The Arctic in the Crosshairs: New Russian-Chinese Society, Trade and Submerged Dangers - Analysis

The Northern Sea Route Shipping Line, a Russian-Chinese joint venture, was registered in late 2024 between the Russian state corporation Rosatom and the Chinese company New New Shipping. The official announcement, made on June 18, 2025, by Vladimir Panov, Rosatom's special representative for the Arctic, marked a significant step. This partnership is not just a commercial project; it is a key element in Russia's broader strategy to reassert its geopolitical and economic position, especially in light of growing Western pressure.

An Evolving Geopolitical Context

The push for the NSR's development is deeply intertwined with the current geopolitical situation. Following the conflict in Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, Russia found itself needing to re-evaluate its trade routes and alliances. It was in this context that Russian President Vladimir Putin, back in May 2024, sought greater support from China.

During his visit to China, Putin spent half his time in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, a clear signal of Russia's intention to broaden cooperation with China in the Far East and the North. Subsequently, in Vladivostok, the fifth meeting of the Russian-Chinese "Northeast-East" Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee took place, co-chaired by Chinese Vice Premier Zhang and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Trutnev. Trutnev's presence, as Russia's most senior Deputy Prime Minister, underscored the importance Russia attaches to these talks.

On that occasion, through Trutnev, Putin explicitly asked for "greater assistance" from China, stating that Russia had identified the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a strategic opportunity for its national revival. This plan aims to re-establish trade, energy, and military defense ties with the non-Western world, bypassing traditional maritime routes increasingly hindered by geopolitical tensions.

Western Sanctions and Rosatom

It's important to note that, while many Russian companies and sectors have been affected by sanctions, Rosatom has not been directly sanctioned by the European Union. Russia's nuclear sector is largely excluded from EU sanctions packages due to some member states' reliance on Russian atomic energy. The EU, in 2024, even saw a 15% year-on-year increase in Russian LNG transshipment from the Yamal terminal in EU ports during the first half of 2024, despite announcements to limit gas imports from Russia. France, in particular, more than doubled its imports of Russian LNG in the same period.

However, the United States has imposed sanctions on specific activities and individuals linked to Rosatom. Specifically, U.S. President Joe Biden sanctioned the Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom for its involvement in the development of weapons systems and their use in the war against Ukraine. Among the 14 high-ranking Russian officials hit by these sanctions was Vyacheslav Ruksha, the Deputy Director of the Northern Sea Route Directorate, a key figure in Rosatom's Arctic operations. These actions highlight the complexity of the economic and geopolitical dynamics at play, with the U.S., for example, continuing to purchase Russian nuclear fuel while aiming to target specific aspects of Rosatom's operations.

The NSR's Strategic Importance for Russia and Traffic Data

For centuries, Russia has sought an ice-free port to facilitate its foreign trade. Its primary maritime routes have passed through the Black Sea (controlled by NATO member Turkey) and the Baltic Sea (whose coasts are now all part of NATO countries). This situation, aggravated by Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO and global sanctions, has effectively "blocked" Russia's main international sea lanes.

The NSR, stretching across the Arctic Ocean along Russia's northern coast, emerges as the solution to this isolation. This maritime route is the shortest between Western Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region. For comparison, the distance from Rotterdam to Shanghai via the Northern Route is over 13,000 km, while through the Suez Canal, it's over 16,000 km. Its historical disadvantage has been seasonality and ship size limitations, requiring ice-reinforced or Arctic-class hulls.

Thanks to Arctic ice melt, many areas now present year-round navigation conditions for commercial shipping. The most advantageous part of the NSR for Russia is within its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, allowing Russia to defend the route and provide support with icebreakers and other land-based infrastructure.

Cargo traffic along the NSR shows significant growth in recent years:

• In 2019, approximately 680,000 tons of transit cargo were transported.

• In 2020, traffic rose to about 1.3 million tons, as reported in March 2021 by Vyacheslav V. Ruksha.

• In 2022, a weaker period, only 43 vessels transited with approximately 0.1 million tons of cargo.

• In 2023, considered a positive year, 79 voyages were made, and approximately 2.1 million tons of cargo were transported.

