Stolen Secrets, Eluded Sanctions: U.S. Accusations of Huawei and Global Risks

Extrema Ratio reviewed the federal prosecution record, revealing the legal vulnerabilities and strategic implications of unprecedented litigation

On July 1, 2025, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. suffered a significant legal setback in the United States, as U.S. District Judge Ann Donnelly of Brooklyn largely rejected the Chinese telecommunications giant's motion to dismiss a sweeping federal indictment against it. The company now faces a complex and lengthy trial, scheduled to begin on May 4, 2026, where it will defend against serious accusations of attempting to steal technological secrets from U.S. rivals and defrauding banks regarding its operations in Iran. Huawei has consistently denied all accusations, pleading not guilty and branding itself "a prosecutor's target in search of a crime".

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Concurrently, Huawei's position is further precarious due to a series of global restrictions and a new scandal shaking the European Parliament. The United States has implemented escalating punitive measures, culminating in Huawei's inclusion on the Commerce Department's Entity List, drastically limiting its access to crucial technologies. This strategy is based not only on security concerns linked to China's 2017 National Intelligence Law and the Military-Civil Fusion doctrine, but also on recent corruption suspicions. Consequently, numerous other countries have imposed bans on Huawei equipment in their network infrastructures. More recently, an investigation in Belgium has raised suspicions of bribery involving Members of the European Parliament, with allegations of undue influence through gifts and benefits, which could further undermine Huawei's influence and credibility in a Europe already divided on its role in digital sovereignty.

The U.S. Federal Indictment: A Mosaic of Alleged Violations

The indictment, a substantial 55-page document, accuses Huawei and its subsidiaries – Huawei Device Co., Ltd., Huawei Device USA, Inc., and Futurewei Technologies, Inc. – of a series of serious federal crimes. The charges outline an alleged pattern of criminal conduct spanning nearly two decades, with the aim of "operating and growing the worldwide business" of Huawei through illicit means. The counts include:

• Racketeering Conspiracy.

• Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets.

• Wire Fraud and Wire Fraud Conspiracy.

• Bank Fraud and Bank Fraud Conspiracy.

• Conspiracy to Defraud the United States.

• Conspiracy to Violate and Violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA").

• Money Laundering Conspiracy.

• Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice.

The accusations are based on alleged schemes aimed at misappropriating intellectual property, defrauding financial institutions, and obstructing justice.

1. Misappropriation of Intellectual Property

From 2000 to 2018, Huawei allegedly systematically sought to acquire intellectual property from U.S. companies. This purportedly involved violating confidentiality agreements with competitor companies, attempting to recruit their employees to gain access to confidential information, and using "proxies such as professors working at research institutions or third party companies" to access "nonpublic intellectual property". Huawei allegedly even incentivized such conduct through a "formal policy instituting a bonus program to reward employees who obtained confidential information from competitors". The indictment lists six victim companies:

• Company 1 (since 2000): Huawei and Futurewei allegedly stole copyrighted "operating system source code for internet routers, command line interface... and operating system manuals" from an American technology company headquartered in California. From April through December 2002, Huawei purportedly incorporated this source code into internet routers that Futurewei marketed as cheaper versions of Company 1's routers and sold in the United States. Huawei and Futurewei allegedly also "hired or attempted to hire Company 1 employees" to misappropriate the source code. In December 2002, after being notified of the infringement, Huawei and Futurewei purportedly "agreed to replace the original versions" of the code and to "recall from the U.S. market products that included the misappropriated source code". In 2003, Company 1 sued Huawei and Futurewei in a Texas federal court for intellectual property infringement. Although Huawei and Futurewei claimed they had removed the stolen source code, they allegedly "destroyed evidence by erasing the memory drives of recalled routers, sending those routers to China, and by trying to erase stolen source code on sold routers by getting remote access to them". A Huawei executive allegedly filed a false declaration claiming a third party gave Huawei Company 1's source code. Finally, a neutral examiner concluded that certain portions of Huawei's source code were "substantially similar to or developed or derived from Company 1's source code" and had been misappropriated.

