The New Great Game: Geopolitical Rivalry and Technological Warfare in China’s Deep-Sea Exploitation

China’s rise as a global maritime power is taking place against a backdrop of systemic competition among major powers, where technological dominance and access to deep-sea resources have become the cornerstones of national security and sustainable development. The picture emerging from recent analyses by the Chinese Academy of Sciences highlights an integrated strategy aimed at transforming industrial advantage into normative and geoeconomic hegemony, despite the persistence of critical structural vulnerabilities in technology supply chains. This battle for the seabed represents a new front in global security where control over data, technical standards, and undersea infrastructure defines the new hierarchy of international power. A key factor in Beijing’s strategy is the assessment of the economic viability of deep-sea mining compared to land-based mining. Financial models developed by Central South University (CSU) indicate that the internal rate of return (IRR) for the development of polymetallic nodules stands at around 17.1%, a figure higher than the average for land-based mining. These assessments are supported by international projections that predict that, by 2065, approximately 35–45% of the global supply of critical minerals will come from the seabed.

A chinese vessel involved in the oil exploration industry. GettyImages.

Beijing's Strategic Advantage and Operational Capacity

China has consolidated a global lead in the availability of exploration areas, currently holding five contracts with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for a total area of approximately 235,000 square kilometers. This underwater territorial extension makes China the country with the largest number of mining districts and the widest variety of resources under contract in the world. The geoeconomic relevance of these assets is linked to a critical dependence on land-based imports, given that over 70% of essential minerals such as copper, manganese, nickel, and cobalt come from abroad, making the exploitation of marine resources an existential necessity to sustain industrialization and the green transition. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) possesses manganese, nickel, and cobalt reserves that are respectively 8, 2, and 4 times higher than total land-based reserves. Chinese technical progress is marked by precise chronological milestones: in 2018, the Kunlong 500 vehicle demonstrated a nominal production capacity of 10 tons per hour, while in 2021, the Changyuan intelligent transport system validated mineral pumping at a maximum flow rate of 356 cubic meters per hour at a depth of 500 meters. China has also verified that hydraulic transport ensures higher efficiency and stability compared to pneumatic systems in complex underwater environments.

Risks to the West: Between Espionage and Coercion

China's expansion in the marine sector raises serious risks for the technological integrity and security of the West. A primary danger is represented by scientific and industrial espionage conducted under the cover of academic research missions or international partnerships. Chinese scientific research vessels and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) can be used to map critical Western underwater infrastructure, such as fiber-optic cables for global communications or acoustic sensor networks for defense, facilitating potential sabotage or data interception activities. Furthermore, Chinese control over key technologies and the definition of technical standards through forums like the BRICS could force Western companies to adopt compromised technologies or depend on Chinese software that includes backdoors for surveillance. There is also the concrete risk that Beijing might use its strong position in marine mineral supply chains as a lever for political coercion, threatening to disrupt supplies of materials essential for the Western defense industry and renewable energy sectors in the event of geopolitical tensions.

Geopolitics of Norms and Scientific Soft Power

The marine resources sector has become a battlefield for normative power where China seeks to transition from a participant to an architect of international rules through Scientific Soft Power. Beijing promotes concepts such as the "Community of a Shared Future for Mankind" in BBNJ negotiations and has formally introduced the concept of pre-commercial mining to the ISA to validate environmental technologies, accrediting itself as a responsible actor between development and conservation. Simultaneously, Beijing is attempting to turn scientific research on the resilience of deep-sea ecosystems into an opportunity, as there is currently a lack of baseline data on the recovery capacity of benthic communities and the effects of sediment plumes and noise pollution. China recognizes that the lack of original environmental data weakens its ability to counter the environmental narrative led by Western countries—primarily Germany and the EU—which seek to insert very strict environmental standards into ISA regulations. For this reason, Beijing is pushing for the creation of long-term monitoring networks to obtain first-hand environmental data, essential for supporting its legislative proposals and avoiding the appearance of a nation ready to sacrifice the environment for resources.

Technical Vulnerabilities and Innovation Autonomy

Despite its successes, internal analysis reveals technological bottlenecks defined as "ka dian" (卡点) that threaten strategic autonomy, with an estimated lag of about five years compared to the most advanced global technologies. Dependence on foreign sensors for high-precision acoustic positioning remains critical, as their limited accuracy currently restricts the fusion of optical data and real-time communication between underwater robot fleets. The Chinese ecosystem also faces reliability issues with materials under cyclic loads and extreme pressures; Chinese synthetic buoyancy materials still show water absorption rates that do not fully meet safety requirements for prolonged use in deep-sea systems. Innovation still suffers from the "Valley of Death" in technology transfer, with marine R&D spending limited to 1% of the national total and private participation reduced to 18.6%. To mitigate these limitations, Beijing is implementing reforms in evaluation mechanisms that tolerate experimental failure and is creating integrated coastal processing bases in Hainan and Fujian to manage the entire value chain and ensure sovereignty in the marine innovation cycle.

Land-Sea Integration and National Markets

A critical point concerns managing the impact that marine minerals will have on existing industrial chains through market calibration mechanisms. A coordination system is being studied to harmonize terrestrial and marine mineral production, with the aim of preventing a sudden influx of manganese, nickel, or cobalt from the deep sea from destabilizing domestic prices or undermining the profitability of Chinese land-based mines. Furthermore, the chemical complexity of marine minerals—characterized by fine grain and high salinity—requires the development of low-carbon smelting and refining techniques still in the experimental phase. Without a breakthrough in on-board mineral pre-enrichment technologies, the commercial profitability of the entire value chain risks remaining tied to the energy costs of transport and refining. Strengthening autonomy also involves the creation of a National Control Center for Marine Mineral Resource Reserves to monitor global supply and manage extraction quotas based on defense and green industry demand, eliminating strategic pressure points resulting from Western technological sanctions.