Beijing Consolidates Its Presence in Libya: An Intelligence Analysis

China is rapidly consolidating a strategic position in Libya, particularly in eastern Libya under Haftar's control, transforming the country into a crucial logistics and energy hub for its Belt and Road Initiative. Through massive investment in dual-use infrastructure such as the Tobruk refinery and port, Beijing aims to redefine trade routes between Asia, Africa and Europe and gain significant leverage over European energy security. This expansion, facilitated by Libya's political fragmentation and lack of a cohesive Western policy, raises deep concerns about the strategic implications on NATO and Europe's autonomy

Internal sources from Libya indicate that China is consolidating a strategic position on NATO's southern flank, with Libya emerging as a focal point for Beijing's growing geopolitical and economic ambitions. Over the past decade, China's engagement in North Africa has steadily increased, and Eastern Libya, under the control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), has become a crucial nexus for negotiations that could transform the region into a vital hub for Sino-African and Sino-European trade. Haftar's approval of Chinese proposals would position Libya as the western anchor of a vast China-led logistical and energy network, extending across the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. The Tobruk refinery and associated infrastructure would give Beijing new leverage over European energy markets, precisely as the EU actively seeks to diversify its energy resources.

Extrema Ratio

Strategic Position and Investment Scope

The port city of Tobruk, on Libya's eastern coast, is central to Chinese plans, not only due to its geographical location but also its inherent natural capabilities. Less than 400 kilometers from Crete and Southern Europe, its naturally protected bay, the Marmarica inlet, and its deep-water port characteristics make it a privileged access point for international maritime traffic. This capability is crucial for accommodating large container ships, overcoming the draft limitations of numerous Southern European ports such as Genoa, Piraeus, and Barcelona. This strategic positioning is perfectly consistent with Beijing's doctrine of overseas power projection, which aims to build a global network of commercial ports and dual-use facilities, providing logistical and intelligence support to the Chinese navy. As of 2022, Chinese companies already owned or operated terminals in 96 ports across 53 countries, and in at least nine of these, including two in Europe, significant repair or maintenance operations for People's Liberation Army (PLA) warships have been carried out. Visits by Chinese military vessels to these ports also reveal areas of influence, priority operational zones, and intelligence gathering objectives.

China's multi-phase investment plan envisions Tobruk becoming an integrated logistical megahub. Its core is a $10 billion oil refinery, with a processing capacity of 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Refined products would be directly exported to European markets, offering a crucial alternative energy source in Europe's post-conflict diversification efforts, but also a powerful negotiating lever for Beijing. Libyan sources suggest that, if Field Marshal Haftar gives his consent, Chinese investors are prepared to invest even more substantially, potentially exceeding $50 billion in total commitments across Libya in the short-to-medium term. This project is not isolated but is part of a broader vision that conceives Tobruk as an integrated logistical platform, including modern fuel depots, state-of-the-art transshipment terminals, and supply depots for maritime and land transport, strengthening its position as a gateway to Europe.

Expansion of Ports, Airports, and Logistics

In addition to the refinery, Chinese companies intend to expand and modernize the port of Tobruk, transforming it into a first-class transshipment hub. Large vessels would dock and unload goods, which would then be transferred to smaller ships for capillary distribution to European destinations, offering a strategic solution to European port limitations. Port modernization would include advanced container terminals, efficient refueling facilities, and modern customs infrastructure to facilitate smooth and rapid trade flows.

China has also proposed to upgrade Al-Adem Airport, located adjacent to the port of Tobruk. Once the largest Royal Air Force base in the world, now under the control of Haftar's forces, Al-Adem is set to become a crucial logistical hub. The airport would seamlessly integrate with maritime and land transport systems, serving as both a civilian cargo and refueling station, and a potential dual-use facility with significant strategic implications. Fuel produced by the Tobruk refinery could be stored and distributed through this air hub, strengthening China's aviation and military logistics. The combined port and airport projects would create a modern multimodal logistical hub in Tobruk, from which China could control the flow of goods and energy to Southern Europe, securing an unparalleled position on NATO's southern flank. Although Haftar has not yet formally approved the projects, Libyan sources suggest that Chinese officials are offering generous terms and may seek Russian mediation to overcome U.S. concerns. Haftar's hesitation underscores Libya's fragile geopolitical balance but also highlights the stakes of deeper Chinese involvement.

Railways, Roads, and Interregional Connections

China's ambitions extend far beyond Libya's Mediterranean coast, aiming to create deep interregional connectivity. While Egypt is building a 2,000-kilometer high-speed rail network connecting Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea to Marsa Matruh on the Mediterranean, China-backed plans envision extending this corridor into Eastern Libya, effectively linking Tobruk and Benghazi to the Red Sea. This transnational east-west railway link would create an uninterrupted land bridge from Libya's major eastern ports, through Egypt, to maritime routes facing Asia.