• Company 2 (2000-2003): Huawei allegedly recruited an engineer employed by this Illinois-headquartered American technology company to misappropriate its intellectual property. The engineer purportedly emailed a Huawei employee a confidential "50-page document with technical specifications for a base station, designed for use in wireless network, manufactured by Company 2," marked "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL" and "Company 2 Confidential Property".

• Company 3 (2004): During a July 2004 trade show in Chicago, a Huawei employee was discovered "removing the cover from... and taking photographs of the circuitry" of Company 3's networking device. Huawei allegedly sought to steal this technology to "save on research and development costs". Huawei then purportedly issued false statements to Company 3, claiming the employee was a "junior engineer" who acted "without Huawei's authorization" and that his "actions do not reflect the culture or values of Huawei".

• Company 4 (2009): Huawei and Futurewei allegedly "devised a scheme to misappropriate [Company 4's] technology related to antennas that provide cellular telephone and data services". They purportedly feigned interest in forming a partnership with Company 4, and Futurewei signed a non-disclosure agreement preventing it from using Company 4's confidential information "for [Futurewei's] own benefit or the competitive disadvantage of Company 4". Despite this, on October 30, 2009, Futurewei allegedly filed a provisional patent application that "used and relied in large part upon the Company 4 intellectual property". Between 2009 and 2016, Huawei purportedly received about $22 million from the sale of products that used Company 4's intellectual property.

• Company 5 (since 2012): Huawei, Huawei Device, and Huawei Device USA allegedly "devised a scheme to misappropriate robot technology" from Company 5, an American wireless network operator. Huawei Device purportedly sought to "save on research and development costs". In May 2012, Company 5 declined Huawei Device USA's request to "sell or license its proprietary robotic system". Subsequently, Huawei and Huawei Device "began to develop their own robotic phone-testing system" and directed Huawei Device USA employees "to provide detailed information about Company 5's technology". Despite confidentiality agreements, Huawei Device USA employees purportedly sent Huawei "multiple photographs" of Company 5's "secure" laboratory, robot, and software interface system. In May 2013, a Huawei engineer allegedly visited Company 5's laboratory "for reconnaissance and to obtain measurement data". On May 29, 2013, a Huawei Device USA employee purportedly stole a "robot arm" from the laboratory. An internal investigation report by Huawei Device USA in August 2013 allegedly "falsely described its conduct and the engineer's conduct in the laboratory as 'isolated incidents,' and the theft of the arm as a 'moment of indiscretion'".

• Company 6 (2013-2018): Huawei, a "direct competitor" of Company 6, allegedly schemed to misappropriate Company 6's "architecture for memory hardware" to "save on research and development costs". In 2015, Huawei purportedly circulated an internal presentation outlining "countermeasures" against Company 6, including "continuously" recruiting its employees to create "internal turmoil". In June 2015, Huawei allegedly "immediately" distributed a "Proprietary and Confidential" presentation from Company 6 to its engineers, despite agreeing not to share it. In 2016, a Huawei engineer allegedly visited Company 6's California headquarters under false pretenses and later sent an internal email describing Company 6's intellectual property. Huawei purportedly also used a "proxy" – a professor – to get information about Company 6's technology, hiring him in December 2016 to develop "software prototype for memory hardware". The professor, without disclosing his relationship with Huawei, allegedly gained access to a "prototype board" containing a "proprietary chip" from Company 6 for "research purposes". The professor purportedly then provided Huawei with product numbers, distributor identity, and performance testing results.

2. Defrauding Financial Institutions

Huawei is accused of conducting business in countries subject to U.S., E.U., and/or U.N. sanctions, including Iran and North Korea. It allegedly used Skycom Tech Co., Ltd. as "an unofficial subsidiary to obtain otherwise prohibited U.S.-origin goods, technology and services, including banking services" for its Iran-based business, "while concealing the link" between the companies. Huawei purportedly also helped the Iranian government install surveillance equipment used to "monitor, identify and detain protestors during the anti-government demonstrations of 2009 in Tehran".

