Contested Libya: Sino-Russian Strategic Penetration Threatens European Security

Libya, an inherently fragile state still fragmented between the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, is rapidly becoming a critical convergence zone for China's and Russia's geopolitical and economic ambitions. This scenario has profound implications for regional stability and, particularly, for Europe's energy security and strategic posture. Beijing, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is pursuing market and infrastructure penetration in Eastern Libya, aiming to establish a transcontinental logistical-commercial hub with significant dual-use capabilities. Concurrently, the Russian Federation is intensifying its military and economic projection in Africa, with Libya serving as a potential Mediterranean outpost and a central node for expansion into the Sahel. This confluence of strategic interests from non-Western powers, set against Libya's state fragility, constitutes a systemic risk for the Euro-Mediterranean balance.

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China's Strategic Offensive: A Dual-Use Integrated Hub in Eastern Libya

China has escalated its engagement in North Africa, positioning Libya as an essential pillar of its global ambitions, particularly within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Multi-sector investments in energy, infrastructure, and logistics in Eastern Libya, under the control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, aim to redefine trade routes and supply chains connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Tobruk, a port city on Libya's eastern coast, is central to this strategy. Its geographical location, less than 400 kilometers from Southern Europe, and its deep-water port characteristics within a naturally protected Marmarica inlet, make it, according to some sources, the best port in North Africa. This capability positions it as a privileged access point for maritime traffic, overcoming capacity limitations of numerous European ports. This feature makes Tobruk an invaluable strategic asset for Chinese enterprises, consistent with Beijing's doctrine of overseas power projection through a network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities that provide logistics and intelligence support to the Chinese navy. As of 2022, Chinese companies either owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries. In at least nine of these ports, including two in Europe, significant repair or maintenance operations for PLA warships were carried out. Visits by Chinese military vessels also reveal areas of influence, priority operational zones, intelligence gathering objectives, and cooperation priorities.

China's proposed projects in Tobruk are systemic. A $10 billion oil refinery, with a processing capacity of 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day, is a core component. Refined products would be directly exported to European markets, offering a crucial alternative energy source in Europe's post-conflict diversification efforts. China's vision for Tobruk extends to creating an integrated logistics hub with modern storage facilities, transshipment terminals, and supply depots. Complementary to this, Al-Adem Airport will be upgraded to serve as a combined civilian and military logistics center, integrating air, sea, and land transport systems, positioning Libya at the heart of China's Mediterranean logistics strategy.

Chinese influence also extends inland. A proposed railway line, promoted by the China Railway International Group (CRIG) and supported by the BFI Management Consortium (which includes Siemens and Arup), aims to connect Benghazi and Tobruk to the Egyptian high-speed rail system. This would create an uninterrupted trade corridor between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, with future extensions planned into Chad and Sudan, configuring a transcontinental logistics corridor.

In a significant development, on July 12, Libyan Railways signed an agreement in Beijing with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) for the resumption of suspended railway projects, in accordance with pre-existing contracts. The agreement was formalized during the Libyan delegation's participation in the 12th World Congress on High-Speed Rail (Beijing, July 8-11). This understanding followed a working meeting between the Libyan delegation and CCECC leadership, during which contracts related to the Tripoli-Ras Ajdir, Tripoli-Sirte, and Al-Haysha-Sabha railway projects were discussed. CCECC reiterated its commitment to completing these projects, and both parties agreed to ongoing coordination to address challenges and facilitate the Chinese company's return to resume the work.

These initiatives are supported by the newly established Libyan Bank for Energy and Mining in Eastern Libya, designed to attract Chinese capital and facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects. Chinese companies like Kerui Petroleum have already initiated preliminary studies for the Tobruk refinery. High-level Libyan delegations have visited China for discussions with Huawei and the China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC). Notably, Huawei has commenced testing a new telecommunications network in Eastern Libya, solidifying China's technological penetration.

From a security perspective, while there is no confirmed formal military alliance between Libya and China as of July 2025, clear indications exist of increasing Chinese engagement in Libya's security landscape and potential for future military cooperation. China's foreign policy has shown a growing emphasis on security elements, including its Global Security Initiative (GSI). China has already engaged in security cooperation with around 100 countries; this trend suggests a potential evolution of relations toward military ties. China has supported the UN arms embargo and offered economic aid, concurrently engaging in security initiatives with other countries. Despite China's support for UN Security Council resolutions, the dual-use nature of civilian infrastructure and increasing engagement in sensitive sectors indicate a potential future projection of capabilities into the military domain.

