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Ukraine discovered that a factory produces Iranian-designed drones using Chinese components and labor from East Africa

Russia seeks to increase Shahed UAVs production to gain advantage in Ukraine. Chronology of Chinese support for Russia

Kyiv earlier in May gained footage of a high-tech college and manufacturing complex Alabuga that produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for the Russian military, reported The Wall Street Journal (WSJ).

Credit GettyImages

The facility that relies on Iranian design and logistics networks, Chinese components and workforce from East Africa is believed to provide Moscow with long-term advantage in drone warfare that has proved itself to be critical in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Over the time of the conflict, Russia has launched over 4,000 Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones, according to the Ukrainian military. According to the report citing senior Biden administration officials, China provided Russia with "optics, microelectronics and other dual-use materials that could be used in drones, along with other military hardware."

Russian business executives sealed the deal to build the Shahed drone plant in late 2022 when they flew to Tehran with "a lucrative offer," said WSJ. Namely, Moscow offered to pay $1.7 billion in gold bars.

"The unusual terms, corroborated by The Wall Street Journal with U.S. security officials, were revealed in February by a hacker group called the Prana Network, which said it broke into email servers associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [(IRGC)]," read the report.

The Alabuga facility is expected to churn out 6,000 Shahed attack drones a year, in addition to surveillance drones, according to the leaked documents. Russian troops are training to operate the UAVs in Syria with the IRGC and Hezbollah instructors, according to Ukrainian military intelligence and a former Syrian officer with conflict-monitor group Etana.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy earlier in April warned that Ukraine would soon run out of air-defense missiles if the intensity of the Russian strikes continued. With the Alabuga factory, Moscow has gained an opportunity to produce its own warheads instead of waiting for Iranian ones, speeding up production of combat-ready weapons.

China supports the Russian war

  • April 15, 2024 Reuters reports that the Russian Copper Company (RCC) and Chinese firms have disguised the trade of copper wire between Russia and China as scrap metal to avoid taxes and in an attempt to avoid reputational harm in light of recent sanctions prohibiting imports of Russian copper into the United States and United Kingdom. Chinese customs data shows China has imported significantly more copper scrap from Russia since December 2023.

  • April 12, 2024 A report by the Financial Times cites  senior U.S. officials saying China supplied 90 percent of microchips  imported by Russia in 2023, and that these microchips were in tanks, missiles, and aircraft. The U.S. officials add that China is helping Russia to improve its satellite and space-based capabilities and providing satellite imagery to help Russia conduct war in Ukraine. Chinese entities are also “likely providing” Russia with nitrocellulose, a substance used to make propellants for weapons. The Chinese embassy in the United States disputes these claims and insists that China has “not provided weaponry to any party.”

  • February 23, 2024 U.S. Department of Commerce adds eight entities from China to its Entity List for activities supporting Russia’s defense-industrial sector and war effort. Five of the eight entities allegedly facilitated the diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia’s military and intelligence authorities, while two others allegedly procured U.S.-origin machine tools, electronics test equipment, and machine tool spare parts for Russian end-users.

  • February 23, 2024 The European Union approves its 13th package of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions includes three Chinese firms and one Hong Kong-based company due to their role in trading electronic components of EU-origin products to Russia.

  • February 22, 2024 The UK announces sanctions targeting individuals and businesses sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine, including three Chinese companies. According to the UK Government, China’s Finder Technology and Juhang Aviation Technology allegedly supplied sanctioned electronics to Russia, and Beijing Micropilot Flight Control Systems’ unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) engines were found in UAVs used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

  • January 11, 2024 The Kyiv School of Economics releases a joint study with the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions that details how Russia continues to import components for military production despite current export controls. According to the study, supply chains for battlefield goods and critical components shifted in large part because of current export controls. Russia now imports most of these goods from China.  

  • December 20, 2023 Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention includes the China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC)  on its list of “international war sponsors” for its continued construction of subways, bridges, and highways in Russia.   

