Exclusive report. The PLA's "Urban Collapse Warfare" Doctrine: Integrating Big Data, Generative AI, and the Lorenz Butterfly Effect for the Conquest of Taiwan

Abstract

This report explores the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s emerging "urban collapse warfare" doctrine, which aims to "reunify" Taiwan through the systematic disintegration of its social functions rather than large-scale kinetic conflict. The strategy is rooted in complex systems theory, particularly the Lorenz butterfly effect, to identify and exploit "critical trigger points" within Taiwan's vital infrastructure (energy, communications, water). The integration of big data and generative artificial intelligence is central to this vision, enabling the PLA to refine intelligence, decision-making, and cognitive warfare operations, including the creation of targeted disinformation and the planning of precision strikes.

The report analyzes Taiwan's inherent vulnerabilities, such as its high energy dependence and the fragility of its power grid, evidenced by historical blackouts and the susceptibility of its submarine cables. The doctrine proposes an "electricity-communication-exchange" attack sequence to paralyze the island and induce capitulation, aligning with the Eastern strategic principle of "winning without fighting." It also examines the intrinsic risks of a Taiwan invasion, including the potential for World War III, and Xi Jinping's motivations, framing China as a "peaking power" experiencing economic slowdown, historically prone to aggression. Finally, the strategic implications for Taiwan are discussed, as it seeks to bolster its resilience through military exercises and digital defense measures, alongside the growing role of "grey zone" tactics in shaping the future of asymmetric conflict.

by Gabriele e Nicola Iuvinale

1. Introduction: Redefining Modern Warfare – The PLA's Vision for Taiwan

The "reunification" of Taiwan with mainland China represents a historical imperative for Beijing, a goal consistently reiterated by Xi Jinping's leadership and serving as a primary catalyst for the evolution of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s military doctrine. This aspiration has triggered a profound transformation within the PLA, moving away from a strategy focused on "people's war" to embrace a more sophisticated approach, known as "intelligentized warfare" (智能化). This paradigm synergistically integrates real-time situational awareness, precision strike capabilities, and complex psychological operations, outlining a modernization path that the PLA intends to complete by 2035.   

In this context of strategic evolution, a distinctive PLA approach emerges, prioritizing the conquest of Taiwan with minimal military cost, ideally "without firing a shot." This preference for victory achieved through pressure rather than open conflict  outlines a strategy aimed at paralyzing Taiwan from within. The primary objective is the systematic disintegration of its social functions and its capacity for resistance, even before a large-scale invasion becomes necessary.   

The choice of a technologically advanced military force, equipped with devastating kinetic capabilities, to focus on non-kinetic methods to induce capitulation, reveals a deep understanding of the nature of modern conflict. It recognizes that victory does not solely depend on physical destruction, but on the ability to break the will and functionality of a society. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data into this strategy is not limited to improving lethality but is aimed at optimizing the application of systemic and psychological pressure. These technologies are therefore considered fundamental for analyzing vulnerabilities, predicting cascading effects, and maximizing the impact of precision strikes. In particular, the concept of the Lorenz butterfly effect is explicitly invoked as an analogy for the PLA's approach, emphasizing the intent to exploit specific pressure points to trigger systemic collapse.   

2. The Technological Architecture: Big Data and Generative AI at the Service of the PLA

The PLA's ambition to achieve "intelligentized warfare" is intrinsically linked to the pervasive adoption and integration of big data and generative artificial intelligence. These technologies are not mere instrumental additions but represent the pillars upon which a new conception of military operations is founded.

Generative AI for Intelligence and Decision-Making

The PLA and the Chinese defense industry have invested in the development of generative AI-based intelligence tools, designed to process and analyze large volumes of data, generate intelligence products, answer complex queries, provide strategic and tactical recommendations, facilitate early warning, and support decision-making. The main goal of these tools is to improve the speed, efficiency, accuracy, and scalability of intelligence activities while reducing operational costs.   

In the field of OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence), PLA patent applications illustrate methods and systems that employ generative AI for the production of OSINT products and the processing of satellite imagery. It is likely that the PLA has rapidly adopted DeepSeek LLM (Large Language Model) models for OSINT intelligence purposes, with a Chinese defense contractor claiming to have provided a DeepSeek-based OSINT model to the PLA.   

