The Zimbabwean Model: China’s Lithium Grip as a Manifestation of Geopolitical Strategy and "Liminal Warfare"

The in-depth analysis of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) penetration into Zimbabwe’s critical minerals sector, particularly lithium, is not attributable to mere commercial dynamics but constitutes the concrete and probative manifestation of a long-term global geopolitical strategy. Commercial and field intelligence data, gathered in the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organisation (ZELO) situational report, "Mine to Market for Critical Minerals: Zimbabwe’s Lithium Supply and Value Chain Situational Report" (2024/2025), documents a quasi-monopolistic control by Chinese companies along the entire lithium value chain, from extraction to primary processing. This market concentration provides operational confirmation of the strategic thesis advanced in the report "Peking's conquest of Africa. Started in the 1950s, it is also a fundamental part of its 'Liminal warfare' against the West" (2024) by Extrema Ratio. By unconditionally supporting the ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe, elevated to a "China-Zimbabwe community of shared future" in September 2024, and providing vast infrastructure and security cooperation, China secures privileged access to a dual-use resource essential for defense technology and global leadership. The economic interchange, which reached $3.802 billion in 2024 with strong growth in Chinese mineral imports, is the tangible result of a strategy that integrates high-level diplomacy, infrastructure development, and the acquisition of critical raw materials, positioning Zimbabwe as a fundamental pillar in Beijing's hegemonic ambition.

On the morning of September 4, 2025, President Xi Jinping met with Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Mnangagwa was in China to attend celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. The two heads of state announced that they would elevate bilateral relations to a China-Zimbabwe community with a shared future.

Analytical Convergence: The ZELO Report as Probative Evidence

Commercial intelligence and field analysis concerning Zimbabwe's lithium supply chain (conducted by ZELO) provide critical circumstantial and operational evidence for the geopolitical doctrine that describes Peking's projection into Africa as a strategy of "Liminal Warfare" against the West.

Although the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organisation Situational Report, " Mine to Market for Critical Minerals: Zimbabwe’s Lithium Supply and Value Chain Situational Report" is based on economic and environmental (ESG) data, its extensive documentation of Chinese control over the mining sector provides an empirical verification of the strategic hypothesis outlined in the Extrema Ratio report. The Extrema Ratio thesis, which views Africa as a central theatre for China's conquest of critical mineral leadership in the context of systemic competition with Western powers, finds its perfect execution laboratory in Zimbabwe^.

The integration of these two planes of analysis—the economic data (ZELO) and the strategic doctrine (Extrema Ratio)—reveals a framework where dependence on a single power (the PRC) for the extraction, processing, and financing of a crucial resource is the calculated result of decades of political and military-strategic planning.

Commercial Hegemony and Value Chain Acquisition (ZELO Report Focus)

ZELO's commercial intelligence establishes that the PRC has exercised systemic control over lithium extraction and processing, a move rooted in its global strategic vision.

Financial and Operational Consolidation

The Chinese financial commitment has surpassed all other players. Between 2021 and 2023, Chinese companies spent over $1 billion to acquire and develop key projects, securing investment contracts worth $2.79 billion in 2023 alone.

Major Chinese players now control the entire upstream and preliminary processing phase:

• Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, PLZ): Has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the Arcadia mine, securing a supply chain that extends from the African resource to the production of cathode materials in Asia.

• Sinomine Resource Group: Acquired and modernized Bikita Minerals, one of Africa's leading producers, with expansion plans for concentrate production and the extraction of pollucite (caesium).

• Chengxin Lithium Group: Operates the Sabi Star Mine.

• Yahua Group: Through Kamativi Mining Company (KMC), manages the revitalization of the historic Kamativi mine.

These operations aim to produce lithium concentrates, which are then shipped to China for final refining. This strategy ensures that Beijing controls not only the source of the raw material but also the crucial intermediate phase of chemical processing, where it already holds approximately 70% of global refining capacity.

Policy Exemptions and Political Influence

ZELO’s report highlights the political and selective nature of regulatory enforcement. Although the Zimbabwean government imposed an export ban on raw lithium to encourage local processing, this constraint was circumvented in politically sensitive cases. The Sandawana Mine, for instance, which is owned by Kuvimba Mining House (KMH) under the state-controlled Mutapa Holdings, was exempted from the export ban in 2023 and exported thousands of tonnes of raw ore, almost all destined for China. This demonstrates how political alliances facilitate the circumvention of national laws to serve Beijing's strategic objectives.

The Dual-Use Strategy and Hegemonic Security (Extrema Ratio Report Focus)

The logic behind the control of lithium extends far beyond the EV battery market, fitting into a geostrategic competition for materials that enable defense systems and technological superiority (Extrema Ratio).

Critical Minerals and Dual-Use Capabilities

Lithium is classified as a Critical Raw Material (CRM), a category essential for modern dual-use technologies. Its importance lies not only in civilian applications but also in advanced military systems. The lithium acquisitions align with the PRC’s strategy to consolidate its control over materials that power everything from advanced computer technology and satellites to the F-35 stealth fighter and quantum computing, which require significant amounts of critical minerals and REEs.