  • December 12, 2023 The U.S. Department of Treasury designates a network of entities and individuals based in China, Russia, Hong Kong, and Pakistan for their involvement in the procurement and facilitation of Chinese-manufactured weapons and technologies to Russia. The Treasury sanctions Chinese national Hu Xiaoxun and his China-based private defense company Jarvis H K Co., Ltd. for coordinating a network of associates to circumvent U.S. sanctions and Chinese controls on the export of military-related materials. Hu’s company allegedly transferred funds for ammunition, loitering munitions, and semiconductor microchip manufacturing equipment. Treasury also designates 7 Chinese entities for shipments to Russia that support its war efforts in Ukraine such as providing high-resolution observation satellite imagery, advanced electronics, electronic components, and technological equipment and machine tools.

  • December 7, 2023 Data provided by China’s General Administration of Customs  shows China-Russia trade reached $218.2 billion between January and November 2023, surpassing the total for all of 2022. 

  • December 3, 2023 Russia’s military purchases 500 Chinese Desertcross 1000-3 utility terrain vehicles manufactured by Shandong Odes Industry. Russian news Agency TASS reports that Russia’s military already has around 537 basic models of the Chinese-made vehicles in service and plans to procure another 1000 in the first quarter of 2024. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu notes the vehicles are “extremely in demand.” 

  • October 18, 2023 Russian export company, EPT, signed a 12-year contract  with China’s Chengtong State Corporation to export 70 million tons of grain, legumes, and oilseeds to China. Since the start of 2023 Russian grain exports to have reportedly grown to a record 3.5 million tons as of September 24, higher than the 2.2 million tons exported in all of 2022.

  • August, 2023 The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Oil Market Report released in August 2023 reports that crude oil exports from Russia to China and India accounted for 80% of Russian shipments in July, though below reported levels in June.

  • June 9, 2023 According to the Wall Street Journal, in June 2023, shipments of eight unarmed  “Tiger” armored trucks produced by Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicles Manufacturing Co., Ltd appear in a video posted by Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, who has contributed troops and equipment to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

  • April 18, 2023 Bloomberg reports that Russian officials “privately raised concerns” in Summer 2022 about becoming dependent on Chinese technologies following U.S. and European sanctions. A “previously unreported assessment” from the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media states that Russian officials are concerned about companies such as Huawei dominating the Russian market and posing “a risk to the country’s information security and networks.” European officials “familiar with the document” say that the assessment was shared among the Russian General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Russian Security Council.

  • April 14, 2023 Reuters reports that according to Russian customs data, Chinese firm Quzhou Nova purchased $7.4 million worth of copper alloy from a Russian-annexed region of Ukraine between October 8, 2022 and March 24, 2023. Debaltsevsky Plant of Metallurgical Engineering, located in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, produces the copper alloy ingots. According to Reuters, the Russian Federal customs service cannot share information since it is confidential, and the Kremlin did not confirm if the purchase of the cooper alloy took place, claiming it has no information on the matter.

  • March 21, 2023 The New York Times reports that Russia has purchased $12 million worth of drones from Chinese manufacturers, including DJI Technology and Autel, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

  • March 16, 2023 Politico reports that according to customs data, China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO) sent 1,000 CQ-A rifles to Russia between June and December 2022. Politico also reports that Chinese companies sent 12 tons of body armor to Russia over the same time period. In November and December 2022, DJI Technology sent 12 shipments of drone parts to Russia, routing the shipments through the United Arab Emirates according to the report.

  • March 1, 2023 MMC Norilsk Nickel, Russia’s largest mining company, is accepting payment denominated in Renminbi (RMB) for its sales of nickel to China, according to Bloomberg. Russian companies’ ability to transact in dollars, in which the vast majority of commodities trading is priced, have been severely curtailed under U.S. and partner countries’ financial sanctions on Russia. MMC Norilsk Nickel’s willingness to accept prices set in RMB will likely boost its sales to China. In 2022, 14 percent of Russia’s total exports were paid for in RMB, an increase from 0.4 percent at the beginning of that year. Over the same period, bilateral trade rose to $190 billion, a 30 percent increase compared to 2021.

