China's Strategic Reorganization: From Passive Response to Proactive Shaping of Technological Governance in the Era of Great Competition

The world has entered a phase of profound and structural strategic competition between great powers, where confrontation is no longer limited to the traditional economic or military spheres but is increasingly fought on the ground of technological supremacy and institutional shaping. This new scenario, often described as "targeted decoupling" or "institutional warfare," has triggered a radical transformation in the landscape of global Science and Technology (S&T) governance.

The world has entered a phase of profound and structural strategic competition between great powers, where confrontation is no longer limited to the traditional economic or military spheres but is increasingly fought on the ground of technological supremacy and institutional shaping. This new scenario, often described as "targeted decoupling" or "institutional warfare," has triggered a radical transformation in the landscape of global Science and Technology (S&T) governance.

This article analyzes the genesis of this "new geopolitical normal," explores the new S&T governance framework China is constructing, which is based on a "dual-dimension, multi-category" approach , and outlines the three strategic directions and future actions planned for the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), aimed at enhancing national resilience, institutional shaping capacity, and cooperative global influence.

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The Geopolitical Context: The Transition from Catch-Up to Normative Shaping

The paradigm shift in global S&T governance is driven by the use of technology policy as a lever for national security and geopolitical supremacy. China has moved from the phase of "catch-up development" (追赶式发展) to the phase of "leadership and normative shaping" (引领型塑规).

The Lesson of the U.S. Containment Model

The S&T governance strategy of the United States has evolved from a predominantly cooperative orientation to one focused on competition. Analysis of this approach has provided China with crucial lessons for developing its new framework:

• Towards Allies (EU, Japan, South Korea): The U.S. seeks consolidation through technological alliances and cooperation on standard-setting and supply chain coordination. Instruments like the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and the "Chip Quadripartite Alliance" aim to consolidate the normative framework of the Western bloc.

• Towards Competitors (China): A strategy of all-around containment (全方位遏制) and technological blocking is applied through intensified export control regulations (such as those on advanced chips and semiconductor equipment) , foreign investment review (CFIUS) , and talent restrictions, transforming competition into an institutional contest.

Gaps in the Traditional Chinese System

According to some analysts, the traditional Chinese system, based on the classic “Supply-Demand-Environment” model, while significantly improving internal innovation capacity, has shown clear limitations in a context of geopolitical conflict:

• Insufficient Global Functions. The instrument design focused on optimizing domestic resource allocation, lacking a systematic consideration for adaptability to international rules, global resource mobilization, and transnational risk management mechanisms.

• Weak Competitive Functions. The policy historically emphasized cooperation and openness. Facing "decoupling" and containment, the lack of countermeasure tools and proactive rule-shaping limited the strategic response capability. Although defensive and countermeasure instruments (like the Unreliable Entity List) were introduced, they remained a composite system in evolution, with obvious weaknesses in strategic reserve and coordination.

  
  

The New S&T Governance Framework: "Dual-Dimension, Multi-Category"

To overcome the constraints of inward-oriented policy design, China has adopted a dual-value framework of "internal capacity strengthening – external rule shaping". This "dual-dimension, multi-category" collaborative system marks the fundamental shift toward global governance.

The Internal Dimension: Capacity Strengthening (内生能力强化)

Technological self-reliance (科技自立自強) remains the necessary power base for any global influence. This dimension is supported by traditional instruments but with a renewed strategic focus on increasing resilience and technical autonomy.

• Supply-Side Instruments (供给型). Focus on consolidating the foundation through special projects for basic research, national S&T infrastructure, and high-level talent plans.

• Demand-Side Instruments (需求型). Aim at market pull, such as using government procurement for innovative products and technical market incentive mechanisms.

• Environmental Instruments (环境型). Address institutional optimization, including the reform of research evaluation systems, the creation of regional innovation clusters, and the preliminary exploration of cross-border data governance rules.

  
  

The External Dimension: Rule Shaping (外部规则塑造)

This dimension is crucial for global influence expansion and institutional embedding.

• Countermeasure Instruments (竞争反制型). Provide strategic defense and deterrence against external containment. They include export controls, the Unreliable Entity List (不可靠实体清单), and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (反外国制裁法).

• Rule-Shaping Instruments (规则主导型): Aim to guide the global agenda and gain institutional initiative. They include promoting technical standards (e.g., 5G/6G communication technology international standards) and proposals for AI ethical governance.

• Cooperative Instruments (合作共赢型): Aim to increase soft influence and the provision of technological public goods, through "Belt and Road" S&T platforms and international talent exchange mechanisms.

  
  

The Defensive Legal Arsenal: Logic and Limits of Countermeasures

Countermeasure instruments constitute China's immediate line of defense against external containment actions, developed with a clear logic of deterrence and defense of sovereignty.