The indictment alleges that Huawei "repeatedly misrepresented" to U.S. financial institutions (identified as Financial Institutions 1, 2, 3, and 4) that its business in Iran "did not violate applicable U.S. law". Despite public reports (by the Wall Street Journal and Reuters in 2011-2013) regarding Huawei's involvement with Skycom in Iran, Huawei purportedly responded with "published official statements" denying assistance to the Iranian government's surveillance efforts and denying that Skycom sold American goods to Iran. Subsequent to the 2012 and 2013 Reuters reports, Huawei allegedly told the public and Financial Institutions 1, 2, 3, and 4 that "the allegations regarding [its] ownership and control of Skycom were false" and that Huawei complied with United States sanctions. These financial institutions purportedly "continued their banking relationships with Huawei at least in part based on these false representations".

In March 2013, Huawei allegedly told Financial Institution 4 that the company did not conduct business in North Korea, despite internal Huawei documents showing its involvement in numerous projects there starting no later than 2008.

Huawei's Chief Financial Officer, Wanzhou Meng, is directly implicated. In August 2013, Meng purportedly met with Financial Institution 1 and gave a presentation that included several misrepresentations: (1) HUAWEI "operates in Iran in strict compliance with applicable laws, regulations and sanctions of UN, US and EU"; (2) "Huawei has never provided and will never provide any technology, product, or service for monitoring communications flow, tracking user locations, or filtering media contents in the Iranian market"; (3) "HUAWEI's engagement with SKYCOM is normal business cooperation"; (4) Meng's participation on the Board of Directors of SKYCOM was to "help HUAWEI to better understand SKYCOM'S financial results and business performance, and to strengthen and monitor SKYCOM's compliance"; and (5) "HUAWEI subsidiaries in sensitive countries will not open accounts at [Financial Institution 1], nor have business transactions with [Financial Institution 1]".

After Financial Institution 1 unilaterally ended its relationship with Huawei in 2017 due to "risk concerns", Huawei allegedly "took steps to secure and expand its banking relationships with other financial institutions," including Financial Institution 4's U.S. subsidiary. Huawei purportedly "falsely represented" to this subsidiary that the termination with Financial Institution 1 was based on its "level of service", leading the subsidiary to "expand its banking relationship" with Huawei. Through this, Huawei allegedly "received income indirectly in the form of cost savings and the value of continued banking services".

The indictment further alleges that Huawei and Huawei Device USA learned of the government's investigation in 2017 and subsequently "made efforts to move witnesses with knowledge about [Huawei's] Iran-based business" to China and "destroy and conceal evidence" of these operations.

3. False Statements to the United States Government

Huawei is accused of making "false statements to the U.S. government" regarding its misappropriation of intellectual property and the scope of its business activities in sanctioned countries, to "avoid the economic and regulatory consequences". Examples include:

• In July 2007, Huawei's founder allegedly told FBI agents that Huawei "did not conduct any activity in violation of" and "operated in compliance with" U.S. export laws. He also claimed Huawei "won" Company 1's lawsuit, and that Company 1's CEO would "testify" that Huawei "did not engage in intellectual property rights violations".

• In September 2012, a Huawei "Senior Vice President" purportedly "falsely testified" before the U.S. House of Representatives' Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) that the source code allegedly stolen from Company 1 was "from a third party partner... already available and open on the Internet". He also testified that Huawei had not violated any sanctions-related laws concerning Iran or provided equipment to the Iranian government. Additionally, Huawei allegedly submitted a chart that "omitted Huawei clients with connections to the Iranian government and falsely reflected that Huawei did not conduct any business in North Korea after 2009".