  • February 25, 2023 Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns confirms in a CBS News interview that China is considering sending lethal aid to Russia to support the Kremlin’s efforts in Ukraine. He says that China has yet to decide on transferring lethal equipment to Russia, and that there are no “actual shipments of lethal equipment” found yet.

  • February 14, 2023 Reuters and Bloomberg report that Chinese state-owned petrochemical giants Sinopec, PetroChina, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) are resuming purchases of Russian crude oil. China’s major state-owned petrochemical companies had halted purchases of Russian crude after the G7, the EU, and Australia first implemented a price cap mechanism on December 5, 2022, which is aimed at limiting the revenue Russia receives on oil exports. Oil importers that purchase oil above a set price will be ineligible for shipping and services, including insurance, from G7 -based companies. However, the cargoes purchased by these Chinese refiners are purchased through trading companies that arrange payments to Russian oil producers as well as insurance and shipping, side-stepping the limitation imposed by the price cap mechanism. Oil industry consultants Energy Aspects estimate that China’s daily imports of Russian oil may rise by 500,000 barrels or more over the course of the year, reaching 2.2 million barrels per day. China’s total crude imports are projected to reach as high as 11.8 million barrels per day.

  • February 4, 2023 The Wall Street Journal reports that multiple Chinese state-owned and non-state companies have exported military and dual-use technology items to Russian defense companies. According to the Journal’s review of Russian import and transshipment records compiled by U.S. think tank C4ADS, these transactions include $1.2 million worth of SU-35 jet fighter components sold by Chinese state-owned aerospace firm AVIC International Holdings Corp, whose parent company Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) is included on the U.S. Treasury Department’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List. China also exported over $128 million in computer chips and chip components to Russia between April and October 2022, according to the Journal.

  • January 26, 2023 The U.S. Treasury Department adds Changsha Tianyi Space Science and Technology Research Institute (Spacety China) and its Luxembourg-based subsidiary to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list after it provided support to Russia’s military industrial base. Treasury asserts that Russia-based technology firm Terra Tech procured high-resolution satellite images from Spacety China to support the combat operations of Russian proxy private military company Wagner Group. Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for China’s Embassy in the United States, subsequently states that Treasury’s determination “has no factual basis, but is purely speculative and deliberately hyped up.”

  • January 26, 2023 Google’s Threat Analysis Group claims that the pro-Chinese influence campaign DRAGONBRIDGE disseminated narratives about the war in Ukraine on social media in 2022. Google’s Threat Analysis Group says that DRAGONBRIDGE pushes narratives criticizing the U.S. for sending military equipment to Ukraine and “worsening the conflict.”

  • January 10, 2023 Financial Times reports that an anonymous Chinese official said Russian President Vladimir Putin is “crazy.” The official also asserts that China shouldn’t “simply follow Russia,” and acknowledges that only a handful of Russian officials made the decision to invade.

  • December 9, 2022 Bloomberg and Reuters report that China’s independent oil refiners may be purchasing oil above a price cap on Russian crude oil that the Group of Seven industrialized nations (G7) introduced on December 5. The cargoes purchased by these Chinese refiners are likely insured and transported by Russian oil sellers, side-stepping the price cap mechanism’s proscription on G7-based companies providing shipping, insurance, and other services to purchasers that pay above the cap.

  • November 29, 2022 Newsweek reports that Russian An-124 transport aircraft visited China nine times within seven days in November. The article repeats claims in an article by the Ukrainian military news outlet Defense Express that for some flights the aircraft turned off their transponders, and that internet users speculated the cargo included military aid. On November 24, China’s state-owned news agency Xinhua reported that three Russian An-124 planes landed at Zhengzhou Airport on November 23 and that airport staff “loaded several hundred tons of cross-border e-commerce and clothing goods into the cargo hold… These items will fly directly from Zhengzhou Airport to Moscow with the cargo plane, and will soon be sent to the homes of local people.”

