Due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and pressure from the United States led by the new Trump administration, anxiety about European security has suddenly increased.
However, due to the inherent differences between member countries, lack of capabilities and other factors, the road towards the creation of an autonomous European defense is long and very difficult.
For a long time, Europe's security relied on NATO, led by the United States. On March 6, Trump had reminded reporters that the issue of countries not investing at least 2% of GDP on defense was shared by him with allies on various occasions during his first term, between 2017 and 2021. Although pressure from Washington pushed several nations to increase spending, Trump he specified that "it is not enough", adding that "they should pay more". The President also added that his biggest problem with the Atlantic Alliance is that “if the United States had a problem and turned to France or some other country I won't name and said, 'we have a problem,' do you think they would come and help us as they should? I'm not sure."
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Furthermore, several sources, including three senior officials from the current and former US administrations, told the Nbc News that the head of the White House discussed with his advisors the possibility of "calibrating America's rules of engagement in a way that favors members of the Nato who spend a certain percentage of their GDP on defense.
Europe has always been reluctant to accept the possibility of Trump's return to the White House. As anticipated in January a year ago, “If Trump is re-elected, the United States could withdraw its military power and reduce its extensive defense investments to European allies, allowing European countries to assume responsibility for regional security.” And this is what is happening.
Today in Washington, Trump again cast uncertainty on the NATO alliance and its unifying principle of collective defense during remarks with reporters. Trump was asked if he will make it U.S. policy not to “defend NATO countries that do not pay their fair share” in terms of defense spending. While ignoring Article 5 of the alliance, invoked by the United States after the Sept. 11 attacks, Trump replied : “Well, I think it's common sense. If they don't pay, I won't defend them. No, I won't defend them.”
At an EU summit two years ago, Estonian Prime Minister Karas proposed the establishment of a 100 billion euro military fund to take corresponding measures when Trump returned to the White House. He said ensuring European military security should become the focus of the next European Commission and national defense should be one of the EU's top three priorities.
In response to this initiative, Wolff, president of the German Council on Foreign Relations, said that a military fund of 100 billion euros can support European technological innovation and thus ensure greater security.
According to some, the Trump administration's "America First" policy is sinking the transatlantic partnership with Europe increasingly concerned about the aggressive US policy towards European allies.
It must be said that Many European countries jointly carry out equipment research and development and establish security cooperation mechanisms to improve internal cohesion, in order to promote European defense integration, which has been delayed for many years.
At the end of 2023, Germany and Lithuania signed a "roadmap" to an agreement on the presence of troops. According to the agreement, in the second quarter of 2024, the Wehrmacht brigade combat advance team will be formally stationed in Lithuania, and at the end of 2024 to form a brigade command, in 2025 to complete the long-term deployment of approximately 5,000 men of the German Armed Forces, in 2027 to enter a state of full combat readiness. German Defense Minister Pistorius said Germany's move was defining the future security situation in Europe in advance. Lithuania will spend 0.3% of its GDP in consecutive years to provide housing, training camps and other infrastructure for the German defense forces.
In 2023, the British Ministry of Defense announced the strengthening of its military presence in the Nordic region, with plans to send 20,000 troops there by 2024. Four Nordic countries, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark, have formed a fighter wing. The Council of the European Union has approved the adoption of the EU Space Security and Defense Strategy, the construction of the common European defense extended to the space sector.
In addition to intensifying the deployment of forces, European countries have strengthened cooperation in the field of military industry. Germany, France and Italy have established a military-industrial complex and jointly promoted the project of the new generation European main battle tank. Italy plans to establish 15 billion euros of project funds for the formation of a multinational cooperation "European Military-Industrial Alliance".
More constraining factors
European countries seem to be making a lot of efforts, but the process of European defense autonomy is subject to multiple constraints.
As the "leaders" of Europe, Germany and France have their own calculations in matters relating to the autonomy of European defense. Germany hopes to carry out the construction of weapons within the framework of NATO, the disposition of forces and defense contributions highlight the necessity of NATO's existence. France, on the other hand, pursues European strategic autonomy and plans to leave NATO to build its own European defense forces.
However, between Germany, France, Italy and other countries - representatives of "old Europe" - and Poland - the head of "new Europe" - there are differences in the concept of common defense. The political and diplomatic "centrifugal force" means that the road to European defense autonomy is long and difficult.
Even the current seemingly warm military-industrial cooperation is at risk. The European Joint Organization for Armaments Cooperation, Germany, France and Italy, as well as the military-industrial complex and the United States in the global arms sales market, have a competitive relationship, and the future of the technology supply chain is bound to be limited by the United States. At the same time, the European military industry has limited production capacity, even if technological products are making great strides. Therefore, it is unable to supply a sufficient number of weapons and equipment in a short period of time.
They must then be considered the possible limits national legal systems (such as the compatibility with the internal rules of a possible European common defense regulatory framework, the consequent transfer of sovereignty, how the armed forces should be distributed between the various member states, their interoperability, the adoption of communication and quality standards, the absence of a weapons industry adequate for current needs, the lack of raw materials such as rare earths (the EU depends almost 100% on China), the lack of indigenous technology such as chips and “off the shelf” like laptops, the absence of European satellite communication, etc.
The methods for developing the common (repayable?) debt used to finance the European defense project are not even clear.
In short, it could turn out to be the usual emotional leap that of European Council on Common Defence. Then there is the timing to consider. If everything goes smoothly, the EU will not have a common defense for 15/20 years.
In any case, in the meantime NATO must also (and above all) be financed with at least 2% of national GDP, with member states not exactly willing to cut their wages to do this.
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