The China Railway International Group (CRIG), supported by the BFI Management Consortium (based in Singapore, and including global engineering firms such as Siemens and Arup), has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Libyan Railways to evaluate the construction of this railway from Benghazi to Marsa Matruh via the Musaid border crossing, at an estimated cost of up to $20 billion. The BFI Management Consortium plays a pivotal role in advancing China's infrastructure ambitions in Libya. As CRIG's exclusive partner, BFI has facilitated high-profile agreements in both Eastern and Western Libya, including planned railway and metro systems in Benghazi and Tripoli. Its establishment as an ad hoc vehicle for Libya's development, bringing together global engineering companies, offers both technical expertise and protection from political risks, serving as a key channel for Beijing's growing logistical and commercial presence in North Africa.

In a significant development, on July 12, Libyan Railways signed an agreement in Beijing with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) for the resumption of suspended railway projects, in accordance with pre-existing contracts. The agreement was formalized during the Libyan delegation's participation in the 12th World Congress on High-Speed Rail (Beijing, July 8-11). This understanding followed a working meeting between the Libyan delegation and CCECC leadership, during which contracts related to the Tripoli-Ras Ajdir, Tripoli-Sirte, and Al-Haysha-Sabha railway projects were discussed. CCECC reiterated its commitment to completing these projects, and both parties agreed to ongoing coordination to address challenges and facilitate the Chinese company's return to resume the work. These railway lines are not merely transit routes; they represent a new backbone of connectivity across North Africa, designed to streamline the movement of goods and people between Asia, Africa, and Europe, and also aiming to open future corridors southward into Chad and Sudan, to strengthen China's position in emerging African markets, while using Libya as a continental gateway.

Energy Finance and Institutional Frameworks

To facilitate these complex infrastructure and energy investments, Eastern Libya has approved the establishment of the Libyan Bank for Energy and Mining. Its director, Juma Jaballah, has openly stated his intention to attract substantial Chinese capital and is currently awaiting approval from the Central Bank of Libya for the SWIFT code to initiate international transactions. This development underscores China's preference for building solid institutional foundations, in addition to infrastructure. The bank would serve as a crucial financial channel for refinery construction, port modernization, and associated service contracts. It is expected to play a pivotal role in facilitating capital flows and ensuring compliance with international norms, despite Libya remaining politically divided.

Kerui Petroleum, a major Chinese oil services company, has already initiated preliminary studies for the Tobruk refinery, under contract with the Ministry of Investment in Benghazi. This highlights the operational readiness of Chinese companies to proceed with detailed planning, even as geopolitical approvals remain pending. In support of this growing partnership, a high-level Libyan delegation, led by one of Field Marshal Haftar's sons and representing the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund, recently traveled to China to promote multiple avenues of cooperation. The delegation met with important Chinese companies, including Huawei and the China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC), to discuss a wide range of projects spanning telecommunications to energy infrastructure and logistics. Notably, according to our internal sources in Libya, Huawei is already leading the implementation of a dedicated telecommunications network in Eastern Libya through a joint venture with local authorities, with the system currently undergoing testing. These developments highlight China's growing multi-sector engagement in Eastern Libya.

Connection with Africa: Roads to Chad and Sudan

China's vision for Libya transcends national borders, aiming for continental integration. With Africa's population projected to double by 2050, Beijing aims to deepen trade routes that bypass traditional maritime choke points like the Suez Canal. The transformation of Tobruk includes ambitious plans to extend highway and logistical corridors southward into Chad and Sudan. These land routes would allow Chinese products to reach internal African markets quickly and cost-effectively, bypassing long and expensive maritime routes. In return, China would gain privileged access to African raw materials – oil, rare earths, and agricultural products – which would be transported north to Tobruk for processing and export. This multimodal corridor strategy mirrors similar Chinese projects already implemented in East Africa, such as the Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Ababa corridor, demonstrating a proven model of economic and strategic expansion.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

China's interest in North Africa is not new, dating back to the 1960s when Beijing maintained a presence in Africa by supporting liberation movements and subsequently focusing on infrastructure and trade. Libya, once marginalized due to internal conflicts and instability, is now re-emerging as a candidate for a key strategic partnership. China's policy of non-interference in internal affairs and its proven track record of dealing with non-Western regimes particularly attract Haftar's administration, which remains internationally unrecognized.

Eastern Libya's parliament, based in Tobruk, is de facto controlled by Haftar, an 81-year-old Libyan and U.S. citizen, who wields considerable power in Eastern Libya. Haftar has received support from various regional actors at different times since 2011, including the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Egypt, and France. In mid-2019, Haftar launched a failed attempt to overthrow the UN-recognized government in Tripoli.