  • November 2, 2022 Russian forces use Iranian-made suicide drones with Chinese knock-off parts to attack Ukrainian cities. The Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drone use an engine by Beijing MicroPilot Flight Control Systems, which is a copy of the German aerospace company Limbach Flugmotoren’s engine design. Aside from indigenously producing the engines China also exports the designs to Iran.

  • September 6, 2022 Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation agrees to pay for half of the gas it buys from Russian company Gazprom using renminbi (RMB), and will use rubles for the other half. Shifting towards gas payments denominated in rubles and RMB supports Russian efforts to stabilize the value of the ruble and reduce the use of dollars and euros when settling international transactions. Russian businesses and financial institutions have struggled to access dollars due to Western sanctions imposed in response to its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

  • August 24, 2022 Bloomberg reports that Russia’s Ministry of Finance is considering issuing government bonds denominated in RMB, although it has not announced plans to do so in 2022. Russia has considered issuing RMB-denominated bonds since Russian companies were impacted by sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

  • August 18, 2022 The research unit of SWIFT, the financial messaging system, finds that Russia’s use of RMB to settle international transactions has skyrocketed since its invasion of Ukraine. According to the monthly reports released by SWIFT, Russia surpassed Singapore as the third-largest market for overseas transactions denominated in RMB, behind Hong Kong and London. In July 2022 Russia was responsible for 3.9 percent of all payments using RMB outside of China, compared to less than 1 percent in January 2022. Russian businesses and financial institutions may be exploring opportunities to use RMB in their international transactions after international sanctions curtailed Russian banks’ access to U.S. dollars and euros.

  • August 8, 2022 Bloomberg reports that Chinese exports to Russia in July were valued at $6.7 billion, which is comparable to the level of Chinese exports to Russia from before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bloomberg notes that some “Chinese goods are filling the niche left by the exodus of western brands,” particularly with vehicle sales from Great Wall Motor Co. and Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd, which now rank among Russia’s best-selling cars. Rising local Russian demand for Chinese currency also drove RMB-ruble currency trade to its highest ever volume in July.

  • July 29, 2022 RUSAL, a Russian aluminum producer listed on the Hong Kong and Moscow exchanges, issues the first ever RMB-denominated bond in Russia. Alexei Grenkov, Head Corporate Finance of RUSAL, explains that “the Yuan [RMB] is a good alternative to traditional foreign exchange investments” to meet the growing demand from Russian banks and private investors for financial instruments that help them circumvent sanctions and the dollar-denominated financial system. International sanctions on Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine have isolated many Russian banks from western financial institutions. Aluminum Insider reports that three Russian banks, Gazprombank, Credit Bank of Moscow, and Bank Zenit, managed the bond’s issuance.

  • July 26, 2022 South China Morning Post reports that China’s People’s Liberation Army has sent military tanks and a delegation to Russia to participate in Russia’s International Army Games in August. China has participated in each iteration of the International Army Games since the Russian Defense Ministry hosted the first event in 2015.

  • July 21, 2022 CIA director William Burns asserts that China is learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lessons that may apply to an invasion of Taiwan. He notes that China recognizes the need to have an initial overwhelming force for a decisive victory,  to control the information space, and to shore up its domestic economy against sanctions.

  • July 20, 2022 Bloomberg reports that China imported 72 percent more Russian oil and gas in June 2022 than a year earlier, amounting to $6.4 billion. China has imported $25.3 billion in Russian energy between March and June 2022. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, China has overtaken Germany as the largest purchaser of Russian oil, and in June 2022, Russia replaced Saudi Arabia as China’s largest crude oil supplier.

  • July 15, 2022 The Wall Street Journal reports that China’s exports of microchips, other electronic components, and raw materials to Russia have more than doubled in the first five months of 2022, compared to the same period in 2021. Many of these exports have military applications. The Journal states that China may be backfilling orders from Russia for defense-related components after Western nations cut off exports to Russia’s defense industrial base.

