Is the future of biotechnology Chinese? Biological warfare risks and global security - Report
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 29 mag
- Tempo di lettura: 21 min
This article analyzes China's unstoppable ascent as a leading power in biotechnology, a sector that, thanks to its deep integration with artificial intelligence (AI), is radically redefining the concept of innovation and global power. Biotechnology has evolved from a mere discipline of discovery into a true field of engineering, promising revolutionary advancements in medicine, agriculture, and energy. However, it also holds the unsettling potential to generate biological weapons of unprecedented scope, a risk that Beijing might be inclined to exploit for military purposes, opening the door to scenarios of biological warfare.
The article delves into China's strategy, characterized by massive state investments, ambitious five-year plans, and a growing fusion between civilian research and military applications. Significant dangers arising from intellectual property (IP) theft and the expansion of government surveillance are highlighted. The latter is enabled by a complex and pervasive legislative framework (including National Security Laws, Intelligence Laws, Cybersecurity Laws, and Personal Information Protection Laws), which mandates the compulsory cooperation of entities and individuals with Chinese authorities, even for intelligence and defense purposes. Among the gravest risks are the compromising of supply chains, the dual-use of technologies for offensive purposes, and the direct potential threat of biological attacks.
The article also examines current Western countermeasures, underscoring their shortcomings, particularly the lack of reciprocity in data access and the urgent need for more stringent intellectual property protection. Finally, the article proposes concrete strategic recommendations for governments and private companies. These include strengthening domestic innovation, diversifying supply chains, implementing robust systems for IP and sensitive data protection, and critically recalibrating economic relationships. Such measures are essential to safeguard Western security and maintain technological preeminence in this new and dangerous biotechnology era.
Key Points: The Chinese Biotechnology Challenge and its Implications
China's rapid advancement in biotechnology, fueled by massive state investments and integration with artificial intelligence, represents one of the most significant geopolitical and economic challenges of our time. Here are the key points to understand the scope of this transformation and its implications:
1. Biotechnology as a New Strategic Frontier
From discovery to design: Biology is evolving from a field of observation to a discipline of engineering, with the potential to create new forms of life, materials, and functions. This transformation, enabled by AI, engineering, and automation, is comparable to the revolutions in chemistry and physics in past centuries.
Strategic sectors: Biotechnology has profound implications for defense, healthcare, agriculture, energy, and manufacturing. It can lead to revolutionary innovations (e.g., cancer therapies, more productive seeds) but also unprecedented risks (e.g., biological weapons, genetically modified soldiers).
Global power: Leadership in this sector is intrinsically linked to national security, economic power, and geopolitical influence. Countries that dominate biotechnological innovation will gain a decisive strategic advantage.
2. China's Rise and the Role of AI
State investments and plans: China has invested over $100 billion in biotech R&D and considers it a priority sector in its Five-Year Plans (e.g., Made in China 2025, 14th Five-Year Plan), aiming for self-sufficiency and global leadership.
Integration with AI: Artificial intelligence, with tools like AlphaFold, is accelerating biotechnological discovery, drastically reducing research and development times. Chinese companies like BioMap (Baidu) and BGI are at the forefront of AI applied to biology and genomics.
Aggressive market strategy: Beijing tends to follow a "steal, expand, strangle" strategy to achieve market dominance, as seen with rare earth minerals. The West losing the biotechnology competition would carry far greater economic risks.
3. Security and Intellectual Property Risks
IP theft and espionage: China has long been accused of intellectual property theft through legal channels (mergers/acquisitions) and illegal ones (cyber and human espionage). Examples include the acquisition of Syngenta and accusations against WuXi AppTec and GenScript.
Chinese legislation and surveillance: Laws such as the National Security Law (2015), National Intelligence Law (2017), Cybersecurity Law (2017), Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL, 2021), Data Security Law (DSL, 2021), Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL, 2021), and the updated Anti-Espionage Law (2023) expand government control over data and information, making all entities and citizens in China potential extensions of state intelligence.
"Dual-use" risk and armaments: Biotechnology can be used for military purposes, from developing pathogens and biological weapons to creating genetically modified, AI-enhanced "super-soldiers." The case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg (Canada) suggests collaborations between Chinese scientists and the military in sensitive areas.
Genomic surveillance: China uses genomic surveillance for population control (e.g., Uyghurs) and has amassed enormous databases of genomic data, including from abroad, raising concerns about privacy and strategic use.
4. Western Countermeasures and Their Gaps
US legislation: The United States has implemented measures like the BIOSECURE Act to limit collaboration with at-risk Chinese biotech companies.