Huawei's Defense and the Rejection of its Arguments

Huawei has consistently denied all accusations, pleading not guilty and seeking to dismiss 13 of the 16 counts, asserting it is "a prosecutor's target in search of a crime". Its defense was based on several legal arguments, all of which were rejected by Judge Donnelly:

• Intra-Corporate Conspiracy Doctrine: Huawei argued that a parent company cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiaries, invoking the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp. (1984) in an antitrust context. Huawei contended this doctrine should apply to criminal cases, including racketeering, to prevent an enterprise from being exposed to liability merely for efficient internal structuring. Judge Donnelly unequivocally rejected this argument, stating there is "no precedent" for such an application in criminal law. She affirmed that "every Circuit to have considered the question has thus held that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is inapplicable to criminal prosecutions". The court cited Salinas v. United States (1997), emphasizing that Copperweld considerations "do not apply in the context of criminal conspiracies" because "combined criminal activity even within a corporate enterprise is more 'dangerous to the public' than crimes committed alone".

• Use of Racketeering Income: Huawei claimed the indictment failed to sufficiently allege any domestic use or investment of funds derived from racketeering activity, asserting the only plausible reading was that investments were in Chinese, not domestic, businesses. The defense argued that a Racketeering charge under Section 1962(a) is "presumed to be limited to domestic use or investment of proceeds derived from a pattern of racketeering". Judge Donnelly deemed this argument premature, as it pertains to the sufficiency of evidence, which is not evaluated in a motion to dismiss. The court noted the indictment alleges that Huawei Device USA, an American subsidiary, was part of the racketeering enterprise and that the defendants conspired to "use and invest, directly and indirectly, a part of income... in the establishment and operation of the Huawei Enterprise".

• Lack of a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity": Huawei argued that the alleged acts of fraud and sanctions violations were insufficiently "related" to constitute a pattern of racketeering, citing "different companies, different technologies, different Huawei personnel, different methods, different locations, and different timeframes". The defense claimed the trade secret and sanctions-related charges lacked "connective tissue". Judge Donnelly reiterated that an indictment need only specify predicate acts "that evidence continuity and relatedness", and that the determination of a pattern is a matter of trial evidence, inappropriate at this stage.

• Duplicity of Charges and Due Process Violations: Huawei contested Counts 2 and 3 (trade secrets) for alleged "duplicity" (grouping multiple distinct conspiracies into a single count). The defense argued the indictment "encompass[es] multiple alleged conspiracies" due to differences across the six trade secret allegations. The judge ruled that the charges adequately allege a single conspiracy for trade secrets theft and a single conspiracy for wire fraud, despite the cited differences. She further stated that whether single or multiple conspiracies exist is a factual question for the jury. Regarding due process, Huawei claimed that excessive pre-indictment delay related to Companies 1, 2, and 3, resulting in lost evidence and unavailable witnesses, prejudiced its defense. Judge Donnelly rejected this, emphasizing that "the possibility of faded memories, unavailable witnesses, and loss of evidence, by itself, is insufficient" to prove "actual prejudice". Huawei failed to demonstrate that the delay was "intentionally pursued by the government for an improper purpose".

• Implications of Ciminelli v. United States: Huawei sought to dismiss Counts 4-9 (financial institution fraud) by citing Ciminelli v. United States (2023), which limited federal fraud to schemes depriving individuals of traditional property interests. Huawei argued these charges were based on the now-abrogated "right-to-control theory" of fraud. Judge Donnelly noted that Ciminelli's applicability at the motion to dismiss stage is "not clear". Crucially, she highlighted that the indictment alleges attempts to obtain "moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution" and "other financial services," which constitute "traditional property interests" recognized by case law, as illustrated in Shaw v. United States (2016).

