The Russian "Pivot to the East": Geopolitics, Domestic Development, and Sino-Russian Realism

Abstract

This text provides an in-depth analysis of Russia's "pivot to the East" strategy, a political and economic reorientation towards Asia. The author, Zhao Huasheng, argues that this strategy is driven by geopolitical and national development imperatives rather than a fundamental shift in cultural identity. Historically, Russia has long focused on the East, but the meaning of this concept has varied over time: from a question of cultural identity in the 19th century to a colonial expansionist move in the first "pivot," and now to a contemporary need to rebalance international relations. The current breakdown of relations with Europe has made the "pivot to the East" a necessary and forced choice for Moscow.

The "Pivot to the East" Strategy: A Mosaic of Necessities

The "pivot to the East" is not just a response to diplomatic isolation, but a long-term national development policy. Russia must address a serious imbalance: its eastern regions, while rich in resources, are sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, and have obsolete infrastructure. The goal is to transform these areas into new sources of economic growth and national security.

Development of Siberia and the Arctic

For Russia, Siberia and the Arctic are the future. The development of these regions is essential to exploit the immense reserves of gas, oil, minerals, and other raw materials. Asia, particularly China, represents the ideal market for these resources. The creation of new infrastructure, such as gas and oil pipelines, and the construction of cities and ports in these areas would not be economically sustainable without a partner with such a high energy demand.

The Arctic Sea Route and Cooperation with China

A fundamental element of this strategy is the Arctic Sea Route. This route, which is becoming navigable due to climate change, offers a significantly shorter maritime path between Asia and Europe compared to the traditional passages through the Suez Canal. Russia is its guardian and actively promotes its development.

Cooperation with China is vital for this project. Beijing is not only a key potential customer for the transit of goods but also actively participates in infrastructure projects in the Arctic, such as the Yamal LNG project, providing capital, technology, and icebreakers. This partnership is essential to overcome logistical challenges and high costs, transforming the route from an idea into a geoeconomic reality.

The "pivot to the East" is therefore an initiative that inextricably links Russian foreign policy to its internal development ambitions. Russia is not simply changing partners, but is redefining its own economic and geopolitical future through its most remote and potential-rich regions.

Central to this new orientation is China, which, while not the sole focus, represents the key partner due to converging economic and strategic interests. The need to develop Siberia and the Arctic is a core driver, as these regions are rich in resources but sparsely populated and economically underdeveloped. The collaboration with China on projects like the Arctic shipping route and major energy initiatives, such as the Arctic LNG-2 project, is crucial for Russia to turn these vast territories into new sources of economic growth and national security.

Despite the immense potential for cooperation in sectors like energy, infrastructure, and technology, the article also highlights Russian concerns about potential "over-dependence" and an "asymmetrical relationship" with Beijing, given the disparity in economic and military strength between the two nations. The article concludes that Russia's future will likely require a balance between both Eastern and Western directions, as its identity and interests remain intrinsically linked to both. The success of this strategy will depend on Russia's ability to overcome internal obstacles—such as bureaucracy and a lack of innovation—and to find a sustainable development model for its vast eastern regions.

by Gabriele and Nicola Iuvinale

Preface

The Russian "pivot to the East" strategy is a fundamental issue in current international politics, which has taken on a new urgency following the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Zhao Huasheng, a special expert for the Beijing Club for International Dialogue and a professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, recently published an article on the official website of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). In the article, he analyzed the evolution of the concept of "East," the historical practice, and the current motivations behind the "pivot to the East," arguing that it is essentially a product of geopolitics and national development needs, rather than a reconstruction of a civilization's identity.

Zhao Huasheng also explored the logic of Sino-Russian relations within the "Pivot to the East." Although the "Pivot to the East" does not necessarily imply a "Pivot to China," China holds a central position in the Russian "Pivot to the East" based on mutual national interests and cooperation in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, within Russia, there are also concerns about excessive dependence on China and an "asymmetrical structure."

The Russian "Pivot to the East": Geopolitics, Domestic Development, and Sino-Russian Realism

Club Briefing: Russia's "Pivot to the East" strategy has become an increasingly important item on the international political agenda, especially in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In a recent article published on the website of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Zhao Huasheng, a Senior Fellow at the Beijing Club for International Dialogue and a Professor at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, analyzes the evolution of the concept of "East," the historical practice of the "pivot," and its driving factors. He argues that the essence of this strategy lies in geopolitical and developmental imperatives rather than a redefinition of Russian civilizational identity.

Zhao also explores the logic of China-Russia relations within the broader "Pivot to the East," noting that, while the pivot does not equate to a full "Pivot to China," China nevertheless occupies a central position in Russia's eastward strategy, driven by shared national interests and cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, concerns remain in Russia about "over-dependence on China" and the risks of an "asymmetrical relationship."

Where is Russia's East? This is the main question when turning eastward. Throughout Russian history, the debate between East and West has been long-standing, embodied by the Westernizing and Slavophile factions, with the former representing the West and the latter the East. Their debate is often framed within the "East-West" framework.

However, interpreting the "turn to the East" as referring to the current "East-West" opposition—or rather, Asia versus Europe and the United States—is likely a misconception. Today, the "East" typically refers to the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the Confucian cultural sphere of East Asia represented by China. However, the "East" understood by the Slavophiles in Russian history was not geographically or culturally equivalent to Asia in this context. Although the Slavophiles sometimes advocated a "return to Asia," the "Asia" they referred to was actually Russia itself in relation to Europe—a distinct Slavic civilization tradition separate from Western Europe, rather than a move towards East Asian civilization.

