From Shadow to Supremacy: China's Rise in Integrated Air-Space Domination — An OSINT Analysis of the 6G Roadmap and Strategic Resilience

Abstract

This paper presents a strategic analysis of the People's Republic of China's comprehensive effort to achieve Information Sovereignty (信息主权) and global leadership in the 6G era. This doctrine is realized through the construction of the Space-Air-Ground-Sea Integrated Network (SAGSIN), an architecture designed for total national security resilience.

The study focuses on the Near-Space Communication Network (NS-ComNet), detailing its indispensable role as a resilient bridge between satellite and terrestrial systems, and the advanced capabilities of platforms like the long-endurance Yuanmeng Dirigible (圆梦). These platforms are being developed alongside breakthrough dual-use technologies, such as CNSC (Communication-Navigation-Sensing-Computing) and RmMIMO (Reconfigurable Massive MIMO), which transform communication nodes into autonomous C4ISR systems for enhanced surveillance and electronic warfare (EW).

Strategically, the project is underpinned by the fully operational Beidou Navigation System (BDS) and an aggressive push to accelerate Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Sat-Internet development. The terrestrial infrastructure supports this through massive investment in AI compute power and critical hardware like CPO (Co-packaged Optics) to achieve microsecond-level latency, linking the economic plan directly to the high-end military and communication requirements.

The analysis concludes with a pro-active intelligence assessment, highlighting vulnerabilities in AI deployment and the CPO/RmMIMO supply chain as critical targets for exploitation, emphasizing the necessity of countering China's technological diplomacy to prevent the establishment of non-interoperable global 6G standards.

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I. The Geopolitical Game: Information Sovereignty and the Race to 6G

The overarching air and space strategy of the People's Republic of China is not just a collection of technological projects but the meticulous execution of a long-term political and programmatic plan aimed at achieving "Information Sovereignty" (信息主权). This fundamental principle dictates that communications and information services critical to national security and the economy must be autonomous, secure, and reliable (自主开放、安全可靠), free from dependence on any rival nation's technology.

This strategic mandate is formalized in political documents such as the "National Civil Space Infrastructure Mid-to-Long-Term Development Plan (2015–2025)", which explicitly names civil space infrastructure as an important support for national security. China aims to position itself as the technological leader establishing future 6G standards, turning technological influence into economic and political leverage.

The Integrated Vision: SAGSIN

The entire vision converges on establishing the Space-Air-Ground-Sea Integrated Network (SAGSIN), a comprehensive architecture designed for total resilience. SAGSIN ensures that even if terrestrial infrastructure is disabled by an attack or disaster, critical communications and command systems can continue operating via the air and space layers. This enormous undertaking is managed by key state entities and research institutes, including the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND - 国家国防科技工业局), the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT - 北京理工大学), and the Purple Mountain Laboratories (紫金山实验室).

The Three Pillars and Achieved Objectives

The Plan established three foundational systems, which are either completed or rapidly advancing:

1. Navigation and Positioning (Beidou): The Beidou Satellite Navigation System (BDS) completed its global constellation of 35 satellites. Beidou delivers global positioning accuracy better than 10 meters and timing accuracy of 20 nanoseconds. Ongoing investment in the Beidou Ground Augmentation System is intended to push precision to the centimeter/millimeter level in key areas, a fundamental requirement for military accuracy and autonomous vehicles.

2. Remote Sensing: The goal is to build a global observation capability with high, medium, and low resolution, including optical satellites and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems for all-weather monitoring. Strategically, China plans to gradually open up satellite data with resolution lower than 0.5 meters (50 cm) to stimulate the commercial market while retaining strict state control over high-resolution intelligence data.

3. Communication and Broadcast (Sat-Internet and 6G): The objective is to establish a global communication network, focusing heavily on Sat-Internet and 6G. R&D priorities include advanced technologies like laser and quantum communication and anti-interference technologies for secure information transmission.

II. The Technical Architecture: From Near-Space to Chipset Dominance

The unique advantage of China lies in integrating layers that others often keep separate, notably the Near-Space domain.

A. NS-ComNet: The Resilient Air Bridge

The Near-Space layer (between 20 and 100 km) is considered an indispensable component of the 6G network. This layer functions as a resilient, low-latency bridge between LEO satellites and terrestrial networks.

Platform Capabilities: Near-Space vehicles offer unique tactical benefits:

• The Yuanmeng Dirigible (圆梦) operates at around 20 km for long periods, carrying heavy payloads (up to 300 kg) for Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

• The BH-HAPS Platform provides 5G/6G services via stable station-keeping at 20 km for marine and remote areas.

