China's Strategic Presence in Italy: An Analysis of Espionage, Sabotage and National Security Risks

Executive Summary

Italy's relationship with China presents a complex and evolving dynamic, characterized by significant economic engagement alongside growing national security concerns. Although Italy has recently recalibrated its foreign policy, notably withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to align more closely with Western partners, China remains a crucial economic partner.

This report details the multifaceted risks associated with China's presence in Italy, focusing on espionage, sabotage and elite capture in critical sectors.

Espionage manifests itself in both industrial and cyber forms, often exploiting existing economic ties and the Chinese diaspora. Incidents involving strategic Italian companies and sophisticated cyber attacks against government and critical networks highlight a persistent threat to sensitive information and technological advantage. The risks of sabotage are evident in vulnerabilities within technology supply chains, where seemingly innocuous Chinese components may conceal secret devices, and in the potential for physical attacks on vital undersea infrastructure. Finally, Beijing's systematic efforts to influence Italy's political, academic, and commercial spheres through elite capture operations aim to shape narratives, undermine democratic processes, and subtly shift Italy's strategic alignment away from its traditional Western alliances. These interconnected threats underscore the imperative for Italy to maintain vigilance and implement robust countermeasures to safeguard its national security.

1. Introduction: The Evolving Landscape of Italy-China Relations

Historical Context and Economic Commitment

Italy and China share a long history of bilateral engagement, marked by significant milestones such as the 20th anniversary of their Global Strategic Partnership and the 700th anniversary of Marco Polo's passing, both observed in 2024. These anniversaries underscored a mutual commitment to promoting stable and long-term relations in the economic, trade, investment and cultural sectors. Economic ties between the two nations are substantial, with trade reaching 59.9 billion euros in the first eleven months of 2024.

During this period, Italy exported 14 billion euros to China, while imports from China amounted to 45.9 billion euros, indicating a significant trade imbalance. Despite this disparity, China is of strategic importance to Italy, serving as its largest market in Asia and its second largest non-European trading partner, surpassed only by the United States. Investment flows further illustrate this commitment: Italy has directly invested more than 15 billion euros in China, supporting some 130,000 jobs, while China's direct investment in Italy amounts to 2.3 billion euros.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Retreat

Italy's decision to join China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019 was initially motivated by aspirations for more Italian export opportunities and increased Chinese investment in the country. This move, however, generated considerable apprehension in Washington and other European capitals, where it was perceived as a potential deviation from Italy's historical partnerships.  

Less than five years later, in December 2023, Italy formally withdrew from the BIS, becoming the first G7 country to do so. This decision was widely expected and resulted from several key factors. Economically, the BRI did not produce the expected benefits; it contributed only modestly to the increase in Italian exports to China, while imports of Chinese products nearly doubled Italy's exports, exacerbating the existing trade imbalance.

BRI-related foreign direct investment also turned out to be unexpectedly low. Geopolitically, the government led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni openly criticized the BRI as a "big mistake" and prioritized reaffirming Italy's commitment to its Western alliances, including the United States and NATO. This strategic pivot was further underscored by Italy's support for U.S.-approved trade routes, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which some see as an alternative to the BRI.

The withdrawal from the BRI was highly symbolic, reinforcing a transatlantic posture on China and challenging the global image of the initiative. This action demonstrated Italy's intent to align more closely with its traditional Western partners. However, this strategic recalibration does not mean a complete decoupling from China. The persistence of deep economic ties and the subsequent negotiation of a new action plan suggest that the underlying challenges of Chinese influence and economic imbalance persist, requiring continued vigilance beyond mere symbolic gestures.

Current Strategic Alignment and De-risking Efforts

Following the withdrawal from the BRI, Italy and China agreed on a new three-year economic cooperation action plan (2024-2027) during Prime Minister Meloni's visit to Beijing. This plan emphasizes cooperation in emerging industries, particularly in technology sectors where China has competitive advantages, and aims to rebalance trade ties under more transparent and equitable conditions. This approach reflects a nuanced de-risking strategy, in which Italy seeks to maintain economic engagement with China, especially in areas such as technology and sustainability, while diversifying its partnerships and aligning with Western allies. This means a strategic attempt to reshape bilateral relations on more favorable terms, rather than cutting ties altogether.

A key aspect of Meloni's foreign policy has been to reassure Washington of Italy's reliability as a loyal partner. This commitment is reflected in Rome's Indo-Pacific strategy, which aligns largely-though not exclusively-with the interests of its Western allies. Italy's engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is described as "inclusive," with strengthening ties with key regional players such as India and Japan. For example, Italy and Japan signed a comprehensive three-year action plan in June 2024 to strengthen diplomatic, defense, economic and cultural cooperation, emphasizing growing strategic collaboration. These efforts demonstrate Italy's ongoing attempt to balance its economic interests with the needs of its Western alliances, with its strategies for China and the Indo-Pacific continuing to evolve in response to changing international pressures and opportunities.

