In addition to photovoltaics, China's wind power also poses intolerable risks to states' national security - A brief analysis
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 21 mag
- Tempo di lettura: 6 min
Concern is growing in Western countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, that Chinese-made wind farm components and Chinese-owned shares in energy infrastructure may pose national security risks, including the risk of sabotage.
The German Ministry of Defense (BMVg) could stop the approval process for the "Waterkant" offshore wind farm operated by Waterkant Energy GmbH and the German investor Luxcara for reasons of "security for national and alliance defense." As confirmed by the responsible Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) at the request of Table.Briefings, the BMVg has until May 26 to submit a statement.

The Waterkant wind farm project in the North Sea has China's Ming Yang Smart Energy as a supplier.
The German report urges Germany to block Chinese suppliers from ongoing and future wind energy projects, citing national security concerns and risks to critical infrastructure.
Similar concerns have led other European countries, including the Netherlands and the UK, to impose restrictions on Chinese wind turbine manufacturers.
In Italy, China's Ming Yang plans to set up a wind turbine factory in Taranto and supply 18.8 MW turbines for a floating wind project, as well as to set up a production site in Brindisi to manufacture power cables to connect offshore wind farms to the electricity grid. To that end, Ming Yang has entered into an agreement with Italian developer Renexia -- a Toto Group company that is in negotiations with Turkey's Yilport to buy shares in the port of Taranto -- to explore the possibility of forming a joint venture to build a production facility with an investment of about €500 million. The turbines will be used for the “Med Wind” floating wind project, a 2.8 GW floating wind farm off the coast of Sicily.
Taranto and Brindisi are two Italian cities crucial to the activities of the Italian Navy and NATO.
Confirming the factory in Taranto was Adolfo Urso, minister of Enterprise and Made in Italy. In August last year, it was the Urso-led ministry that had announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding with MingYang and Renexia to create a newco in Italy to build wind turbines.
Who is Ming Yang?
Mingyang Wind Power Group Limited (also known as Mingyang Smart Energy Group Co., Ltd.) is a large wind turbine manufacturer in China.
A recent analysis revealed his ties to the People's Liberation Army. Ming Yang Group founder and chairman Zhang Chuanwei reportedly joined the People's Liberation Army in 1978, applying for membership in the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the age of 18. In a Chinese-language portrait and interview posted on the website of the Guangdong Department of Veterans Affairs, it is reported that “the Ming Yang Group Party Committee...has entrusted important tasks to retired soldiers, placing them in important frontline positions, key projects and assault tasks.”
China's renewable energy sector, including companies such as Mingyang Wind Power, has seen civil-military integration, with several key figures having backgrounds in the People's Liberation Army.This is part of China's broader strategy to use new energy for military purposes and improve energy security.
Some sources, such as a German government defense think tank, have warned that allowing Chinese companies like Ming Yang to supply wind energy equipment carries technological, political and supply chain risks because of their ties to the Communist Party and the military.
The main concerns
Undisclosed "kill switches" and remote access
Recent reports indicate the discovery of undisclosed communication devices, including cellular radios, embedded within Chinese-made power inverters used in solar panels and wind turbines in the U.S. and Europe. These devices could potentially allow remote access, bypassing firewalls and giving Beijing the capability to alter settings, collect data, or even shut down power grids, leading to widespread blackouts.
Supply chain dependence
China dominates the manufacturing of many critical components for renewable energy infrastructure, including wind turbines, inverters, and rare earth elements essential for magnets. This heavy reliance on Chinese suppliers creates a significant vulnerability, as disruptions to the supply chain or the inclusion of malicious components could compromise energy security.
Espionage and data harvesting
Experts warn that Chinese-made wind turbines could be equipped with sensors that allow for espionage, potentially tracking naval ships, submarines, and aircraft. Furthermore, access to the control systems of wind farms could allow for the harvesting of sensitive data.
Political leverage and economic coercion
Chinese ownership or significant stakes in critical energy infrastructure give Beijing potential leverage for political influence or economic coercion. In a high-tension scenario, this could lead to deliberate delays in projects, disruption of energy supplies, or passive interference with grid stability.
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities
The increasing connectivity and digitization of wind energy systems, while making them more efficient, also expand their attack surface for cyber threats. State-sponsored actors could exploit vulnerabilities to disrupt operations, steal data, or cause system shutdowns.
