Behind the Iranian Launches: The Key Role of Chinese Propellant and the Global Supply Network for Missiles and Drones - OSINT
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 12 minuti fa
- Tempo di lettura: 9 min
Chinese Propellant for Ballistic Missiles: Iran is receiving massive supplies of ammonium perchlorate (AP) and sodium perchlorate from China, essential materials for producing solid propellant. This fuel powers Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missiles, like the Kheibar Shekan, and many short-range missiles.
Direct Link to Attacks: Chinese supplies are linked to both the recent missile attacks on Israel in June 2025 and the previous waves in April and October 2024. The order for 800 missiles indicates a long-term plan to significantly expand the arsenal, not just to replace existing stock.
Satellite Assistance: China also provides Iran with relevant satellite technology, including potential enhancements for guidance systems (like the use of Beidou 2), intelligence, and communications, boosting the precision and effectiveness of Iranian missiles.
Mixed Suppliers for Drones: Iranian drones (e.g., Shahed-136) use gasoline or jet fuel and rely on a complex supply chain. China supplies components for these drones, but Iran also acquires Western components through intermediary networks. There's no evidence that China directly supplies the fuel for the drones themselves.
Challenge to Sanctions: The cooperation between China and Iran, especially after the expiration of the UN embargo, circumvents international sanctions and directly contributes to missile proliferation, destabilizing the Middle East and challenging global balances.
The skies of the Middle East have recently been crisscrossed by waves of Iranian missiles and drones, in response to escalating tensions with Israel. But where do the key components that enable Tehran to sustain such an attack capability come from? Specifically, who sold the propellant for the ballistic missiles and drones launched by Iran? The complex current geopolitical chessboard is marked by increasingly close interconnections between state actors and regional dynamics. The deepening military relationship between China and Iran is emerging as a decisive factor, capable of influencing global balances and severely testing international efforts to contain proliferation. This partnership, often hidden but increasingly evident, raises crucial questions about stability in the Middle East and the effectiveness of international sanctions, revealing how Beijing is tacitly, but concretely, supporting Tehran's military capabilities, although it is not the only actor involved.
Iran's Missile Push: China's Key Role
Following the expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran (October 18, 2020, for conventional arms and October 18, 2023, for missiles), the landscape of international military transactions has evolved, opening new opportunities for Tehran to strengthen its arsenal.
Historically, China has been a significant arms supplier to Iran, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, providing not only weapon systems but also assistance in establishing local production facilities for cruise missiles and contributing to nuclear and missile programs with technology and scientific expertise transfers. After 2005, China had shown some alignment with international sanctions, reducing new conventional arms sales.
However, the situation has changed. Recent reports, dating back to June 2025, indicate that Iran has placed a massive order for ammonium perchlorate (AP) from China. The quantities are said to be large enough to potentially enable Iran to manufacture up to 800 ballistic missiles. AP is a key component of composite solid propellants used for ballistic missiles and rockets. Its import in such volumes is a clear indicator of Iran's intent to expand and modernize its arsenal, suggesting a violation of remaining sanctions and international regulations.
This move is not isolated: a previous Chinese shipment of missile fuel precursor material was reportedly linked to a severe explosion at Iran's Shahid Rajaei port in April 2025. Two Iranian cargo ships sanctioned by the United States, the Golbon and the Jairan, reportedly delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas in early 2025. Sodium perchlorate is a precursor that can be converted into ammonium perchlorate; the delivered cargo would have been sufficient to produce propellant for approximately 260 short-range missiles. The port incident, which caused dozens of casualties, was reportedly linked to the handling of this highly volatile material. These episodes raise serious questions about the transparency of supply chains and China's direct or indirect complicity.
Beyond materials, it has been suggested that China is providing Iran with relevant satellite technology. This aspect is crucial, as satellite technology can have multiple military applications:
Guidance and Navigation: Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are fundamental for ballistic missile precision. Specifically, it was reported that as early as October 2015, the Iranian company Salran signed an agreement with Chinese companies to begin using China's indigenous satellite positioning, navigation, and timing system, Beidou 2, for defensive purposes. This could significantly enhance the use of satellite navigation in Iran's ballistic missile program. China's provision of systems or components that improve the navigation and precision of Iranian missiles would represent a significant enhancement of their capabilities.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): Earth observation satellites can provide Iran with crucial information for attack planning, target identification, and post-attack damage assessment. Access to high-resolution satellite imagery or Chinese-sourced satellite intelligence data could greatly improve Iranian targeting capabilities.
Communications: Communication satellites are vital for missile and military forces command and control. Chinese assistance in this field could make Iranian missile communications more resilient and secure.
These supplies and technological assistance circumvent restrictions and directly contribute to the proliferation of a missile capability that is a source of deep concern for regional and global stability.
Types of Weapons Employed and Their Fuel
From the latest news regarding the June 2025 attacks, Iran launched waves of ballistic missiles and drones against Israel, employing a combination of advanced weapon systems.
Ballistic Missiles: Iranian and Israeli sources differ on the exact numbers, but reports indicate over 150 ballistic missiles were launched (according to some Iranian sources, hundreds, while the IDF estimated fewer than 100 ballistic missiles in the first wave). These missiles caused damage to buildings in Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Rishon Lezion, resulting in injuries and one fatality. Iran possesses a large arsenal of ballistic missiles of various ranges. In previous attacks (such as those in April and October 2024, dubbed "True Promise" and "True Promise II"), Iran used:
Liquid-fueled missiles based on cooperation with North Korea, such as the Ghadr and Khorramshahr (Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles - MRBMs). The liquid propellant for these missiles is chemically different and has no direct link to perchlorate supplies from China, likely originating from Iran's petrochemical industry or specific fuel imports.