Bilateral Relations and Post-BRI Collaborations

Despite Italy's exit from the BRI, bilateral relations remained stable and predictable. China's response to Italy's withdrawal from the BRI has been measured, reflecting an understanding of the broader geopolitical context, without exacerbating tensions. To sustain cooperative ties, both nations continued to interact through high-level visits. The Italian government reaffirmed its commitment to the 2004 Global Strategic Partnership to guide future bilateral relations. This commitment was reinforced during Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani's visit to Beijing in September 2023 .

In particular, Minister of University and Research Anna Maria Bernini traveled to China in November 2023 for the 12th China-Italy Week of Science, Technology and Innovation. Her visit focused on collaboration in smart manufacturing and technologies for the Winter Olympics. During this visit, a renewed Executive Program for Science and Technology Cooperation between Italy and China (2024-2025) was signed between the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. This protocol supports joint research in agriculture, artificial intelligence, green energy and biomedicine, strengthening the commitment of both in scientific and technological collaboration.

Prime Minister Meloni's visit to Beijing, July 28-31, 2024, marked her first official trip to China since taking office in 2022. The visit aimed to revitalize bilateral relations, culminating in the signing of a three-year Action Plan to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, education, environmental protection and food safety.

In addition, during meetings with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping, six new agreements were finalized, focusing on key sectors such as electric mobility and renewable energy. These agreements reflect Italy's commitment to addressing trade and investment imbalances. Prime Minister Meloni stressed the need to increase Chinese investment in Italy, which currently lags behind Italian investment in China.

The visit also included participation in the 7th China-Italy Business Forum, where Prime Minister Meloni outlined new agreements and articulated his goals for achieving more balanced trade relations. Analysts widely perceive the visit as a clear signal of renewed commitment to improving relations in a complex global context and underscores Italy's intention to work with China on strategic areas of mutual interest, overcoming past criticisms and concerns.

Bilateral trade

Italy and China have cultivated a strong economic relationship characterized by dynamic trade. For Italy, China is the second largest trading partner in Asia and the largest non-EU partner after the United States. As of early 2024, Italy is the 22nd largest market for Chinese exports, with a market share of 1.4 percent from January to May 2024, up from 1 percent during the same period in 2023. For Italian exports to China, Italy's share increased to 2.5% from January to April 2024, up from 8.1% in the previous year, indicating modest growth.

Italy ranks 24th among China's major suppliers, showing that although Italian exports are growing, they are still lagging behind other major European suppliers such as Germany and France. China, in turn, is a key supplier to Italy, occupying third place in terms of goods supplied. Between 2019 and 2023, Italy and China saw a significant increase in their trade relations, with Chinese exports to Italy increasing by 50 percent and Italian exports to China increasing by 48 percent. This expansion outpaced China's trade growth with the EU as a whole and with important European countries such as France and Germany.

A significant component of Italian exports to China is industrial goods, which have driven this growth. Packaged medicines, a vital part of Italy's pharmaceutical sector, accounted for $1.36 billion in exports in 2022. The automotive sector also contributed substantially, with car exports worth $1.01 billion in the same year. This demand reflects China's expanding middle class and growing interest in premium automotive brands. In addition, exports of machinery and equipment, including advanced production tools and technical equipment, grew substantially.

Despite these gains, the trade imbalance between the two nations has widened, particularly in the past three years. The surge in 2023 was greatly influenced by a spike in Italian pharmaceutical exports following China's relaxation of its anti-Covid policy. However, excluding pharmaceuticals, overall growth in Italian exports to China has been negative.

The increase in exports also includes Italian consumer goods and luxury items, in line with the recovery in Chinese consumer spending. However, China's focus on self-sufficiency and the reduction of its manufacturing activities have further reduced the share of industrial products in Italian exports, reflecting a broader trend also observed in trade between Germany and China . In 2023, Italy's main exports to China, by value-added categories, included pharmaceutical, chemical-medical and botanical products ($4.72 billion), textiles and apparel, leather goods and accessories ($4.35 billion), machinery and equipment nca ($4.02 billion), chemical substances and products ($1.35 billion) and vehicles ($1.07 billion), according to data from MAECI Economic Observatory elaborations .

2. Espionage and Covert Intelligence Operations

Industrial Espionage: The Ferretti Group Case

A significant case highlighting concerns about industrial espionage in Italy involves Ferretti S.p.A., a world-renowned luxury yacht builder that also produces boats for law enforcement and the coast guard. In April 2024, prosecutors in Milan launched an investigation following the discovery of listening devices in the company's Milan offices. Hidden microphones and signal amplifiers were found in the offices of Executive Director Xu Xinyu, a Chinese representative of Ferretti's major shareholder Weichai Group, as well as in the offices of the board secretary and Chinese-Italian translator.

