Contested Indo-Pacific: The Dual Challenge of Chinese Hypersonic Missiles and US Logistics Vulnerability

In the rapidly evolving geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, great power competition is shaping the future of the global order. This report aims to analyze the most pressing challenges the United States faces in this crucial arena: from the rise of Chinese hypersonic missile capabilities to the intricate logistical issues and vulnerabilities within its own defense industrial base. A thorough understanding of these dynamics is fundamental for strategic planning and for safeguarding the security and interests of the United States and its allies in a region of vital importance.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

Executive Summary

Contested Indo-Pacific: The Dual Challenge of Chinese Hypersonic Missiles and US Logistics Vulnerability

China's expanding hypersonic missile capabilities, particularly with the DF-26 and DF-27 systems, are fundamentally altering the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. These missiles, combining speed, maneuverability, and precision, pose a significant threat to U.S. naval assets and regional bases, challenging traditional U.S. maritime dominance and power projection. The United States is responding with a multifaceted approach that includes developing new interception capabilities, adopting "soft-kill" defenses, and adjusting its force posture, incorporating strategies such as Elbridge Colby's "denial."

However, the report highlights critical logistical vulnerabilities for U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific. This problem is severely amplified by the region's vast geographical expanse, China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and persistent issues that, despite lessons from previous conflicts like the Gulf Wars, remain unaddressed. These challenges make a prolonged conflict exceptionally difficult to sustain and indicate that potential costs would far exceed past operations. Further exacerbating this picture, the U.S. defense industrial base faces systemic production issues and a critical dependency on China's near-monopoly over rare earth elements, which are indispensable for advanced military technologies. These structural weaknesses and supply chain vulnerabilities directly compromise the Pentagon's ability to maintain technological superiority, develop new capabilities, and effectively equip forces and allies. Addressing these profound logistical and industrial challenges is as critical as developing advanced defensive and offensive capabilities to ensure the U.S. can effectively operate in an increasingly contested environment.

1. The Evolving Threat: China's DF-26 and DF-27 Hypersonic Missiles

China has made monumental strides in developing hypersonic and anti-ship ballistic missiles, with the DF-26 and DF-27 emerging as key components of its A2/AD strategy.

• 1.1 Capabilities of the DF-26 (Anti-Ship Ballistic / "Carrier Killer")

  The DF-26 is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with anti-ship capabilities, famously dubbed the "Carrier Killer." Its potency stems from:

  • Extensive Range: With a range of approximately 4,000 km, the DF-26 can strike moving naval targets well beyond the "first island chain," reaching key areas of the Western Pacific, including Guam.

  • Terminal Maneuverability: While not inherently hypersonic throughout its entire trajectory, the DF-26 is capable of complex maneuvers in its terminal phase, making conventional missile defense systems extremely difficult to intercept. Some variants may also employ hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

  • Precision: Its advanced guidance capabilities allow for sufficient accuracy to engage large, moving targets like aircraft carriers.

  • Payload: It can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, providing significant strategic flexibility.

• 1.2 Capabilities of the DF-27 (Hypersonic Intercontinental Ballistic Missile)

  The DF-27 represents an evolution in China's missile capabilities, combining intercontinental characteristics with hypersonic attributes:

  • Intercontinental and Hypersonic Range: While specific details remain classified, the DF-27 is described as an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) incorporating hypersonic technology. This implies extremely high flight speeds (exceeding Mach 5) and the ability to cover vast distances in very short times.

  • Penetration Capability: The combination of hypersonic speed and maneuverability makes it exceptionally difficult to detect, track, and intercept with current missile defense systems. It can evade existing missile defenses designed primarily to intercept predictable ballistic trajectories.

  • Extended Conventional Strike: Its conventional strike capabilities allow China to target assets within the "third island chain," extending its tactical reach and directly threatening critical U.S. resources.

• 1.3 Strategic Objectives and Targeting

  The DF-26 and DF-27 missiles are essential components of China's A2/AD strategy, aiming to deny the United States and its allies access or freedom of maneuver near China in the event of a conflict.

