China's New Air Doctrine: A Dangerous Escalation Incompatible with International Law. "Open Fire if Warning is Ineffective". A Strengthened U.S. Perspective

This report holds significant relevance for several key reasons, making it important for foreign policy and defense analysts, as well as for the public interested in geopolitical dynamics:

Strategic and Geopolitical Relevance

1. Assessment of Chinese Intentions: The report provides a U.S. perspective on China's military doctrine, particularly its new and more aggressive "open fire if warning is ineffective" policy. Understanding how the United States interprets these intentions is crucial for foreign policy and defense planning.

2. Escalation Risk: It highlights the serious risks of miscalculation and escalation in already tense regions such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. This is fundamental for assessing the likelihood of future conflicts and for developing prevention strategies.

3. Chinese Military Modernization: It integrates up-to-date data (from 2024-2025 Pentagon reports) on China's impressive and rapid military modernization, including nuclear armaments, naval power, and advanced air capabilities. This offers an overview of the challenges facing the United States and its allies.

4. Incompatibility with International Law: It underscores the concern that China's policy of using internal regulations to justify the use of force against foreign military aircraft conflicts with international law. This is a critical point for the debate on freedom of navigation and the maintenance of the rules-based order.

5. Crisis Communication: It analyzes the problematic issue of military hotlines and China's historical reluctance to use them during crises. This aspect is fundamental for understanding the difficulties in de-escalation and incident management.

Policy and Defense Relevance

1. Guidance for Policymakers: It provides a foundation for U.S. policymakers in formulating strategic responses to China's growing military assertiveness.

2. Intelligence Analysis: It offers a synthesis of relevant information and analysis for the intelligence community monitoring developments in the Indo-Pacific region.

3. Cooperation with Allies: The concerns expressed in the report directly impact U.S. cooperation with its regional allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines), reinforcing the need for joint defense strategies.

4. Impact on Defense Budget: Chinese military capabilities and their strategic implications directly influence U.S. defense budget decisions and investment priorities in new technologies and platforms.

Public and Educational Relevance

1. Public Awareness: It helps to inform the public about complex geopolitical scenarios and the security challenges facing the United States, promoting a greater understanding of foreign policy decisions.

2. Academic and Analytical Debate: It can serve as a starting point for further research and discussions in academia and among foreign policy experts, stimulating new analyses and perspectives.

In summary, this report is a crucial tool for understanding what is at stake in the strategic competition between the United States and China, highlighting the challenges and risks associated with Beijing's growing military assertiveness and its potential incompatibility with international norms.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

Abstract

The recent adoption by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of the "open fire if warning is ineffective" policy marks a concerning escalation in Beijing's air defense doctrine. This policy, presented by China as a necessary response to growing external "provocations" and bolstered by its significant military modernization (such as nuclear and naval expansion, highlighted in 2024-2025 Pentagon reports), is perceived by the United States as an assertive move that increases the risks of miscalculation and escalation in already tense regions like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's application of internal police regulations, such as the "Regulations on the Use of Police Equipment and Weapons by the People's Police," to justify the use of force against foreign military aircraft in contested airspace is considered incompatible with international law and established norms on freedom of navigation and overflight. This new doctrine raises serious concerns for regional stability and the safety of routine air and naval operations conducted by the United States and its allies in accordance with international law.

China's New Air Doctrine: "Open Fire if Warning is Ineffective" – A Strengthened U.S. Perspective

The recent adoption by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of the "open fire if warning is ineffective" policy represents a significant shift in Beijing's air defense doctrine. This move, perceived by the United States as a strategic escalation, signals China's transition from primarily defensive measures to a more aggressive approach in safeguarding its national sovereignty and airspace security. While China presents it as a defensive measure based on legal authorization and enhanced military capabilities, from a U.S. perspective, it introduces new and serious risks of miscalculation and escalation in already tense regions, particularly in the context of China's accelerating military modernization and regional ambitions.

Perceived Context and Motivations for the Policy Change

From a U.S. standpoint, China's policy shift is the result of a combination of factors, including escalating geopolitical tensions, Beijing's assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, and the accelerated modernization of its armed forces. The U.S. Department of Defense closely monitors these developments, as highlighted in the December 2024 annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (CMPR).