• In 2024, traffic reached a record, with over 3 million tons of transit cargo. Specifically, a total of 97 voyages were recorded, with 56 vessels carrying cargo and 41 in ballast. Chinese shipping companies nearly doubled the number of voyages on the NSR in 2024. Zhou Hao, Commercial Counselor at the Chinese Embassy in Russia, speaking at the 14th International Forum "Arctic: Present and Future," stated that 13 Chinese voyages took place in 2024, transporting over 10,000 containers, marking increases of 62% and 30% respectively compared to the previous year.

In 2024, the Northern Route was primarily used for crude oil transport, but also for bulk goods such as coal, fertilizers, and iron ore. Small quantities were also transported in containers, and single voyages were made for LNG and oil products, as well as general cargo and several fish consignments. During the winter season, transport was carried out by ice-class vessels, with over 85% of voyages handled by Arc7-class ships. Arc4-class ice-class vessels were also used, primarily for delivering materials and supplies to the construction sites of the Vostok Oil and Arctic LNG-2 projects. In 2024, LNG exports from the port of Sabetta involved 99 deliveries in the first four months, primarily directed to gas terminals in France, Belgium, and Spain. Crude oil is exported year-round by tankers, predominantly Arc7-class, to the RPK Nord transshipment terminal in Murmansk, with approximately 15 deliveries per month.

The NSR is seen not only as an alternative route for oil and gas exports—crucial given the need to find new customers due to Western sanctions—but also as a "vital communication line" that will determine Russia's ability to "restore its national destiny in the coming decades." Essentially, for Moscow, it is a matter of strategic and economic survival.

Russia's Icebreaker Power

Russia possesses the world's largest and most powerful icebreaker fleet, a crucial factor in its ambition to dominate the NSR and ensure year-round navigation. This fleet comprises nearly 50 vessels, including both conventionally powered units and, crucially, a significant component of nuclear-powered icebreakers, the pinnacle of Russian shipbuilding. Rosatom manages the NSR's infrastructure and provides services to carriers, including icebreaker escort. The new Yakutiya icebreaker (Project 22220 LK-60Ya, a new-generation Arktika-class), the fourth vessel of this class, was recently commissioned, capable of breaking through ice sheets up to 2.8 meters thick.

China: An Indispensable and Growing Partner on the NSR

China's choice as a key partner in realizing the NSR is strategic. China boasts robust technological and infrastructural capabilities, is a global leader in shipbuilding, and possesses substantial financial resources. Furthermore, it has become the primary purchaser of Russian energy exports and enjoys strong political proximity to Moscow.

Back in June of last year (2024), Rosatom and several Chinese companies signed a letter of intent to establish a joint venture in shipbuilding and to create a year-round container shipping line through the NSR.

Chinese optimism regarding the NSR is palpable. According to Zhou Hao, Commercial Counselor at the Chinese Embassy in Russia, speaking at the 14th International Forum "Arctic: Present and Future," China considers the Northern Sea Route a transport route of paramount importance. Beijing actively cooperates with Russia in key areas such as navigation, navigation safety, technology, and the construction of Arctic-destined vessels. It also invites businesses from both countries to jointly develop transport along the NSR based on market principles, further strengthening bilateral cooperation.

Official Statements on Joint NSR Use

Collaboration on the Northern Sea Route is enshrined by official declarations at the highest political levels. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly emphasizes the NSR's importance for Russia and expresses a desire for international cooperation in its development, with China as a privileged partner. He highlights how the route offers a shorter and safer path for international trade, particularly relevant in the current geopolitical context. The invitation to Beijing to actively participate in the NSR's development is a clear signal of Russia's willingness to strengthen this strategic partnership.

Chinese President Xi Jinping also expresses China's strong interest in the Northern Sea Route. China, through its "Belt and Road" initiative, recognizes the strategic potential of the NSR as part of a "Polar Silk Road." Xi's statements highlight Beijing's willingness to deepen cooperation with Russia in Arctic infrastructure development, scientific research, and the promotion of sustainable navigation along the route. This shared vision strengthens the foundation for joint initiatives like the Northern Sea Route Shipping Line, aimed at establishing a year-round container transport line.

Military Implications and Risks to International Security

The expansion of the NSR and growing Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic raise significant military and security concerns for NATO countries and Western intelligence.