According to the Slavophiles, Russia possesses a unique history and tradition and should pursue a standalone "Russian path." Although this path differs from the Western one, it is not an "Asian path" either. Neither the Slavophiles nor the pro-Western "Westernizers" considered Russia to belong to traditional Asian civilization. Therefore, the core of the debate between the two was not whether Russia should belong to Asia or Europe, but whether it should fully integrate into European civilization. The "East" in this context is essentially the "Russian East," a cultural and geopolitical conception opposed to Western Europe but still centered on Russia.

In the 1920s, Russian Eurasianism emerged. It argued that Russia possessed both European and Asian attributes but was neither European nor Asian. Instead, it was a "closed, complete geographical, economic, and ethnic entity." In other words, Eurasianism viewed Russia as an independent entity, a viewpoint it shared with Slavophilism.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a movement called Neo-Eurasianism emerged in Russia, which included several schools of thought. Neo-Eurasianism, however, is not content with theoretical speculation; it possesses a strong practical dimension. Given the emergence of former Soviet republics as independent states, it also carries specific political and geopolitical implications. Yet, in its core concept of an autonomous Eurasian unity, Neo-Eurasianism shares a common thread with Eurasianism. This shows that whether it's Occidentalism, Slavophilism, or Eurasianism, none of them aim for an Asian trajectory. Occidentalism is outward-looking, advocating for integration into Europe; Slavophilism and Eurasianism are inward-looking, advocating for a return to their own identity.

Since the major currents of Russian thought, including Occidentalism, Slavophilism, and Eurasianism, have no aspirations toward Asia, how did this turn to the East occur? Is it a contradiction?

In reality, there is no contradiction. The core of the debate among Russian schools of thought concerns the nation's civilizational nature and its development path, whereas the Turn to the East primarily concerns external relations and foreign policy. One discusses the spiritual East and West, or the civil and cultural East and West; the other, the diplomatic East and West, refers to specific countries and regions, not the civilizations they represent. There is no conflict between them; one concerns the nation's civilizational identity, while the other concerns the direction of its diplomacy.

Civilizational positioning and diplomatic positioning are not the same thing. Civilizational positioning reflects the nature of a country's value system and spiritual orientation, while diplomatic positioning reflects the country's diplomatic priorities at a given time. Civilizational positioning has a profound impact on diplomacy, but it does not imply an immutable diplomatic focus. A country's diplomacy is shaped not only by its civilizational positioning but also by its actual political, economic, diplomatic, and security interests. In the complex diplomatic environment, these latter factors often play a more direct role. Civilizational positioning does not necessarily align with the closeness of a country's relationships. Although Russia belongs to European civilization, it does not necessarily mean that its relations with Western countries are necessarily better, nor does it necessarily mean that its relations with non-Western countries are necessarily worse. In fact, Russia's friends are mostly non-Western countries, while it has very few close friends in the West.

In short, Russia's turn to the East is a diplomatic and economic development, not a rethinking of its national civilizational positioning. The East it is turning toward are the countries and regions of the Asia-Pacific, not its spiritual and cultural homeland in Asia.

Russia's Historical Turn to the East

The "Turn to the East" is neither a new idea nor a new practice in Russian diplomatic history. Russia has long been present in Asia, and the so-called "Turn to the East" is just a figurative expression. It does not represent Russia's "discovery of Asia" or its first appearance on the Asian stage. Its core meaning is to strengthen its eastward development.

As early as the Tsarist era, the East was a key focus of Russian diplomacy. Throughout Russian diplomatic history, Ottoman Turkey and the Caucasus were integral parts of its eastern diplomacy. For centuries after the 16th century, Russia continuously turned its attention eastward, looking toward the Ottoman Empire, the Qing Empire, the Central Asian khanates, and others. Peter the Great, known for his admiration of Europe, also desired to explore the East. In 1716, Peter the Great sent an expedition to Khiva and Bukhara, which was, however, completely destroyed.

The current turn of Russia toward the East as a national policy is not unprecedented. It is important to note that the meaning of East has varied over time in Russian diplomatic history. In general, the East refers to Asia, which is geographically separate from and culturally distinct from Europe. However, the meaning of East varies significantly depending on the context. It often broadly refers to the Asian region surrounding Russia, not necessarily geographically east of the country, nor does it exclusively encompass China and East Asia. Culturally, the East is largely non-Christian. The Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus, the Qing Empire, and the Central Asian Khanates were not part of the Christian cultural sphere. Throughout Russian diplomatic history, the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus are integral parts of Russia's eastern diplomacy. There is a popular Russian saying, "Eastern affairs are delicate and subtle." This phrase, from the Soviet film "White Sun of the Desert," has become a famous Russian aphorism for describing the East. The East here refers to Central Asia. It can be seen that although Central Asia is in the south of Russia, in the consciousness of the Russians at that time, it was also considered the East. However, in the current conception of Russia's turn to the East, Central Asia is no longer included.

While there is a consensus that Russia has pivoted eastward multiple times, there is much debate about when it first occurred. Beginning in the late 17th century, Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought ten wars over a period of more than 200 years. Although Ottoman Turkey was also considered part of the East, the conflict mainly took place in what is now the "West," including the Caucasus, the lower Volga, Crimea, western Ukraine, Moldova and Bessarabia, Istanbul, and the Balkans. These warm, fertile regions near Europe could not be considered the true East. In reality, this represented a significant shift in Russian diplomacy, though not to the east, but rather from north to south. Since the Middle Ages, the Grand Duchy of Moscow exported furs and timber from the north through the Baltic Sea, but this was not sufficient. Russia realized that to become a powerful nation, it had to turn south and gain access to the sea. This shift reached its peak during the reign of Catherine II in the 18th century and continued until the Crimean War in the mid-19th century.

