The Russian Perspective on China's Nuclear Potential and Implications for the United States

The New START Treaty at the End of the Line (February 2026): How China's Nuclear Expansion Reshapes Global Deterrence and Dooms the Bilateral Agreement

The analysis focuses on the complex and deteriorating dynamics of nuclear arms control, examined through the lens of the Russian Federation (specifically, the analyses of the Russian International Affairs Council - RIAC).

The study draws inspiration from the famous aphorism by Lord Palmerston, paraphrased to emphasize the reality of contemporary realpolitik: "There are no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only nuclear weapons are eternal and constant."

The world is currently facing the deepest crisis in the history of the nuclear arms control and disarmament system. This system, once a pillar of the post-Cold War order, has been systematically eroded over the last two decades, starting with the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and culminating with the Russian suspension of New START in 2023.

The analysis focuses on the imminent collapse of the global nuclear arms control system, an outcome largely predetermined by the impossibility of renewing the New START Treaty, whose extension expires in February 2026. This failure risks undermining the entire Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Through the lens of the Russian Federation, the study examines how the rapid qualitative and quantitative modernization of the People's Republic of China's nuclear arsenal—in particular the emergence of a flexible nuclear triad—is fundamentally redefining the strategic equation. The growth of Beijing's military potential, exacerbated by US accusations of pursuing a "confrontation with two adversaries" strategy, effectively dooms the bilateral Russia-US agreement and compels Moscow to demand a future trilateral negotiating format, which is currently politically unfeasible.

In conclusion, Beijing's nuclear expansion will function as leverage for Russia, pushing Moscow to reject new agreements unless significant limitations on China's strategic nuclear capabilities are negotiated. The intensifying arms race between the US and China creates escalation risks in the Asia-Pacific region, prompting Russia to intensify technical cooperation (e.g., on the nuclear fuel cycle) with China.

The document provides an essential overview for understanding the strategic factors driving Moscow and Beijing in this period of maximum nuclear uncertainty.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

1. Premise: The Perpetual Crisis of Arms Control

The subtitle of this analysis, a paraphrase of Lord Palmerston's famous adage, summarizes the strategic logic that, according to Russian analysts, guides contemporary international relations: only nuclear weapons are eternal and constant.

The world is going through the deepest crisis in the history of the system of nuclear arms control and disarmament built over the last sixty-five years. This system, though imperfect, was an integral attribute of the previous world order, which has been transformed by profound economic, political, and technological changes. Although it did not eliminate nuclear weapons, thanks to it, the probability of nuclear weapons use was significantly reduced, strategic relations between the main powers gained considerable stability and predictability, and global nuclear arsenals were reduced in quantity by almost an order of magnitude [Cochran, Arkin, Hoeing 1984: 30-35; Arbatov 2024].

"Consequently, the threat of nuclear war between East and West in the 1990s and 2000s was essentially reduced to zero."

Unfortunately, these positive trends have reversed over the last decade. The process began with the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002, followed by withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (2018), denunciation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020. When the West set a course for the "strategic defeat" of Russia, the latter suspended the New START and denounced the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and withdrew its ratification of the CTBT in 2023.

2. The New START Deadlock and the Russian View of the Binary Confrontation

Three fundamental pillars of the arms control system are currently at risk:

1. New START (Expiration February 2026): The extended Treaty expires in February 2026, making it practically impossible to conclude a new treaty in the remaining time. The ambiguity of the Republican administration and the growing pressure within US circles to abandon the Treaty are perceived by Russia as an attempt to restructure nuclear deterrence in anticipation of a confrontation with the two major adversaries (Russia and China). This strategic objective, according to Moscow, is aimed at freeing the US from constraints to deal with a combined threat. The Russian leadership has also expressed strategic grievances, and the Kremlin's stance on its extension remains unclear.

2. CTBT Treaty: Pressure is growing within both the US and Russia to abandon the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The collapse of the first two pillars would destroy the NPT.

3. The New Strategic Equation: Russia, China, and the US

Russian-Chinese relations have steadily improved and are currently the closest in history, facilitated by the deterioration of Russia-US/West relations and contradictions between the US and China (mainly over Taiwan). Washington considers China its primary global rival. Within this tandem, however, the balance of power has now shifted significantly in favor of Beijing.

4. Detailed Russian Analysis of Chinese Nuclear Modernization (RIAC)

The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) notes how China has initiated a targeted buildup of strategic nuclear potential since 2021, potentially capable of achieving parity with the US within a decade.

Qualitative and Quantitative Changes:

In recent years, China's nuclear missile forces have undergone significant qualitative and quantitative changes, raising concerns among the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing's official nuclear doctrine continues to rely on the concept of "minimum deterrence," emphasizing a guaranteed but limited retaliatory strike. However, a more complex and flexible architecture of Chinese nuclear forces has emerged.

The entire nuclear arsenal has undergone major transformations (ICBMs, SLBMs, hypersonic systems, cruise missiles). Efforts have focused on increasing the number of carriers and expanding their performance characteristics: range, accuracy, missile defense penetration capability, and the ability to deliver multiple payload options. As a result, China has come close to forming a true nuclear triad, with each component showing signs of transitioning toward a more multi-functional and resilient configuration.

