China and Russia are the real winners in the battle of public opinion - Analysis

For Western countries, on the other hand, reducing efforts to convey information abroad is a conscious choice, despite the terrible information battle going on

While for some states such as Russia and China, managing global public opinion is increasingly important to create an international environment conducive to their interests, for Western countries, on the other hand, reducing efforts to convey information abroad is a conscious choice, despite the terrible information battle going on.

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In March, President Donald Trump withdrew funding from Voice of America and its affiliated stations, while also dismantling the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) - the U.S. government's independent agency that administers humanitarian and development assistance in more than 100 countries - which was funding thousands of journalists around the world.

Not only that; budgets of public broadcasters are being cut everywhere from Australia to Canada and France.

Thus, in the Western (counter) information vacuum, China and Russia are investing billions in disinformation, said BBC managing director Tim Davie on May 14. "For the first time in my lifetime, the future of our cohesive and democratic society seems at risk," he said in a speech, calling for more funding to double the reach of the BBC's World Service.

An investigation by Forbidden Stories - which through its "Story Killers" project investigates the deadly disinformation industry operating around the world - described the inner workings of the Russian propaganda machine in Africa. "The Russians have managed to transform the media landscape here," said one journalist. "With their (...) tracking of information, infiltration of groups on social networks and targeting of critics of the regime, everyone is afraid. No one dares to speak, even on the phone, for fear of being wiretapped."

Months ago RT, Russia's state-controlled news station, launched an advertising campaign in countries such as Mexico, India, Serbia and Tunisia. "Why doesn't Britain return the Koh-i-Noor diamond?" asked an ad on the front page of the Times of India.

The RT Academy, which trains journalists in Africa, Southeast Asia and China, opened last year.

Sputnik, another Russian state-controlled news organization, recently launched a service for Africa.

RT and Sputnik are expanding into Latin America, where they share producers, crews, and offices with Venezuela's Telesur and Iran's Hispan TV.

Smaller countries are also broadcasting news around the world.

Turkish state broadcaster TRT launched a service for Africa in 2023, opening a Somali-language branch in March.

In addition to promoting Turkey's good deeds in Africa, where it invests in infrastructure and exports arms, TRT also pokes fun at former colonial powers.

In any case, the one who invests the most in foreign journalistic - and propaganda - activities is China.

For Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the media is a "weapon" in public opinion warfare, aiming to rally the target audience into the position defended by power.

The concepts of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare were introduced when the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) revised the "Guidelines for Political Work of the People's Liberation Army" in 2003.

According to scholars, the "Three Wars" represent the essence of Chinese political warfare, which can be understood as all kinds of non-military confrontations to achieve a strategic goal.

China's war of public opinion

The war of public opinion consists of making a "cognitive orientation" of the masses "to excite their emotions" and, thus, "constrain their behavior."

For Falck Hartigof Goethe University, Beijing sees itself as operating in an international environment that is "potentially hostile" to its interests, where its true intentions are "misunderstood," and it must proactively send the message that it is a 'friendly, peaceful and reliable partner.'"

The official political leadership of the CCP everywhere requires the use of the media to tell China's story well and to increase the power of the country's international discourse.

In order to project China as a benevolent power and legitimize its development model, Chinese leaders have coined banner terms such as: 'community of common destiny,' 'Belt and Road,' 'Chinese model,' 'Chinese dream,' and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.'

The tools used by the propaganda are all kinds of media such as print media, radio, television, social networks (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, WeChat, Weibo, TikTok, Plurk, etc.), movies and books.

The use of social media

Chinese propaganda is particularly present on social media.

China, in particular, relies on Facebook, an American social network, to spread its message internationally. The most-followed news organization on Facebook is not CGT , China's state-run television network, which has about 125 million followers. Despite the fact that Facebook is banned in China, the five most-followed news organizations on Facebook are all Chinese and spread news in English.

According to a survey, Chinese organizations have gained much of their visibility through Facebook advertising, and none of them are as popular on other social networks. Some advertisements are harmless, while others have political significance. For example, last year Xinhua paid Facebook to promote a story insinuating that Filipino fishermen in disputed waters were spies, with the hashtag #fishyfishermen.

A study by the Harvard Misinformation Review examined nearly 1,000 Facebook ads purchased by Chinese state media in 2018-20, which were seen 655 million times, mainly outside the rich world. The authors, Arjun Tambe and Toni Friedman, found that when a country saw more such ads, its media produced more positive coverage of China, for example, calling pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong "riots." As more ads were exposed, pro-Chinese coverage of topics such as COVID-19 and the Chinese economy also increased.

