China's Biotech Threat: A "Potential Agro-Terrorism Weapon" Found in U.S.

Two Chinese nationals, Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu, are facing charges in the United States for smuggling "Fusarium graminearum," a fungus identified as a potential agro-terrorist weapon. This raises concerns about China's biotech ambitions, fueled by its significant food security challenges and its propensity to engage in espionage of agricultural genetic technologies. The incident highlights the urgent need for Western countries to protect intellectual property and sensitive biotech data from state threats

Two Chinese nationals, Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu, have been accused in the United States of illicitly introducing the fungus "Fusarium graminearum," which is considered a potential agro-terrorism weapon. The U.S. Department of Justice identified the individuals as Yunqing Jian, 33, and Zunyong Liu, 34, both citizens of the People's Republic of China. Authorities allege they received funding from the Chinese government for their research, some of which was conducted at the University of Michigan.

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China's Food Security Challenges and Agricultural Ambitions

China faces increasing demands on its agricultural production, which it seeks to address through policy, technology, and economic activities. In 2021, China imported a record 28.35 million metric tons (mmt) of corn, a 152 percent increase from 2020 and more than 10 percent of its estimated total corn consumption. The China Academy of Social Sciences' 2020 Rural Development Institute report projected a "grain shortfall of about 130 mmt, including about 25 mmt of staple food grain" by the end of 2025.

Diminishing arable land, shifting demographics, and natural disasters exacerbate these trends, posing significant food security challenges for Chinese leaders. In response, China has implemented domestic policies to promote food security and reduce food waste, both priorities for General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping since he assumed power. Under his rule, the government has also established policies to expand domestic farmland and leverage innovations in agricultural technologies, such as genetically modified (GM) seed lines, all aimed at bolstering food security.

However, the Chinese government's domestic efforts are not sufficient to solve China's problems. Recognizing these challenges, China has also sought solutions abroad through investments and acquisitions of farmland, animal husbandry operations, agricultural equipment, and intellectual property (IP), particularly related to GM seeds. The United States, as a global leader in these fields, is a prime trading partner and often a target of China's efforts to strengthen its agriculture sector and food security, sometimes through illicit means.

These efforts present several risks to U.S. economic and national security. For example, Chinese companies acquiring hog herds in the United States may save China money and enhance its domestic capacity, but this could also reduce China's need for U.S.-sourced production and redistribute the environmental effects of hog waste to U.S. communities. Further consolidations and Chinese investments in U.S. agricultural assets could grant China undue leverage over U.S. supply chains. China's access to U.S. agricultural IP may also erode U.S. competitiveness in agriculture technology that supports food production. Additionally, China's illicit acquisitions of GM seeds provide a jumpstart to its own development of such seeds, deprive U.S. companies of revenue, and offer an opportunity to discover vulnerabilities in U.S. crops.

The Threat of Fusarium graminearum

Fusarium graminearum causes "head blight," a devastating disease affecting key crops like wheat, barley, corn, and rice. The FBI estimates this disease leads to billions of dollars in economic losses globally each year, posing a significant threat to food security and the agricultural economy.

The Allegations and Deception

According to the complaint, Jian's electronic devices contained information indicating her allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party. Liu, Jian's boyfriend, reportedly works at a Chinese university researching the same pathogen. Initially, Liu allegedly denied illegally bringing the fungus into the U.S. via Detroit Metropolitan Airport but later admitted to it. His goal was to conduct research on it at the University of Michigan lab where Jian worked.

U.S. Attorney Jerome Gorgan stressed the severity: "The alleged actions of these Chinese nationals, including a loyal member of the Chinese Communist Party, represent one of the gravest national security concerns. These two foreign nationals have been accused of smuggling a fungus, described as a 'potential agro-terrorism weapon,' into the heartland of the United States, where they apparently intended to use a University of Michigan laboratory to further their scheme."

The Role of Border Security

Marty C. Raybon, Director of Field Operations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, highlighted CBP's critical role: "The criminal charges filed today against Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu are indicative of CBP’s crucial role in protecting the American people from biological threats that could devastate our agricultural economy and cause harm to humans; especially when it involves a researcher from a major university attempting to smuggle potentially harmful biological materials into the United States."

The charging affidavit details Liu's entry into the U.S. on July 27, 2024. He initially claimed he was visiting and had no work materials. However, a secondary inspection of his luggage revealed tissues concealing a Chinese note, a filter paper, and four plastic bags with reddish plant material. After initially denying knowledge of the materials, Liu admitted to intentionally hiding them in his backpack, aware of import restrictions. His aim was to evade CBP and continue his research in the United States.

China's Ambiguous Biotechnological Ambitions

This incident is part of a broader trend of escalating concerns about China's use of biotechnology for military purposes. Intelligence reports, like Extrema Ratio's "Is the Future of Biotechnology Chinese? Biological Warfare Risks and Global Security," warn of potential development of pathogens, bioweapons, and even genetically modified, AI-enhanced "super soldiers."

Recently, agricultural genetic technologies have also attracted Chinese espionage for dual civilian and military use. By acquiring genetic code data on crops, China could bolster its own agricultural production, but it could also take a more sinister path. As one expert from the Chinese Academy of Sciences noted, "an important characteristic of genetically modified technology is that reverse engineering is very easy to achieve." Similar to hacking computer code, Beijing could easily "hack" the code or DNA of U.S. GMO seeds to wage biological warfare by creating blights that destroy crops. For example, biotechnology experts have acknowledged that fungal spores "could be used as biological warfare agents to target staple crops." Notably, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., the Chinese government also began expressing concern about bioterrorism and increasing its focus on biosecurity measures.

The case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, Canada, further suggests potential collaborations between Chinese scientists and the military in sensitive areas. U.S. officials warn that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is determined to weaponize biotechnology. China is reportedly already using genomic surveillance to identify, track, and control Uyghur Muslims, part of a broader system of technologically-driven genocide.

The CCP has long prioritized human genomic data collection. Estimates from 2020 indicate Beijing possesses genomic data for 140 million people, the largest such database globally. Beyond its own citizens, it has collected human genomic data abroad. The alarming case of a Chinese scientist who produced genetically modified babies and, after a brief imprisonment, has already returned to the lab, adds to these concerns.

Through its military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, the CCP aims to use biotechnology-based troops – defining this human-machine collaboration as "intelligent warfare" – to transform the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a "world-class military" by 2049. The prospect of facing genetically modified PLA "super-soldiers" with fused human and artificial intelligence seriously prompts the West to open its eyes to Beijing's biotechnological ambitions. It's crucial to defend intellectual property and biotechnological data from state-sponsored Chinese corporate espionage, even if it means declining attractive investments. Chinese state-owned enterprises can no longer be treated as normal competitors in the domestic market, even if it means resorting to more costly alternatives.