  • June 28, 2022 The U.S. Department of Commerce adds five Chinese companies to the Entity List over their continued support of Russia’s military efforts since Russia invaded Ukraine despite export controls aimed at blocking Russia’s access to dual-use technology and equipment. The Department of Commerce also identifies two additional Chinese companies already included on the Entity List who are supplying the Russian military. The Department of Commerce stated in March 2022 that it would add any entities to the Entity List that provide support to the Russian and Belarusian security services, militaries, and defense industrial bases.

  • June 28, 2022 Reuters reports that Indian companies are increasingly using renminbi (RMB) to pay for coal imports from Russia. According to an Indian customs document reviewed by Reuters, India’s UltraTech Cement purchased 157,000 tons of coal from Russia’s SUEK using RMB. An Indian government official who spoke with Reuters, stated that “the use of the yuan to settle payments for imports from countries other than China was rare until now, and could increase due to sanctions on Russia.” It may be difficult for Indian companies to acquire RMB for transactions with Russia, however, as People’s Bank of China’s interbank foreign exchange trading platform does not currently process direct exchanges of rupee for renminbi.

  • June 20, 2022 Russia becomes China’s largest oil supplier as Chinese state-owned petrochemical companies such as Sinopec and Zhenhua Oil increased purchases of cheap Russian crude oil. Business Insider notes that Russian oil sales to China have offset lost revenue from the decline in Western imports due to Western sanctions on Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Chinese imports of Russian oil in May of 2022 increased by 55 percent from the same month the previous year, after climbing just 4 percent year-on-year in April 2022.

  • May 27, 2022 The RBK Daily reports that the Civil Aviation Administration of China is barring Russian airlines from flying foreign-owned Boeing and Airbus aircraft in its airspace. Sources who spoke with RBK said that China is requiring Russian airlines to provide evidence that their Boeing and Airbus planes are de-registered abroad, showing proof that they are Russian-owned. While many of the planes operated by Russian airlines are leased from international lessors, Russia passed a law in March permitting Russian airlines to dual register these aircraft in Russia and continue service, in violation of international law. Russian-operated Boeing and Airbus aircraft are also impacted by U.S. and EU export controls, including prohibitions on providing maintenance components, which has raised safety concerns from other aviation authorities. The United States has also identified a list of noncompliant aircraft operated by Russian entities and could take enforcement actions against “any person, anywhere” who provides any services, even refueling, to these aircraft.

  • May 27, 2022 Bloomberg reports that China International United Petroleum & Chemical Co., a subsidiary of state-owned Sinopec, has hired ten additional tankers to transport Russian crude oil loaded at Kozmino port. It is not yet clear if these ships will deliver oil to Chinese ports.

  • May 19, 2022 The Wall Street Journal reports that the CCP’s Central Organization Department issued an internal notice in March that bars ministerial-level officials’ spouses and their children from holding overseas real estate and equity in foreign companies, largely prevents senior officials and their immediate families from setting up accounts with overseas financial institutions, and requires officials to sign pledges complying with the bans. It is not clear at the moment if the rules apply retroactively to the current overseas holdings of senior cadres. The Journal says that the rules may be intended to reduce the exposure of top officials to the kinds of sanctions targeting Russian oligarchs.

  • May 19, 2022 Bloomberg reports that China and Russia are holding bilateral talks on government purchases of crude oil to replenish China’s strategic petroleum reserves. These discussions are reportedly at the government level with little involvement from oil companies. According to the data and analytics firm, Kpler, China has “room to replenish stocks and it would be a good opportunity for them to do so” because the price of Russian crude oil has fallen due to western sanctions.

  • May 16, 2022 U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo says that the United States is not “seeing systematic efforts by China to go around our export controls,” and China’s technology exports to Russia, including product categories covered by the export controls, have declined sharply. In March 2022, China’s exports of laptops to Russia fell 40 percent year-on-year. Raimondo also reports that exports of telecommunications network equipment to Russia were down by 98 percent, while smartphone shipments also fell roughly two-thirds.