A. Land Component: The Three-Body Problem (Alexander Ermakov)

The land component is the backbone of the expansion.

• Advanced ICBMs: The new generation DF-41 solid-fuel ICBM has entered service (deployed in at least two brigades) in a mobile variant and is also believed to have a silo-based variant (silo launchers revealed in 2020). The main ICBM, the DF-31, is receiving new modifications (DF-31A, DF-31AG). Prior to the DF-41, silo-based DF-5 ICBMs were armed with multiple warheads in the DF-5B and DF-5C versions (presumed to carry three and five warheads, respectively).

• Dual-Capability and Hypersonic Missiles: The DF-27 system ($5,000-8,000 \text{ km}$ range), which entered service in 2023, is likely a dual-capability missile that can be equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle. The core of China's medium-range missile capabilities is the dual-capability DF-26 missile, deployed in northern regions to reach US military bases in the Asia-Pacific region (such as Guam). The DF-17 with the DF-ZF warhead (hypersonic glide vehicle) made China the first country in the world to deploy such a system ($1,800-2,500 \text{ km}$ range).

• Quantitative Expansion: In 2021, three sites were discovered with an estimated total of 320 silos (120, 110, and 90 in Gansu, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, respectively). These silos, believed to be for the DF-41, complicate targeting for a potential adversary, which is forced to allocate weapons to neutralize vast areas.

• Cruise Missiles (GLCMs): The development of land-based missiles like the CJ-10 and CJ-100 (eliminated by the INF Treaty), of which the PLA has about 150 launchers. American publications periodically assert the possibility of deploying low-yield nuclear warheads on Chinese cruise missiles, but there is no practical confirmation of such plans.

B. Maritime and Air Components

• Navy: The PLA Navy operates six Type 094 submarines (SSBNs) with JL-2 SLBMs. Noisier engines are believed to limit their range from Chinese territorial waters, a problem partially solved by the new, longer-range JL-3 SLBMs, expected on the future Type 096 SSBNs.

• Air Force: The air component is traditionally the least developed, but progress is being made with the H-6N strategic bomber (unveiled in 2019, with in-flight refueling capability), which can carry air-launched ballistic (based on the DF-21) and cruise missiles. The future is linked to the advanced H-20 bomber.

C. Command and Control (C2) and New Threats

• Nuclear Boomerang (Alexey Arbatov): The 2021 test of a so-called Fractional Orbital Bombardment System sparked controversy, as it could theoretically attack the US from any direction (e.g., from the south), bypassing major early warning radars. While Lewis stated that such a system appears technically redundant and of dubious effectiveness, it reflects the intent to use outer space for nuclear attacks.

• C2 and Early Warning Systems: China is actively developing robust C2 systems (creating underground command posts and protecting C2 networks) and a comprehensive Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS), installing large phased-array early warning radar stations and utilizing satellites.

• "Early Warning Counterattack" (Andrey Gubin): The development of radar and space components indicates a willingness to improve rapid response capabilities. While the "launch-on-warning" strategy is deemed unfounded by Russia, Chinese studies describe the concept of "Early Warning Counterattack" (预警反击) which aligns with the logic of launching missiles after receiving reliable MAWS information about an enemy attack, before impact.

5. Strategic Implications and Beijing's Role in New START's Failure

Consequences of Modernization:

Due to the increasing number of warheads (approximately 600 current, with Pentagon projections up to $1,000 \text{ by 2030}$) and the variety of carriers, the structure of the Chinese arsenal is shifting toward a configuration where the PLA is able to strike a wider range of targets. This leads to scenarios of limited nuclear use and increases the manageability of its movements. China is clearly seeking to increase the vulnerability of a potential adversary (primarily the United States).

The Chinese Weight on the New START Renewal (February 2026):

China's expansion is gradually closing the gap and complicating Russian-American cooperation in strategic nuclear deterrence.

Chinese Factor	Impact on Russia (and US Negotiations)
Complication of Deterrence	The Chinese arsenal narrows the gap between the US/Russia and China. Russia will hardly accept constraints if its strategic partner is not constrained.
Pressure for the Trilateral Format	Chinese trends increase the potential role of future trilateral negotiating formats (US-Russia-China) in risk management. Since China strongly opposes formalized treaty-based restrictions, Beijing's absence is the main obstacle to the renewal of any US-Russia agreement.
Justification for Flexibility	China's weight provides Russia with the justification to reject a stringent bilateral treaty, effectively making the renewal of the bilateral New START obsolete.

In conclusion, Beijing's nuclear expansion will function as leverage for Russia, pushing Moscow to reject new agreements unless significant limitations on China's strategic nuclear capabilities are negotiated. The intensifying arms race between the US and China creates escalation risks in the Asia-Pacific region, prompting Russia to intensify technical cooperation (e.g., on the nuclear fuel cycle) with China.