More advanced solid-fueled missiles, such as the Kheibar Shekan, which features maneuverable re-entry vehicles and satellite navigation for increased accuracy. Iran also claims to have developed a variant of the Kheibar Shekan called Fattah, which can fly on hypersonic trajectories. A large arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, with ranges between 300 and 1,000 km) also uses solid propellant.
This is where "Chinese fuel" comes into play: the recent massive supplies of ammonium perchlorate (AP) and sodium perchlorate from China are specifically intended for the production of composite solid propellants. These propellants are used to power Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missiles, such as the Kheibar Shekan and many SRBMs. Given the rapid launch capability and ease of storage and mobility of these solid-fueled missiles, it is highly probable that those used in the June 2025 attacks (and in the previous waves of 2024) were powered by propellant produced using precursor materials supplied by China.
Drones: Over 100 drones were also launched (some reports indicate about 200 drones). The type of drone most commonly associated with these attacks is the Shahed-136 (a "kamikaze" or "loitering munition" drone), although other models may have been used. Drones were primarily launched as initial waves to saturate Israeli air defenses. Iranian drones, including the Shahed-136, are typically powered by internal combustion piston engines that run on gasoline, or in some cases by jet engines that use jet fuel. While China is a supplier of components for these drones (such as engine parts based on Chinese designs or electronic components sourced globally), there are no indications that China is directly supplying the fuel (gasoline or jet fuel) used to power them. This type of fuel is a standard petroleum product that Iran could produce domestically or acquire through more conventional commercial channels.
In summary, the June 2025 attacks employed a combination of ballistic missiles (likely a mix of MRBMs and SRBMs with solid and liquid propellants, including models like Ghadr, Khorramshahr, Kheibar Shekan, and possibly Fattah) and drones (primarily Shahed-136). This pattern replicates the previous attacks of 2024, but with an intensity and frequency that suggest sustained production and launch capabilities, with a key role for Chinese precursors in solid-fueled missiles.
Beyond China: Who Else Fuels Iran's Arsenal?
While China emerges as a key supplier of precursor materials and satellite technology for Iran's missile program, Iran has historically drawn upon and continues to seek components and technologies from various sources, often through complex networks and front companies to circumvent sanctions.
Drone Components: Regarding drones, particularly models like the Shahed-136, investigations of downed drones in Ukraine have revealed a significant presence of Western-origin components, including U.S. and European chips and connectors. Iran lacks the capacity to autonomously produce advanced printed circuit boards, suggesting it acquires these boards from abroad. Western intelligence agencies and the U.S. Treasury Department have sanctioned various entities, including in Hong Kong and China, for facilitating the purchase and transport of key components for Iranian drone production, highlighting how the supply chain for these systems is global and complex, often exploiting "dual-use" nature of components (civilian components usable militarily) and intermediary networks.
Other Suppliers and Self-Sufficiency: Iran has also developed significant domestic production capabilities for missiles and drones, often through reverse-engineering or with the help of designs and technologies acquired in the past from actors like North Korea and Russia. While Russia has been the primary source of conventional arms for Iran in the post-embargo period (delivering air defense systems, missiles, and sensors, and agreements for Su-35 fighter jets), specific information on Russian supplies of missile propellant or drone components is less widespread compared to recent reports about China. Russia has acquired Iranian drones (like the Shahed-136) for the war in Ukraine, suggesting a flow in that direction rather than vice versa for components. Iran's goal, however, remains the maximum possible self-sufficiency, reducing dependence on external suppliers for its strategic programs.
Preparation and Coincidence with Attacks
The close temporal coincidence between reports of massive propellant purchases from China and Iran's ballistic missile launches against Israel in June 2025 suggests a clear preparation strategy.
This strategy became even more evident after the unprecedented attacks launched by Iran against Israel in April 2024 (Operation "True Promise") and in a second wave in October 2024 (Operation "True Promise II"), which involved the use of hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles. While the transformation of ammonium perchlorate into missiles takes time, the decision for such large orders, presumably agreed upon months ago (even before the 2024 attacks), indicates a long-term plan to sustain and expand Iran's missile arsenal. The ongoing actual attacks, including the most recent ones in June 2025, would have only accelerated the need to replenish consumed stocks and further enhance Tehran's capabilities, even in the face of damage to its own missile infrastructure. The order for 800 missiles, in fact, has been assessed as more than double what Tehran would need to replace all ballistic missiles launched in April and October 2024.
Furthermore, the Shahid Rajaei port incident in April 2025, linked to a previous Chinese precursor shipment for missile fuel, occurring just a couple of months before the June 2025 attacks, indicates that Iran was actively receiving and processing key materials right in the period immediately preceding this new escalation. This reinforces the idea of an operational supply chain and a continuous production and utilization plan. The propellant purchases from China are therefore a crucial element in maintaining this pressure and demonstrating a continuous response capability, in line with ongoing hostilities.
Geopolitical Implications
This multi-layered cooperation between China and Iran, which goes beyond simple sales of finished weapons and extends to the production capacity and technological enhancement of Iranian missile and drone systems, is particularly sensitive. It directly contributes to the proliferation of a military capability that is a source of great concern for regional and global stability.
China, while also conducting joint military exercises with Iran, appears to favor a strategy of targeted supply to strengthen Iranian capabilities "from within," rather than just with complete weapon systems. This pragmatic policy, which often disregards international criticism and proliferation concerns, reflects China's priority to pursue its economic and national security interests in a multipolar world order. Iran represents a key partner for Beijing in the Middle East, offering not only energy resources but also a strategic position for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The China-Iran axis is shaping up as a destabilizing factor that adds complexity to an already fragile global landscape. The international community faces the challenge of containing Iran's missile proliferation and its drone production capabilities, while China continues to strategically navigate complex terrain, pursuing its power objectives.
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