Regarding command and control support, articles published in PLA Daily indicate that large generative models can generate intelligence briefings, extract key points, and predict changes in the battlefield situation. These systems are also capable of automatically integrating vast amounts of battlefield intelligence into comprehensive situational reports, easing the workload of intelligence personnel and improving the analysis and planning capabilities of combat personnel.   

LLMs are also considered crucial for creating detailed operational simulations and realistic training scenarios, significantly reducing the time and personnel traditionally required. The PLA's "War Skull" wargaming system, with its second generation launched in 2020, is an emblematic example of how AI is used to develop modular strategies adaptable to different adversaries.   

The application of AI in these contexts goes beyond simply automating tasks; it aims to expand the cognitive capabilities of commanders. The ability to analyze vast datasets, generate recommendations, and predict changes in the battlefield situation allows for the creation of a cognitive advantage. This advantage manifests in the reduction of the "fog of war" and the ability to make faster and more informed decisions, critical factors in "intelligentized warfare."

However, despite the optimism, PLA researchers openly acknowledge the limitations of generative AI, including issues such as "hallucinations" and potential ideological biases. This internal awareness of fallibility is a crucial aspect. If AI models were trained on biased intelligence data or analytical products, or if they presented "black box" or "value bias" problems, they could generate inaccurate intelligence and lead to compromised decisions. This implies that the success of the PLA's AI adoption will largely depend on its ability to validate and refine these technologies under real operational conditions , and to effectively integrate human input to ensure reliable and credible results. This represents a potential vulnerability for the PLA itself.   

Big Data for Situational Awareness

The PLA's AI initiatives are closely related and enhanced by a growing integration of big data programs. These programs are designed to expand battlefield awareness, refine predictive analytics, and reduce the "fog of war." Intelligent algorithms are employed to process vast datasets, in order to discover operational patterns, optimize logistics, and improve tactical decision-making.   

Norinco's Intelligent Precision Strike System is a striking example of how the PLA is building a "network information system" that leverages AI, cloud computing, and big data techniques to fuse data from different operational units and create "dynamic kill networks" across all domains. This is not just an improvement in situational awareness, but the creation of a system capable of autonomously identifying, tracking, and proposing attack plans. Big data serves as fuel for these systems, enabling real-time analysis and the formation of "iterative feedback loops" that improve cross-domain data integration and real-time adaptation on the battlefield.   

Integration: Towards "Intelligentized Operational Command"

The synergistic integration of AI and big data is conceived as the fundamental step towards the next phase of "intelligentized warfare." In this phase, deep learning and multimodal data processing will be able to refine target recognition, situational assessment, and command decisions with unprecedented precision and speed. This process culminates in what the PLA defines as "intelligentized operational command" , a system of systems based on algorithms, designed to dominate great-power competition and armed conflict.   

Table 1: Key Applications of Generative AI and Big Data in the PLA

3. The Strategy of Social Disintegration: The Lorenz Butterfly Effect and Critical Nodes

The PLA's strategy for Taiwan is based on a deep understanding of complex systems theory, particularly the concept of the Lorenz butterfly effect. This principle, derived from the studies of mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, illustrates how in chaotic systems, small variations in initial conditions can lead to completely different and unpredictable trajectories in the long term. The PLA applies this logic to warfare, seeking to identify and strike "critical points" that, if perturbed, could trigger a systemic collapse in Taiwan, maximizing military impact at minimal cost.   

Chaos Theory and Military Application

The analogy of the Lorenz butterfly effect is not a mere metaphor in PLA doctrine; it implies a sophisticated attempt to model and predict chaotic behavior within Taiwan's infrastructure and social fabric. This approach suggests an advanced level of analytical capability, likely supported by AI and big data, to map these "critical nodes" and their interdependencies with high precision. The goal is to identify the "initial conditions" (the critical nodes) that, once altered, lead to a desired "completely different trajectory," i.e., systemic collapse. This shifts military strategy beyond traditional target lists, towards a systemic and network-centric vulnerability analysis.   