Some believe that Russia's first Turn to the East began in the late 19th century, a turn that is closely associated with the name of Count S. Witte. Witte held a series of important posts in the Tsarist government during the reigns of Alexander III (1881-1894) and Nicholas II (1894-1917), including Minister of Railways, Minister of Finance, and Chairman of the Council of State. He vigorously promoted Russia's strategic turn to the East in economics, trade, investment, transportation, and logistics. He advocated for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and planned and completed the Chinese Eastern Railway, which ran through Manchuria to Vladivostok, establishing the Russo-Chinese Bank for this purpose. Although his Turn to the East was never fully realized, he was the first to envision it. Naturally, there are divergent views. Some argue that Russia did not have a coherent Asian strategy until the late 19th century and that many of the major Russian actions in the East, whether in Central Asia or the Far East, were improvisations by local Russian commanders rather than premeditated high-level planning. However, once these expansionist actions succeeded, the Tsarist government not only recognized them but also refused to withdraw them. For example, according to the 1689 Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Heilongjiang River Basin belonged to China. However, even before the Crimean War, Russian soldiers had advanced deep into the Heilongjiang River Basin, occupying settlements and establishing outposts. Although the Tsarist government recognized this as a violation of the treaty and an illegal occupation of Chinese territory, Tsar Nicholas I (who reigned from 1825 to 1855) responded by stating, "Once the Russian flag is raised, it should never be lowered." Furthermore, some argue that Russia's first Turn to the East occurred in the early years of the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the Ostpolitik of Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The author of this article believes that Russia's first turn to the East, in a modern sense, occurred after the end of the Crimean War, lasting from the 1850s until the Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century. The turn to the East promoted by Witte also occurred within this process.

The fundamental purpose and nature of Russia's first "turn to the East" were territorial expansion and colonization, with economic interests being secondary and no mission to spread civilization. Central Asia, the Far East, and the Caucasus were the primary targets of this Russian turn to the East. During this turn, Russia gained control of the Caucasus in the west, conquered all of Central Asia in the south, and expanded eastward to the Pacific coast.

Russia had been present in Central Asia since the early 18th century, and by the outbreak of the Crimean War, it had penetrated deep into the region. For example, the fortress of Vilny, known today as Almaty, was founded in 1854. After the Crimean War, in order to prepare for and contain a possible conflict with Great Britain from Central Asia, Russia proposed a strategy of southward expansion, exploring the "unexplored" regions of Central Asia, conquering Turkestan and the Central Asian steppes, and approaching the Afghan border. The Tsar tasked the young officer Nikolai Ignatiev with formulating this strategy.

In the process of expanding into Central Asia, expansion and colonization became ends in themselves, weakening Russia's security role against Great Britain. Beginning in 1858, Mikhail Chernyaev, known as the "19th Century Yermak," led his army to annex Turkestan, occupying cities such as Shymkent, Semipalatinsk, and Tashkent. In 1867, Russia established the Reichskoye-Turkestan Governorship, with K. Kaufman, formerly the Governor-General of the Russian Army in Poland, as its Governor-General. In the years that followed, the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand fell in succession under Kaufman's control, effectively completing Russia's conquest and colonization of Central Asia.

China is the main focus of the current "shift to the East" for Russia. In the brief years following the Crimean War, Russia exploited the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing and the internal unrest in China to force the Qing government to sign a series of unequal treaties, ceding over 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory in Northeast and Northwest China. It was Nikolai Ignatiev, then the Russian ambassador to China, who forced the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Beijing.

The Tsarist Russian eastward advance did not stop there. It crossed the Heilongjiang River and continued its advance into Northeast China, attempting to annex the entire region, establish a "Yellow Russia," and turn Northeast China into a second "Bukhara." This plan was largely unsuccessful due to conflicts and constraints among the great powers over the carving up of interests in China. In 1896, the Qing government signed an alliance with Russia for the purpose of jointly defending against Japan. This alliance granted Russia the privilege of building the Chinese Eastern Railway, nominally for wartime troop transport, but it actually became a tool for Russia to achieve its goal of a "Yellow Russia." In 1897, Germany occupied Qingdao. The Qing government sought help from Russia, but Russia refused, claiming that the defensive objective of the alliance was only Japan. Russia then seized the opportunity to force the Qing government to agree and sent troops to capture the Chinese port of Port Arthur. In 1900, Russia joined the Eight-Nation Alliance in invading China, engaging in a war against the Qing dynasty and occupying all of Northeast China. The brutal massacre of numerous Chinese civilians in the Sixty-Four Villages of Jiangdong occurred. In 1904-1905, Russia and Japan fought a war for Northeast China and Korea, with Northeast China as the main battlefield. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia instigated and supported the independence of Outer Mongolia, ultimately leading to China's loss of Outer Mongolia.

It is crucial to note that China and Russia have different, even contradictory, perceptions and interpretations of this period in Sino-Russian relations and the historical figures involved. In the historical understanding and psychological perception of the Chinese public, this episode in Sino-Russian relations is an integral part of China's century of humiliation, bringing profound suffering and humiliation to China and leaving deep scars in the hearts of the Chinese people. Of course, in the complex history of Sino-Russian relations, there have been dark chapters as well as periods of friendship and mutual assistance. The Soviet Union's military support for China during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and its aid to China after the founding of the People's Republic of China remain imprinted in China's historical memory.