  According to Extremarationews.com, the specific objectives outlined are: "In general, if the DF-26 strategic missile is used for tactical strikes within the second island chain, and is also used partly for theater-level nuclear exchanges and for partial-level total nuclear exchanges, then the DF-27 not only can attack the third island chain, but can tactically target the entire archipelago and even be used for all-out nuclear exchanges."

  Expanding on these objectives, potential targets include:

  • U.S. Naval Fleets:

    • Aircraft Carriers: High-value targets, considered "floating cities" and symbols of American maritime power. Their destruction or neutralization would have enormous strategic impact.

    • Amphibious Ships: Amphibious assault ships, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, which provide power projection and air defense capabilities.

    • Logistical Support Vessels: Resupply ships, hospital ships, and other support units, essential for the sustainability of naval operations.

    • Undermining U.S. Maritime Hegemony: By threatening key naval assets, China aims to challenge and potentially alter the U.S. nuclear strategy and maritime power projection capability.

  • U.S. and Allied Military Bases:

    • Guam: A critical strategic hub, hosting Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam. Its neutralization or destruction would drastically reduce the U.S.'s ability to project power and sustain operations in the Indo-Pacific.

    • Japan: Yokosuka, Okinawa, and other bases supporting U.S. naval, air, and ground operations.

    • South Korea: Camp Humphreys and other key installations for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.

    • Philippines: Bases providing strategic access to the South China Sea.

    • Australia: Logistics facilities and bases supporting the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific.

  • Critical Infrastructure:

    • Command and Control (C2) Nodes: Command centers, communication sites, and sensor networks essential for managing U.S. forces.

    • Airports and Ports: Facilities enabling force deployment and resupply.

    • Radar and Surveillance Sites: Installations providing situational awareness.

    • Logistics and Storage Centers: Ammunition depots, fuel dumps, and other support facilities.

  • Verification Warfare and Global Nuclear Exchange: Some Chinese strategists view the DF-27's strategic attack capabilities as a tool for "verification warfare" and global nuclear exchange operations, suggesting both conventional and nuclear roles, and versatility for first-strike and counter-attack scenarios.

    
    

2. U.S. Countermeasures and Defensive Strategies in the Indo-Pacific

The United States is implementing a multifaceted approach to counter the threat of Chinese hypersonic missiles, combining advanced defenses, developing its own offensive capabilities, and adjusting force posture.

• 2.1 Enhanced Missile Defense Systems

  • Patriot (PAC-3 MSE) Integration on Naval Vessels: The U.S. Navy is evaluating the integration of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) interceptors on its warships. These missiles, known for their agility and "hit-to-kill" technology, could provide an additional layer of defense against hypersonic threats, though further testing is required to validate shipborne launch and integration with the Aegis system's SPY-1 radar.

  • Advanced Tracking and Interception Technologies: The Pentagon is rapidly investing in developing new technologies for tracking and intercepting hypersonic threats. This includes creating an interconnected network of sensors and defense systems to achieve continuous tracking.

  • THAAD and Layered Defense: Existing systems like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) can intercept ballistic threats at high altitudes, while the PAC-3 MSE can engage lower-altitude threats, creating a layered defense to maximize interception probabilities.

  • Guam's Enhanced Missile Defense: An ambitious $8 billion effort is underway to equip Guam with 360-degree missile defense, interconnecting interceptors, missiles, radars, and sensors. However, recent reports have highlighted "glaring problems" in planning and implementation, including personnel requirements and installation/maintenance challenges.

• 2.2 Offensive and Deterrence Capabilities

  • Development of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons: The United States is actively investing in developing its own hypersonic weapons as a deterrent and a credible response capability.

  • Advanced ISR, Unmanned Systems, and Resilient C4I Networks: There's a focus on advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, unmanned systems, and resilient command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) networks. The goal is to confuse and blind Chinese targeting sensors and improve strike capabilities.

  • "Soft Kill" Defenses: Beyond kinetic interceptors, "soft kill" defenses are being explored, such as jamming missile sensors and using chaff and flares to divert missiles.

• 2.3 Force Posture Adjustments

  • U.S. Army Mobile Task Forces: The Army is forming new mobile task forces designed to operate within the first island chain, capable of striking land targets and gathering crucial battlefield intelligence.

