Energy sovereignty and the realist paradigm: the US geoeconomic encirclement of China
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 26 minuti fa
- Tempo di lettura: 4 min
In an era of radical transformation of global balances, understanding power dynamics requires abandoning any idealistic approach in favor of a realist analysis that identifies geoeconomics and military deterrence as the true pillars of international stability. The current global scenario is witnessing a profound redefinition of the world order, where the control of energy resources and the use of asymmetric economic levers have replaced formal treaties as the actual guarantors of peace.

Many observers and analysts today invoke international law as a tool that has ensured a lasting peace for over seventy years, using it as a yardstick to criticize the recent actions of the Trump administration in Venezuela and Iran. However, a professional and detached analysis reveals that such claims rest on fragile and often instrumental foundations. International law, while having played a role in regulating relations between states since the end of the Second World War, now manifests insurmountable structural limits, primarily its lack of real applicability.
The geoeconomic strategy of the United States is emerging as a coordinated action of energy encirclement aimed at neutralizing the hegemonic ambitions of the People's Republic of China. Analysis of the events of January 2026 reveals how Washington is using the control of strategic resources in Venezuela and Iran as a lever to directly strike China's structural vulnerability, an economy that depends on these two actors for over twenty percent of its energy imports.
The core of this maneuver is the Venezuelan oil sector. The Trump administration has framed its intervention as a necessity to redress historical wrongs related to the seizure of American oil fields decades ago, but the real strategic objective is the transformation of Venezuela into a pivot to influence OPEC and establish global oversight of crude oil flows. January 13, 2026, represents a symbolic date in this regard, when the Chinese supertankers Xingye and Thousand Sunny, which were supposed to load Venezuelan crude, were forced into a sudden U-turn back to Asia due to the U.S. embargo. Washington has made it clear that the purchase of Venezuelan oil by Beijing and Moscow can only occur under agreements controlled and monitored by the United States, effectively stripping China of its supply autonomy in Latin America. This blow is particularly severe considering that Beijing has invested over sixty billion dollars over time in Venezuela through the "oil-for-loans" logic, seeking to guarantee an energy security that today appears increasingly fragile under the weight of American power.
Simultaneously, the United States opened a second front by targeting Iran with the threat of imposing 25 percent tariffs on any nation that continues to trade with Tehran. This decision aims to end the era of cheap Iranian crude imports that for years fueled Beijing's industry under a "veil of convenience" that has now been definitively torn away. Washington's strategy configures a total challenge that could be defined as "oil versus rare earths," where the United States exploits its financial centrality and the strength of the dollar to respond to the Chinese near-monopoly on critical raw materials. Beijing's reaction, delivered by Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning, attempted to defend the sovereign right of countries to choose their cooperation partners, but such rhetoric appears powerless against the reality of an encirclement that jeopardizes twenty percent of China's national energy needs.
In this scenario of raw geoeconomic realism, the systematic recourse to international law as a dispute resolution tool shows all its structural limits. The structural limit of international law lies in the fact that the rulings of jurisdictional or arbitral bodies presuppose formal recognition by the state through the ratification of treaties—an act that is promptly revoked or ignored when it conflicts with vital national interests. The example of the South China Sea is definitive: Beijing dismissed the 2016 international arbitration that condemned it as a "piece of paper," continuing its strategy of territorial expansion. The fragility of the international system is a result of the failure to implement the UN Charter regarding the creation of a world army for peace, a project that remained a dead letter, transforming global institutions into discussion forums devoid of coercive force.
In the absence of a super partes armed wing, peace and stability are ensured exclusively by military deterrence and the ability to exert asymmetric pressure. Deterrence, supported by the U.S. arsenal, is the only real barrier to the "liminal warfare" conducted by Russia and China—a form of conflict that operates constantly below the threshold of open clash to erode the stability of Western democracies through economic, cyber, and influence operations.
When we talk about international law, we must do so with a realism that recognizes how stability depends on power relations and the ability to use the levers of geoeconomics. As we wrote in our essay, ignoring this dynamic in the name of an outdated legal idealism means accelerating the collapse of the world order. If Western powers did not firmly confront the authoritarian aims of those who want to rewrite global rules, the alternative to this balance based on force and mutual coercion would not be a regulated and idyllic peace, but unfortunately only the outbreak of another world war of catastrophic proportions.
For this reason, the U.S. maneuver on Venezuela and Iran must be read as a necessary strategic defense action in a world where international law, deprived of coercive instruments, is no longer able to guarantee the security of states on its own.