• Extraterritoriality: Huawei argued that several counts (4, 6, 7, 9) were impermissibly extraterritorial and failed to allege domestic application of wire and bank fraud statutes. Huawei contended that press statements were merely "retransmitted by others to the United States", that the dollar-clearing transactions were "facially incidental", and that the false statements to the financial institutions were "made outside the United States". The judge reaffirmed that extraterritoriality is typically assessed after a full presentation of evidence at trial. However, the indictment "sufficiently alleges conduct in furtherance of fraudulent schemes 'calculated to harm American citizens and interests'" through the "continuing use of U.S.-dollar clearing services through U.S. banks".

• Klein Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371): Huawei sought to dismiss Count 10 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), arguing that post-Ciminelli, such fraud must involve intent to obtain money or property from the government. The judge rejected this, stating that the definition of "defraud" in Section 371 "is not confined to fraud as that term has been defined in the common law", and that the Klein doctrine, protecting the integrity of U.S. agencies, was not overturned by Ciminelli.

• Vagueness of IEEPA Charges (Counts 11 and 12): Huawei sought dismissal of these counts, claiming the IEEPA did not provide "fair warning" regarding potential criminal liability for non-U.S. persons whose banks routed payments through the U.S.. The judge denied this, stating it is a "premature challenge" at this stage, requiring further factual development to ascertain "what the defendant did" before assessing whether the statute adequately informed them their conduct was prohibited. The indictment adequately alleges Huawei and Skycom's attempt to "export... directly and indirectly... banking and other financial services from the United States to Iran and the Government of Iran".

Judge Donnelly's decision underscores the gravity of the accusations against Huawei and the U.S. prosecution's determination to pursue what it views as systemic violations of American laws. The impending trial represents a pivotal phase in this complex dispute.

Global Bans and the Battle for 5G Dominance

The U.S. legal action is part of a broader, decade-long campaign against Huawei, set against a backdrop of escalating tensions between the United States and China in the technology sector. In recent years, the U.S. government has implemented a series of measures and sanctions against Chinese technology companies. According to a study by the China Development Institute, from January 2017, with the start of the Trump administration, until June 2021, when Biden approved the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), Congress, the government, and major think tanks published 209 bills and reports concerning scientific and technological policies towards China. Huawei, as one of China's most prominent communications equipment manufacturers, bears the brunt of these actions. The U.S. has pressured Huawei for over a decade, since its proposed acquisition of 3Com Corporation was rejected in 2008 by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Since then, Huawei's equipment sales contracts or R&D partnerships with various U.S. companies, including AT&T and Google, have been terminated. Starting in 2018, the crackdown on Huawei intensified sharply. In May 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce decided to add Huawei to its Entity List for export controls and began sanctioning it globally. In May 2020, the Commerce Department expanded the scope of export restrictions, requiring foreign chip manufacturers using U.S. equipment and software to obtain approval before supplying chips to Huawei. Three months later, the Commerce Department further limited Huawei products made with U.S. technology and software, adding 38 Huawei affiliates to the Entity List. Practically, the ban had already been intensified by September 15, with a new regulation prohibiting any entity from providing Huawei with chips containing U.S. technological components. The former Biden Administration has remained consistent with the punitive measures adopted against China under the first Trump administration. The 2021 United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) includes a provision prohibiting the Commerce Department from removing Huawei from the Entity List without first demonstrating that it no longer poses a national security threat.

Following the U.S. lead, many other countries have banned Huawei from their 5G networks, notably Australia, Vietnam, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Nauru, the United Kingdom, India (de facto), and Canada. In Canada, local companies were given until June 28, 2024, to remove 5G equipment and until December 31, 2027, for 4G equipment. Interestingly, in 2021, Brazil, which had previously planned to block Huawei from participating in its 5G rollout due to security concerns, reversed its decision two weeks after appealing to China for COVID-19 vaccines.

In the EU, the situation appears more complex, as security matters fall under shared regulatory competence, preventing supranational bodies from adopting uniform and binding measures for member states. However, in January 2020, the European NIS (Network and Information Systems) cooperation group adopted the "EU Toolbox for 5G Cybersecurity," containing a series of strategic measures to address security threats. This instrument, approved by the Commission and the European Council, was adopted nine months after the European Parliament and Council first raised 5G security concerns.