In 2018, ByteDance, the Chinese company responsible for TikTok, purchased the Indonesian news aggregator BaBe in 2018; soon after, BaBe began censoring news that criticized the Chinese government.

Partnerships, sharing agreements and press offices abroad

China disseminates its media abroad through partnerships and content-sharing agreements with foreign media organizations in target countries.

Xinhua, China's official state news agency, has established an extensive network of cooperation agreements with media organs and institutions around the world.

As of December 2023, it is believed to have signed cooperation agreements with more than 3,600 institutions around the world, including press organs, government departments and higher education institutions.

A partnership between Italy's largest news agency, Ansa, and Xinhua began in 2017 with an agreement, renewed in 2019 and then terminated, to encourage cooperation and expand their respective global reach.

Also, in March 2019, one of Italy's leading broadcasters, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China Media Group, a Chinese state-owned company incorporating China National Radio and China Radio International.

In 2023, Xinhua News Agency signed news exchange and cooperation agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with 33 traditional media and government agencies in 25 countries and regions, totaling 173 contracts covering 124 countries and regions.

Xinhua has also paid foreign news organs such as the New York Times , the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal to publish its advertorial inserts, called "China Watch" or "China Focus."

Xinhua and the All China Journalist Association (ACJA) have signed MOUs with foreign journalists' unions to encourage foreign journalists to engage in pro-Beijing narratives, sometimes through journalistic exchanges and sponsored tours.

Xinhua is a ministerial-level agency under the direct control of the State Council (Chinese Cabinet), while the other media organizations all operate under the Publicity (or Propaganda) Department of the CCP.

Media influence in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, Beijing's media influence has been a means of shaping the opinions of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an area where competition with the U.S. is strong.

In Thailand, at least 12 news outlets and websites had signed content-sharing agreements with Xinhua by the end of 2019, including Thai news network TNN24 and the parent company of Khaosod, one of Thailand's largest newspapers.

Indonesia's MetroTV signed a similar agreement in 2019.

In the Philippines, the Presidential Communications Operations Office, which operates the Philippine News Agency and other state media, has signed multiple agreements with the Chinese government in recent years for content sharing and other forms of media cooperation.

Xinhua also has news offices in all Southeast Asian countries. The English-language TV news channels CCTV-4 and CGTN also operate in almost every country in the region, while China Radio International broadcasts multilingual content in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar.

In Southeast Asia, Beijing's media influence has been a means of shaping the opinions of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an area where competition with the U.S. is strong.

Media influence in Africa

China has also sought to shape the African media space to promote narratives favorable to it and its model of journalism is such.The efforts have gained further momentum from the BRI through what Beijing calls its "Belt and Road News Network (BRNN)," first proposed in 2017 in order to gain international support for the BRI. Secretary-General Xi called on participating media outlets to "tell the stories of the [BRI] in a way that forms a favorable public opinion for cooperation with the BRI.

The BRNN comprises 182 media outlets from 86 countries, including a number of influential media stations in Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia.These media outlets include: the Independent Media (South Africa), the Ethiopian News Agency (Ethiopia), the Thisday Newspaper (Nigeria), the Alintibaha Daily Newspaper (Sudan), the Guardian Limited (Tanzania), and the Zambia Daily Mail (Zambia).

In addition to BRI-related programming, African newspapers are increasingly publishing editorial content produced in China, without offering any indication that this was produced by a Chinese state-owned media outlet. For example, in November 2019, the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation passed off the content of a story praising China's efforts to "alleviate poverty in Xinjiang" as locally generated, when it was not, according to Eric Olander, co-founder of the independent news service China Africa Project.

The modernization of African media

China's leading role in the modernization of African media from analog to digital technology has given Beijing greater influence over the continent's media space.

This was prioritized in the 2015 White Paper on Africa, which stated that China "will continue to promote the digitization of radio and television broadcasting in Africa, provide related funding, technical support and staff training, and encourage Chinese and African enterprises to engage in joint venture cooperation."

Key to the transition from analog to digital was the "10,000 Villages" program, announced by Xi in the 2015 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The program aimed to provide digital satellite television to communities in rural areas of 25 sub-Saharan African countries. In January 2020, China reported that it had completed the installation of this equipment in more than 80 percent of the communities participating in the program.

StarTimes, a nominally private company with deep ties to the Chinese government, is the sole contractor for the project.

The company generally does not present Western programs on its platform, offers cheap access to Chinese television, and is an important tool of soft power for Beijing.