Identification of "Critical Points"

Beijing's strategy to "conquer Taiwan without firing a shot" focuses on the "weaponization" of the island's critical infrastructure. An article in the Naval and Merchant Ships journal identifies between 30 and 40 "super critical" nodes that, if deactivated, could paralyze Taiwan from within. These nodes include key facilities for energy (power plants, liquefied natural gas - LNG plants), water supply, communications, and data hubs.   

Chinese analysis suggests that a well-orchestrated attack on these points, especially if conducted during periods of vulnerability such as typhoons or electoral events, could rapidly destabilize Taiwan, eroding resistance and forcing capitulation at minimal military cost. Proposed methods for these attacks include precision strikes, cyberattacks, electromagnetic pulses (EMP), and even engineered "pseudo-natural disasters."   

Taiwan's Infrastructural Vulnerabilities

Taiwan presents a series of inherent vulnerabilities that the PLA aims to exploit. Its dependence on energy imports is particularly acute, with 97% of energy and 70% of food coming from abroad. Taiwan's stockpiles are limited: less than two months of coal and gas, and only six months of crude oil and food. These stockpiles would also be targets for bombardment in the event of an invasion, further reducing Taiwan's capacity for resistance.   

The fragility of Taiwan's power grid has been highlighted by numerous historical blackouts. The incident of July 29, 1999, which left 82.5% of consumers without electricity, and the blackouts of March and May 2022, which affected millions of households and caused significant economic losses, demonstrate the island's susceptibility to cascading failures. Such historical events provide the PLA with valuable case studies to model propagation paths and amplification multipliers of cascading effects (as suggested by the Lorenz effect), identifying the most critical nodes and the most effective attack sequences.   

The Longtan substation, for example, has been explicitly identified as critical national infrastructure. Although not specifically mentioned as one of the 30-40 "super critical" nodes in the available sources, its designation as critical infrastructure and its energy storage capacity make it a plausible strategic target for disabling Taiwan's power grid. Recent PLA exercises, such as "Strait Thunder 2025A," have simulated attacks on Taiwan's LNG depots, confirming China's focus on the island's energy vulnerabilities. The destruction of LNG terminals would cripple Taiwan's energy grid, also reducing the repair burden for Chinese occupation forces.   

Vulnerabilities also extend to communications. Taiwan relies on 15 submarine cables that land at seven stations, many of which are concentrated in the northern regions, creating highly vulnerable choke points. Past incidents, such as the simultaneous cutting of both submarine cables to Matsu in February 2023, have demonstrated the severity of disruptions, with internet and banking blackouts lasting weeks or months. These events, attributed to Chinese vessels, have been interpreted as possible acts of "grey zone" aggression or as preparation for a military invasion.   

In addition to physical infrastructure, the PLA aims to exploit social and political vulnerabilities. The PLA's doctrinal concept of "dividing the enemy into factions" is a key component of its psychological warfare. China has attempted to co-opt "fifth column" elements within Taiwanese society to sow chaos and degrade Taiwan's self-defense capability, as demonstrated by the recruitment of Taiwanese military personnel for insurrection. The "squeeze and relax" approach aims to create resignation in Taiwan, leveraging the family and business ties of Taiwanese elites with mainland China to promote peaceful accommodation rather than open resistance.   

Table 2: Taiwan's Critical Infrastructural Vulnerabilities and PLA Targets

4. "Winning Without Fighting": Cognitive Warfare and Precision Operations

The PLA's doctrine of "winning without fighting" is a modern reinterpretation of ancient Eastern strategic principles, enhanced by the integration of big data and generative AI. This approach does not merely aim to avoid direct confrontation but to preclude the need to fight, by dismantling the adversary's capacity and will to resist.

Cognitive and Psychological Warfare

The PLA considers cognitive warfare a key element to winning conflicts, potentially without even having to fight them directly. Operations in the cognitive domain merge psychological and cyber tactics, seeking to manipulate adversary perceptions, decision-making, and behavior. Generative AI tools enable the PLA to craft adaptive, context-specific disinformation, executing psychological operations with extreme precision. Advanced language models can generate desired narratives in real-time, using digital platforms to influence perceptions, sow discord, and erode public morale. This serves the PLA's "cognitive confrontation" tactic, which aims to control information flows to disrupt adversary decision-making.   