An interesting data point is that as of December 2020, over half of the 4G and 5G equipment in the EU originated from non-EU suppliers. In 2019, Huawei managed approximately 60% of European telecommunications networks. By 2024, only ten EU member states had banned or restricted "high-risk" telecommunications suppliers for their 5G network infrastructure. As of mid-2023, "34% of mobile network access equipment remained from Huawei and ZTE, a penetration that, despite the Union's objectives, has not decreased." In Germany, the largest European telecommunications market and an economy closely tied to China, Huawei and ZTE's market share remains stable at 59%, and in five other countries, it exceeds 50%. Germany has set 2029 as the deadline for the total elimination of critical components from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE. For this reason, Henna Virkkunen, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission and European Commissioner for Digital and Frontier Technologies, recently urged member states to "accelerate their efforts" to reduce the presence of Chinese companies.

The "Brussels Qatargate": Huawei Under Investigation for European Parliament Corruption

Pressure on Huawei is escalating with a new and potentially explosive scandal that has hit the political heart of Europe. On March 13, Belgian federal police conducted dawn raids, searching over 20 addresses across Europe and sealing two European Parliament offices. Authorities suspect Huawei used "items like expensive football match tickets, luxury gifts, luxury trips to China, and even cash" to gain support from Members of the European Parliament. This scenario, reminiscent of the Qatargate scandal two years ago, further undermines the credibility of Brussels institutions, with the investigation still ongoing.

At the center of the investigation is Valerio O., a former senior public affairs manager for Huawei in Brussels. Valerio O. is now under investigation for alleged corruption, with authorities examining whether the line between legitimate lobbying and illicit influence was crossed. In a series of confessions to Belgian authorities earlier this year, and reviewed by Euractiv and its partners De Standaard and Le Vif, Valerio O. outlined how Huawei allegedly sought to influence EU policy by leveraging connections, purported payments through intermediaries, and subtle gestures of gratitude, including champagne, luxury hotels, and football match tickets. His testimony is now central to a broader, ongoing investigation into lobbying practices in Europe's de facto capital. No individual or entity mentioned has been indicted yet, and all are presumed innocent.

The case has quickly become one of the most revealing corruption investigations in EU history, potentially more far-reaching than the so-called Qatargate scandal, which saw European lawmakers accused of accepting money and gifts from Gulf state agents. While Qatargate focused on foreign money in parliamentary corridors, the Huawei case shifts attention to more institutionalized methods of influence: lobbying consultancies, political networks, and refined mechanisms that underpin policy advocacy in Brussels. At its core is a system that allegedly legalizes access, masks money flows, and operates in the grey area between diplomacy, lobbying, and corporate strategy. Belgian prosecutors are now investigating where legal representation ends and illicit influence begins. So far, eight individuals (including Valerio O.) have been provisionally charged with participation in a criminal organization, money laundering, or corruption. Authorities have conducted a series of raids at 21 locations in three countries in connection with the case.

Huawei has not been accused of any wrongdoing and denies ordering employees to break the law. A company spokesperson in Belgium stated that they "unfortunately discovered that two of its employees acted in violation of company policies and applicable local laws," adding that the company has cooperated with judicial authorities and terminated the contracts of those involved. An attorney representing Valerio O. declined to comment. The Belgian prosecutor's office declined to comment on an ongoing investigation.

Valerio O. reportedly told investigators how Huawei sought to counter growing hostility in Europe by promoting a counter-offensive, including a coordinated "5G Letter" signed by MEPs calling for non-discriminatory treatment for 5G infrastructure. He claimed these efforts were linked to alleged payments to Italian MEP Fulvio Martusciello through third-party consultancies and his former assistant, Nuno WM. Invoices examined indicate payments of 45,590 euros to Nuno WM, with subsequent distributions to Martusciello and others. Martusciello has denied any wrongdoing, while Valerio O. claimed he was part of a group of parliamentarians with "corruption in their DNA."