As Dani Madrid-Morales, a global media expert at the University of Houston, notes, there is "a huge ideological element in StarTimes. [...] These are very specific shows that show an urban China, a growing China, a non-controversial view of China."

The "10,000 Villages" program has further strengthened StarTimes' dominant position in African local media markets. As of September 2018, the company had nearly 20 million users in more than 30 African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

As part of a deal to transition migration from analog to digital technology in Zambia, the latter's state broadcaster formed a joint venture with the StarTimes after obtaining a $273 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China.

According to David Shullman, senior advisor to the International Republican Institute, the joint venture allegedlyviolatedZambia's competition laws because it obtained two licenses from the government, one for signal distribution and the other for content provision.

For Shullman, the violation of rules prohibiting any media company from gaining such market influence allows Chinese entities to effectively control the national broadcasting service.

Media influence in Latin America

China also pursues media influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), again with the aim of promoting favorable reports about Beijing and stifling information it views as "anti-Chinese."

So far, however, these attempts have not been very successful, unlike in other regions.

In fact, the regional market is dominated mainly by U.S. and European media.

However, Xinhua and China Radio International produce Spanish- and Portuguese-language content in the region, and China Central Television (CCTV) hosts a free 24-hour Spanish service, while it does not have a Portuguese version.

Chinese state media have established agreements in countries such as Brazil, Chile and Venezuela to regularly republish Chinese content in local media.

The training of journalists abroad

China has also built relationships with journalists from third countries. For example, Beijing has held numerous joint forums with ASEAN since 2007 to promote media exchanges and cooperation, sometimes under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Since 2014, the government-supported China Public Diplomacy Association has organized a 10-month training program for foreign journalists that includes lectures on Chinese society and politics, internships at state-run newspapers such as China Daily, and (highly supervised) field trips to Xinjiang to promote the CCP narrative. The program has attracted about 100 journalists in 2019, including many from Southeast Asian countries.

The Chinese government also supports various journalism associations such as the Thai-Chinese Journalists Association, ostensibly to promote understanding and good relations between Chinese and foreign journalists.

In 2019, the China News Service organized the World Chinese Media Forum, a conference that invited hundreds of Chinese-language media personalities from around the world, including more than 50 from Southeast Asian countries (and another 50 from the United States). The journalists attended speeches by the deputy director of the United Front Labor Department, the director of the department's 10th Office (responsible for monitoring and influencing overseas Chinese) and other CCP officials who urged them in promoting China's prosperous, stable and peaceful development abroad; shaping a positive image of China in their home countries; and telling the story of the CCP government. It is obvious that these local journalists are seen as an extension of Beijing's propaganda work. Partly as a result of these outreach efforts, Chinese-language media in target countries tend to take pro-Beijing positions on issues such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

In Latin America, China also complements these influencing efforts by hosting trainings and events for journalists and news agencies in the region aimed at impressing on participants a positive perception of the Chinese economic and political model.

In 2018, for example, Beijing convened the China-Latin America and Caribbean Media Forum, bringing together 13 Chinese media outlets and more than 100 Latin American news agencies.

Sponsorship of journalists and media personalities

Beijing also sponsors foreign journalists and media personalities who travel to China to gain their support for the CCP's priorities and worldview.

The China-Africa Press Center, an annual program launched by Beijing in 2014, for example, offers African journalists paid trips to China for training. Typically, about 25 to 35 journalists participate in this type of initiative annually. This figure refers only to the annual training courses held by the China-Africa Press Center under the China Public Diplomacy Association. The implementing unit is the School of Journalism at Renmin University.

More generally, it is estimated that Beijing hosts about 1,000 media professionals each year for trainings, exchanges and visits. These activities include training on specific topics such as promoting BRI, and it has been found that African journalists who have attended such courses end up incorporating Chinese propaganda into their local media.

David Bandurski, co-director of the China Media Project, says the goal of these courses is not only to improve Beijing's image abroad, but also to gain "control of the narrative and legitimization of the [co munist] Party's power and governance."

The same year, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the China-Caribbean Press Center, which facilitates Caribbean journalists' travel to China.

In early 2021, major media outlets in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru and Venezuela published reports echoing the CCP's messages on poverty reduction in China.

Since 2020, Chinese media outreach has focused on shaping the region's perception of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Francisco Urdinez, an associate professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, said the pandemic has severely damaged China's reputation among citizens in the region.

In an attempt to limit the damage, Chinese diplomats not only retweeted positive information about China's handling of the outbreak, but also amplified the favorable voices of local actors, spread disinformation and conducted media attacks.