The use of AI for algorithmic narrative generation and the coordination of social media accounts highlights unprecedented sophistication in influence operations. The goal is to create an information environment where "reunification" is perceived as inevitable, fostering resignation in Taiwan. The PLA's routine exercises and "grey zone" tactics are designed to intimidate the Taiwanese population and present Chinese actions as a necessary response to "Taiwanese independence forces."   

Precision Strikes and "Systems Destruction Warfare"

The concept of "Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare" is the overarching strategic framework guiding the PLA's precision strikes. This doctrine focuses on paralyzing an adversary's operational system by targeting its networks, particularly leadership, command and control (C2) nodes, sensors, and information hubs. The PLA believes that destroying just ten percent of critical nodes can cause the collapse of the enemy's information network. This quantifiable data demonstrates a direct application of network science (which studies how removing "hubs" in a "scale-free" network can have disproportionate effects)  to military strategy, indicating a targeted and data-driven approach.   

Targeted attacks on critical nodes include various modalities:

• Cyberattacks: China-linked hacker groups, such as Volt Typhoon and Flax Typhoon, have targeted critical infrastructure in Taiwan, including telecommunications, healthcare, and IT, with the aim of establishing long-term access for information theft and potential destructive actions. Taiwan experiences between 20 and 40 million cyberattacks per month, with the majority suspected to originate from China.   

  
  

• Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP): Simulations of EMP attacks aim to instantly and simultaneously fry most electronics, causing an immediate and widespread blackout.   

  
  

• Kinetic Precision Strikes: The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has at least 1,700 missiles pointed at Taiwan. These include short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, with exercises simulating simultaneous attacks from multiple locations and with different types of weapons. Targets include oil refineries, fuel depots, hydroelectric and thermal power plants, and electrical transformers.   

  
  

Integrated Attack Sequences

The PLA's strategy involves an integrated attack sequence, often described as "electricity-communication-exchange." This sequence aims to disrupt power supply, followed by disabling communications, and then paralyzing exchange and coordination capabilities. Disrupting telecommunications systems aims to sever communication between the government and citizens, while compromising the electrical system aims to foment popular discontent. Degrading transportation systems, including the Taipei Metro, supports enemy troop mobilization and deployment.   

This sequence, if executed with precision, is designed to maximize social disintegration and functional paralysis. The goal is not just physical destruction, but the creation of widespread shock and awe through a limited number of targeted attacks, demonstrating the PLA's capabilities and stunning the enemy into submission. The ability to deceive the enemy with false or mixed information, leading to wavering decisions or the dispersion of forces, is considered a success. This integrated strategy of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, supported by AI and big data, embodies the modern interpretation of the Eastern strategic wisdom of "winning without fighting."   

5. Risks and Motivations: China as a "Peaking Power" in Economic Slowdown

An attempt to conquer Taiwan carries risks ranging from military defeat to World War III.  However, Xi Jinping may not be willing to live indefinitely with the status quo of Taiwan, which he considers unjust, even offensive, to a China that, in his view, is reclaiming its rightful place at the top of Asia and the world.  "What his actual intentions are, I couldn't say, but China is preparing for a war, and particularly one with the United States," US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall recently stated.  It is a mistake to think that Xi would never attempt something so shocking. China has a long tradition of starting its wars with surprise attacks, as American forces discovered in Korea in 1950 and the Vietnamese in 1979.  Chinese military doctrine favors rapid and overwhelming assaults.  Such a decision could have dire consequences for China and for the world.    

China is a "peaking power" experiencing an economic slowdown, and historically, such powers are often economically and militarily aggressive.  They are actually the most dangerous type of country because they have both the means and the motivation to shake up the international order.  In most cases, they develop power projection military forces and deploy them along major trade routes, fueling great power competition.  Now is a moment of maximum danger with Xi Jinping's China.  In the last 150 years, all cases where a rapidly growing great power experienced a prolonged economic slowdown, none of these "peaking powers" softened.    

Instead, most suppressed dissent at home while expanding abroad to secure an economic lifeline, repel rivals, and conquer territory; rulers of peaking powers tighten their grip on domestic power while seeking to forge empires abroad.  Indeed, with its financial, military, geopolitical rise and now with its economic slowdown, China already appears to be following this historical pattern.    