The investigation also examines gifts valued under 150 euros, such as champagne and skincare products. More significant are hospitality benefits, such as seats in the corporate box at RSC Anderlecht's football stadium, where MEPs including Nicola Minchev and Daniel Attar were allegedly invited. Belgian authorities have requested the waiver of parliamentary immunity for Minchev and Attard. Both admitted attending a match but denied knowing the invitation came from Huawei or accepting illicit favors.

The investigation also focuses on more exclusive benefits, such as technological gadgets or luxury trips, and a lobbying strategy targeting Southern Europe. Valerio O. described how Huawei might have gained access to early versions of legislative proposals in a member state in exchange for investment commitments. Valerio O. was arrested in March 2025, and Huawei terminated its relationship with him. Cooperating with investigators, he offered a bleak assessment of the political landscape in Brussels, stating that "the whole Parliament is corrupt." The European Parliament has declared a "zero-tolerance policy on corruption and fraud" and is cooperating fully with authorities.

Systemic Risks: Chinese Legislation and Military-Civil Fusion

Concerns about national security, highlighted by the legal proceedings against Huawei, find a structural basis not only in Chinese legislation but also in its long-term development strategies. The National Intelligence Law (NIL), promulgated in 2017, imposes an undeniable and unambiguous obligation on all Chinese organizations and citizens to cooperate with government authorities on national intelligence efforts. This provision, particularly some of its articles, drastically strengthens the argument that the presence of Chinese companies in any nation's critical infrastructure can constitute a systemic risk for data control and access to sensitive information.

The main articles of the NIL stipulate:

• Article 7: Outlines an indispensable requirement for all organizations and citizens to cooperate with national intelligence efforts.

• Article 9: Actively incentivizes such cooperation through commendations and rewards.

• Article 12: Grants intelligence institutions the power to establish "cooperative relationships" and to "entrust them with undertaking related work" with private entities.

• Article 14: Allows intelligence institutions to request "necessary support, assistance, and cooperation," transforming such requests into binding legal obligations when interpreted jointly with Article 7.

The scope of this legislation is global: it extends to all Chinese groups, including overseas branches, regardless of their geographical location. It also applies to all organizations established in China, regardless of ownership (private, public, or foreign), and to all Chinese citizens, even when residing outside the country.

This imposing regulatory framework fits into China's broader and strategically crucial doctrine of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF). This is an ambitious program aimed at transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military force by 2049. Through MCF, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is systematically reorganizing the country's entire scientific and technological apparatus to ensure that new innovations simultaneously contribute to economic development and the strengthening of military capabilities. China pursues MCF to "fuse" its economic and social growth strategies with security strategies, building an integrated national system to support its goals of "national rejuvenation." The CCP considers MCF a fundamental pillar for achieving its regional and global ambitions, convinced that artificial intelligence will be the engine of the next revolution in military affairs and that the nation that first succeeds in applying it to next-generation warfare will achieve military dominance. MCF, therefore, aims to pave the way for China to be the first power to transition to "intelligent warfare" and to develop the military capabilities deemed indispensable for achieving these strategic objectives.

In this pervasive regulatory and strategic context, the entry of any Chinese technology provider company (e.g., in the 5G or surveillance sector) into a state's domestic market can be interpreted as an authorization for potential infiltration by Beijing, laying the groundwork for long-term technological dependencies and access to vast volumes of user data. Chinese ICT companies, often pioneers in emerging markets with extremely competitive offerings, manage to "lock in" users, defining technical standards that will shape the long-term structure of digital economies and their inevitable dependence on Beijing. These tools, sold under the guise of "smart city" projects, can include advanced surveillance technologies, facial recognition, and integrated social tracking systems that aggregate significant citizen data, thereby replicating abroad the same control mechanisms already widely used in China.