China’s Stealth ‘Loyal Wingman’ Confirmed: The Attack-11 Threat and America’s Urgent Shift to ACE

The Duel in the Dual Domain: Air and Sea

The strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific is rapidly shifting toward a multi-domain contest for supremacy. Just days after reports from Chinese sources claimed the disappearance of a U.S. Navy Orca Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV), underscoring the vulnerabilities of American operations in the maritime domain, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) delivered a powerful counter-message in the aerial domain.

The release of promotional footage—showing the stealth attack UAV Attack-11 (GJ-11) flying in operational formation with the J-20 and J-16 fighters—is not mere propaganda. This is the first official video confirmation of the Attack-11’s integration into the "Manned-Unmanned Teaming" (MUT) concept, following its static appearances at previous Beijing military parades.

This juxtaposition—a potential setback for the U.S. undersea program coupled with China's proven progress in air teaming—highlights the success of China’s "system cluster" approach. The Attack-11, conceived as a high-performance stealth "Loyal Wingman," directly challenges U.S. air dominance programs like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). This demonstrated capability demands an urgent response: the Pentagon must accelerate both its technological counter-programs and the adoption of resilient operational doctrines, such as the Agile Combat Employment (ACE), to counter China's escalating Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenge across air and sea.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

Codenamed "Xuanlong," the Attack-11 has been officially announced as operational. What missions will it undertake, flying in formation with the J-20 and J-16 fighters?

The Erosion of the Qualitative Advantage

For years, U.S. defense strategy has relied on an undeniable qualitative advantage over adversaries. However, the rapid modernization of the PLAAF, particularly with fifth-generation aircraft like the J-20 and stealth drones like the Attack-11, is eroding this superiority.

• Superior Stealth Capability: The Attack-11’s tailless flying wing design is considered the pinnacle of stealth technology, offering low observability across the full spectrum.

• Increased Operational Mass: Integrating drones like the Attack-11 with J-20 and J-16 fighters exponentially increases the number of platforms the U.S. and its allies must confront in a potential conflict. China is relying on the mass of advanced systems.

• Extended Range: Utilizing its uncrewed efficiency, the Attack-11 can patrol between the First and Second Island Chains, extending the PLAAF's operational reach and threatening crucial deep-Pacific targets.

Strategic Failure in the Western Pacific

According to recent reports and simulations, the current U.S. Air Force strategy could fail in a conflict over Taiwan, due to the vulnerability of its air bases and China’s long-range firepower.

1. Critical Vulnerability of Air Bases

The primary threat is not just in the air, but on the ground. Large U.S. air bases in the region (such as Kadena or Guam) are static, vulnerable targets for China’s massive conventional missile firepower (ballistic and cruise missiles).

The alarming finding is that, in a potential conflict, essential runways and support facilities could be quickly neutralized, preventing U.S. fighters and tankers from taking off or landing.

2. The Attack-11’s Role in Long-Range Strikes

The Attack-11, with its high endurance and excellent stealth capabilities, further complicates this situation:

• It could act as an advanced target designation platform, penetrating airspace to illuminate ground targets for subsequent Chinese missile strikes.

• It can be deployed in low-observability strikes against critical infrastructure or surface vessels within the Second Island Chain.

Towards Supersonic Flight: The Evolution of the Chinese Loyal Wingman

The current Attack-11 suffers from a clear limitation: the inability to sustain supersonic flight. This creates a significant tactical constraint when operating alongside fifth-generation fighters like the J-20, which is capable of supercruise (sustained supersonic flight without afterburner). For future Chinese "Loyal Wingmen," overcoming this barrier is essential, and the Chinese aviation industry is likely working on three main directions:

1. Aerodynamic Enhancements for Speed

• Non-Flying Wing Designs: While the flying wing design of the Attack-11 optimizes stealth and range at subsonic speeds, subsequent models may adopt a different configuration, such as a delta wing or more slender, area-ruled shapes, optimized to reduce wave drag at transonic and supersonic speeds.

• Advanced Flight Control: A supersonic drone would require smaller, more robust control surfaces, potentially integrating foldable or removable vertical tails for low-speed stability that could be retracted during the supersonic dash to maintain stealth and reduce drag.

2. Advanced Engine Development

• Variable Cycle Engines (VCE): VCE technology, critical for supercruise flight, allows engines to optimize efficiency at both subsonic and supersonic speeds. While complex, it is the key to equipping drones with supercruise capability without relying on afterburners (which would increase the infrared signature and rapidly deplete fuel).

• UAV-Optimized Variants: China could develop variants of existing turbofan engines (like those used in the J-20) stripped of heavy pilot control systems and life support systems, allowing for a higher thrust-to-weight ratio specific to uncrewed flight.

3. Specialization of Operational Roles (Diversified Cluster)

• The "Sacrificial" (Subsonic) vs. the "Advanced" (Supersonic) Wingman: The most likely solution will not be a single drone that does everything. Subsonic drones like the Attack-11 will continue to be used for electronic warfare, intelligence (ISR), and "stealth arsenal" missions where speed is not crucial.

• In parallel, China will develop a smaller, sleeker, supersonic model (an "Interceptor UCAV" or "Supersonic Striker") dedicated to operating exclusively with the J-20 in high-speed missions requiring formation keeping during supercruise.

The Attack-11's subsonic limitation is a weakness that future Chinese "system clusters" are poised to correct, further escalating the threat to U.S. air dominance.

The Strategic Response: Agile Combat Employment (ACE)

Faced with the threat of Chinese missile systems and the vulnerability of fixed bases, the U.S. Air Force is adopting the doctrinal concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) as a crucial defensive and operational strategy.

ACE aims to transform military air operations, moving from a model based on large centralized air bases to one based on a network of smaller, dispersed, and temporary operating sites .

The Three Pillars of ACE:

1. Dispersal and Survivability: Instead of concentrating resources at a few "super-bases," ACE distributes aircraft and logistical support across dozens or hundreds of "spokes" (peripheral points). This makes it economically and logistically unfeasible for China to waste expensive precision missiles to destroy a single aircraft on a remote runway or highway segment.

2. Mobility and Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA): The strategy requires "Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA)"—soldiers cross-trained to perform multiple functions. This allows for the creation of mini-teams that can operate autonomously and efficiently in austere or civilian locations for brief periods.

3. Resilient Command and Control (C2): ACE decentralizes decision-making, delegating operational choices to front-line commanders. If a main command center is destroyed, the entire operational network is not paralyzed, thanks to redundant communication systems.

The Technological Counter-Response: Accelerating the CCA

While ACE addresses logistics and the operational base, the technological response to the Attack-11 lies in the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.

The Pentagon is heavily investing in developing these "Loyal Wingmen" drones to operate alongside existing fighters (F-22, F-35) and future NGAD systems. The Attack-11 serves as a wake-up call for Washington: the competition is real and time is running out. Focus must be placed not only on technological development but also on the rapid adoption of doctrines like ACE to mitigate the threat of Chinese long-range missiles and UAV strikes.