Pressure from External Provocations (From a Chinese Perspective)

China asserts that this policy is a response to increased reconnaissance and "provocation" activities by foreign aircraft, particularly U.S. aircraft, in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Beijing complains about close-in operations and what it terms "dangerous maneuvers" like "vertical dives" and "radar locking" within its self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). From our perspective, these are routine operations conducted in international airspace in accordance with international law, essential for freedom of navigation and maintaining regional stability.

Statements from the U.S. Department of State, including during meetings like the Australia-United Kingdom Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) in July 2025, reiterate strong opposition to the "coercive or destabilizing activities by Chinese Coast Guard, naval vessels, and maritime militia in the South China Sea, including shoulder-to-shoulder swerving, water cannons, and close-in maneuvers that have caused injuries, endangered lives, and created risks of miscalculation." This underscores our perception that China is already employing aggressive tactics, and that the new policy could exacerbate such behaviors.

Accelerated Development of National Defense Capabilities

The remarkable advancement of China's military capabilities is undeniable and provides the material basis for this new assertiveness. The CMPR 2024 estimates that China surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads by mid-2024 and is projected to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030, many of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. This expansion also includes a greater number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers than the U.S., though not all Chinese silos are armed.

The introduction and batch production of J-20 stealth fighters, the upgrade of J-16 multi-role fighters, and the enhanced range and firepower of H-6K bombers, alongside early warning aircraft like the KJ-500, unmanned reconnaissance drones, and electronic jamming systems, have indeed improved Beijing's ability to operate a coordinated combat network. The CMPR 2024 highlights that the Chinese Navy is on track to achieve 395 battle force ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030, significantly outnumbering the U.S. fleet. This quantitative imbalance, combined with increased quality, suggests that China feels increasingly confident in its air and naval defense capabilities.

Furthermore, U.S. Army General Ronald P. Clark, in a July 2025 statement, observed that China is developing military technologies, capabilities, and procedures at an unprecedented pace and scale, with a focus on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in air and maritime domains against the U.S. and its allies. Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), at the Honolulu Defense Forum in February 2025, warned that the PLAAF's aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are "rehearsals for forced unification, not just military exercises," indicating a more serious interpretation of Chinese capabilities and intentions. He also noted that the PLA increased military pressure on Taiwan by 300% in 2024.

Legal Basis and Rules-Based Strategic Wisdom (From a Chinese Perspective)

China's justification for this policy as a "counterattack based on clear legal authorization" is problematic. While Beijing cites its "Regulations on the Use of Police Equipment and Weapons by the People's Police" to justify the use of force against acts that "seriously endanger public safety," the application of such regulations to international military air operations in contested airspace is a very different matter and is not recognized under international law.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, during talks with his Chinese counterpart in April 2024, "emphasized the importance of upholding freedom of navigation on the high seas guaranteed by international law, especially in the South China Sea." The U.S. will continue to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and routine flights where international law allows, including the Taiwan Strait, as demonstrated by P-8 aircraft transits (July 2025) and U.S. Navy ship passages, despite Chinese objections.

Instances of Concrete Actions and Deterrent Effects (From a Chinese Perspective)

The Chinese document presents certain incidents to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new policy, with claims that require careful evaluation by the United States.

Repelling Foreign Aircraft in the East China Sea

The June 2025 incident, where a Chinese aircraft allegedly "repelled" foreign aircraft in the East China Sea ADIZ using aggressive maneuvers and infrared jammers, is presented as a success. This shift from "passive defense" to "active disabling based on legal authorization" is a clear signal to the U.S. that China is willing to be more assertive in its aerial interactions. The use of aggressive maneuvers raises concerns about safety and the potential for collisions in an already complex environment.

Combat Capabilities of Young Pilots

Stories about young Chinese pilots demonstrating resilience and precision in night interceptions indicate an advanced training program and growing professionalization of the PLAAF. This highlights that China is developing an air force capable of high-intensity, all-weather operations, which contributes to our overall assessment of its deterrence and power projection capabilities.