This incident came amid growing tensions between Ferretti's Italian management and its Chinese shareholders. A particular point of contention was a share buyback plan, submitted to the Italian government in March, that could have altered the company's control structure and raised concerns among Chinese board members about potential state intervention under Italian "golden power" regulations. The timing of the alleged surveillance activities, directly following a controversial board meeting regarding a share buyback plan and the potential invocation of "golden power" regulations, suggests that espionage may be employed not only for technology theft but as a tactic in corporate power struggles. This indicates an intention to maintain or gain control over strategic Italian assets through illicit means. Given that six of the nine board members are Chinese, this situation indicates internal divisions and a potential struggle for decision-making power within the company.

This situation echoes a precedent set by Pirelli, where Italian authorities exercised "golden power" to review governance and limit the influence of its Chinese shareholder, Sinochem. The fact that Ferretti produces boats for both luxury and law enforcement/coast guard means that it operates as a dual-use company. This characteristic means that any industrial espionage targeting this entity has direct national security implications, as sensitive information could be exploited for military or security purposes beyond mere commercial gain.

Cyber Espionage and Vulnerability

In addition to industrial espionage, Italy faces a broader threat from Chinese cyber operations. Sophisticated cyber attacks have targeted sectors such as government, politics, technology and journalism, often employing "zero-click" exploits that can infiltrate devices without any user interaction. These attacks demonstrate the ability of Chinese groups, reportedly linked to military and intelligence services, to "dig deep into telecommunications networks" and target the smartphones of prominent individuals. The pervasive nature of mobile devices, including smartphones, makes them a significant and often overlooked attack vector. Because sensitive information, passwords, and insights into policy discussions are frequently accessed through these devices, their vulnerability creates a "mobile security crisis" in which foreign actors can gain access to critical data or use them as gateways to broader networks.

The deep penetration of telecommunications networks by these groups suggests a strategy of pre-positioning for future cyber attacks or intelligence gathering, rather than mere immediate exfiltration of data. Such persistent access could enable long-term surveillance or disruption capabilities, posing a strategic threat to national infrastructure. A clear pattern of state-sponsored cyber espionage against Western allies is further highlighted by the Czech government's public indictment of China's APT31 group in May 2025. This group allegedly conducted a prolonged cyber attack that compromised the Czech Foreign Ministry's unclassified networks, allowing Beijing to monitor diplomatic correspondence during the Czech presidency of the European Union in 2022. NATO condemned this malicious cyber campaign, noting a "growing pattern of malicious cyber activity emanating from the People's Republic."

Transnational Repression: China's "Overseas Police Stations"

A highly controversial aspect of the Chinese presence in Italy is the operation of alleged Chinese "police stations" within the country. Reports by the NGO Safeguard Defenders identify at least 11 such centers throughout Italy. These facilities are accused of facilitating transnational repression against dissent to Beijing, primarily by monitoring the Chinese diaspora and suppressing opposition to the Communist Party. Specific examples include "pilot projects" in Milan and Rome, with other centers identified in Prato, Florence, Bolzano, Venice and in Sicily.

These stations allegedly violated national sovereignty by allowing Chinese police to circumvent established police cooperation rules and procedures by coercing individuals through threats to their families in China. This direct challenge to the Italian legal and security framework represents a clear erosion of sovereignty through covert and unofficial operations. Moreover, the focus on monitoring and suppressing dissent within the Chinese diaspora reveals a strategy in which overseas communities are simultaneously a target of control and a potential tool for influence or intelligence gathering. The coercion tactics employed, such as threatening family members in China, create a pervasive environment of fear within these communities, which can be used to silence critics or extract information, turning a segment of the population into an unwilling tool or vulnerable target for foreign state interests.

Discussions also included the possibility of resuming joint patrolling initiatives between Italian and Chinese police forces, a proposal linked to a 2015 memorandum for the upcoming 2026 Winter Olympic Games in Milan-Cortina. Critics warn that such joint operations could pose serious risks to national sovereignty, effectively legitimizing the presence of Chinese law enforcement on Italian soil.

3. Sabotage Risks to Critical Infrastructure

Vulnerabilities in Technology Supply Chains

Investigations revealed a disturbing reality regarding critical infrastructure equipment: seemingly innocuous Chinese-made solar inverters and batteries could be hiding "clandestine communication devices." Recent reports indicate the discovery of undisclosed communication devices, including cellular radios, embedded in Chinese-made inverters used in solar panels and wind turbines in the United States and Europe.

These devices could potentially allow remote access, bypassing firewalls and giving Beijing the ability to change settings, collect data or even disrupt power grids, causing widespread blackouts.  ìThese undocumented modules are capable of passively collecting data or performing active command and control operations, posing a significant threat to national and public security. The clandestine nature of these devices means that their presence often goes unnoticed by importers, retailers and even national regulators, indicating a deep vulnerability in procurement and detection mechanisms.