The Eastern Libyan region, historically known as Cyrenaica, played a crucial role in the Allied campaign during World War II, serving as a key reference point in the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The region's legacy as a frontline in the defense of liberal democracy underscores the strategic importance of its current alignment. In the context of increasing Chinese activity, many Western analysts argue that restoring Libyan unity under a government aligned with Western institutions is not only a matter of regional stability but a vital component of broader transatlantic security.

The absence of a cohesive Western policy and Libya's fragmented governance discourage Western investment and engagement, creating a vacuum that alternative actors, including China, are eager to fill. A recent emblematic incident of this complexity occurred when a European delegation, including the EU Commissioner for Internal Affairs and the Interior Ministers of Italy, Malta, and Greece's Minister for Migration and Asylum, was denied entry into Eastern Libya by the Benghazi government. The Benghazi government justified the denial as a violation of "Libyan national sovereignty," declaring the ministers "personae non gratae" and asking them to immediately leave Libyan territory. This episode tangibly underscores the challenges and risks associated with interacting with Libya's various factions, making any coherent European strategy extremely difficult.

Implications for European Energy Security

The implications of growing Chinese influence in Libya for European energy security are profound and multifaceted. European energy diversification efforts, dramatically accelerated by the war in Ukraine, have led to increased reliance on alternative sources from the Middle East and North Africa. If Beijing gains control of a large-scale refinery in Tobruk and associated port infrastructure, it would exert significant and potentially decisive influence over the supply chains feeding Europe.

This scenario extends far beyond mere oil access. The ability to refine, store, and transport energy products directly from North Africa to Europe would allow China to dictate pricing, volume, and prioritization in times of crisis, severely compromising Europe's energy autonomy and increasing its dependence on Beijing, at a time when the transatlantic alliance is already under pressure.

Furthermore, Chinese control over container logistics through Tobruk would provide Beijing leverage not only over energy but also over manufactured goods and critical technologies. The dual-use nature of the airport, combined with surveillance and digital infrastructure (like the Huawei network under testing), could also serve military and intelligence interests, extending China's power projection capabilities into the Mediterranean.

It is crucial to emphasize that all major Chinese investments in seaports, railways, and airports offer Beijing the opportunity to monitor and control activities at critical logistical nodes of fundamental strategic dimension. Any form of participation by Chinese enterprises in the EU's strategic resources, particularly those companies directly or indirectly linked to the Chinese political-military or intelligence apparatus, represents an unacceptable risk for the EU. This includes heightened risks of espionage, technology transfer, and expertise transfer to the PLA. PLA naval forces possess legal means and tools to ensure that Chinese civilian vessels and infrastructure can be utilized for military and security purposes abroad. Beijing can also leverage its civilian commercial infrastructure to support PLA presence in third countries. Civilian-military fusion provides the PLA access to foreign ports, enabling it to preposition logistical support to sustain naval deployments as far as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Espionage and sabotage risks are higher when Chinese civilian commercial activities are located in logistical hubs near NATO naval bases. China's strategy to build a "blue economy cooperation base" along African coasts, even through the construction of fishing vessels and ship repair facilities, could also be repurposed for military objectives.

Consequences and Outlook: The Redefinition of Global Balances

Haftar's approval of Chinese proposals would position Libya as the western anchor of a vast, China-led logistical and energy network, extending across the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. The Tobruk refinery and associated infrastructure would give Beijing new leverage over European energy markets, precisely as the EU actively seeks to diversify its energy resources.

The dual-use nature of Tobruk's upgraded airport and port could extend Chinese naval or intelligence capabilities into the Mediterranean. This possibility has already raised concerns in some NATO circles, although no formal opposition has been expressed.

A successful Chinese strategy in Libya would profoundly reshape Eurasian supply chains and trade flows. It would also signal a significant shift in the balance of soft power and strategic influence in North Africa, with potentially deep implications for Europe's energy security and geopolitical autonomy. Libya, though seemingly a fragile and fragmented state, represents a crucial gateway for Chinese planners, with the potential to link Africa, Europe, and Asia under a new, Beijing-led global trade architecture.

Conclusion

The analysis highlights a clear and accelerated strategic offensive by China in Libya, with the objective of establishing a dominant position on NATO's southern flank. Through massive infrastructure investments, particularly in Tobruk, Beijing aims to create a dual-use logistical and energy hub that will redefine trade routes and supply chains between Asia, Africa, and Europe. This potential control over critical infrastructure, coupled with increasing technological penetration (such as the Huawei network), would grant China significant leverage over Europe's energy security and geopolitical autonomy. Libya's political fragmentation and the lack of a cohesive Western policy have created a strategic vacuum that China is skillfully exploiting. The implications of this growing Chinese influence are profound, challenging the Alliance's strategic resilience and regional stability, and suggesting a significant shift in global power balances.