The Dragon's Gambit: How China Exploits Global Turmoil to Reshape the World Order, with Russia as a Subordinate Partner
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 4 lug
- Tempo di lettura: 27 min
Executive Summary
On July 3, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly candidly admitted to his European counterpart, Kaja Kallas, that Beijing "cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine" because it needs the United States to remain focused on Moscow and Kyiv, thus staying away from the Pacific. This statement is not merely a revelation; it is a stark indication of Beijing's central strategic motivation, viewing the conflict as a calculated means to divert U.S. pressure from its own sphere of influence.
Far from being a liability, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has proven to be a significant strategic asset for Beijing. This in-depth analysis reveals how China has shrewdly leveraged this protracted crisis to advance its fundamental geopolitical, economic, and military objectives. The primary benefit for China lies in the conflict's ability to divert the attention and resources of the United States and its European allies from the Indo-Pacific theater, granting Beijing a valuable "distraction dividend" to pursue its strategic interests.
Concurrently, the war has cemented a profound, yet increasingly asymmetric, economic interdependence between Russia and China. Moscow, isolated by Western sanctions, has become a captive supplier of discounted energy and a crucial market for Chinese exports, while Beijing offers a vital financial and technological lifeline, enabling Russia to circumvent Western restrictions. This dynamic has accelerated de-dollarization efforts and bolstered China's financial resilience. On the military and technological fronts, collaboration has intensified, with technology exchanges and the opportunistic acquisition of invaluable battlefield intelligence from Ukraine, accelerating China's own military modernization. The conflict has also reshaped strategic dynamics in key regions like the Arctic and compelled China to recalibrate and reinforce its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes in Central Asia, expanding its influence into an area traditionally dominated by Moscow. China's approach is a calculated gamble: a deliberate, albeit nuanced, investment in a long-term strategic competition with the West, accepting certain diplomatic and economic costs in exchange for greater geopolitical returns and an acceleration towards a multipolar global order more favorable to its authoritarian interests, even at the expense of Russia's long-term strategic autonomy.
Introduction: A Strategic Alignment in a Shifting Global Order
Understanding China's stance on the Ukraine conflict requires an analysis that transcends superficial declarations, delving into the underlying strategic motivations.
Further reinforcing this position are the recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin, made during the 28th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (June 18-21). Putin emphatically underscored the "solidity and long-term prospect" of the Sino-Russian partnership, extending from economy to technology and the military sphere, presenting it as a "pillar for global stability." Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Moscow in May 2025, coinciding with Russia's Victory Day celebrations, further solidified this alignment, with Xi emphasizing mutual support against perceived Western dominance. The timing of this visit was crucial, occurring at a key moment in the war, with the United States, under President Donald Trump's administration, reportedly pressuring Russia and Ukraine to reach a peace deal. These pronouncements not only confirm mutual commitment but also highlight a shared vision of an evolving world order.
The fundamental premise of this analysis is that Beijing perceives the prolonged conflict in Ukraine not as a crisis to be swiftly resolved, but as an advantageous geopolitical development. This perspective is rooted in China's assessment of a growing likelihood of confrontation with the United States, making a stable, anti-Western Russia a crucial, albeit increasingly subordinate, partner. This report aims to delineate this complex strategy, exploring geopolitical rebalancing, economic interdependence, military-technological collaboration, and the broader implications for the Arctic, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the expansion of Chinese influence in Central Asia.
Geopolitical Rebalancing: Diverting U.S. Attention and Reshaping Global Power
The Ukraine conflict has provided China with an unprecedented strategic opportunity to advance its geopolitical interests, primarily by diverting U.S. attention and resources.
The U.S. "Distraction Dividend"
The most explicit and significant benefit for China is the diversion of U.S. and European allied strategic resources and attention towards the Ukraine conflict. Foreign Minister Wang Yi's statement on July 3, 2025, that Beijing cannot afford a Russian defeat to keep the U.S. focused on Moscow and Kyiv, away from the Pacific, directly confirms this. This assertion reveals a clear Chinese preference for a prolonged U.S. engagement in the European theater.
The United States has historically maintained a multi-front strategic posture, but resources are inherently finite. A prolonged conflict in Europe demands significant U.S. military, financial, and diplomatic commitment. This engagement, by its very nature, draws away resources that might otherwise be directed towards other potential flashpoints, particularly the Indo-Pacific. For China, this creates "strategic maneuvering room" or a "distraction dividend," enabling it to pursue its military modernization and assertive regional policies with less immediate and concentrated U.S. pressure. This situation directly favors China's long-term goal of establishing regional primacy and, potentially, preparing for contingencies like Taiwan. Recent reports indicate that the Trump administration is reportedly easing pressure on China regarding its support for Russia, instead focusing on other bilateral issues. Furthermore, the U.S. Defense Department's decision on July 1, 2025, to pause shipments of key weapon systems to Ukraine, including Patriot air defense missiles, signals a potential weakening of Western support, which could further serve Chinese interests.