This represents a sophisticated stealthy sabotage vector that is extremely difficult to detect through conventional cybersecurity measures, shifting the focus from software vulnerabilities to the integrity of the hardware supply chain. This requires a deeper level of scrutiny in the acquisition of technology components.

Just a few days ago, unauthorized communication devices, not listed in product documentation, were discovered in some Chinese photovoltaic inverters. Similar devices, including cellular radios, were also found in Chinese batteries. The European Solar Manufacturing Council, the association representing the continent's solar power manufacturers, raised the alarm, saying that remote access to software in Chinese PV inverters presents significant cyber vulnerabilities, including the possibility of sabotage.

As Italy and the European Union in general increasingly rely on renewable energy for their green transition, the pervasive use of potentially compromised Chinese components could create systemic vulnerabilities in the energy grid. This situation turns a climate imperative into a national security liability, as the very infrastructure designed to ensure energy independence could become a vector for foreign interference or disruption.

Threats to Submarine Cables

Concerns about attacks on undersea infrastructure have escalated, highlighted by the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in September 2022 and more recent incidents. A Chinese fishing vessel has been accused of cutting telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea by dragging its anchor across the seabed, an act that regional leaders have called sabotage, despite the common occurrence of accidental damage to cables.

Further complicating these concerns is China's development of a purpose-built tool capable of cutting reinforced cables at depths of 13,000 feet, nearly twice the depth of most undersea infrastructure. This development indicates a deliberate ability to strategically disrupt vital global communication arteries. Submarine cables are critical for telecommunications and data flow, and the ability to cut them could have devastating economic and military consequences for Italy and its allies.

The focus on submarine cable sabotage also signals an expansion of hybrid threats in the maritime domain, moving beyond cyber and information warfare to potential physical disruption of vital global arteries. This calls for a shift in defensive strategies beyond traditional naval security. Reflecting the severity and perceived relevance of this threat to Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean, NATO is considering Italy as the site of a new center of excellence specifically focused on submarine cable sabotage threats.

4. National Security Risks in Critical Sectors

4.1. Technology Sector

5G Network Security

Italy has adopted a "case-by-case basis" approach to regulating high-risk telecom suppliers, such as Huawei and ZTE, for its 5G network infrastructure, rather than implementing an outright ban. An example of this approach is the prevention of Fastweb from signing a deal with Huawei for its 5G network in 2020, demonstrating an application of Italy's "golden power" regulations. This contrasts with Germany's more decisive policy, which aims to phase out Huawei and ZTE components from its 5G core networks by the end of 2026. Historically, Huawei and ZTE have been deeply involved in Italian 5G projects, including government-supported trials in cities like Bari and Matera, where they demonstrated various 5G use cases.   

Italy's "case-by-case" approach, while offering flexibility, creates a fragmented regulatory landscape compared to the more decisive bans implemented by some allies. This could lead to inconsistent security postures across different network operators and potentially allow for continued, albeit controlled, penetration by high-risk vendors. The initial reluctance to impose a blanket ban and the continued engagement with Chinese 5G vendors reflect a tension between perceived economic benefits, such as lower costs and technological advancement, and national security imperatives. This balancing act can inadvertently create vulnerabilities if economic considerations are allowed to overshadow security risks.   

Data Centers

Italy is poised for a significant surge in data center investments, with spending projected to double to €10 billion between 2025 and 2026. This increase is largely driven by global technology giants like Microsoft and Amazon Web Services expanding their cloud capabilities to meet surging demand, particularly from artificial intelligence applications. Data infrastructure has been designated as Critical National Infrastructure in the UK , a classification that is likely applicable to Italy given the strategic importance of data centers for digital transformation and national resilience.   

While specific direct Chinese investment in Italian data centers is not explicitly detailed in the available information, the designation of data infrastructure as critical national infrastructure implies a heightened vulnerability. As these facilities become the backbone of digital economies and government operations, they represent an emerging target for foreign influence or potential sabotage, mirroring patterns observed in other strategic sectors. The significant foreign investment in this sector, regardless of origin, necessitates robust regulatory oversight, particularly concerning data sovereignty, energy supply, and potential foreign subsidies, to mitigate any risks to national security. This emerging vulnerability in the digital backbone underscores the need for proactive measures to safeguard these essential assets from potential exploitation.   

4.2. Energy Sector

Network Infrastructure

China's influence in Europe's energy sector extends to critical grid infrastructure. State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), a Chinese state-owned company, acquired a 35 percent stake in Italian holding company CDP Reti for €2.1 billion in 2014, marking SGCC's largest single foreign investment and the largest Chinese investment in Italy at the time. The binding agreement for the sale of 35 percent of CDP Reti to SGEL was signed in July 2014, but the finalization of the transaction and the actual entry of State Grid as a shareholder took place in late November 2014, after obtaining the necessary government and antitrust approvals. CDP Reti is an investment vehicle that manages investments in major strategic Italian companies such as Snam (gas pipelines), Terna (power lines) and Italgas (gas distribution).  Through this holding company, SGCC indirectly owns between 10 percent and 13 percent of Terna, the operator of Italy's electricity transmission system, and Snam, its natural gas counterpart. These minority stakes confer "soft veto power" over strategic decisions, providing a significant level of influence over Italy's energy backbone.