  • May 6, 2022 PetroChina states that it is not seeking discounted Russian oil and gas, and is only buying through existing contracts. Chief Financial Officer Chai Shouping said deals with Russia are operating normally, and that transactions continue to be settled in U.S. dollars or euros despite international sanctions against several Russian banks. PetroChina is the traded unit of China National Petroleum Corp.

  • May 6, 2022 Taiwan imposes export controls on goods going to Belarus. Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Wu sad that the sanctions against Belarus showed Taiwan’s solidarity with Europe. Taiwan previously implemented similar controls on Taiwanese exports to Russia on February 15, 2022.

  • May 3, 2022 The Financial Times reports that some independent oil refiners in China are stealthily buying Russian oil at a discount, refraining from publicly reporting the deals out of fear of being hit by U.S. sanctions. Independent refiners have taken over some of the purchase quotas held by China’s state-owned commodity trading firms. The FT also tracks a modest increase in Russian oil shipped to China, with some shipments massing through Europe. Shipbrokers and operators in European ports are consolidating Russian Urals crude in supertankers via ship-to-ship transfers before sending the oil to East Asia.

  • April 21, 2022 Bloomberg reports that the Chinese state-owned petrochemical companies CNOOC, China National Petroleum Corporation, and Sinopec are in joint discussions to purchase Shell’s 27.5 percent stake in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas facilities, after Shell announced it will exit major equity partnerships in Russia.

  • April 13, 2022 Reuters reports that the state-owned energy company CNOOC plans to sell its “marginal and hard to manage” assets in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada due to increased concern that it could be targeted by sanctions.

  • April 6, 2022 Reuters reports Chinese state-owned petrochemical companies Sinopec, CNOOC, PetroChina, and Sinochem are avoiding new oil contracts with Russian suppliers. While these companies continue to carry out transactions with Russia oil exporters under existing contracts, they are worried that new spot deals “could be seen as representing [actions by] the Chinese government, and none of them wants to be singled out as a buyer of Russian oil,” according to Reuters’ source. Reuters also reports that China’s independent refiners have continued to buy Russian oil in secretive deals using “alternative payment mechanisms such as cash transfer, paying after cargo is delivered and using Chinese currency” to avoid attracting scrutiny. Bloomberg reported on March 24, 2022 that nonstate refiners have privately negotiated orders for Russian oil to be shipped in May 2022.

  • April 5, 2022 Oleg Tishakov, a board member of Russia’s National Card Payment System (NSPK), the operator of the Mir bank card network, says NSPK has found new Chinese suppliers of microchips needed in Mir bank cards, and the organization is currently certifying these new suppliers. Tishakov says that the NSPK faces a shortage of components for issuing new Mir bank cards as their supplies from Europe have been impacted by sanctions while supplies from Asia have been hampered by pandemic-related factory shutdowns.

  • March 30, 2022 Bloomberg and Reuters report CNOOC is considering selling its assets in the United Kingdom’s North Sea oil and gas fields, which are valued at as much as $3 billion. Industry executives who spoke with Reuters say that the sale discussion are part of a reevaluation of its global assets, and there is concern that CNOOC’s investments could be impacted by future sanctions.

  • March 24, 2022 Bloomberg reports that Chinese nonstate refiners, which account for one-quarter of China’s processing capacity, continue to place new orders for oil loaded at Russia’s eastern port of Kozmino.

  • March 9, 2022 The Financial Times reports that Chinese cell phone manufacturers Huawei, Xiaomi, and Oppo have cut back cell phone shipments to Russia by over 50 percent due to the risk that secondary sanctions could be imposed on China.

  • February 28, 2022 As the United States and EU impose the SWIFT ban on Russia, Russian state media boosts the narrative that Russia-China financial relations can grow closer and Russia might turn to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments (CIPS) messaging system, a SWIFT alternative. Some Chinese media also publishes commentary on the potential for Russia to use CIPS and work with Russia’s own messaging system, the SPFS. Neither state officials nor Chinese state media are amplifying the narrative, implying that this is not an established position.

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