The Logic of Legal Shield and Deterrence

The system was created to provide a legal basis for China to counter the improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws and sanctions.

• The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (2021): Allows Chinese authorities to sanction individuals or companies that implement or support the implementation of discriminatory foreign sanctions against Chinese citizens or entities.

• The Unreliable Entity List. Functions as a "blacklist" of foreign actors that unjustly damage China's sovereignty or development interests, subjecting them to trade restrictions or transaction bans.

• The Blocking Mechanism (阻断外国法律与措施不当域外适用办法). Establishes a reporting regime and allows Chinese entities to seek compensation for losses incurred due to compliance with foreign sanctions.

  
  

Current Institutional Weaknesses

Despite its ambition, the Chinese countermeasure system presents notable challenges:

• Normative Ambiguity and Legislative Rank. The Unreliable Entity List and the Blocking Mechanism are of lower legislative rank (departmental rules) and rely on the authorization of superior laws, lacking clear executive details and coordination mechanisms. The interpretation of "compliance" remains ambiguous, creating legal uncertainty.

• Reactive Nature. The system was largely created in urgent response to sanctions. It is still predominantly reactive and requires strengthening in terms of strategic reserve and cross-tool synergy.

• Investment Dilemma. The need to balance national security with economic openness mandates caution, as an overly aggressive use of countermeasure instruments risks triggering "de-risking" by multinationals.

  
  

The Three Strategies for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030)

To overcome limitations and realize the ambition of proactive shaping, the study proposes three interconnected strategies for the next Five-Year Plan period.

Consolidation Strategy: Building "Internal-Global" Resilience

The goal is to integrate internal autonomy with global adaptability.

• Normative Shaping Power Base. The aim is to establish an autonomous and globally compatible technical standard system , leveraging advantages in fields like 5G/6G communications and Artificial Intelligence to promote Chinese standards in international forums (e.g., ISO, IEC), thereby increasing the international adoption rate of Chinese rules.

• Global S&T Resource Network. A global S&T resource network will be created, integrating overseas R&D centers and joint laboratories. Regional innovation hubs will be established along the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in strategically important areas like Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

• Prevention and Countermeasure System. Regulations related to the Export Control Law will be refined, creating a dynamic system of "key technology export whitelist + sensitive technology control list" to implement precise domain-level control.

  
  

Innovation Strategy: Developing a Flexible and Coordinated "Toolkit"

The objective is to overcome reactivity with strategic flexibility and cross-tool coordination.

• Rapid Response Mechanism (Fast Response). A real-time "warning → assessment → adjustment" mechanism will be instituted, based on technological trends and international policy changes, to anticipate blocks or sanctions.

• "Techno-Economic-Regulatory" Toolkit (三位一体). A joint toolkit will be created to increase the systematicity and coordination of policies.

  • Judicial Action. Active use of multilateral platforms like the WTO, in coordination with developing countries, to contest discriminatory technical barriers imposed by the U.S. and EU, raising China's institutional bargaining power.

  • Countermeasure "Sandbox": "Compliance testing zones" (合规试验区) will be established in high-innovation regions to provide companies with sanction scenario simulations, policy analysis, and legal support, building a replicable model of corporate resilience.

    
    

Co-Governance Strategy: Building a Global Cooperation Ecosystem

The goal is to increase global influence through the provision of technological public goods and multi-actor participation.

• Cooperation Upgrade (BRI S&T 2.0). The Action Plan for S&T Innovation version 2.0 will be promoted, focusing on creating a global research infrastructure interconnection network and promoting common technical standards.

• Multi-Actor Governance and "Soft Power" Tools. Non-governmental actors—such as industry associations, open-source communities, and platform companies—will be encouraged to integrate into agenda-setting and standard development. New models such as "Global Open Source Technology Communities" and "Digital Joint Laboratories" will be promoted in fields like AI and clean energy.

• Global Alliances. The establishment of a "Global S&T Cooperation Alliance" or similar mechanisms will be promoted to expand the legitimacy and representation of Chinese norms.

  
  

Conclusion

China is responding to the "new competition" with a renewed strategic imperative: the transition from a "domestic incentive" logic to a "global governance" one. The outlined S&T policy instrument system—with its emphasis on integrating internal autonomy and external proactivity—represents a systematic attempt to guarantee national technological security, overcome containment, and gain the initiative in shaping global rules.

The success of this strategy in the 15th Five-Year Plan period will depend on China's ability to balance the hardness of countermeasure instruments with the softness and inclusivity of cooperation and rule-shaping tools. Only by building a system perceived as resilient, yet also a reliable provider of technological public goods, can Beijing effectively compete with the Western bloc and shape the future global technological order in a more pluralistic direction.