The “sharp sword” gap: Why Chinese Special Forces are not yet ready for a Delta Force-style operation in Taiwan

The question of the People's Republic of China's actual capacity to conduct high-risk special operations in hostile territory, similar to the raid against Osama bin Laden or the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, requires an examination that goes beyond simply counting technical resources. Although Beijing aspires to a “world-class” force by 2049, OSINT sources suggest that the operational gap with the United States remains wide.

The following analysis explores the structural, doctrinal, and systemic reasons that make the answer to this question tend to be negative, emphasizing the vague restructuring of 2025 and the internal problems that still plague the Chinese military apparatus.

The paradigm of the raid in Venezuela as a point of comparison

To understand what China is missing, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics of the US operation in Venezuela in January 2026, described by President Trump as a spectacular military operation. This raid was not only an act of kinetic force, but the culmination of months of meticulous planning involving over 150 military aircraft and elite Delta Force units. The operation relied on a network of local informants and the use of simulation rooms where every movement was obsessively rehearsed. Maduro's capture, which took place in a matter of hours, demonstrated a capacity for joint coordination that allows operations to be carried out thousands of kilometers from the motherland with surgical precision. In contrast, internal Chinese debate recognizes that the PLA, in a hypothetical similar operation in Southeast Asia, would encounter insurmountable obstacles in replicating such fluidity, lacking a logistical and intelligence support network of this magnitude.

The PLA's first special operations brigade

The 2025 restructuring and the mystery of the suppressed brigades

2025 was a year of radical and opaque transformation for the PLA's Special Operations Forces (SOF). According to the US Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2025, Beijing is attempting to overcome the limitation of brigades subordinate to individual army groups. Historically, the structure consisted of 13 brigades (one for each army group), with a total estimated strength of approximately 45,000 personnel.

However, in the second half of 2025, a disturbing sign emerged for OSINT analysts: the official designation of many of these brigades disappeared from state media.

This disappearance probably indicates the elimination of units considered inefficient or their merger into new centralized commands under the Operational Theaters. The transition from a super infantry model to a true special operations force is hampered by the fact that many of these brigades were created simply by converting elite infantry regiments, which lacked the technological and doctrinal DNA necessary for missions outside their area. The disappearance of a specific brigade from the army group, mentioned in reports from September 2025, confirms that the PLA is still searching for a stable organizational form, which is creating a period of vulnerability and confusion in command and control.

The burden of corruption and the limitations of the system of systems

One factor that must be monitored very carefully is the impact of corruption on combat readiness. Despite purges, the Chinese military system suffers from distortions that directly affect elite units. Corruption in the PLA is not only about the diversion of funds, but is also reflected in the quality of equipment and the accuracy of training data. In a context where SOF are supposed to operate as a system of systems, the manipulation of results for political career purposes among middle management casts doubt on the reliability of units in real stress situations. The Pentagon's 2025 report points out that, despite the introduction of technologies such as exoskeletons and support drones, the chain of command can break down when put to the test in a raid where there is no margin for error.

Technological and doctrinal gaps in air and naval support

While the United States has the 160th SOAR Regiment for silent air infiltration, China is only beginning to test special formations. During the parade on September 3, 2025, special mission aircraft based on the Y-9 platform (electronic warfare and anti-submarine versions) were presented, escorted by J-16 fighters. Although these assets are critical to the defense of Chinese airspace, they are not yet integrated into a long-range offensive projection doctrine.

Furthermore, there is a discrepancy between the various branches of the military. While the Navy (PLAN) has the Jiaolong commandos and the Air Force (PLAAF) has recently formed a specific unit for search and rescue behind enemy lines, coordination between these branches remains more of an academic exercise than an operational reality. The Chinese Marine Corps, despite having a special operations brigade, is still focused on regional amphibious assaults rather than high-value capture operations in distant territories.

 160° SOAR

Conclusions

In conclusion, evidence gathered in 2025 indicates that Chinese special forces are in a critical transition phase. The suppression of historic units, persistent corruption, and a lack of real combat experience (the so-called experience gap) render the PLA incapable of conducting an operation similar to the one that led to the demise of Osama bin Laden or the capture of Maduro. Beijing has the tools for high-intensity conflict in its own backyard, but for a global surgical strike, it still lacks the foundations of reliable human intelligence and stealthy special transport capabilities.