It can be seen that in the nearly half-century of the first "turn to the East," Russia's eastward expansion and colonization reached their peak, acquiring extremely vast territories and advancing to its maximum geographical extent in the Far East and Central Asia, forming the final spatial structure of the Tsarist Russian Empire in the East, which remained essentially fixed and continued until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

A New Turn to the East

The current turn to the East by Russia has taken on a different meaning and character. Some often directly link this turn to the Ukraine crisis that broke out in 2014, arguing that the crisis was the fundamental cause and that it served as a buffer against the Russia-West conflict. While this is partially true, it is not entirely accurate. Russia's turn to the East is driven by a complex set of factors, primarily three: the shift of global economic and political focus to the Asia-Pacific region; Russia's need to develop Siberia and the Far East; and the international context. These factors have collectively contributed to Russia's turn to the East.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the shift in international political and economic weight toward the Asia-Pacific region has become increasingly evident. This region, home to several major global economies, is the world's most economically dynamic. At the same time, it has increasingly become a source of international political and economic power. This has attracted Russia's attention, prompting it to turn eastward, to develop closer ties with Asia-Pacific countries, to strengthen its position in the region, and to participate in this historical change in the structure of global political and economic power. President Putin has also repeatedly expressed this motivation.

The development of the Far East and Siberia is the core component of Russia's turn to the East, as well as the main driving force and imperative for this turn. All measures under Russia's Eastward Strategy are ultimately aimed at the development of the Far East and Siberia. When Putin first proposed the national strategy for eastward development in 2012, he explicitly stated that the goal was the development of the Far East and Siberia. The Far East and Siberia are rich in natural resources, with vast untapped wealth hidden under and above their soil. The development of these resources has been a Russian dream since the Tsarist era. This is necessary not only for the development of the Far East and Siberia but also for the development of the Russian nation itself. Russia sees the Far East and Siberia as the future, hoping that through their development, they will become a new source of wealth for Russia and fuel its prosperity and development in the 21st century. Therefore, President Putin has identified these regions as a priority development project for Russia for the entire 21st century. At the 9th Eastern Economic Forum in September 2024, President Putin further emphasized the importance of developing the Far East and Siberia, arguing that this will largely determine Russia's future destiny.

Russia faces a severe imbalance in development between its eastern and western regions. The Far East and Siberia are significantly behind the western regions in terms of economic and social development, posing a serious challenge to Russia's national development. This challenge is about both the economy and national security, and the two are intertwined. The Far East and Siberia are vast and rich in resources but sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, with aging infrastructure and a decreasing population. This contrasts with the developed economies and large populations of neighboring China, Japan, and South Korea, which have a huge demand for resources. Russia believes that if it fails to develop and improve the economic and social development of the Far East and Siberia, the economic gap between eastern and western Russia will widen, the population will decrease, and the region will feel increasingly distant from the West, losing its appeal to the public. Russia's control over the region will weaken, and it could even face the risk of losing it.

The Ukraine crisis did indeed play a significant role in Russia's turn to the East. In fact, every previous turn in Russian history occurred against the backdrop of setbacks in Europe. The turn to the East in the second half of the 19th century occurred after the defeat in the Crimean War, and the Soviet Union's first expansion to the East also came under Western encirclement. The common denominator in both cases was that European powers were advancing eastward, blocking Russia's way to the west. As a result, Russia turned to the East, which was weaker and more easily conquerable, temporarily avoiding the European onslaught and attempting to compensate for losses in the west with gains in the east.

The Ukraine crisis is the most serious conflict between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War, and it has profoundly altered relations between the two. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West imposed the harshest sanctions ever on Russia, almost completely severing political, economic, financial, technological, transportation, cultural, sports, educational, and humanistic ties. This is unprecedented in Russian and European history. Even during the Crimean War, Europe maintained its economic ties with Russia, and bilateral trade continued through neutral countries. A high wall has now been erected between Russia and the West, dividing Europe in two. With almost all of Europe on the other side of the wall, Russia feels isolated and trapped in Europe, and even the shadow of war looms between them. Under these circumstances, it is natural for Russia to expand eastward to break the Western diplomatic siege and recoup the lost markets and resources in Europe. However, fundamentally, this factor accelerated and deepened Russia's shift to the East, not its origin, as Russia's eastward-oriented policy existed before the Ukraine crisis.

As an academic concept and a political proposal, the "pivot to the East" has long been brewing in Russian academia. Some believe that Primakov, the originator of this idea, proposed it as early as 1996 when he was Russia's Foreign Minister. In 2012, the Valdai Club published a research report titled "To the Ocean: Russia's New Globalization," advocating for Russia's development toward the Asia-Pacific area. The report was authored by Professors S. Karaganov and T. Baldachev, two of the most vocal advocates and proponents of the "pivot to the East." They subsequently published numerous reports and articles on the topic, building public opinion in favor of Russia's "pivot to the East." Professor A. Lukin, a renowned Russian China expert, also published a new book on the subject in 2014. Many other Russian scholars have published numerous articles on Russia's "pivot to the East."