Russian Military Ports in the Arctic and Dual-Use Capabilities: Russia maintains a substantial military presence in the Arctic, with strategic naval bases like Severomorsk (headquarters of the Northern Fleet) on the Kola Peninsula and installations at Nerpichya and Ura Bay. The closed city of Severodvinsk, near Arkhangelsk, hosts important shipyards. Many of the port infrastructures along the NSR, while ostensibly civilian, are developed with dual-use capabilities, meaning they can serve both commercial and military purposes. This versatility allows Russian armed forces to use these ports for resupply, maintenance, and deployment of naval assets, including submarines and warships. The possibility that China could benefit from this dual-use, gaining access to such infrastructures for logistical purposes or to support its own vessels, is a risk that Western intelligence closely monitors.

Militarization of the Arctic: Russia continues to invest heavily in the militarization of the Arctic region, reactivating and modernizing Soviet-era bases. This militarization, combined with increasing naval activity, is viewed by NATO as a direct potential threat. The possibility that Russia will use the NSR not only for commercial purposes but also for military force projection or intelligence activities represents a concrete risk. Dutch Admiral Rob Bauer, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, has already expressed the Alliance's need to prepare for a Russian threat emanating from the High North.

Joint Russian-Chinese Military Exercises in the Arctic: Military cooperation between Russia and China also extends to the Arctic. While large-scale joint exercises often focus on the Pacific, areas adjacent to the Arctic and the NSR itself have become theaters for maneuvers. In September 2024, Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise "Ocean 2024," which involved areas of the Pacific and Arctic, and in which China also participated with vessels and aircraft from the People's Liberation Army Navy. This included simulated attacks on maritime targets, search and rescue operations, and highlighted increasing integration and interoperability between the two navies. For the first time, even Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted exercises in Arctic seas, signaling Beijing's interest not only in commercial but also in security and patrol activities in the region. Moscow and Beijing are expected to conduct annual naval exercises in the Arctic, likely near the NSR, underscoring an increasingly deep military partnership.

Threat to Submarine Cables: A particularly high risk concerns the integrity of submarine cables that carry over 95% of global internet traffic and are vital for communications, financial transactions, and even energy grids. The long and sparsely monitored underwater stretches of the Arctic and the Baltic Sea are particularly vulnerable to sabotage. NATO and intelligence agencies are increasingly concerned about Russia's capacity to conduct "hybrid warfare," which includes the potential damaging of these critical infrastructures.

Suspicious Sabotage Cases: There have been several incidents that have fueled these concerns:

• In 2022, the damage to the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea highlighted the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure.

• Between October and November 2024, several submarine fiber optic cables and a gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea were severely damaged. Investigations focused on a Chinese cargo ship, the Yi Peng 3, and a Russian vessel, the Sevmorput (operated by Rosatom, though some sources indicated a possible confusion with the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear). Finnish and Swedish authorities opened preliminary investigations, and Germany openly spoke of "sabotage." While proof of intent is difficult to establish, the anomalous behavior of some vessels, such as slowing down or anchoring in unusual positions over cables, fuels suspicions.

Protecting these cables requires international cooperation among governments, private companies, and organizations like NATO, but the vastness of the oceans makes continuous surveillance extremely challenging. The presence of what has been termed a Russian "shadow fleet" of merchant vessels, suspected of also engaging in espionage and threatening activities, further aggravates the situation.

Joint Venture Objectives and Prospects

The Northern Sea Route Shipping Line, established in the People's Republic of China, is the vehicle for realizing this ambitious vision. The objective is the development of a year-round container shipping service between China and Russia's northwestern ports. In the first phase of the project, up to 5 Arc7 ice-class container ships with a capacity of 4400 TEU are planned for construction. The partners expect the first vessel to make a voyage by 2027.

The initial choice of Russian ports falls on Saint Petersburg and Arkhangelsk, due to the lack of modern container terminals in Murmansk. However, it is clear that the future development of port infrastructures in Murmansk or Arkhangelsk, which would reduce transit times by 7-8 days compared to Saint Petersburg, is a priority. The transshipment capacity of Arctic ports has recently increased to 40 million tons, and Rosatom is committed to deepening the Gulf of Ob, constructing a coal terminal, and a cargo terminal at Cape Nagleynyn.

The project is not just a commercial opportunity but a strategic pillar for the future of Russia and China, solidifying a partnership that challenges current geopolitical dynamics and opens new avenues for global trade and cooperation, while also posing new challenges to international security.