Consolidation of an Anti-Western Axis
The conflict has accelerated the formation of a de facto anti-Western alignment between China and Russia, with the explicit aim of challenging the U.S.-led international order. The joint statement of March 21, 2023, which described Russia as "better than an ally," formalized the shift from mere mutual trust-building to a joint struggle against the U.S.-dominated system. This "higher-level alliance" indicates a deeper convergence of strategic interests than even during the Cold War, with Russia explicitly supporting China's position on Taiwan. Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in May 2025 further solidified this union, with leaders reiterating their joint stance on the war in Ukraine and their vision for a new world order.
China's rhetorical alignment, consistently avoiding labeling Russia's actions as an "invasion" or "war," instead adopting the Russian term "special military operation," and echoing Russian criticisms of NATO's eastward expansion, further reinforces this ideological synergy. This shared narrative helps legitimize their joint efforts to build a "new international order." The war in Ukraine has acted as a catalyst, pushing Russia, already alienated from the West, firmly into China's strategic orbit. This has created a potent revisionist bloc capable of collectively challenging Western norms, institutions, and power projection. For China, this means a reliable partner in international forums, such as the UN Security Council, and a stronger collective voice against what both countries perceive as Western hegemony, potentially accelerating the transition to a multipolar world order more favorable to authoritarian states.
Strategic Stability on the Northern Border
China requires security and stability along its vast northern border with Russia to focus its resources on its primary strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. A weakened or unstable Russia, or one that might reorient towards the West, would represent a significant strategic liability for Beijing.
Beijing's willingness to invest "political and economic capital" in Russia's "authoritarian, anti-Western, and China-friendly regime" demonstrates its commitment to preserving this buffer zone and partner. The Russian invasion, by isolating Moscow from the West, has made it more dependent on Beijing. This increased dependence, paradoxically, enhances China's security by ensuring Russia remains a compliant and stable partner on its vast northern flank. This frees up Chinese military and diplomatic resources that might otherwise be needed to manage a potentially volatile border or a less predictable Russia, allowing China to concentrate on its core strategic objectives in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the broader Indo-Pacific.
Economic Interdependence and Sanctions Evasion: Fueling Russia's War Machine and China's Growth
The Ukraine conflict has redefined economic relations between Russia and China, transforming a growing partnership into a true strategic interdependence, crucial for Russia's economic survival under sanctions and for China's energy security and growth.
Surging Trade and Energy Security
Following the invasion, bilateral trade between Russia and China not only rebounded but reached unprecedented levels. Total bilateral trade turnover hit a record high of $190 billion in 2022 (a 29.3% increase over 2021) and $94 billion in the first five months of 2023 (a 40.7% increase over the same period in 2022). President Putin confirmed these figures, indicating trade reached $240 billion. In 2024, total trade reached $244.8 billion, a 1.9% increase from the previous year. However, the first four months of 2025 signaled a temporary slowdown, with China-Russia trade at $71.12 billion, a 7.5% drop from the same period in 2024. This decline is attributed to factors such as global economic cooling, new sanctions-related logistical disruptions, currency volatility, and seasonal adjustments. Despite this dip, the broader trend suggests a resilient and evolving partnership, with trade expected to rebound later in the year, especially with new infrastructure projects and energy deals on the horizon.
China has become the primary consumer of Russian energy, importing significant volumes of discounted oil (e.g., €67 billion since the war began, with an average 11% discount), gas (€12 billion, with a 50% volume increase in 2022), and coal (€7.2 billion, with a 20% volume increase in 2022). Russia has been China's top crude oil supplier since 2023. This influx provides China with cheap and secure energy supplies, essential for its industrial growth.
Concurrently, Chinese exports to Russia have surged, including vehicles, machinery, electronics, metals, plastics, rubber, and, crucially, militarily important integrated circuits. China has become Russia's leading supplier of industrial equipment in 2023-2024. Western sanctions, aimed at crippling the Russian economy, have inadvertently created a "captured" market for China. Russia, desperate for revenue and imports, is forced to sell its vast energy resources at discounted prices to China and rely heavily on Chinese industrial and technological goods. This not only provides China with low-cost energy and a new market for its exports but also deepens Russia's economic dependence on Beijing. This dynamic strengthens China's leverage over Russia and enhances its own economic resilience against potential future Western pressure, while simultaneously undermining the effectiveness of Western sanctions. Chinese exports of products like off-road vehicles and portable data processing devices have seen significant growth, highlighting Russia's increasing reliance on Chinese products following the withdrawal of Western brands.
The following table illustrates bilateral trade trends and key raw material flows, providing quantifiable evidence of this shift.