International Response: From Disregard to Re-evaluation

China's perception of a shift in "international response, from disregard to re-evaluation" is noteworthy. The claim that our senior military officials commented on the PLAAF's shift "from passive defense to active denial" is accurate. China claims that the frequency of "provocations by foreign aircraft" has decreased since the policy's implementation. This suggests Beijing believes it has established a "red line" that has deterred perceived threatening operations. However, from a U.S. perspective, any reduction in flights in contested areas could be a matter of tactical recalibration rather than an acceptance of China's ADIZ claims. China's pursuit of peace "through force" is viewed with caution, as excessive assertiveness could lead to unintended escalations.

In-depth Interpretation of Dual Internal and External Signals

The "open fire if warning is ineffective" policy carries significant implications for both the Chinese domestic audience and the international community.

Internally: Responding to Public Expectations and Building National Defense Consensus

From our analysis, it is clear that this policy also serves a domestic purpose, appeasing a Chinese public that has grown increasingly impatient with what it perceives as weak responses to foreign intrusions. Calls for "concrete actions" from netizens and the promotion of videos and equipment advancements contribute to reinforcing public consensus and confidence in national defense, consolidating government support.

Externally: Clarifying Red Lines and Avoiding Risks of Misjudgment

China claims that the essence of this policy is "to reduce the probability of conflict by clarifying the bottom line." While the intent to avoid miscalculation is commendable, the unilateral nature of China's "red line" in contested air and maritime space increases the potential for incidents. Our concern, as reiterated by INDOPACOM officials, is that an over-reliance on "deterrence to stop war" without robust de-escalation mechanisms and open communication channels could actually increase the risk of an inadvertent conflict, particularly in scenarios of rapid approach or aggressive maneuvers. The CMPR 2024 also highlighted that China and Russia have conducted multiple combined naval and air operations, including bomber patrols near Alaska and Guam, signaling growing military cooperation that adds further complexity to the situation.

Obstacles to Crisis Communication: The Military Hotline Issue

The United States has consistently sought to establish and maintain a military communication hotline with China to prevent strategic miscalculations and effectively manage crises. This stance has been reiterated on numerous occasions by Pentagon and State Department officials, emphasizing the need for open channels for de-escalation. However, the history of interactions between the two countries raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of such mechanisms during critical moments.

China, despite recently agreeing to establish a military hotline with the U.S. during the San Francisco summit between President Xi Jinping and the U.S. President, has shown significant reluctance in the past to utilize it when tensions were at their peak. Historical events such as the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 mid-air collision incident involving a U.S. EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese interceptor are stark examples of this trend. In both cases, Beijing's military leaders categorically refused to answer calls from Washington, rendering the hotline inoperable precisely when it was most needed.

This persistent lack of response during crises suggests that, despite formal agreements, the likelihood of Chinese generals promptly answering U.S. phone calls in future emergencies remains extremely low. From the American perspective, this reluctance to engage in direct and timely communication exponentially increases the risk of uncontrolled escalation, especially in light of the PLAAF's new and more aggressive "open fire if warning is ineffective" policy. Without reliable communication, managing air or naval incidents in contested maritime and air space becomes even more precarious, potentially turning an isolated incident into a broader crisis.

Future Outlook: Balancing Strategic Deterrence and Peaceful Development

The United States will continue to closely monitor the evolution of China's military doctrine, such as its emphasis on expanding capabilities in emerging domains like space and cyberspace, and the integration of drone swarms, as detailed in Pentagon briefings. While China claims its policy adjustment does not aim to seek confrontation but to ensure peaceful development through "deterrence to stop war," the increased defense budget and emphasis on emerging sectors highlight an ambitious national defense strategy. China's rhetoric of "rules first, then the killing blow" is at odds with its selective application of international norms. The United States will continue to operate in accordance with international law and uphold freedom of navigation and overflight in international regions, while striving to maintain open communication channels to manage escalation risks and promote regional stability. The commitment to a peaceful resolution of disputes in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, without the threat or use of force or coercion, remains a fundamental priority of U.S. foreign policy.