Minority stakes can also provide critical access to information and strategic visibility into sensitive areas. A Chinese investor with representation on the board of a transmission operator could, in theory, gain visibility into network vulnerabilities, influence technical sourcing decisions, or delay action during a crisis. This means that China's presence in the Italian energy sector is no longer seen purely from a commercial perspective, but as a strategic responsibility that touches the heart of the European security architecture.

Renewable Energy and Batteries

Concern is growing in Western countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, that Chinese-made wind farm components and Chinese-owned actions in energy infrastructure may pose national security risks, including the risk of sabotage.

Chinese companies have acquired significant stakes in European wind, solar and hydropower companies and projects, entrenching themselves not only as investors but as long-term players with increasing strategic relevance. A case in point was the purchase of a 22 percent stake in Energias de Portugal (EDP) by China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) in 2011. Through this stake, CTG gained influence over EDP's extensive wind, solar, and hydro portfolio across Europe and beyond, securing both market access and technology transfer opportunities in line with Beijing's broader industrial ambitions.  Historically, Chinese energy giants have acquired stakes in wind farms in at least nine European countries, not only to diversify portfolios but also to absorb operational expertise, particularly from Europe's global leaders in offshore wind power. For example, China General Nuclear (CGN) acquired wind farms in the United Kingdom and France through its subsidiary CGN Europe Energy, a move that gave it access to a prominent place in Western energy management and regulatory systems. These deals have made Chinese companies not only financial participants but also key minority shareholders and joint venture partners, which can provide leverage over time in policy-relevant areas of the economy.

This exploitation of the green transition for strategic penetration enables China to gain market access and facilitate technology transfer. Although these upstream investments are commercial in nature, they quietly integrate Chinese players into Europe's broader energy ecosystem, positioning them to monitor production dynamics and market behavior from within. In addition, Chinese investment in Europe's battery and electric vehicle (EV) sector has increased, giving Beijing a growing role in the energy industrial base that will power Europe's next-generation transportation systems. Chinese companies dominate the global battery industry and are building capacity directly on European soil, entrenching themselves in both supply chains and local industrial planning. It should be noted that China has already dominated the photovoltaic sector in Europe and is aggressively expanding into other markets, including EV markets.This exploitation of the green transition for strategic penetration enables China to gain market access and facilitate technology transfer. Although these upstream investments are commercial in nature, they quietly integrate Chinese players into Europe's broader energy ecosystem, positioning them to monitor production dynamics and market behavior from within. In addition, Chinese investment in Europe's battery and electric vehicle (EV) sector has increased, giving Beijing a growing role in the energy industrial base that will power Europe's next-generation transportation systems. Chinese companies dominate the global battery industry and are building capacity directly on European soil, entrenching themselves in both supply chains and local industrial planning. It should be noted that China has already dominated the photovoltaic industry in Europe and is aggressively expanding into other markets, including electric vehicles.

Ming Yang's Presence in Italy and Security Concerns

In Italy, China's Ming Yang Smart Energy, a large wind turbine manufacturer in China with ties to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Communist Party of China (CPC), plans to set up a wind turbine factory in Taranto. Ming Yang Group founder and chairman Zhang Chuanwei reportedly joined the PLA in 1978, and the Ming Yang Group's Party Committee has given important assignments to retired soldiers and assigned them to senior positions. China's renewable energy sector, which includes companies such as Mingyang Wind Power, has seen an integration of civilian and military, part of China's broader strategy to use new energy for military purposes and improve energy security.

Ming Yang intends to supply 18.8 MW turbines for the "Med Wind" floating wind project, a 2.8 GW floating wind farm off the coast of Sicily, and to open a production site in Brindisi to manufacture power cables to connect offshore wind farms to the power grid. To this end, Ming Yang has entered into an agreement with Italian developer Renexia to explore the possibility of setting up a joint venture to build a production plant with an investment of about 500 million euros. Taranto and Brindisi are two Italian cities crucial to the activities of the Italian Navy and NATO. The presence of the Taranto plant was confirmed by Adolfo Urso, Minister of Enterprise and Made in Italy, who in August last year announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding with MingYang and Renexia.

Key Concerns Related to Chinese Renewable Energy Suppliers

Some sources, such as a German government defense think tank, have warned that allowing Chinese companies like Ming Yang to supply wind energy equipment carries technological, political and supply chain risks because of their ties to the Communist Party and the military. Key concerns include:

• "Kill switches" and undisclosed remote access. Recent reports indicate the discovery of undisclosed communication devices, including cellular radios, embedded in Chinese-made inverters used in solar panels and wind turbines in the United States and Europe. These devices could potentially allow remote access, bypassing firewalls and giving Beijing the ability to change settings, collect data or even disrupt power grids, causing widespread blackouts.