As a national policy, the turn to the East emerged later than in academia, but also before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The idea of a turn to the East was already evident during the Medvedev administration (2008-2012). In his 2010 State of the Nation address, then-President Medvedev stated that entering the Asia-Pacific economic space was an urgent task for Russia and that expanding Russia's relations with Asia-Pacific countries was strategic in nature. After Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012, the turn to the East finally took shape and has been promoted with continuity and conviction. As mentioned earlier, Russia had already proposed the eastward development strategy in 2012, and in his 2013 State of the Nation address, President Putin used the concept of a "turn to the Pacific," which essentially implies a turn to the East.

Although the name "Turn to the East" is used indiscriminately, the function and positioning of the "Turn to the East" have significant differences in different periods. Even in the same period, the policy of "Turn to the East" is not static but continues to evolve with changes in the situation.

Measuring the importance of the Turn to the East by comparing it with the European Direction reveals that, in Russian diplomacy, the Turn to the East initially served as an integration to a Eurocentric policy, mainly aimed at mitigating over-dependence on Europe without altering the Eurocentric structure. This was largely the nature of the Turn to the East before Medvedev came to power. Subsequently, the Turn to the East was elevated to a position of equal importance with Europe, with the goal of achieving Europe-Asia symmetry and balanced development between East and West. The Turn to the East after 2012 began to take on this meaning. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the importance of the Turn to the East changed further. With the path to the West completely blocked, the Turn to the East (including the Global South) became a necessary and unique option. In this context, it took on the importance of being the centerpiece and pillar of Russian diplomacy. It went beyond merely balancing Europe and began to replace the previous centrality of Europe, becoming the main direction of Russia's external development, while Europe was, at least temporarily, relegated to a secondary role.

However, Russian academia holds a rather rigid view on this issue. Some argue that the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict marks the end of the 300-year Russian odyssey through Europe, starting with Peter the Great, that Europe has long been closed to Russia, and that Russia will now return to its homeland in the East. Dostoevsky came to a similar conclusion a century and a half ago. In the 19th century, the great writer declared that Russia had reached the end of its historical path in Europe and that the time had come to forge its own way. In stark contrast, the opposite judgment was once just as unequivocal. It is remembered that in the early days of Russian independence, Occidentalism reigned supreme in Russia, and Russia embraced the West without hesitation. After the 9/11 attacks, relations between Russia and the United States intensified dramatically, leading some scholars to make extremely optimistic predictions: "Russian society has chosen its own path—the European path. President Putin's choices after 9/11 have put the final nail in the coffin of all Eurasian concepts." Clearly, these predictions have not come to pass.

So, will the prediction that Russia will completely break with Europe come true? While this can only be verified by future practice, based on the inspiration from history and the current conditions, this possibility does not seem remote.

Russia sent diplomatic missions to Europe in 1696 and became a major European power after the Great Northern War of 1700-1721. Since then, Russia has participated in European affairs, both as a partner and an adversary, but it has never withdrawn from Europe. The current confrontation with Europe is simply a special response to war and sanctions; it will not be the norm in Russian diplomacy, as it is incompatible with normal international political and economic laws. Russia's current isolation from Europe stems from political conflicts, not a loss of importance of Europe to Russia. Europe remains crucial to Russia politically, in terms of security, and economically, and its geographical, cultural, and religious ties remain unchanged. President Putin has stated that Russia remains a part of European civilization. Furthermore, as a vital entity, severing ties with Europe would be politically unwise, economically undesirable, and impossible from a security perspective. Relations between Russia and the European Union may be cyclical, but as a European country, Russia cannot afford to neglect Europe and will not hesitate to develop in that direction, should the opportunity arise. As one Russian scholar has observed, "Europe and Asia are both the most important directions for Russian diplomacy. Developments in both directions are guided by a policy of multifaceted and diversified foreign economic cooperation." It is foreseeable that after the war ends and Western sanctions against Russia are lifted, with the gradual normalization of bilateral relations, Russia's pragmatic relationship with Europe will also gradually recover. Although this may take a long time, and it is unlikely to return to a state better than before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, history shows that Russia will not remain confined to just one direction—East or West—for long. When one path goes too far, history will naturally correct it, and the other eye of the two-headed eagle will open wider.

The success or failure of the Turn East can only be evaluated based on the goals it defines for itself. The Turn East is no longer merely a foreign policy or an economic policy but rather a comprehensive national development strategy for Russia. It encompasses a multifaceted and articulated approach and serves as the primary indicator for assessing the progress of the Turn East. Specifically, it can be broken down into three reference systems: first, the socioeconomic development of the Far East and Siberia; second, Russia's integration into the Asia-Pacific area economy; and third, Russia's increasing political voice in the region. Improvements in all three of these areas indicate progress in the Turn East, while declines signal stagnation or regression. All three indicators require long-term data for evaluation. A single moment or short-term data can illustrate gains and losses in a specific period but cannot fully prove the success or failure of the Turn East.

The turn to the East will be a long process, inevitably accompanied by twists and turns and setbacks. Historically, each of Russia's diplomatic turns has spanned decades, if not longer, with countless ups and downs, failures, and even devastating defeats. However, Russia has always persevered despite the setbacks, demonstrating its strong strategic resilience in pursuing long-term goals. In today's world, development proceeds on a remarkably compressed timeline. While the turn to the East cannot be completed in centuries, the structural transformation will still take decades, and its success is not guaranteed. Although significant achievements and progress have been made in the past decade or so, Russia still faces a series of challenges, the greatest of which comes from its own interior.