  • Deployment of "Typhon" Missile Systems: New missile systems, such as the "Typhon," are being deployed, capable of reaching targets on the Chinese mainland, extending the reach and threat of U.S. ground forces.

  • Aircraft Carrier Deployment Considerations: Some analysts recommend keeping aircraft carriers out of range of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles, recognizing their inherent vulnerability and the need to adapt operational doctrines.

  • The Strategy of Denial (Elbridge Colby): This strategy, elaborated by Elbridge Colby (Under Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration and author of "The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict"), focuses on denying China the ability to achieve regional dominance, particularly by preventing its military superiority over neighboring countries. The strategy emphasizes effective denial defense along the first island chain, including Taiwan, to maintain Washington's credibility and prevent Chinese hegemony. It contrasts with alternative strategies like nuclear threats or horizontal escalation, advocating for a forward denial defense that can prevent China from subordinating U.S. allies.

    
    

3. The Critical Challenge: U.S. Logistics in an Indo-Pacific Conflict Scenario

The sustainability of a high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific is heavily constrained by significant U.S. logistical vulnerabilities, exacerbated by the operational environment and China's A2/AD capabilities.

• 3.1 The Nature of Contested Logistics

  A conflict in the Indo-Pacific would involve "contested logistics," where supply lines for materiel, personnel, and fuel would be under constant threat. China would target logistical nodes, fuel depots, and resupply vessels to paralyze U.S. air and naval power.

• 3.2 Geographical and Distance Impediments

  The Indo-Pacific is a dispersed archipelago with thousands of nautical miles separating U.S. bases. This "tyranny of distance" (distance, time, scale, and crossing hundreds of miles of water) makes transporting large quantities of materiel and personnel extremely challenging.

• 3.3 Lessons from the Gulf Wars and Projections for the Pacific

  Past U.S. military operations have provided valuable, though often painful, logistical lessons.

  • Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm, 1991): The "real logistics war" occurred during the six-month pre-invasion buildup. Total incremental costs for the operation were estimated at around $60-61.1 billion (in 1991 dollars), though almost all of this was reimbursed by allies. Despite this, significant problems were encountered, such as a lack of asset visibility, poor materiel distribution, long processing times for supply requisitions, and a dependence on overseas sources. Concerns arose that a lack of cohesive industrial response would lead to "disastrous shortages" of critical spare parts if the conflict had been prolonged.

  • Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, 2003): This operation was one of the largest logistics and supply efforts in U.S. military history. Of the $28.1 billion initially obligated, approximately $14.2 billion was for operating support costs and $4.9 billion for transportation costs. However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted severe problems: backlogs of hundreds of pallets and containers, discrepancies between shipped and received goods, potential late fees for leased containers, "cannibalization" of equipment due to lack of spare parts, poor asset visibility, and insufficient distribution capability. A critical issue was the failure to deploy adequately trained logistics personnel before or concurrently with combat troops.

  Projected Costs for an Indo-Pacific Conflict: The scale and complexity of a conventional conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific would far exceed the logistical challenges of the Gulf Wars. While precise, publicly available figures for logistics-only costs of such a war are unavailable, general projections indicate colossal expenses:

  • A 2016 RAND study estimated that a year-long severe conventional conflict in East Asia could result in a 5-10% loss of U.S. GDP. This figure, while not limited to logistics, provides an indication of the economic scale.

  • The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), while not a direct war cost, requires significant investments in infrastructure and force posture. $4.68 billion was requested in FY22, and $22.69 billion from FY2023 to FY2027 for deterrence initiatives, including power projection, dispersal, and training facilities. These funds are essential to improve the ability to operate and sustain forces in the region.

  • Modernizing the maritime transport fleet (which has an average age of 40 years) to maintain adequate capacity could cost $25 billion or more over a decade. The necessity of sustaining a conflict over such distances, with an aging and threatened transport fleet, projects unprecedented direct and indirect logistical costs.

    
    

4. Problems within the U.S. Defense Industrial Base and Rare Earth Dependency

Beyond operational logistical challenges, the United States faces systemic issues within its defense industrial base (DIB) and a growing vulnerability tied to reliance on external supplies, particularly from China.