Table 1: China-Russia Bilateral Trade Volume and Key Raw Material Flows (2021-2025)
Category | 2021 (Billion USD/EUR) | 2022 (Billion USD/EUR) | 2023 (Billion USD/EUR) | 2024 (Billion USD/EUR) | Jan-Apr 2025 (Billion USD/EUR) | Additional Details |
Total Bilateral Trade | ~147 (USD) | 190 (USD) | 240.1 (USD) | 244.8 (USD) | 71.12 (USD) | +29.3% in 2022 vs 2021; +40.7% in first 5 months of 2023 vs 2022; +1.9% in 2024 vs 2023; -7.5% in Jan-Apr 2025 vs 2024 |
Russian Exports (to China) | ~80 (USD) | 114 (USD) | N/A | N/A | 40.31 (USD) | 43.4% increase in 2022; China is main consumer; -9.1% in Jan-Apr 2025 |
Chinese Imports (from Russia) | ~67 (USD) | 76 (USD) | N/A | N/A | 30.81 (USD) | 13.4% increase in 2022; -5.3% in Jan-Apr 2025 |
Russian Oil (to China) | N/A | ~67 (EUR) | >21 (EUR) | N/A | N/A | Average 11% discount from April 2022; 8.3% volume increase in 2022; record volume 2.27 M b/d in March 2023; Russia top crude oil supplier since 2023 |
Russian Gas (to China) | N/A | ~12 (EUR) | N/A | N/A | N/A | Pipeline gas volume +50% in 2022 (15.5 bcm); LNG +44% in 2022 (6.5 M tons); LNG supplies +3.3% in 2024 (8.3 M tons) |
Russian Coal (to China) | N/A | ~7.2 (EUR) | N/A | N/A | N/A | 20% volume increase in 2022; China 2nd largest supplier in 2022 |
Renminbi Payments | N/A | N/A | 75% (with China), 25% (other countries) | N/A | N/A | Yuan used for 75% of Russia-China trade; 25% with other countries (1H 2023) |
Chinese Exports (components, dual-use) | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Significant increase in electronics, machinery, integrated circuits; China main industrial supplier 2023-2024; microchips essential for precision-guided weapons |
Financial Resilience and De-dollarization
Russia has increasingly embraced the Chinese Yuan (Renminbi) for trade payments. The Yuan now accounts for 75% of Russia's trade with China and 25% of its transactions with other countries. Its share in Russian import payments surged from 4% to 23% in 2022. This is a direct response to the Western freezing of over half of Russia's foreign reserves.
Putin has explicitly stated the need to "ensure reliable financial flows that guarantee increasing trade volumes," suggesting a desire to create financial mechanisms less dependent on the Western system. China has a proven track record of facilitating sanctions evasion for partners like Iran through "elaborate mechanisms and networks." The war has significantly accelerated China's long-term strategic goal of de-dollarization. By compelling Russia to abandon "toxic currencies" and adopt the Yuan, China actively promotes the internationalization of its own currency and the construction of an alternative financial infrastructure outside the Western-dominated system. This reduces the effectiveness of financial sanctions as a geopolitical tool and strengthens China's global financial influence, a key component of its challenge to U.S. economic hegemony. An increased use of digital Yuan and Ruble in cross-border transactions is anticipated for the remainder of 2025. Furthermore, small regional Chinese banks have continued to process payments for sanctioned Russian banks and companies, despite the risk of penalties.
Industrial and Technological Support
China is supplying Russia with essential components for its war machine, including microchips, semiconductors, and dual-use goods. Shahed kamikaze drones, now produced in Russia, predominantly contain Chinese components, replacing previously smuggled U.S. parts. By early 2025, approximately 80% of critical electronics used in Russian drones are of Chinese origin. China has also reportedly helped Russia produce explosives and fiber optic cables. Ukrainian intelligence reports from April and May 2025 indicate that China is supplying Russia with gunpowder and artillery, and that Chinese citizens are involved in manufacturing certain weapons on Russian territory, in addition to providing special chemicals and machinery to about 20 Russian defense facilities.
Russia relies on China to circumvent Western restrictions on critical technologies, high-end machinery, and advanced components, often via "complex trade routes." While Chinese companies are cautious about direct sanctions risks, evasion networks are active. The direct impact of Western sanctions on Russia's industrial and technological base has made China an indispensable supplier. This is not merely about commercial transactions; China is effectively becoming the "arsenal of authoritarianism," providing the necessary inputs to sustain a modern military conflict against Western-backed forces. This pattern reveals China's strategic intent to undermine Western sanctions regimes and demonstrate the resilience of its own supply chains in supporting strategic partners, effectively testing its capacity to withstand future Western pressure.
Strategic Access to Energy and Resources from Central Asia
China's pursuit of energy security is a central driver of its strategy in Central Asia.
Oil and Natural Gas
The Central Asia-China gas pipeline, stretching approximately 7000 km from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang, is a cornerstone of this strategy, transporting over half of Turkmenistan's natural gas exports to China. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has played a pivotal role in this infrastructure, and China has provided substantial loans, including $3 billion to Turkmenistan for field development and $10 billion to Kazakhstan for future oil supplies, demonstrating a long-term commitment to securing supplies. Despite previous delays, Chinese President Xi Jinping specifically urged the acceleration of the pipeline's fourth line (Line D) in May 2023, underscoring its profound strategic value over purely commercial considerations for Beijing. Furthermore, Russia has extended its agreement to use Kazakhstan's oil pipeline to China for its own oil volumes, illustrating a complex energy dynamic where China is a crucial destination for both Central Asian and, increasingly, Russian energy exports.