The understanding of the East has an intangible but significant meaning. In Russian cultural psychology, especially among the Westernizers, East and West are sharply distinct, with the West symbolizing civilization and progress, while Asia represents barbarism and backwardness. So much so that the very root of the word "Asia" in Russian implies barbarism and backwardness. Europe, on the other hand, is the complete opposite. As Belinsky once said, "Everything great, kind, human, and spiritual was born and grew on European soil, blossoming with bright colors and bearing abundant fruit." This perception, which persists to some extent, has traditionally caused Russia to harbor a certain disdain for the East, particularly regarding culture and modernity. This is also the cultural and ideological obstacle that prevents Russia from truly becoming both a European and an Asian country. For Russia to become a member of Asia, it must reconsider its contemporary Asia in a holistic and objective manner.

The efficiency of Russian government agencies is crucial, and particularly that of local administrations. Government agencies at all levels are the concrete drivers and implementers of the Turn to the East, and the enthusiasm and efficiency of local administrations, to a certain extent, determine its success. Bureaucracy, formalism, red tape, and a lack of ambition can foil any good plan. Poor governance, lax discipline, and corruption are even more damaging to any good policy.

Turning to the East requires finding the most rational and effective development model for the Russian Far East and Siberia, which is an arduous task. The Far East and Siberia have unique environments and conditions. The models of China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia are not suitable for Russia. The current global economic context is profoundly different. Russia must adapt to the new situation based on its own circumstances, leverage its own strengths, and forge its own development path.

Turning to the East requires true innovation and development. While rich in resources, the Far East and Siberia suffer from harsh natural conditions, underdeveloped infrastructure, insufficient labor, limited markets, and limited manufacturing and technological products. Making these regions thrive is a challenge. Vladivostok, the central city of the Far East, faces international and regional financial, technological, innovation, and logistics hubs such as Tokyo, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, which makes it a formidable force. In addition to energy and defense, Russia also faces challenges to establish itself in the Asia-Pacific market. The Asia-Pacific market already has a relatively stable structure, with a clear division of labor and fierce competition. Russia must demonstrate exceptional competitiveness to break through this existing structure and enter the Asia-Pacific market.

Attracting foreign investment is a fundamental path for the development of the Far East and Siberia, but this requires greater openness to the outside world. This calls for a favorable investment environment, reliable legal guarantees, policies and measures that attract investors, reasonable tax policies, an efficient customs system, pragmatic labor policies, and a willingness to accept profits from foreign capital. Russia must also ensure consistency and coordination in policy implementation and strengthen awareness of market rules in economic cooperation.

The Ukraine crisis has played a significant role in Russia's shift to the East but has also brought unexpected and serious difficulties. The severe Western political and economic sanctions have significantly reduced Russia's access to external financing. Not only have Western investments been blocked, but investments from other countries have also been severely restricted. Under the threat of Western sanctions, economic and technological cooperation with Russia has been cut off, bilateral trade has been restricted, and settlement issues have become a significant problem.

The changing geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has also had a significant impact on the initial strategic vision of the "pivot to the East." On the one hand, the Ukraine crisis has narrowed the geographical scope of the "pivot to the East." Japan and South Korea, as major economic and technological powers in Asia and key targets of Russia's "pivot to the East," hold a crucial position in this process. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Japan and South Korea followed the lead of the United States in imposing sanctions on Russia, cooling political relations and interrupting economic and trade cooperation. These two countries have withdrawn, at least temporarily, from the scope of the "pivot to the East," which is a setback for Russia's "pivot to the East." On the other hand, some key projects of the "pivot to the East" initiative have had to be scaled back, such as the development of the Arctic sea route. The Arctic sea route is a key component of the "pivot to the East" initiative. Its main goal is to establish a new shipping route connecting East Asia and Europe. This route is significantly closer than the traditional route from East Asia to Europe through the Indian Ocean, significantly reducing shipping costs and transport times. With the acceleration of global warming, the time available for navigation on the Arctic route will increase. The completion of this route will challenge traditional international shipping routes and potentially alter the current international shipping landscape. This will not only bring significant benefits to Russia but also have important geopolitical and geoeconomic relevance. However, following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, European sanctions against Russia have cut off access to Europe, hindering access to the continent via the Arctic route. The route now only reaches Murmansk. While this facilitates Sino-Russian trade, further access to Europe faces difficulties. Additionally, the development of related infrastructure and services, including the production of icebreakers, has been affected. Nevertheless, in the long term, the Arctic route maintains its value as a new Eurasian sea route, but its restoration depends on future improvements in Russia-EU relations.

Turning to the East and China

Russia's turn to the East is not just about China; it also includes other Asia-Pacific countries, particularly Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Southeast Asian nations, although Japan and South Korea have temporarily withdrawn. Russia seeks to diversify its relations with Asia, and because China plays a significant role, it strives to maintain a balanced approach toward it. This turn to the East is not sentimental; it is a strategy formulated by Russia based on its own national interests and practical needs, not out of a desire or fondness for Asia, nor for Asia or China itself. Some commentators, intentionally or not, equate this turn to the East with a closer relationship with China, and even interpret it as a "preference" for China. This is a sentimental interpretation of the turn to the East.

But China is undoubtedly the main target of Russia's turn to the East, and this is natural. China is the world's second-largest economy and one of the two countries with the greatest overall national strength. Its economic size far surpasses that of any other country except the United States, and it holds a central position in both the Asian and global economies. Politically, China is Russia's strategic partner, economically it is Russia's largest trading partner, and geographically China and Russia share a long border, with vast territories directly adjacent, which creates a natural need for economic cooperation. Therefore, it is inevitable that China will play a central role in Russia's turn to the East.