• 4.1 Problems in Armament and Ship Production

  The U.S. DIB is struggling to simultaneously meet the current demands of American and allied armed forces while preparing for future challenges.

  • Consolidation and Rigidity: Decades of consolidation within the defense industry, inconsistent government demand, and bureaucratic rigidity have rendered the DIB more vulnerable, less capable, and slow to react.

  • Insufficient Production Capacity: The DIB lacks the capacity to produce sufficient volumes of the right types of weapon systems and platforms needed to deter adversary aggression and prevail in a future conflict. This includes evident problems in the shipbuilding sector, where the United States struggles to produce new vessels with the speed and innovation required to counter Chinese advancements.

  • Lack of Responsiveness and Flexibility: It does not possess the responsiveness and flexibility to rapidly surge armament production in times of crisis or conflict, nor to quickly adapt to new technologies or emerging threats. This manifests in slow and costly development programs, such as those for next-generation destroyers, which often face delays and cancellations.

  • Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Supply chains are fragile and susceptible to shocks, with shortages that could disrupt the production of essential components.

• 4.2 China's Rare Earth Monopoly and its Military Impact

  This vulnerability is critically exacerbated by the near-total reliance of the United States on China for Rare Earth Elements (REEs), a group of 17 essential minerals for almost all advanced military technologies.

  • Chinese Dominance: China holds approximately 70% of global REE mining and about 85-90% of refining capacity. The United States directly imports about 80% of its REEs from China, and 100% of heavy rare earth imports (critical for high-performance magnets, military sensors, and autonomous guidance systems).

  • Crucial Military Applications: Rare earths are indispensable components in a wide range of military systems, including:

    • Jet engines and turbines

    • Precision-guided munitions

    • Radar and communication systems

    • Lasers and targeting systems

    • Night vision and other advanced sensors

    • High-power magnets for drones and other vehicles

    • Alloys for aircraft and missiles

    • Armor-piercing rounds (tungsten, gallium, germanium)

    • Missile propulsion (graphite, fluorite)

  • Strategic Vulnerability: This dependence creates a significant strategic vulnerability. China has demonstrated the ability to use its dominant position as an economic weapon, imposing REE export restrictions in the past. A 2024 RAND Corporation study warned that a 90-day cutoff of REE supplies from China could halt 78% of U.S. defense contractors' production lines.

  • Impact on Military Development in the Indo-Pacific: This dependency directly limits the U.S.'s ability to:

    • Maintain Technological Superiority: Without secure access to REEs, the development and production of new generations of advanced weapons (such as hypersonic missiles and associated defense systems) slow down or cease, compromising the ability to maintain a technological advantage over China.

    • Respond Rapidly to Threats: The lack of resilience in the REE supply chain prevents the United States from rapidly increasing armament production in a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

    • Equip Allies: The ability to provide allies in the Indo-Pacific with the necessary equipment to strengthen their deterrence and defense capabilities is directly hampered by these dependencies.

Conclusion

The proliferation of Chinese hypersonic missiles like the DF-26 and DF-27 has ushered in a new era of challenges for U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. These systems directly threaten high-value assets and key bases, questioning the effectiveness of established operational doctrines. The U.S. response is multifaceted, combining new defense technologies, its own hypersonic weapons, and adjustments to force posture, including the denial strategy promoted by Elbridge Colby. However, it is imperative to recognize that success in a potential conflict will critically depend on the ability to sustain large-scale operations and the resilience of its industrial base. The deep and persistent logistical vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater, far more complex and costly than those faced in the Gulf Wars, remain a "gigantic problem." Compounding these are severe challenges in the DIB's production capacity and, notably, the critical dependence on Chinese rare earths, which directly compromises the development and availability of key armaments. To ensure U.S. forces can operate effectively and sustainably in an increasingly contested environment, a radical overhaul is necessary, encompassing substantial investment, innovation, and deep cooperation with allies, with the goal of strengthening production autonomy and supply chain resilience. Logistical and industrial resilience is not merely an enabler, but a critical element of deterrence itself.