• Supply chain dependence. China dominates the production of many critical components for renewable energy infrastructure, including wind turbines, inverters, and rare earth elements essential for magnets. This heavy reliance on Chinese suppliers creates a significant vulnerability, as supply chain disruptions or the inclusion of malicious components could compromise energy security.

• Espionage and data collection. Experts warn that Chinese-made wind turbines could be equipped with sensors that enable espionage activities, potentially tracking military ships, submarines and aircraft. In addition, access to wind farm control systems could allow the collection of sensitive data.

• Political leverage and economic coercion. Chinese ownership or significant stakes in critical energy infrastructure offer Beijing potential leverage to politically influence or exert economic coercion. In a high-voltage scenario, this could lead to deliberate project delays, energy supply disruptions, or passive interference with grid stability.   

• Cybersecurity Vulnerability. The increasing connectivity and digitization of wind systems, making them more efficient, also expands their attack surface for cyber threats. State-sponsored actors could exploit vulnerabilities to disrupt operations, steal data or cause system shutdowns.

• China's legal mandate for espionage. China's National Intelligence Law compels Chinese companies to support state intelligence operations. Huawei, the world's largest inverter manufacturer, has already been banned from U.S. telecommunications networks for security reasons.

Responses and Mitigation Measures by Other Countries

Several countries are already taking measures or considering measures to mitigate these risks. The German Ministry of Defense (BMVg) could block the permitting process for the "Waterkant" offshore wind farm on grounds of "security for national and alliance defense," since the supplier is Ming Yang Smart Energy. A German report urges Germany to prevent Chinese suppliers from ongoing and future wind energy projects, citing national security concerns and risks to critical infrastructure. Similar concerns have prompted other European countries, including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, to impose restrictions on Chinese wind turbine manufacturers. The United Kingdom has made it clear that further Chinese involvement in its energy sector is politically untenable, even the purchase of a Chinese stake in a nuclear power project.

The EU is also investigating Chinese wind turbine manufacturers for potential government subsidies and considering banning non-European-made wind turbines if they do not meet strict cybersecurity standards. Specifically, in 2024 the Commission launched an investigation into Chinese wind turbine suppliers in Spain, Greece, France, Romania and Bulgaria due to suspected Chinese government subsidies. The investigation was prompted by fears that the domestic industry could be affected by the influx of cheap imports, risking its collapse.

In the United States, Department of Energy officials are investigating the potential threats posed by Chinese-made equipment in renewable energy infrastructure, and legislative initiatives are underway to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers for sensitive infrastructure. A report on offshore wind energy released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) lent credibility and substantiated concerns that offshore wind turbines pose serious threats to national security and aviation and maritime safety by interfering with radar systems. The GAO report states that "offshore wind can impact defense and radar systems," reducing the performance of radar systems used for defense, maritime navigation, and security in several ways, including reducing detection sensitivity, obscuring potential targets, and generating false targets.

However, due to limited capacity in offshore wind supply chains around the world, European wind farm operators are forced to turn to Chinese manufacturers.

4.3 Ports

COSCO Shipping and Strategic Ports

COSCO Shipping Italy, a strategic joint venture between COSCON Europe GmbH and Fratelli Cosulich Spa, operates extensively in major Italian ports, including Genoa, Vado, La Spezia, Livorno, Naples, Salerno, Ancona, Venice, Ravenna, Rijeka, Trieste, Bari and Catania. This extensive network facilitates the acceptance of cargo to and from major global destinations, leveraging COSCO's impressive fleet of 489 ships and its operations on 404 routes, reaching 576 ports in 140 countries.

Ports, by their nature, possess a dual-use function, serving both commercial and potential military or intelligence purposes. Control or significant influence over commercial port operations can be exploited for strategic advantage, including intelligence gathering, logistical support or even denial of access during a crisis. In addition, state-funded companies such as COSCO, which receive state funds from China, do not compete on the same level as other companies in the industry. Their market dominance can become a potential geopolitical tool for Beijing, allowing economic leverage and strategic influence over critical trade arteries.

China Communications Construction Company (CCCC)

Concerns about the Chinese presence in Italian ports have been exacerbated by a cooperation agreement signed in 2019 between the Port of Trieste and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). CCCC, which is controlled by the Chinese government and acts as a contractor in many of Beijing's expansionist projects, was blacklisted by the U.S. government in 2020 for its ties to the Chinese military. The agreement aimed to facilitate access of Italian products to Chinese markets and support infrastructure development in Central Europe, with plans for collaborative initiatives in logistics-industrial projects in China.

