Beyond sanctions: China supports Russian arsenal, but Kremlin fears covert invasion

A leaked internal document from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), obtained by The New York Times, has revealed a deep-seated distrust within Moscow towards Beijing, despite public declarations of a "limitless partnership" between leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. The report, which appears to have been drafted between late 2023 and early 2024, paints a picture of a "tense and dynamically developing intelligence battle" in the shadows of a seemingly solid alliance.

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The silent enemy in the Far East: territorial fears and counterintelligence operations

According to the leaked document, a previously unknown FSB unit refers to China as "the enemy" and a serious threat to Russian national security. The primary concern is that Beijing might attempt to annex parts of Russia's Far Eastern region, including the strategic port city of Vladivostok. This fear is fueled by China's historical challenge to 19th-century treaties that ceded vast territories to Tsarist Russia, including Vladivostok itself, under the 1860 Treaty of Beijing.

The FSB alleges that China is attempting to strengthen its historical claims in the region, for instance, by searching for traces of "ancient Chinese peoples" and, more recently, in 2023, by enforcing the use of Chinese names for Vladivostok and seven other cities in the Russian Far East on its new maps. The document suggests that China might seek to influence local public opinion in support of its own narrative.

Beyond territorial concerns, Russia fears that Chinese intelligence is recruiting Russian spies, attempting to acquire sensitive military technologies, and gathering information on Russian operations in Ukraine to study Western technology and warfare. The document highlights reciprocal distrust, with China reportedly subjecting its agents to polygraph tests upon their return home and intensifying checks on approximately 20,000 Russian students in China, while attempting to recruit Russians married to Chinese citizens as potential spies.

A "Superior Partnership": Chinese Military Aid, Economic Support, and Crucial Role in Sanctions Evasion

The "limitless partnership" declared in 2022 between Moscow and Beijing evolved into a "superior partnership" in 2023, described by Xi and Putin as "better than an ally" and even a higher level than Cold War alliances. This linguistic shift reflects an explicit move from mutual trust to a joint fight against the United States-led international system.

This increasingly deep cooperation is clearly evident in China's about-face regarding Ukraine: Beijing has disregarded a 2013 agreement with Kyiv and has openly supported Russian positions, refusing to condemn the invasion and criticizing NATO expansion. The cooperation also extends to the military sector, with US intelligence documents revealing an agreement by the Chinese Central Military Commission to secretly sell weapons to Russia, and the presence of dual-use Chinese technologies on Ukrainian battlefields.

An even more concerning aspect of this partnership is China's crucial role in evading sanctions imposed on Russia, serving as the economic lifeline keeping Moscow afloat. A classified report from the German Foreign Ministry, based on the conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, indicates that China is responsible for 80% of sanctions evasion cases. This translates into vital support for Russia's military industry, with China supplying essential materials, machinery, chemicals, gunpowder, and electronic components for drones. It is estimated that cooperation involves at least 20 Russian military factories and five aerospace projects between 2024 and 2025, and that an impressive 80% of critical electronic components in Russian drones originate from China. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's accusations that China is providing direct military support to Russia and that Chinese citizens are fighting for the Russian army have led to sanctions against Chinese entities involved in the production of Russian missiles.

Economic relations and evasion strategies in 2024 further highlight this dynamic. China has become Russia's predominant trading partner and its main customer for discounted goods such as agricultural products and energy. Chinese imports from Russia almost doubled in 2022, and Chinese exports to Russia increased by 17.8%. Beijing obtains significant discounts on Russian energy and has even banned the export of essential minerals like gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States, while simultaneously supplying them to Russia for military production. In 2024, 80% of microchips imported by Russia came from China, used in tanks, missiles, and aircraft. Chinese companies have supplied long-range attack drones, off-road vehicles, and armored trucks to the Russian army, often disguising trade to evade sanctions, as seen with copper. Russia has begun using cryptocurrencies for trade with China, which in turn has established an interagency working group to study the impact of Western sanctions. The China National Petroleum Corporation accepts payments in renminbi for Russian gas, reducing reliance on the dollar. The United States and the European Union have sanctioned numerous Chinese entities for their involvement in these supplies, including the China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) for infrastructure construction in Russia.

A Complex Asymmetric Interdependence and Geopolitical Risks

Despite internal Russian fears, the relationship between the two countries is best described as an asymmetric strategic interdependence. China needs Russian energy, assistance with its civilian nuclear program, support from the United Nations, military cooperation, and joint action in the Indo-Pacific. The ideal scenario for Beijing is a diplomatically acceptable status quo that allows it to pursue its interests in Europe and Russia, while simultaneously preserving the Russian state as a great power. Putin and Xi have thus created a strategic partnership at the heart of Eurasia.

This alliance, however, carries significant risks. As Zbigniew Brzezinski warned in the past, the pillars of US global control—Europe, Central Asia, and the Pacific coast—have been challenged. In Europe, China has achieved its most surprising successes yet, acquiring major port facilities that could potentially also be used for military purposes.

The "limitless friendship" between Xi and Putin, officially declared to the world on February 24, 2022, marks the beginning of a new era. The dismantling of Brzezinski's geopolitical pillars is already underway, and whoever dominates Eurasia, as feared, dominates the world. The complex challenge of understanding the current stage of the Sino-Russian partnership, the reasons for its evolution, and the risks it entails is, without a doubt, an extraordinarily important task for all of us.