Uranium and Nuclear Energy
Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, holds immense strategic importance for China's nuclear ambitions. Kazakhstan is a global uranium powerhouse, possessing approximately 20% of the world's uranium reserves and supplying a significant portion of global demand, including 25% of U.S. uranium imports in 2022. In a landmark development, Kazakhstan and China are actively preparing to sign a cooperation agreement in the nuclear energy sector, with Chinese companies, notably China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), emerging as leading candidates for Kazakhstan's planned first nuclear power plant. CNNC's competitive advantage lies in its ability to offer lower project costs (e.g., $2.8 billion for a 1 GW reactor compared to typical $10-15 billion for 2 GW) and its willingness to transfer nuclear technology, which aligns with Kazakhstan's goals of strengthening national sovereignty and reducing dependence on foreign powers. This partnership is particularly significant given China's ambitious domestic nuclear program, with plans to build 150 reactors by 2035 (27 already under construction), positioning Beijing to become a dominant force in global nuclear exports and further sidelining Western competitors.
China's approach extends beyond merely acquiring raw energy resources; it is strategically moving into the high-value, long-term sector of nuclear power and advanced energy technologies. By offering low-cost nuclear power plant construction and technology transfer, China is creating a deeper and more lasting form of influence—a "technological dependency"—compared to traditional resource extraction agreements. This strategy allows Central Asian states to diversify their energy mix and reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, but in doing so, they become increasingly dependent on Chinese technology, expertise, and potentially, fuel cycle services. This represents a fundamental shift in the nature of influence, from a commodity-based dependency to a technology-based one. This sophisticated approach enables China to secure long-term energy supplies and export its advanced nuclear technology, simultaneously diminishing Russia's traditional energy leverage in the region. It also positions China as a key player in the global nuclear energy market, challenging established Western and Russian dominance in this strategic sector.
Critical Minerals
Central Asia also boasts significant reserves of critical minerals and rare earths, indispensable for high-tech industries, advanced manufacturing, and defense. While information primarily highlights China's global dominance in critical mineral processing and its trade dynamics with the U.S., it underscores the strategic importance of these materials. China has spent decades building the world's main industrial chain for mining and processing such materials, holding an essential monopoly over "heavy rare earths" and producing a substantial portion of the world's tungsten, gallium, antimony, and germanium. This global dominance makes China's access to Central Asia's critical mineral reserves a natural extension of its resource security strategy, further solidifying its leverage in global supply chains.
Table 2: Key Energy and Mineral Resources from Central Asia to China
Resource Type | Country of Origin | Volume/Significance | Key Agreements/Projects |
Natural Gas | Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan | Pipeline capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per annum (bcm/a); over half of Turkmenistan's exports | Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (Line D); loans for field development |
Oil | Kazakhstan | Future oil supplies; Russia's use of Kazakhstan's oil pipeline | Loans for future oil supplies |
Uranium | Kazakhstan | Approx. 20% of world reserves; key supplier for China | Nuclear energy cooperation agreement; joint research on transboundary deposits |
Rare Earth Metals | Central Asia | Significant reserves | Extension of China's resource security strategy |
Expanding Trade and New Consumer Markets in Central Asia
Trade between China and the five Central Asian countries has seen remarkable growth over the past decade. Total trade volume increased by 116% from $43.48 billion in 2013 to $674.15 billion in 2024. This upward trend continued into 2025, with trade reaching a record $39.91 billion in the first five months, a 10.4% year-on-year increase. During this period, Chinese exports to Central Asia amounted to $188.18 billion (up 5.6%), while imports from Central Asia to China increased significantly by 21%. Kazakhstan remains China's largest trade partner in Central Asia, with bilateral trade reaching $43.82 billion in 2024.
Diversification of Chinese Products in Central Asian Markets
With the withdrawal of Western brands from Russia following sanctions, Chinese consumer products, particularly automobiles, smartphones, and various electronic devices, have rapidly filled the market void. This trend is reflected and expanding in Central Asian markets, where Chinese exports are increasingly diversified to meet growing consumer demand. The growth of cross-border e-commerce is also evident, as indicated by the increase in low-value goods exports from China to Russia, a pattern likely replicated and expanding across Central Asia, leveraging improved logistical channels.
Xinjiang's Role as a Trade and Logistics Hub
Xinjiang, with its unique geographical proximity and cultural ties to Central Asia, has emerged as an indispensable force driving cooperation. Key border ports like Alashankou and Horgos have become "golden corridors" facilitating trade between China, Central Asia, and Europe. In 2024, over 16,000 China-Europe (Central Asia) freight trains transited through these ports, setting a new record. Road transport volumes through Xinjiang's international networks also saw sharp increases in 2024, and Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, maintains direct air links with all five Central Asian nations, further facilitating trade and people-to-people exchanges. In the first five months of 2025, Xinjiang's total imports and exports with the five Central Asian countries exceeded 100 billion yuan ($13.95 billion), accounting for a substantial 39.4% of China's overall trade with the region. This growth is driven by Xinjiang's efforts to optimize its trade structure, actively promoting "Made in China" products and importing energy resources and agricultural products from the region, achieving mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.