• The REE/Cobalt Precedent. The lithium strategy mirrors the successful Chinese pattern of establishing a quasi-monopoly on other CRMs. The PRC holds an estimated 90% share of the global critical mineral market, many of which are imported from Africa. This is consistent with the blueprint established by securing near-total control over cobalt mines in the DRC, a metal critical for superalloys in weapons systems and high-capacity batteries.

• Strategic Co-minerals. The lithium pegmatites in Zimbabwe contain other CRMs, including REEs, caesium, and tantalum. By controlling the extraction sites, China is strategically positioned to intercede and manage the entire spectrum of these raw materials, thus reinforcing its global hegemony.

  
  

Security Doctrine and Governance Model (Extrema Ratio)

The Chinese presence is supported by a long-term political strategy aimed at consolidating influence through state-to-state and party-to-party engagement:

• Political Military Work. The CCP actively exports its model of "Political Military Work" to African security forces. This education, in which the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is seen as a political army loyal to the party, is used to train African soldiers to maintain party control.

• Leadership Training. The influence is pervasive: ZANU-PF President Emmerson Mnangagwa is cited as a former trainee at a CCP-managed military institution, highlighting the direct link between military-political training and securing resource-rich regimes.

• The ESG Paradox: This strategic pursuit accepts compromises that Western investors often cannot afford. Chinese operations, like the Sabi Star Mine, resort to constructing coal-fired thermal power plants for self-generation, prioritizing operational continuity over global decarbonization mandates. This exposes Zimbabwe to reputational risk but solidifies China's resource access regardless of Western ESG requirements.

  
  

The Diplomatic and Institutional Support Structure: The "Community of Shared Future"

The mineral acquisition strategy is inextricably linked to the deep web of diplomatic, economic, and infrastructural relations that China has developed with Zimbabwe, a process formally cemented in 2024.

High-Level Diplomatic Recognition

Bilateral relations were formally elevated during President Emmerson Mnangagwa's State visit to China from August 29 to September 6, 2024. The two heads of state announced the elevation of bilateral relations to a "China-Zimbabwe community of shared future," celebrating the "five-star friendship" as a model of South-South cooperation.

In this strategic framework, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s firm support for Zimbabwe in its independent pursuit of development and promised to continue opposing external interference and illegal sanctions. Zimbabwe reciprocated, emphasizing that unconditional support for the One-China principle remains fundamental to its foreign policy.

Economic and Infrastructure Cooperation

Economic relations are governed by cooperation agreements on trade, investment protection, and technological cooperation. The PRC has financed and built high-profile infrastructure projects, demonstrating long-term commitment:

• Key Infrastructure. China has assisted in the construction of the new Parliament Building, the National Stadium in Harare, hospitals, and schools. Strategic projects include the expansion of the Kariba South Bank hydroelectric power station, the modernization of the OneNet telecommunications network (China Mobile), and the expansion and renovation of international airports.

• Trade Figures. Bilateral trade reached $3.802 billion in 2024, an annual increase of 23.9%. Chinese imports from Zimbabwe (mainly tobacco, stones, and minerals) amounted to $2.43 billion, increasing by 46.2% annually, directly reflecting the success of the mineral extraction strategy.

Security, Cultural, and Global Governance Cooperation

Cooperation extends into crucial non-economic spheres that solidify political alignment.

• Security and Governance. Both sides agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding on police cooperation and to enhance cooperation on global governance initiatives, supporting the establishment of an international mediation court. Zimbabwe supports China’s Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative.

• Soft Power. The Confucius Institute at the University of Zimbabwe (inaugurated 2007) and the dispatch of medical teams reinforce long-term cultural and social ties.

• Mineral Governance Alignment. Crucially, the Joint Declaration emphasizes the need to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in the mining sector, including exchanges of experience on rare earth and critical minerals management policies.

Conclusion: Strategic Vulnerability and Mitigation

The overwhelming concentration of Zimbabwe’s lithium supply chain in the hands of Chinese entities, supported by a vast diplomatic and infrastructural architecture, is a compelling case of geopolitical strategy realization. This dynamic places Zimbabwe in a position of significant strategic vulnerability, potentially constraining its economic and technological future.

To mitigate this dependence and realize the full sustainable potential of its mineral resources, it is essential for ZELO to diversify:

1. Normalization and Integration. The Zimbabwean government must pursue normalization of bilateral relations with the United States and the European Union, actively seeking integration into critical mineral security frameworks like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act).

2. ESG Adherence. Strict adherence to international ESG standards is the only viable path to attracting Western capital, which can offer an alternative to the Chinese business model and mitigate reputational risks associated with corruption and environmental non-compliance.

3. Logistical Diversification. Zimbabwe should actively explore integrating into Western-backed transport initiatives, such as the Lobito Corridor, to create alternative export routes and reduce reliance on Chinese-dominated flows, ultimately diluting Peking’s regional influence over critical mineral transit^.