China’s legal mandate for espionage
The real danger is China's National Intelligence Law, which requires Chinese companies to assist state intelligence operations. Huawei, the world's largest inverter manufacturer, has already been banned from U.S. telecommunications networks due to security concerns.
"We know that China believes there is value in placing at least some elements of our core infrastructure at risk of destruction or disruption," said Mike Rogers, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Some states are running for cover
Several countries are already taking action or considering measures to mitigate these risks
In addition to Germany, the United Kingdom has made it clear that further involvement of China in its energy sector is politically untenable, even buying a Chinese stake in a nuclear power project.
The EU is also investigating Chinese wind turbine manufacturers for potential government subsidies and considering banning non-European-made wind turbines if they do not meet strict cybersecurity standards. Specifically, in 2024 the Commission launched an investigation into Chinese suppliers of wind turbines in Spain, Greece, France, Romania, and Bulgaria due to suspicions of Chinese state subsidies. This was prompted by concerns that the domestic industry could be affected by the influx of cheap imports, which could lead to its collapse.
It should be noted that China has already dominated the photovoltaic industry in Europe and is aggressively expanding into other markets, including electric vehicles.
However, due to limited production capacity in offshore wind supply chains around the world, European wind farm operators are forced to turn to Chinese manufacturers.
In the United States, Department of Energy officials are investigating the potential threats posed by Chinese-made equipment in renewable energy infrastructure, and legislative efforts are underway to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers for sensitive infrastructure.
In addition, a report on offshore wind energy released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress' independent oversight agency, lends credibility and corroboration to concerns first raised in Congress by Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) that offshore wind turbines pose serious threats to national security and aviation and maritime safety by interfering with radar systems.
Smith said the report provides additional scientific justification to President Trump’s pause on offshore wind which he hopes results in immediate stoppage of offshore wind projects, including Empire Wind 1 off the coast of NJ and NY which Smith called “dangerous and reckless”.
The new GAO report states in one section of the report: Offshore Wind May Have Impacts on Defense and Radar Systems: “Wind turbines can reduce the performance of radar systems used for defense and maritime navigation and safety in several ways. These include reducing detection sensitivity, obscuring potential targets, and generating false targets, according to a DOE report.
China spies on us even with photovoltaics
Just a few days ago, unauthorized communication devices not listed in product documentation were discovered in some Chinese PV inverters. Similar devices, including cellular radios, were also found in Chinese batteries. The European Solar Manufacturing Council, the association representing the continent's solar manufacturers, had raised the alarm, saying that remote access to software in Chinese PV inverters has significant cyber vulnerabilities, including sabotage.
Chinese Firms Generate Electricity and Influence Across Europe
China’s state-owned enterprises have acquired significant stakes in European wind, solar, and hydro companies and projects, embedding themselves not just as investors but as long-term players with growing strategic relevance. A landmark example was China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) buying a 22% stake in Energias de Portugal (EDP) in 2011.
China, through State Grid Europe Limited (SGEL), joined CDP Reti at the end of November 2014. The binding agreement for the sale of 35 percent of CDP Reti to SGEL was signed in July 2014 (precisely on July 31), but the finalization of the transaction (the “closing”) and thus the actual entry of State Grid as a shareholder took place in late November 2014, after obtaining the necessary government and antitrust approvals. CDP Reti is an investment vehicle that manages investments in major strategic Italian companies such as Snam (gas pipelines), Terna (power lines) and Italgas (gas distribution).
Through this stake, CTG gained influence over EDP’s extensive wind, solar, and hydro portfolio across Europe and beyond—securing both access to markets and opportunities for technology transfer that align with Beijing’s broader industrial ambitions.
Chinese power giants have historically taken stakes in wind farms across at least nine European countries, not only to diversify portfolios but also to absorb operational expertise, particularly from Europe’s global leaders in offshore wind energy sector.
For instance, China General Nuclear (CGN) purchased wind farms in the UK and France via its CGN Europe Energy subsidiary, a move that offered it a seat at the table in Western energy management and regulatory systems. These deals have made Chinese firms not just financial participants but key minority shareholders and joint venture partners, which can provide soft leverage in policy-relevant sectors over time.
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