Libya's Internal Context: Structural Fragility and Obstacles to European Cooperation

Libya is characterized by ongoing internal conflict, with armed groups clashing for control of territory and resources. The UN Security Council is actively engaged in preventing further escalation and promoting a unified approach to governance and security. This structural fragility and the absence of centralized state control create a vacuum that external actors, such as China and Russia, are eager to fill through targeted investments and support to de facto governments. Persistent economic challenges and political instability, intertwined with the security situation, make reaching an agreement on a unified budget and strengthening key economic institutions crucial for overall stability.

In an emblematic incident reflecting Libya's complex and fragmented reality, a European delegation, comprising the EU Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, and the Interior Ministers of Italy, Malta, and Greece's Minister for Migration and Asylum, was denied entry into Eastern Libya last Tuesday. The Benghazi government justified the denial as a violation of "Libyan national sovereignty." The delegation had arrived for a meeting with the parallel government of Osama Hamad, an ally of Commander Khalifa Haftar, shortly after a prior meeting with the rival, internationally recognized government controlling Western Libya. The Benghazi government stated that the visit was canceled upon the delegation's arrival at Benghazi airport, after which the ministers were declared personae non gratae and asked to immediately leave Libyan territory. Reuters reported that members of the European delegation did not immediately respond to requests for comment. This incident followed a statement by Hamad's government on Monday, prohibiting all foreign visitors and diplomatic missions from traveling to or within the country without its prior authorization. This episode tangibly underscores the challenges and risks associated with interacting with Libya's various factions, making any coherent European strategy extremely difficult.

Strategic Implications for Europe: Heightened Vulnerabilities and Western Inaction

The implications of growing Chinese and Russian influence in Libya for Europe's energy security and strategic posture are deeply concerning. European efforts towards energy diversification, accelerated by the conflict in Ukraine, have led to increased reliance on alternative sources from the Middle East and North Africa. Beijing's potential control over a large-scale refinery in Tobruk and associated port infrastructure would grant China significant influence over European supply chains.

This scenario extends beyond mere oil access. The ability to refine, store, and transport energy products directly from North Africa to Europe would allow China to dictate pricing, volume, and prioritization in times of crisis. Such leverage would compromise Europe's energy autonomy and increase its dependence on Beijing amidst existing transatlantic tensions.

Furthermore, Chinese control over container logistics through Tobruk would provide Beijing leverage not only over energy but also over manufactured goods and critical technologies. The dual-use airport, combined with surveillance and digital infrastructure (like the Huawei network under testing), could also serve intelligence and military interests, extending China's power projection capabilities into the Mediterranean. It is crucial to note that all major investments in seaports, railways, and airports offer Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities at critical logistical nodes of fundamental strategic dimension.

Therefore, any form of participation by Chinese enterprises in the EU's strategic resources, particularly those companies directly or indirectly linked to the Chinese political-military or intelligence apparatus, represents an unacceptable risk for the EU. This includes heightened risks of espionage, technology transfer, and expertise transfer to the PLA. PLA naval forces possess legal means and tools to ensure that Chinese civilian vessels and infrastructure can be utilized for military and security purposes abroad. Beijing can also leverage its civilian commercial infrastructure to support PLA presence in third countries. Civilian-military fusion provides the PLA access to foreign ports, enabling it to preposition logistical support to sustain naval deployments as far as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Espionage and sabotage risks are higher when Chinese civilian commercial activities are located in logistical hubs near NATO naval bases. China's strategy to build a "blue economy cooperation base" along African coasts, even through the construction of fishing vessels and ship repair facilities, could also be repurposed for military objectives.

The absence of a cohesive Western policy and the internal fragmentation within the EU have created a strategic vacuum, enabling Beijing and Moscow to consolidate their influence without significant counter-initiatives. The potential extension of Chinese naval or intelligence capabilities into the central Mediterranean, in close proximity to NATO's southern flank, constitutes a direct challenge to collective security. The possibility that dual-use infrastructure could facilitate espionage, military logistical pre-positioning, or even disruption of vital maritime routes for European trade and defense, raises critical questions about the Alliance's strategic resilience. The increasing influence of external actors with divergent agendas could further exacerbate Libya's internal fragmentation, with potential impacts on migratory flows towards European shores and the stability of neighboring countries in the Sahel and North Africa.