Xinjiang is not merely an economic conduit; it functions as a critical security buffer zone. By fostering economic integration and prosperity in Central Asia through trade and infrastructure, China aims to bolster regional stability, which in turn mitigates potential security threats that could spill over into Xinjiang. The economic leverage gained through trade and investment strengthens Beijing's ability to influence regional security dynamics and address its internal stability concerns. Thus, economic expansion and security are inextricably linked in China's Central Asia policy. This dual role indicates a sophisticated, long-term strategic approach where economic development is a tool to achieve broader geopolitical and internal security objectives.
Table 3: China-Central Asia Trade Volume Trends
Year/Period | Total Trade Volume (USD) | Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%) | Chinese Exports to CA (USD) | CA Imports from China (USD) | Key Trends |
2013 | 43.48 billion | - | - | - | |
2024 | 674.15 billion | 116% (vs 2013) | - | - | |
Jan-May 2025 | 39.91 billion | 10.4% | 188.18 billion (5.6% YoY) | 98.24 billion (21% YoY) | Road transport facilitated 51.8% of trade in 2024 |
2024 (Kazakhstan) | 43.82 billion | - | - | - | Kazakhstan is largest trade partner |
Deepening Military and Technological Cooperation: A Strategic Partnership in Action
Collaboration between Russia and China extends far beyond the economic sphere, manifesting in an intensification of military and technological cooperation with profound strategic implications.
Joint Military Exercises and Strategic Coordination
The frequency and scope of joint military exercises have significantly increased, serving as tangible evidence of deepening cooperation. Recent examples include the "North-Joint 2024" exercises (air and naval maneuvers in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk), "Ocean 2024" (a strategic exercise), and the seventh edition of the "Marine Security Belt 2025" joint naval drills with Iran, which began on March 10, 2025, in the northern Indian Ocean. These exercises are explicitly aimed at "deepening the level of strategic cooperation" and "improving the ability to jointly address security threats."
While some analysts suggest these exercises are more about "demonstrating the will of cooperation to the outside world than improving interoperability," their increasing complexity and geographical reach (e.g., into Pacific waters) indicate a growing strategic alignment and willingness to jointly project power. The escalation of joint military exercises sends a clear message to the West: the Russia-China partnership is not merely rhetorical but is translating into tangible operational coordination. This creates a formidable challenge to the security postures of the United States and its allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It also allows both militaries to gain experience operating together, refining tactics and potentially integrating command structures, even if full interoperability remains a long-term goal. This signals the emergence of a coordinated, anti-hegemonic military bloc.
Technology Exchange and Battlefield Intelligence
Putin's stated willingness to "exchange technologies" with China, going beyond mere "buying and selling," indicates a high level of trust and strategic integration in military-technical cooperation. This represents a significant shift from the pre-2014 period, when Russia showed little interest in Chinese defense technology.
Historically, China has acquired advanced Russian military hardware (e.g., S-400 missile defense systems, Su-35 fighters) and reverse-engineered them to develop indigenous systems. Russia's current isolation makes China its "only remaining major source of much-needed imported military technology and components," while China gains access to advanced Russian missile, air defense, and electronic warfare technology. Western officials have revealed that Russia and China are "actively exploring ways to share Western technologies acquired on the Ukrainian battlefield." European defense officials believe Beijing is "eager to test its materials on a real battlefield." In June 2025, it was reported that Russia will train approximately 600 Chinese soldiers using tactics learned from the war in Ukraine, with a focus on tank warfare, artillery operations, air defense, and combat engineering. There are concerns that some Chinese troops may even embed with Russian units near the front lines to observe or participate in combat operations against Ukrainian forces. Russia's isolation has made it a more willing partner for technology transfer, providing China with access to advanced Russian military systems and, crucially, real-time battlefield intelligence and captured Western technologies from Ukraine. This accelerates China's military modernization, particularly in areas like electronic warfare and missile defense, providing practical data and reverse-engineering opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable. This pattern reveals China's opportunistic approach to the conflict, using it as a living laboratory to enhance its own military capabilities and narrow its technological gaps with the West, thereby increasing its long-term strategic threat.
High-Tech Collaboration
Putin has highlighted cooperation in high-tech sectors such as heavy helicopter construction, space production, and aviation. The CR929 wide-body aircraft joint venture, though predating the war, demonstrates a foundation for such collaboration.
Putin's admiration for China's "simply outstanding achievements" in artificial intelligence (AI), noting it is "10 times cheaper... and 10 times more effective" than competitors, underscores a strong interest in AI collaboration. Both sides also recognize the need to cooperate on the military application of AI technologies. There are signs of increasing cooperation in space technologies and a shared interest in preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. The deepening collaboration in cutting-edge sectors like AI, space, and advanced aviation indicates a long-term strategic investment in future military capabilities. This is not just about current battlefield needs but about building a shared technological base for future conflicts. By pooling resources and expertise in these critical areas, Russia and China aim to reduce their reliance on Western technology and potentially establish a technological advantage in key strategic domains, fundamentally altering the global power balance in the decades to come.
