The Great Reverse Engineering Lab: China's Hunt for U.S. Military Secrets in Iran and Ukraine

An analysis of the current military and intelligence landscape reveals that China is working to secure every scrap of Western technology that has emerged from the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine, with the aim of meticulously mapping the Pentagon’s vulnerabilities through rigorous technical intelligence (TECHINT) operations.

Chinese flag on Iranian territory - GettyImages

Beijing acts as a silent technological predator, exploiting the geographical and operational positions of its partners to gain physical access to hardware that would otherwise remain out of reach. In this context, Iran trades with China the remains of unexploded missiles and flight data collected in the field in exchange for economic investment, diplomatic support at the United Nations, and, above all, advanced electronic components that Tehran is unable to produce on its own. This trade in military secrets allows Chinese technicians to dismantle and analyze cutting-edge systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and the SM-3 and SM-6 naval defense systems, focusing in particular on the infrared sensors and maneuvering engines that ensure the millimeter-level precision of U.S. munitions.

There are many parallels with the situation in Ukraine, which point to a comprehensive data-collection strategy in which Russia plays a role mirroring that of Iran. While in the Middle East the focus is on air defense and stealth technology related to the F-35 fighter jets, in Ukraine China is concentrating on next-generation ground warfare and the resilience of satellite communication systems such as Starlink. Relations with Russia allow Beijing to study captured HIMARS rockets and GMLRS guided munitions, analyzing how American software reacts to Russian electronic jamming attempts. Both theaters serve as open-air laboratories where China does not merely observe but collects physical samples of hardware to test the quality of the metal alloys and the architecture of the microchips that govern the navigation of drones and cruise missiles.

A crucial aspect of this analysis concerns the technological gap between Beijing and Washington, which is still estimated to be a critical gap of about ten to twenty years in favor of the United States. Although China excels in mass production and aerodynamic design, it still lags behind in terms of a deep understanding of advanced microelectronics and ultra-high-efficiency propulsion systems. China’s understanding of Western systems is often limited to the airframe and mechanics, as the digital core of modern weaponry remains protected by levels of encryption and software architectures that Beijing’s laboratories struggle to penetrate without access to the original data. This cognitive asymmetry explains China’s obsession with reverse engineering; since it cannot yet innovate radically at American levels, China seeks to neutralize the enemy’s advantage by studying its structural flaws.

Numerous documented precedents confirm the validity of this approach, demonstrating that China has already used reverse engineering to achieve technological leaps spanning decades. Among the most striking cases is the 2001 Hainan incident, when the dismantling of the American EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft allowed Beijing to understand the U.S. Navy’s electronic surveillance protocols. Another key example is the RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone captured by Iran in 2011, whose structural secrets ended up in Chinese programs for stealth drones such as the GJ-11 Sharp Sword. The recovery of unexploded Tomahawk missiles in Pakistan and Syria, as well as the historic case of the AIM-9B Sidewinder missile lodged in a Chinese fighter jet in 1958, also confirm that Beijing possesses a proven methodology for absorbing enemy technology through the analysis of wreckage.

However, this flow of information is subject to specific constraints dictated by the nature of the power dynamics between these powers, which are often marked by deep mutual distrust. Confidential documents from Russia’s FSB reveal that, despite the facade of alliance, Moscow continues to view China as a potential strategic adversary. This tension is fueled by a massive Chinese cyberespionage campaign conducted by groups such as Mustang Panda and Slime19, which target Russian defense conglomerates like Rostec and aerospace industries to steal secrets about drones and electronic countermeasures that the Kremlin has no intention of voluntarily sharing. Iran and Russia therefore also view China as a problem, as they fear that once their technological secrets are revealed, Beijing could become fully self-sufficient or, worse, sell copied versions of those same weapons to their regional rivals.

Ultimately, China is building a tactical advantage by studying the failures of others, knowing that understanding the enemy’s weaknesses is just as valuable as possessing a superior weapon.