Russia's Strategic Projection: A Complementary but Equally Insidious Role

The Russian Federation's role in Libya is continuously expanding, with the country serving as a central node in its African strategy. European diplomatic sources indicate the operation of a network of traffickers with Libyan political ties supporting Russian strategic efforts, facilitating sanction evasion and the weaponization of migratory flows. A recent display of Russian weaponry in Benghazi during a military parade highlighted the Kremlin's growing proximity to Haftar's forces. The evolving dynamics between the US and Russia, particularly regarding potential agreements on the Ukrainian conflict and Russian influence in the Middle East, could significantly impact Libya's future.

Recent developments underscore the expansion of Russian military presence, particularly at the Maaten Al Sarra airbase, near the borders of Chad and Sudan, positioning this facility as a logistical hub for operations in the Sahel. This base benefits from a strategic geographical location due to its proximity to the Sahel. The recent transfer of military forces and equipment to this base reveals Russia's intent to establish a foothold in the Fezzan region. Russia would gain strategic access to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS), controlling their borders and monitoring the military and economic activities of other international actors in the region. This base could eventually become a military logistical hub, serving as a support base for all its operations in the Sahel, including Sudan. It's noteworthy that Russia, after initially supporting Hemedti's forces, is currently aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. Russia and the Sudanese government recently finalized an agreement for the establishment of a Russian naval base at Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast. This would concurrently justify the presence of the Afrika Corps as an intervention and support force for partner countries in the fight against regional terrorism and illicit trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.).

Russia seeks a stronghold in the Mediterranean, especially after the abrogation of its lease on the Port of Tartus in Syria. Italian Foreign Minister Tajani has repeatedly warned that Libya is the most likely destination for a replacement naval base. Libya's political fragmentation offers Moscow fertile ground to consolidate its influence and project power. Its support for Haftar's military forces during the second civil war allowed it to deploy Wagner forces, which became the Afrika Corps after Yevgeny Prigozhin's death. The presence of Russian military personnel, associated with the "Afrika Corps," is increasing, strengthening control over strategic infrastructure and military bases.

Concurrently, Africa is emerging as a priority market for Russian exporters, presenting underutilized opportunities for trade and investment growth. At the INNOPROM-2025 forum, Tatyana An, Vice President of the Russian Export Center (REC), highlighted REC's support for Russian companies entering the African market. Despite growing export volumes to Africa, An noted a concentration on a limited number of countries and product types. "Grain and petroleum products constitute approximately 65% of supplies," she specified, emphasizing the imperative to diversify sectors and regions. In 2024, REC-supported export transactions to African countries amounted to 121.8 billion rubles (approximately $1.5 billion). Key destinations included Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Algeria, and Morocco.

During the 28th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Dmitry Konyaev, CEO of Uralchem (one of Russia's largest fertilizer producers), outlined plans to quintuple annual fertilizer exports to Africa, from 1 million to 5 million tons by 2030. This ambition reflects a clear Russian strategy to expand both its military and economic influence across the African continent, with Libya serving as a key element in this power projection. As a BRICS member and a "partner nation" to several African countries, Russia adopts an economic-military approach. Its military presence is justified by security and development agreements. Faced with instability and the risk of regime destabilization, the Kremlin presents itself as a reliable security partner. Through offensive diplomacy and direct support for African government actions, the Kremlin is extending its influence across the Sahel region, including the Horn of Africa. All its military bases in Libya have been subject to a prospective strategic study based on a vision for the future.

Consequences and Outlook: The Redefinition of Global Balances

Haftar's approval of Chinese proposals would position Libya as the western anchor of a vast, China-led logistical and energy network, extending from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The Tobruk refinery and associated infrastructure would grant Beijing new leverage over European energy markets, precisely as the EU actively seeks to diversify its energy sources away from Russia.

The dual-use nature of Tobruk's upgraded airport and port could extend Chinese naval or intelligence capabilities into the Mediterranean. This possibility has already raised concerns in some NATO circles.

A successful Chinese strategy in Libya would reshape Eurasian supply chains and trade flows, signaling a significant shift in the balance of soft power and strategic influence in North Africa. The implications for Europe's energy security and geopolitical autonomy would be profound. Despite its apparent fragility, Libya represents a crucial gateway for Chinese planners, with the potential to integrate Africa, Europe, and Asia under a new, Beijing-led global trade architecture.