Broader Geopolitical Implications: The Arctic, Central Asia, and the Belt and Road Initiative
The Ukraine conflict has triggered a cascade of geopolitical repercussions extending beyond the European theater, influencing strategic areas like the Arctic and the trajectory of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The Arctic and the Polar Silk Road
The Arctic has become a key area of strategic and economic interest for both nations. Russia, isolated by the "Arctic 7," desperately needs non-Western partners for its Arctic plans, making China a "suitable option." China, having declared itself a "near-Arctic state," aims to establish a "Polar Silk Road" using the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
Recent developments highlight this cooperation: the first joint Chinese Coast Guard patrol in the Arctic has been reported, joint projects for NSR development are underway, a significant increase in trade between Russia's Arkhangelsk port and China has been observed, and parameters for the construction of a second gas pipeline from Siberia to China have been agreed upon. China thus gains access to the NSR, resources, and opportunities to test technologies in extreme climatic conditions. China has capitalized on Russia's confrontation with the West by offering geopolitical, economic, and technological support in exchange for access to resources and Arctic transport corridors. China has also publicly stated that it will not recognize the Arctic Council without Russia. Russia's isolation due to the war in Ukraine has drastically increased its dependence on China for Arctic development, effectively granting Beijing unprecedented access and influence in a strategically vital region. This accelerates China's "Polar Silk Road" ambitions, providing alternative trade routes to Europe (reducing reliance on the Strait of Malacca) and securing access to resources. This reconfigures Arctic geopolitics, creating a new axis of cooperation that challenges the traditional dominance of Arctic states and potentially opens a new front for strategic competition with NATO. The International Arctic Forum in Murmansk, held in March 2025, further underscored Russia's strategy of economic and military expansion in the region. Russia-China naval cooperation in the Arctic has introduced a new strategic dimension into the region's evolving geopolitical matrix.
China's Strategic Expansion in Central Asia
Central Asia has historically represented a crucial component of Russia's geopolitical and economic sphere, a deep legacy of the Soviet era. Moscow maintained a predominant role in security arrangements, energy transit, and cultural ties. However, China's engagement in the region is driven by a complex interplay of strategic imperatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which positions Central Asia as a fundamental land bridge connecting China to Europe and beyond. The region is also a vital source of energy resources and critical minerals, in addition to representing a growing consumer market and a critical buffer zone for China's western border, particularly Xinjiang province.
The second China-Central Asia Summit, held in Astana in May 2025, served as a pivotal platform to formalize and deepen cooperation. This high-level engagement resulted in the signing of 58 agreements worth nearly $25 billion, covering sectors such as infrastructure development, green technology, renewable energy, and agricultural cooperation. China also pledged 1.5 billion yuan in non-repayable loans and 3,000 training opportunities, in addition to signing a "Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation" that solidifies its role as the primary driver of a new regional order.
Geopolitical Rebalancing: Central Asia's Pivot Away from Moscow
Central Asian states are increasingly asserting their strategic autonomy, evident in their nuanced responses to the Ukraine conflict. While not openly condemning Russia, Central Asian leaders have refrained from endorsing Russia's actions and have expressed adherence to international sanctions regimes, signaling a gradual but clear detachment from Moscow. This pivot is also reflected in cultural and political shifts, including a resurgence of national identities, a reevaluation of historical narratives, and educational reforms prioritizing local languages over Russian. Furthermore, Central Asian students are increasingly choosing to study in China, Turkey, and Western countries, rather than in Russia. China's growing economic dominance, often described as the "undisputed economic overlord" in Central Asia, makes it highly unlikely that any regional state will revert to a "vassalage" relationship with Moscow.
The Dynamic Between BRI and EAEU
The relationship between China's BRI and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has evolved from initial mistrust to a pragmatic, albeit complex, coexistence. Russia initially perceived the BRI as a challenge to its ambitions of restoring influence in the post-Soviet space through the EAEU. However, following Western sanctions post-2014, President Putin adopted a more conciliatory approach, signing a "great Eurasian partnership" with Xi Jinping in 2015 aimed at synchronizing the BRI and the EAEU, recognizing the potential for mutual economic and geopolitical benefits. While this suggests some complementarity, China's rapidly growing economic dominance through the BRI is undeniably "narrowing the scope" of the Russian-led EAEU, shifting the balance of economic power in the region.