• The Jimu-1 Aerostat provides stable optical surveillance at 9,050 meters.

Credit Beijing Institute of Technology - Toward Near-Space Communication Network in the 6G and Beyond Era

B. Defining 6G: The Dual-Use Technologies

Advanced research, driven by institutions like BIT and corporations like Datang Mobile (大唐移动), focuses on enabling technologies critical for information superiority:

1. CNSC (Communication-Navigation-Sensing-Computing): This concept integrates all four functions within a single node, which is managed by onboard Artificial Intelligence. This fusion transforms each platform into an autonomous C4ISR system, enabling immediate tactical response and in situ data processing.

2. RmMIMO (Reconfigurable Massive MIMO): These Smart Antennas can dynamically reconfigure their electromagnetic functionality via software. This technology is crucial for Electronic Warfare (EW) applications, allowing for precision tracking and targeted interference suppression.

3. Semantic Communication: This technology uses AI to extract and transmit only the meaning or intent (语义) of the message, dramatically reducing the amount of data transmitted. The result is ultra-high spectral efficiency and robustness in constrained tactical environments.

4. Security Technologies: Research into Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography aims to establish future-proof security for all strategic communications.

C. The Industrial Layer: AI Compute Power and CPO (2025 Focus)

The terrestrial infrastructure must support the massive data needs of the air-space domain. The 2025 focus is on rapidly expanding compute power (算力) and reducing latency in data centers.

Key Industrial Objectives for 2025:

• CPO (Co-packaged Optics): This is the core technology for future high-speed interconnection. CPO integrates optical components directly into the chip's package, which is necessary to reduce latency to the microsecond level, essential for real-time AI and autonomous driving. Chinese companies such as Guangxun Technology (光迅科技) and Zhongji Xuchuang (中际旭创) are accelerating R&D to achieve autonomy in this critical hardware.

• LEO Acceleration: China is accelerating the assembly of LEO constellations, including China SatNet (国网) and the Qianfan Constellation (千帆星座), with the goal of completing the network in 2025. This effort is supported by the Wenchang Commercial Launch Base (海南商业航天发射基地).

III. Active Analysis: Vulnerabilities, Bottlenecks, and Countermeasures

This section identifies the vulnerability points and provides pro-active guidance for foreign intelligence and defense agencies.

A. Counter-Espionage and Exploitation (Intelligence Vectoring)

1. AI Vulnerability (CYBINT): The reliance of CNSC and Semantic Communication systems on complex AI models makes them susceptible to adversarial attacks and model poisoning. It is crucial to develop techniques to attack the training or deployment phases of these AI models, which could lead to undiagnosed operational failures or the involuntary disclosure of operational parameters.

2. Targeting the Supply Chain (CPO and RmMIMO): The R&D acceleration in CPO and RmMIMO identifies them as high-value acquisition targets. Intelligence efforts should focus on mapping the supply chain of critical components (optical chips, Beidou sensors) and targeting key companies (like Guangxun Technology, Zhongji Xuchuang) to intercept technology transfers or assess the feasibility of introducing compromised components (hardware backdoors) into the NS-ComNet and LEO hardware.

3. Security of Ground Control: The vulnerability of the LEO constellations often lies in the Network Management System (NMS) residing at ground control centers, such as those associated with the Purple Mountain Laboratories. Active defense should concentrate on exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities and protocol weaknesses to gain access to or interrupt the Satellite Backbone Network.

B. Defense, EW, and Technological Diplomacy

1. Contrasting Aerial Platforms (EW): The persistent nature of NS-ComNet platforms (Yuanmeng) makes them strategic targets. It is necessary to develop specialized Electronic Warfare (EW) systems designed to jam the frequencies used by RmMIMO antennas and Beidou navigation signals. Simultaneously, non-kinetic air defense systems should be funded to neutralize vulnerable stratospheric dirigibles.

2. Technological Diplomacy and Proliferation: The Chinese plan promotes the vigorous export of satellites, data, and application services as a tool of influence. To counter this, Western nations must actively fund and promote open, multi-vendor 6G standards and offer secure, viable alternatives (e.g., Western LEO services) to developing countries (especially those in the Belt and Road Initiative), mitigating their exposure to Chinese intelligence gathering.

3. Financial Monitoring and Risk Assessment: The strong growth in the revenue of Chinese operators in emergent services (Big Data +52.5%) signals where national spending is directed. It is essential to monitor the allocation of funds by state agencies like SASTIND to quickly identify when research projects transition from purely scientific R&D to strategic operational deployment.

Bibliography

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