The involvement of entities such as CCCC, even after Italy's withdrawal from the BIS, highlights a persistent channel of influence. Agreements with blacklisted entities maintain avenues for potential strategic penetration, raising questions about the effectiveness of Italy's de-risking strategy in practice. Potential increased Chinese control of Mediterranean ports, following Beijing's majority stake in the Greek port of Piraeus, remains a significant concern.

LOGINK in Italy: The Chinese Platform that Worries Ports

A recent study by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission highlighted the potential dangers associated with the widespread use of LOGINK, China's integrated logistics data transmission platform. It is feared that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may exploit LOGINK to expand its global influence, creating serious commercial and strategic risks for other nations, as well as threatening the security of user data and influencing governance norms in ways contrary to Western interests. LOGINK already has a presence in Italy, particularly in the ports of La Spezia and Marina di Carrara, through a strategic partnership with the International Port Community Systems Association (IPCSA). This cooperation has focused on sharing the status of ships and containers, enhancing LOGINK's ability to monitor cargo movement globally.

The platform has collaborative agreements with at least 24 ports, free ports and port operators outside China, spread across Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Its integration with Cainiao Global Warehouses, the logistics arm of Alibaba, has also enabled its use in the latter's Rome depot. LOGINK's expansion has also been facilitated by partnerships with major international logistics companies and participation in organizations such as UNESCAP and standard-setting bodies such as ISO. Through these channels, the Chinese platform aims to facilitate its adoption in advanced economies and guide logistics development in emerging economies.

4.4 Media

Collaborations with State Media and Propaganda

Despite a significant Chinese resident population of nearly 285,000, Italy has few independent Chinese-language media. In contrast, Chinese state media maintain a strong influence on diaspora groups, with pro-China content dominating existing media. Collaborations between China's state media, such as Xinhua News Agency and China Media Group (CMG), and major Italian news agencies such as Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA) and Rai, the national public broadcasting company, have facilitated the diffusion of Beijing's narratives into Italy's mainstream discourse. These partnerships often involve Chinese entities paying for advertising space in Italian newspapers or offering original Chinese-language articles translated into Italian.

Disinformation and Narrative Manipulation

Of particular concern was the publication of unedited reports from Xinhua by ANSA, which effectively became a platform for disseminating Chinese propaganda material to a large Italian audience. This has included lavishly edited articles congregating with China for various successes while ignoring controversies. This practice, along with the publication of "Chinese dossiers" and paid content, subtly shapes public opinion and undermines journalistic independence.

The COVID-19 pandemic served as a turning point, revealing more clearly China's information manipulation tactics. China aggressively constructed an image as Europe's savior by sending masks and supplies to the Italian Red Cross, presenting them as donations when in fact they were purchases by Italy. This exploitation of an image-building crisis demonstrated China's effectiveness in manipulating information to rehabilitate its image and present itself as a benevolent power. Italian print media generally cut back on Chinese content partnerships after this, but some outlets still publish Chinese state-sponsored content for financial compensation, making Italy an exception in Europe for the monetization of such messages.

Assessments of Italian intelligence and NGOs

Italian intelligence reports confirm China's efforts to "pollute and distort" public debate in Italy and other Western countries, noting significant investments in information warfare over the past decade. Freedom House, a U.S.-based NGO, also assessed Italy as vulnerable to Beijing's influence on the media. Despite increased awareness and research into China's disinformation tactics, Italy shows "substantial weakness in its interventions to counter disinformation and various forms of interference," with regulatory gaps remaining for critical devices such as scanners, in contrast to the robust measures applied to 5G. This persistent vulnerability, despite intelligence warnings, suggests that existing economic incentives and regulatory loopholes continue to allow avenues for Chinese-influenced operations.

5. Capturing the Elites

Definition and Mechanisms

Elite capture, in the context of foreign influence, refers to a form of corruption in which public officials and domestic elites divert resources for their own personal financial gain, to the detriment of the public. More broadly, it encompasses malign foreign authoritarian influence, which involves the covert, coercive and corrupt efforts of an authoritarian government to shape the domestic discourse of another country. This is distinguished from legitimate public diplomacy and engagement. Such tactics include information operations, bribery, economic coercion or the subversion of civil society.

Activities of the United Front Work Department (UFWD)

A key tool in China's elite capture efforts is the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The UFWD focuses its work on individuals and entities outside the CCP, particularly within the overseas Chinese diaspora, who hold political, commercial, religious or academic influence, or who represent interest groups. Under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the role and scope of the UFWD has expanded and intensified since 2012. Its activities can harm national interests through legal and illegal technology transfer, surveillance of Chinese diaspora communities, promotion of PRC-friendly narratives through ostensibly independent voices, and neutralization or harassment of CCP critics. UFWD tactics are designed to "build the broadest possible coalition with all relevant social forces," often masking state activities through "person-to-person," "cultural," or "nongovernmental" labels to evade accountability.

