATCOM, aim to interrupt the adversary's kill chain at this stage, preventing effective engagement. The Cyberspace Force (CSF) is responsible for electronic warfare (EW) and cyber warfare.

• Valuta (Assess).Chinese ISR satellites can be repositioned to provide post-impact imagery, assessing the effects of the attack and gathering intelligence.

The speed with which China can complete its kill chain is critical. Beijing, by investing heavily in space-based sensors, resilient communications networks, and data integration, aims to dramatically reduce the time between identifying a threat and neutralizing it. This "shortening" of the kill chain is what most concerns the United States. China's ability to exploit every stage of the kill chain through its space assets gives it a significant strategic advantage, especially in regional conflict scenarios.

Conclusions

The competition for dominance in outer space has become a defining feature of global security in the 21st century. A detailed analysis of the capabilities and strategies of the United States and Chinese Space Command reveals a rapidly evolving landscape, characterized by significant investments, technological innovations, and an explicit militarization of the space domain.

The United States, through the reestablishment and reorganization of Space Command, has signaled a fundamental shift toward a proactive warfighting posture. Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) with allies, the open adoption of offensive capabilities, and the formation of strategic alliances such as Operation Olympic Defender demonstrate a commitment to deterring aggression and, if necessary, fighting in space. The emphasis on resilience through in-orbit refueling, proliferated constellations, and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) onboard and on the ground demonstrates an adaptive approach to tactical vulnerabilities and speed of decision-making. These measures are intended to ensure the United States maintains a qualitative advantage and the ability to operate effectively in a contested space environment.

At the same time, China has made progress "at a breathtaking pace," consolidating its position as a leading space power. Its long-term strategic vision, which closely integrates civilian and military objectives, has led to a rapid expansion of space-based targeting systems, a diversified portfolio of counter-space weapons, and a deep integration of space capabilities into its conventional forces. The reorganization of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) into the new Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF), and Information Support Force (ISF), directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), underscores an institutionalized commitment to space and information warfare. China is also investing heavily in reusable spacecraft and spaceplane technologies, which improve launch flexibility and in-orbit maneuverability for both civilian and military purposes. The intrinsically state-linked nature of China's commercial space sector, exemplified by the BeiDou system and the mega-constellations, enables rapid innovation and a broad projection of global influence. This approach has allowed China to significantly reduce the gap with the United States in military satellites and overall capabilities, making its forces "more lethal, more precise, and with greater reach."

The "kill chain" concept embodies the centrality of space in modern warfare. China is leveraging its growing space capabilities to optimize every stage of this chain, from precision intelligence gathering to missile guidance and post-attack assessment. Beijing's ability to dramatically shorten the time between identifying a threat and neutralizing it is a significant strategic concern.

The implications of this space arms race are profound. A potential conflict over Taiwan, for example, would see control and access to space as crucial for surveillance, missile guidance, resilient communications, and space denial. Destroying satellites in orbit poses the risk of space debris, potentially rendering entire orbits unusable for decades, a phenomenon known as Kessler syndrome. Furthermore, essential civil services on Earth, such as communications, navigation, and financial transactions, depend on satellites, making a space conflict potentially devastating for the global economy and daily life. Excessive militarization of space could also divert resources and talent from scientific research and peaceful exploration.

In this global security environment, space expertise is no longer optional, but a crucial component of military power. The space race, with China at the forefront, has profound implications for international stability and is redefining the global balance of power. The need for resilience, deterrence, and potentially combat capability in space has become a strategic imperative for the world's leading powers.