Diversification of Central Asian States' Partnerships
Central Asian countries are skillfully navigating the complex geopolitical landscape by pursuing a "multi-vector" foreign policy. They are strategically balancing their relationships with China, Russia, and, increasingly, Western partners, to safeguard their sovereignty and maximize development opportunities. This involves selective cooperation with Russia when it aligns with their national interests, while simultaneously strengthening ties with a broader range of international economic partners to attract diversified investments and avoid over-reliance on a single power, thereby mitigating the risk of secondary sanctions. The perceived decline of Russian influence in Central Asia is not leading to a direct and passive transfer of control to China. Instead, it is creating a strategic opening for Central Asian states to assert greater autonomy and pursue their national interests more independently. They are cleverly leveraging the competition among external powers (China, Russia, and, increasingly, the West) to maximize benefits, attract diversified investments, and avoid becoming overly dependent on a single actor. This demonstrates a sophisticated form of strategic hedging, where regional actors are actively shaping their own destiny rather than merely being objects of great power competition. This dynamic suggests that the geopolitical landscape in Central Asia is becoming more complex and genuinely multipolar, with regional states acting as significant players rather than passive recipients of external influence. Their ability to maintain sovereignty amidst conflicting interests will serve as a crucial case study for the resilience of state autonomy in a rapidly changing global order.
Alternative Transport Corridors and Connectivity
The Ukraine conflict has provided an undeniable and urgent impetus for China and Central Asian states to accelerate the development, investment, and utilization of transport corridors that bypass Russian territory. The disruption of the traditional northern route through Russia has created a void and an increased need for resilient alternatives.
Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) / Middle Corridor
The TITR has gained significant strategic importance as a viable alternative to traditional trade routes through Russia, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine conflict. This multimodal land and sea route connects China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, and Europe, effectively bypassing both Russian and Chinese bottlenecks. Traffic on the TITR increased by 62% in 2024, with container transport growing by an impressive 170%, reaching 56,500 TEUs. The target for 2025 is set at 5.2 million tons and 70,000 TEUs. Kazakhstan, a central hub for this corridor, is undertaking massive investments in its logistics network, planning to modernize 13,000 km of roads and 6,100 km of railways in 2025 alone, in addition to expanding six airports and building new maritime terminals. Despite this rapid development, the Middle Corridor still has limitations and is not yet considered a "serious alternative" to the traditional Northern Route through Russia in terms of capacity and efficiency.
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway
This railway project is a critical component of China's efforts to enhance connectivity and diversify routes. Construction is scheduled to begin in July 2025, with an estimated completion by 2030 and a total cost of $8 billion. Once operational, the CKU railway is expected to significantly reduce freight transport times from China to Europe by 7-10 days, offering a more direct and efficient land bridge.
Other Land and Air Links Enhancing Regional Connectivity
In addition to these major projects, China continues to leverage and expand existing land and air links. In 2024, over 16,000 China-Europe (Central Asia) freight trains transited through Xinjiang's key border ports like Alashankou and Horgos, setting a record. Road transport volumes through Xinjiang's international networks also saw strong increases in 2024, and Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, maintains direct air links with all five Central Asian nations, further facilitating trade and people-to-people exchanges.
Table 4: Key Transport Corridors and Their Status
Corridor Name | Key Countries/Regions Traversed | Current Status/Capacity | Strategic Significance |
Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) / Middle Corridor | China, Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Caucasus, Europe | Traffic increased by 62% in 2024, 170% container growth; 2025 target: 5.2 million tons | Alternative to Russian routes, bypasses bottlenecks; reduces dependence |
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway | China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan | Construction begins July 2025, completion 2030; cost $8 billion | Reduces freight transport times by 7-10 days; direct land bridge |
Northern Route (via Russia/Belarus) | China, Russia, Belarus, Europe | Prior to conflict, 90% of rail cargo; now, major freight forwarders refuse to operate in Russia | Traditional route, now disrupted by sanctions and conflict |
Adaptations of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
The war has "thrown into disarray" China's plans to expand trade and transport ties with Central and Eastern Europe, directly threatening Xi Jinping's signature BRI. Key rail links that passed through Ukraine (e.g., Changsha-Chop, Xian-Budapest) are now in doubt. China-Europe rail trade is expected to fall by at least 35% as major freight forwarders refuse to operate in Russia/Belarus.
This disruption has forced China to prioritize alternative BRI routes, particularly the "China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor." This involves transit through Central Asian countries, the Caspian Sea region, Iran, and Turkey. While initially disruptive, this reorientation accelerates China's existing policies of deepening influence in Central Asia. Russia's economic weakening further strengthens Beijing's influence in the region, potentially allowing for an acceleration of BRI projects there. The war in Ukraine, while disrupting some established BRI routes, has paradoxically created an opportunity for China to consolidate its influence in Central Asia. By making the northern route through Russia less viable for many international actors, it compels China to invest more heavily and rely on the Central Asian corridor. This pattern reveals China's strategic adaptability; it can leverage geopolitical disruptions to redirect and strengthen its grand connectivity schemes, further integrating Central Asia into its economic and strategic sphere of influence, thereby extending its continental power projection. Ukraine has been part of Xi Jinping's BRI since 2017, with nearly $3 billion in BRI-related contracts and the lease of up to 10% of Ukrainian farmland before the Russian invasion. China could also play a significant role in Ukraine's reconstruction, with World Bank estimates indicating reconstruction costs of $486 billion over the next decade. Offering China a role in Ukraine's reconstruction could transform it from a passive pro-Russia bystander into an active participant in peacemaking, providing the Chinese leadership with desired prestige and making it a stakeholder in Ukraine's security.