Specific Cases and Vectors of Influence in Italy

Political Sphere

China is actively striving to present itself as an alternative partner to the United States in Italy, capitalizing on the impact of U.S. tariffs and existing anti-U.S. sentiment, particularly among parties such as the Five Star Movement. Chinese Ambassador Jia Guide has, in recent interviews and press releases, highlighted the potential for deeper Sino-Italian cooperation in areas such as automotive and technology, while criticizing the EU's protectionist measures. This strategy involves exploiting existing internal divisions and political sentiments to promote China's agenda, aiming to foster a narrative of distancing from the West in favor of closer ties with China and the BRICS nations.

Academic Sphere

The academic sphere has also been a target of influence. The growth of Italian language programs in China, with 24 universities offering degrees in Italian language and culture and numerous others offering courses, demonstrates a long-term commitment that began as early as 1954. High-level collaborations, such as the "China-Italy University Presidents' Dialogue" and agreements for research centers and high-level training initiatives, are seen as opportunities for academic discussion and mutual growth. However, organizations such as the Confucius Institutes, which China supports in universities around the world, are identified by Italian intelligence as vehicles of "invasive penetration" and beacons of soft power. These institutes are used to seek knowledge, research and training, assets that Italy "must learn to protect from predatory takeovers." This highlights how cultural and academic exchanges, while seemingly benign, can be used as a precursor to broader operations of influence, gaining access and subtly shaping narratives within educational institutions.

Commercial Sphere

Despite Italy's withdrawal from the BRI, its deep economic interdependence with China persists. China remains Italy's second largest non-EU trading partner. The new action plan (2024-2027) focuses on economic cooperation, scientific and technological innovation, education, sustainability and health. Italian companies continue to invest significantly in China, with more than 15 billion euros in direct investment. This continued economic engagement, even after strategic recalibration, creates avenues for influence. Deep economic ties, even when de-risking strategies are pursued, can serve as leverage for influence, as the desire for market access and trade benefits can lead to concessions or a softening of critical positions toward Beijing.

Covered Influence Operations

A report by Sinopsis and the Marco Pannella Global Committee for the Rule of Law, "Hijacking the mainstream: CCP influence agencies and their operations in Italian parliamentary and local politics," sheds light on covert influence tactics employed by CCP agencies in Italy. These agencies, including external fronts of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) such as the China Association for Friendship (CAFF) and the Liaison Bureau of the Political Work Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), cultivate Italian contacts and engage in "foreigner co-optation activities." These operations often circumvent norms requiring accountability in state-state relations by disguising party-state activities through "person-to-person," "cultural," or "nongovernmental" labels. This allows CCP agencies of influence to operate with little or no superficial cover, providing a veneer of legitimacy while promoting Beijing's strategic goals within Italian parliamentary and local politics.

6. Conclusions

The Chinese presence in Italy poses a complex and multifaceted national security challenge, extending beyond conventional economic engagement to include sophisticated forms of espionage, sabotage, and elite capture. Although Italy made a significant symbolic gesture by withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative, this move initiated a recalibration rather than a complete decoupling. However, the analysis reveals that underlying vulnerabilities persist and are being actively exploited. Industrial espionage, as seen in the Ferretti Group case, demonstrates that illicit information gathering is not just for technology theft, but can be a tool in corporate power struggles over strategic assets, particularly when companies possess dual-use capabilities. Cyber espionage, which targets mobile devices and is deeply embedded in telecommunications networks, indicates a pervasive, pre-positioning threat for long-term surveillance or disruption. The presence of Chinese "overseas police stations" poses a direct challenge to Italian sovereignty, enabling transnational repression and exploitation of the Chinese diaspora for control and potential intelligence.

Moreover, sabotage risks are evident in technology supply chains, where hidden devices in critical infrastructure components such as solar inverters and wind turbines present an "invisible" threat, potentially exploiting Italy's green transition for strategic penetration. China's development of specialized tools for cutting submarine cables underscores a deliberate capacity for strategic disruption in the maritime domain, intensifying hybrid warfare tactics.

Across critical sectors, Italy's approach to national security is tested. The "case-by-case" regulation of 5G vendors, while flexible, creates a fragmented security posture. Significant Chinese stakes in energy grid infrastructure, even if minority, confer strategic influence and informational access. China's pervasive presence in Italian ports, through state-funded entities like COSCO and blacklisted companies like CCCC, provides economic leverage that can be used as a geopolitical tool. Finally, the media landscape is susceptible to subtle information manipulation through state media collaborations and paid content, while elite capture efforts, orchestrated by entities like the United Front Work Department, exploit domestic divisions and leverage academic and business ties to shape narratives and influence policy.

In conclusion, Italy faces a set of persistent and evolving risks arising from China's strategic presence. The interconnected nature of these threats, spanning the economic, technological, and political domains, requires a comprehensive and adaptive national security strategy. Continued vigilance, robust regulatory frameworks, and enhanced alignment with Western allies are essential to safeguard Italy's sovereignty, critical infrastructure, and democratic processes against these multifaceted challenges.