China possesses immense potential for cooperation and capacity in virtually every economic sector of Russia's eastward shift. China's position in trade is self-evident: it has been Russia's largest trading partner for 14 consecutive years, and the trade volume between the two countries continues to grow. In the energy sector, China is one of the most important export markets for Russia. In 2023, Russia exported 107 million tons of oil to China and 34 billion cubic meters of pipeline and liquefied natural gas. By 2025, natural gas exports from Russia to China are projected to increase to 38 billion cubic meters. China actively and significantly participates in the development of the Arctic and the construction of Arctic shipping routes. China is the second-largest shareholder in the Yamal CPG project, and dozens of Chinese companies are participating in its construction. The Arctic shipping route requires the development of a wide range of infrastructure and service facilities, a large number of icebreakers, and important long-term customers for the route. China plays a crucial role in all of these areas. With its strong infrastructure capabilities, China can play a leading role in the infrastructural development of the Far East and Siberia. China is a global leader in artificial intelligence, information and communications, the digital economy, and e-commerce. Cooperation between the two countries in these areas is essential for Russia's development of the Far East and Siberia. Agriculture, fishing, and forestry are also crucial components of the development of the Far East and Siberia. China can collaborate with Russia in these sectors while also becoming a key export market for Russian agricultural, fishing, and forestry products. China and Russia share a strong economic complementarity in the development of the Far East and Siberia, offering significant potential for sustainable cooperation and development. Thanks to their geographical proximity, the economic ties between Northeast China and the Russian Far East are already so close that they are directly intertwined with the lives of residents.

Although the turn to the East has been established as an important national policy, divergent views and interpretations persist within Russian public opinion. The "China threat theory," once popular, has now waned, particularly the claim of a threat from Chinese immigrants. However, other suspicions and concerns persist, although they are not mainstream. These concerns stem from several sources. One arises from a deep distrust of China, a suspicion of its intentions, and a fear that China may become a rival or enemy in the future, expressing skepticism about the prospects of Sino-Russian relations. Another stems from a deeply ingrained Occidentalist ideology, which fundamentally rejects the turn to the East, believing that Russia's future lies in the West, that China cannot provide the technology, equipment, and capital that the West can, and that Russia will gain little from the turn to the East. On the contrary, the turn is a necessary move, made with the door to the West closed. However, the most significant impact is the fear of an excessive tilt toward China, which they believe could lead to a series of unfavorable consequences for Russia: politically, China would become the "Big Brother" and Russia the "Little Brother"; economically, Russia would become a vassal of the Chinese economy and a raw material supplier; over-reliance on the Chinese market for energy exports would create energy security issues; and diplomatically, Russia would lose its neutrality and freedom of maneuver in potential conflicts between China and Asian countries. At the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2024, even the host asked Chinese guests how to prevent Chinese companies from entering Russia. Western media, driven by political interests, have deliberately fueled the fire of this issue, exaggerating Russia's dependence on China in an attempt to create a rift between China and Russia and sow discord.

Although these views stem from different sources, their common background lies in the asymmetrical development between China and Russia. Since Russia's independence, an important feature of Sino-Russian relations has been China's much faster development than Russia's, which has significantly surpassed Russia in terms of overall national strength. This is the first time in the 300-year history of bilateral relations (since the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689) that this has occurred. In terms of gross domestic product, China's GDP in 2023 was $17.79 trillion, while Russia's was $2.02 trillion, making China eight times larger than Russia's. Russia's per capita GDP is only slightly higher, at $13,817 versus $12,614. In terms of national defense, the Chinese military is larger, its equipment is generally more advanced, and its military spending is more substantial. In 2022, China's defense budget was approximately $292.2 billion, while Russia's was approximately $86 billion. Although China's military budget is significantly lower than the United States' $877 billion, it is still more than three times higher than Russia's. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's military budget has increased significantly each year, reaching 6.8 trillion rubles in 2023, 10.8 trillion rubles in 2024, and 13.49 trillion rubles in 2025. However, this is due to special wartime arrangements, not the normal time level. Furthermore, given the sharp depreciation of the ruble, the increase in dollars is minimal. Sufficient military spending supports the expensive modernization of the armed forces. Technological competition is at the heart of current international competition. In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which is profoundly and rapidly transforming the global landscape, China remains a global leader. China's manufacturing industry is vast and comprehensive, earning it the nickname "the world's factory." China is a major trading nation, ranking first in the world for total trade in goods and second for trade in services. It is the largest or a major trading partner for more than 150 countries and regions. China has a strong investment capacity and has invested all over the world, especially along the Belt and Road Initiative. Although China will encounter difficulties and challenges in its development, its overall growth trend will continue.

Given China's enormous economy, the scope of economic cooperation between Russia and China will inevitably grow further, and its share in Russian foreign trade will inevitably become even more significant. This is natural and not a negative fact. It shows that Sino-Russian economic cooperation brings greater benefits to both countries and is of greater importance to both. The Chinese and Russian governments have never worried about the scale of their economic cooperation. On the contrary, both believe that the potential of their economic cooperation has yet to be fully realized. They are constantly striving to expand the areas of cooperation, improve the level of cooperation, and aim to further increase the trade volume.