6. Strategic Implications and Future Prospects

The PLA's "urban collapse warfare" doctrine and the integration of big data and generative AI have profound implications for regional stability and the nature of future conflict. This strategic evolution underscores a fundamental shift in how China intends to achieve its objectives regarding Taiwan.

The Challenge of Resilience for Taiwan and Countermeasures

Taiwan is aware of the threats and is expanding and modernizing its annual Han Kuang military exercises to prepare its armed forces and population for a PLA invasion. The exercises include military-civilian coordination operations and civil defense simulations to increase realism. The increased duration of the exercises and the largest mobilization of reservists in history reflect the emphasis on social resilience and societal participation in defense.   

Taiwan is also seeking to strengthen its digital resilience, particularly against attacks on submarine cables, by exploring the use of satellite networks as backup systems from non-Chinese partners. However, despite these efforts, significant gaps remain in Taiwan's preparedness, especially regarding the protection of essential supplies such as water, electricity, and food in wartime. The lack of redundancy in key sectors and dependence on privatized infrastructure represent persistent challenges.   

The Growing Role of the "Grey Zone" and Non-Kinetic Tactics

The PLA's "grey zone tactics," which operate below the threshold of open conflict, are a crucial component of the pressure strategy on Taiwan. These include disinformation campaigns (often enhanced by generative AI), the cutting of submarine cables, the use of the Chinese Coast Guard for intrusions, and "lawfare" to assert Beijing's jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait. The increasing frequency and scale of military exercises around Taiwan, including simulated blockades and incursions into the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), aim to create an environment of persistent pressure and wear down Taiwan's will to resist.   

These non-kinetic tactics are designed to shape conditions favorable to a future military invasion, making it difficult for democracies to respond effectively due to their ambiguity and exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities.   

The Impact of These Strategies on the Future of Warfare

The PLA's approach to Taiwan, with its emphasis on social disintegration through the application of complex systems theory, AI, and big data, foreshadows a new era of conflict. This "intelligentized warfare" deviates from traditional models of warfare, prioritizing internal paralysis and capitulation over large-scale kinetic destruction. The focus on manipulating the cognitive domain and exploiting infrastructural interdependencies represents a fundamental shift in the conception of victory.

The PLA's success in implementing these technologies will depend on its ability to overcome internal challenges, such as the validation and refinement of AI in complex scenarios and effective integration into a centralized command structure. At the same time, the implications for Taiwan's defense and for the strategy of the United States and its allies are profound, requiring continuous attention to systemic resilience and the ability to counter hybrid and non-kinetic threats.   

Conclusion: A New Era of Asymmetric Conflict and the Pursuit of Victory Without Battle

The analysis of the PLA's doctrine regarding Taiwan reveals a sophisticated strategic evolution, transcending mere military confrontation to embrace "urban collapse warfare" deeply informed by complex systems theory and empowered by big data and generative AI. The primary objective is not territorial conquest through brute force, but the systematic disintegration of Taiwan's social functions and will to resist, ideally "without firing a shot."

The application of the Lorenz butterfly effect is not a mere analogy but reflects a methodical attempt to identify and exploit "super critical nodes" within Taiwan's infrastructure – energy, communications, water, and logistics – to trigger cascading failures. This strategy is based on a deep understanding of Taiwan's interconnected vulnerabilities, such as its energy dependence, the fragility of its power grid, and the vulnerability of its submarine cables, all factors that the PLA studies and simulates to maximize impact.

Generative AI and big data are the enabling tools of this vision, transforming intelligence, decision-making, and cognitive warfare. They allow the PLA to analyze vast datasets, predict scenarios, generate targeted disinformation, and coordinate precision attacks (cyber, EMP, kinetic) that strike at the heart of a society's functional capacity. The concept of "Systems Destruction Warfare" is the operational framework that links these elements, aiming to paralyze leadership and control networks through a synergistic sequence of attacks.

This fusion of Eastern strategic wisdom with cutting-edge technologies redefines the nature of conflict. It is no longer just about military superiority, but about systemic and cognitive superiority, where victory can be achieved before conventional weapons are fully employed. For Taiwan and its partners, the challenge is to build holistic resilience that not only strengthens military defenses but also protects the social fabric and vital infrastructure from invisible and cascading attacks, recognizing that the next war may be won or lost not on the battlefield, but in the stability of social functions and the will of a people.