Asymmetric Interdependence and Strategic Nuances: Limits and Dilemmas
Despite the depth of cooperation, the relationship between Russia and China is characterized by asymmetric interdependence and subtle nuances that define its limits and dilemmas.
The "Better Than an Ally" Dynamic
The relationship is best described as an "asymmetric strategic interdependence." While both countries benefit, China holds the stronger position due to its economic power and Russia's isolation. Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China for financial support (to circumvent sanctions), technology, and a market for its energy.
The needs are reciprocal: China requires Russian energy, assistance for its civilian nuclear program, support in the United Nations, military cooperation, and joint action in the Indo-Pacific. Russia, in turn, needs Chinese financial and technological support and a market for its resources. This dynamic implies that while Russia is a vital partner for China, its weakened position post-sanctions increases Beijing's leverage. China can dictate terms more effectively, securing discounted resources and favorable trade conditions, while continuing to benefit from Russia's role as a geopolitical disruptor and military partner. This "asymmetry" ensures China's long-term strategic advantage within the partnership, reinforced by its growing economic and strategic influence in regions like Central Asia.
China's Cautious Approach
Despite accusations from Ukraine, China has largely refrained from providing direct lethal military aid to Russia, focusing instead on dual-use goods and components. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated on July 3, 2025, that China is not supplying lethal weapons to the parties involved in the conflict. This is a calculated move to avoid triggering severe secondary sanctions from the West.
Beijing seeks to preserve its global great power status and maintain relations with European partners, even as political tensions rise. This requires a delicate balancing act, as its perceived support for Russia dampens enthusiasm for cooperation in Europe. China's support for Russia is strategic and substantial, but it is not "unlimited." The apparent contradiction between China's public neutrality and its concrete support for Russia reveals a sophisticated strategy: provide enough aid to keep Russia vital and distracted, but not so much as to incur crippling Western sanctions that could jeopardize China's own global economic interests. This nuance highlights China's pragmatism and its long-term focus on its own ascent, even at the cost of a full alliance with Russia.
Internal Tensions and Future Vulnerabilities for Russia
Russia's increasing reliance on the Chinese market and financial infrastructure creates new vulnerabilities for Moscow. Russian exports to China are discounted, and imports are often of lower quality and more expensive.
China is concerned about Russia's strengthening ties with North Korea and a potential Chinese monopoly over the NSR. While the partnership is currently mutually beneficial, the asymmetric nature and Russia's growing dependence could lead to future friction. China's apprehension about Russia's ties with North Korea suggests a limit to how much Beijing desires to see a fully integrated "axis of authoritarianism" that could drag China into unwanted conflicts or complicate its own strategic calculations. This emerging theme suggests that, while the current alignment is strong, China will continue to prioritize its own national interests, potentially leading to future divergences or a more overt Chinese dominance within the partnership. This growing dependence on China poses a significant long-term risk to Russia's strategic autonomy, potentially reducing it to a junior partner in a relationship increasingly dictated by Beijing's interests.
Conclusion: A Calculated Gamble with Far-Reaching Consequences
The in-depth analysis of the dynamics between China and Russia in the context of the Ukraine war reveals that the prolonged conflict significantly serves Beijing's fundamental strategic interests. China has shrewdly leveraged the situation to divert U.S. attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific theater, granting itself valuable strategic space for its own modernization and regional ambitions. This "distraction dividend" is a central element of China's strategy to reshape the global power balance.
Economically, the war has cemented a profound asymmetric interdependence, with Russia becoming a supplier of discounted energy and a crucial market for Chinese exports, while China provides Moscow with an indispensable financial and technological lifeline. This dynamic has accelerated de-dollarization and strengthened China's economic resilience against Western pressure. Military and technological cooperation has deepened, with technology exchanges and China's opportunistic acquisition of valuable battlefield intelligence and material testing opportunities from Ukraine, thereby accelerating its own military capabilities.
The geopolitical implications extend to strategic regions like the Arctic, where Russia's isolation has granted Beijing unprecedented access and influence, accelerating its "Polar Silk Road" ambitions. China's strategic expansion into Central Asia, through economic agreements, access to critical energy and mineral resources, and the development of alternative transport corridors, has further solidified its influence in an area traditionally dominated by Moscow. The Belt and Road Initiative has also undergone adjustments, with China reorienting and strengthening routes through Central Asia, further consolidating its continental influence.
The partnership between Russia and China, while not an unlimited formal alliance, is a "higher-level" strategic relationship that challenges the existing international order. China has demonstrated a pragmatic approach, providing sufficient support to sustain Russia and maintain its anti-Western posture, without sacrificing its own strategic autonomy or incurring prohibitive costs in the form of severe Western sanctions. This calculated gamble will have profound and lasting consequences for global stability and power dynamics, accelerating the shift towards a multipolar world and strengthening an anti-Western bloc that will continue to be a critical axis in international affairs. However, this growing reliance on China also presents a significant long-term risk for Russia, potentially diminishing its strategic independence and solidifying its role as a junior partner in a relationship increasingly defined by Beijing's burgeoning power and opportunistic agenda.
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