Perhaps China cannot offer everything that Europe can offer, but conversely, Europe cannot offer everything that China can offer. Europe and China each have their own strengths and weaknesses in their economies. However, judging by development trends, China is increasingly able to replace Europe in sectors such as automobiles, high-speed rail, communication infrastructure, new energy, computers, and mobile phones, while Europe's ability to replace China is relatively limited. Investment, equipment, and technology are certainly important, but economic benefits and needs do not only come from these. Obtaining necessary goods and services from abroad and earning foreign exchange from exports and trade in services are also crucial economic benefits. In 2023, Russia earned $90.5 billion from energy exports to China. Who can deny that this is not a significant economic benefit? Furthermore, China's capabilities in investment, technology, and equipment are constantly growing.

Economic cooperation itself is a relationship of mutual dependence, in which both sides give and receive, with each benefiting from their own. The greater the degree of dependence, the deeper the mutual interest and the greater the economic benefits that result. Of course, the degree of dependence varies depending on the circumstances of each country. While countries generally seek to diversify their external relations, they will not be constrained by economic interdependence. It should be recognized that the natural trend of global development is toward increasing interdependence between countries. Economic globalization, regional integration, and large and small regional cooperation mechanisms are all driving this process. Under normal circumstances, all countries hope to constantly expand economic cooperation, deepen economic ties, and generate greater economic benefits based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

Countries vary in size and power, and disparities in national strength are an objective reality. The same trade volume will account for very different proportions in the economic structure of countries with different economic sizes, but this does not equate to inequality, nor does it mean that one country becomes an economic vassal of another. If economic relations between countries of different economic sizes were inherently unequal, then normal economic cooperation would be impossible. China is the largest or most important trading partner of more than 150 countries around the world. With the exception of the United States, the economies of these countries are much smaller than China's, yet no country has become a vassal of the Chinese economy. How could Russia, the world's fourth or fifth largest economy, become a vassal of China?

Over-dependence is a complex and relative issue. It has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, it can deepen relations between states and generate greater economic benefits; on the other hand, it can indeed lead to a loss of economic independence, raising concerns about national security. However, determining the degree of over-dependence is not a simple matter; it varies significantly depending on the nature of relations between states. Between some types of states, maintaining economic independence is essential for national security, so the degree is higher; but between other types of states, where economic independence is not pursued, the degree is lower. For example, the European Union aims to strengthen economic ties among its member states and form an economic community, so the problem of over-dependence is largely non-existent. Furthermore, the conditions that create over-dependence vary, and not all of them can be changed arbitrarily.

Over-dependence only produces negative effects when relations between states are in conflict. In such situations, states often exploit economic relations as a weapon, using them as a tool for sanctions and attacks. The Western sanctions against Russia following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are a prime example. However, this is not the norm in normal relations between states.

China holds a prominent position in the structure of Russian foreign trade. In terms of trade volume, Russia's total foreign trade volume in 2023 will reach $710.2 billion, of which $240 billion, or over 30%, is for China-Russia. Energy is the most important sector of economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2023, Russia will export 234 million tons of oil, of which 107 million tons, or about 45%, will be exported to China. In 2023, Russia will export 139 billion cubic meters of natural gas, of which China will import 34 billion cubic meters, or nearly 25%. This proportion is not stable or necessarily normal. It occurs under the unique circumstances of the sharp decline in trade between Russia and the EU following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a significant decrease in Russia's total foreign trade volume, and the rapid growth of Sino-Russian trade. In particular, Russia's energy exports have undergone significant changes, with a decline in export volume, particularly natural gas, and a change in the export structure, with Europe shifting from a primary destination to a secondary destination. The supply and demand of natural gas between Russia and Europe could even be completely cut off. Nevertheless, China is still far from filling the role that Europe once held in Russia's foreign trade and energy exports. Nevertheless, China holds a particularly significant share in Russia's foreign economic relations.

As great powers, both Russia and China are cautious about avoiding excessive external dependence, especially in strategically important sectors. This awareness is inherent in their national security philosophies. In strategic sectors such as energy, as an exporter, Russia will strive to diversify its export markets, and it has actually done so. China, on the other hand, will seek to diversify its import sources. Neither country puts all its eggs in one basket. At the same time, maintaining friendly and stable long-term relations is essential to ensuring the positive development of mutual dependence.

However, whether rationally motivated or politically exaggerated, the term "over-dependence" is inappropriate to describe the current Sino-Russian relations. The current state of economic cooperation between the two countries has developed naturally based on objective conditions and internal needs. Most importantly, it benefits both countries. Having lost its European customers, Russia urgently needs to turn to the East and expand its Asian market, particularly in the energy sector. This is of particular importance and urgency for Russia. At present, Russia's priority is to vigorously promote cooperation with Asian countries, particularly its energy partners, rather than to reduce the level of cooperation and prevent over-dependence. Energy, unlike ordinary raw materials, has an impact on the national economy and people's livelihoods. The relationship between energy supply and demand is not unidirectional but bidirectional. In this structure of bidirectional dependence, concerns about over-dependence can be somewhat mitigated because both sides are deeply dependent on each other, and exporters generally hold a more active position than importers. Past global cases have shown that it is usually exporters, not importers, who can use energy weapons.

Finally, in terms of political relations, China does not seek to be a "Big Brother" or a "Little Brother." This is inconsistent with Chinese ideals and policies. Russia, on the other hand, is a proud nation, unwilling to be inferior to others, or to accept the status of a "Little Partner." Even with smaller, even much weaker, neighbors, China has always treated them as equals and with respect, never neglecting them or treating them condescendingly. China has not become their "Big Brother," nor have they become China's "Little Brother." Furthermore, Russia is a great power.