Intelligence warnings: The US ODNI has repeatedly warned about the threat of Chinese IP theft.
Lack of reciprocity: Chinese regulations prevent foreigners from freely accessing and transferring genetic data and biological samples from China, while Chinese entities have access to health data in many Western countries, creating a significant imbalance.
Insufficiency of current measures: Despite efforts, experts believe that current countermeasures are insufficient to fully counter China's advance.
5. Recommendations for the West and Private Companies
For Governments:
Strengthen IP protection: Increase vigilance and enforcement against espionage, secure genetic data, and respond with severe sanctions for violations.
Promote domestic innovation: Invest massively in R&D, train and retain talent, develop resilient supply chains, and incentivize public-private collaboration.
Recalibrate economic relations: Implement stricter screening for inbound and outbound investments, demand reciprocity, and strengthen alliances with like-minded countries.
Address ethics and biosecurity: Develop global ethical standards and strengthen biosecurity and biodefense.
For Private Companies:
Targeted IP protection: Do not register sensitive patents and trade secrets in China due to national security laws that could mandate their disclosure. Focus on IP protection in secure jurisdictions.
Robust cybersecurity: Implement advanced cybersecurity measures, encryption, and segmentation of sensitive data, ensuring it is not accessible from Chinese networks.
In-depth due diligence: Conduct extreme vetting of potential Chinese partners, investors, and suppliers, analyzing their reputation, government connections, and IP track record.
Ironclad contracts: Use detailed NDAs and contracts that protect IP and data management, verifying their international enforceability.
Internal controls and training: Limit access to sensitive information, conduct employee screening, and educate staff on espionage risks and the implications of Chinese laws.
Supply chain diversification: Reduce dependence on Chinese suppliers for critical components and materials, prioritizing sources in allied countries.
The stakes are the future of biotechnology and, with it, the global balance of power. The West must act urgently and with a clear strategy to protect its innovation and security.
The Chinese Biotechnology Revolution: Implications for World Order and Security
The world stands at the cusp of an era where biology is no longer just a field of discovery, but a discipline of design, thanks to innovations in artificial intelligence (AI), engineering, and automation. This transformation recalls the leaps made by chemistry in the 19th century with rubber and plastics, or by physics in the 20th century with atomic energy and computers. Today, for the first time in recent history, the United States and its allies find themselves competing with a rival, China, in a new form of engineering that promises to generate enormous wealth but that, in the wrong hands, could develop extremely powerful weapons. History teaches that countries winning the innovation race often win real wars too.
The biotechnology era makes biology the foundation of innovation, with implications extending far beyond the lab: from more productive seeds to targeted cancer therapies, and even the possibility of genetically modified soldiers. Every strategic sector – defense, healthcare, agriculture, energy, and manufacturing – can be both advanced and compromised by biotechnology. These are no longer just scientific achievements; they are matters of national security, economic power, and global influence.
The United States has already intensified measures to counter alleged intellectual property (IP) theft by China. For example, the BIOSECURE Act aims to prohibit entities receiving U.S. federal funds from collaborating with specific foreign biotechnology companies (primarily Chinese) deemed affiliated with the People's Liberation Army or posing national security risks, including the potential disclosure of sensitive genetic data. U.S. intelligence, through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), has also issued repeated warnings, stating that Beijing is accelerating its scientific and technological development, partly through intellectual property theft. Despite these measures, experts believe it's no longer enough.
Reflection
How would the global balance of power shift if China mastered biological technologies capable of drastically extending human life or enhancing cognitive abilities?
In the biotechnology era, who will control biological intellectual property – from sustainable energy solutions to advanced agriculture – which promises to be as vital in the 21st century as fossil fuels were in the 20th?
What global security implications would arise if an adversary developed and deployed pathogens against the West?
Synthetic Biology: A New Frontier with Dual Use
Synthetic biology is a rapidly growing field with the potential to revolutionize sectors like food, agriculture, medicine, and energy. Leading companies such as Ginkgo Bioworks predict that one day it will be able to reproduce "virtually any physical good." An immediate application of synthetic biology was the development of vaccines and test kits during the Covid-19 pandemic. While these advancements will benefit global consumers, the greatest advantage will go to countries that secure leadership, bringing economic gains, increased job opportunities, and a leading role in the global governance of synthetic biology. However, leadership in this sector carries significant national security implications: from the development of new materials with military applications to the possible creation of more virulent biological weapons. U.S. scientists acknowledge that, while the United States remains the global leader in synthetic biology, its advantage is diminishing due to China's rapid progress. Jason Kelly, CEO of Ginkgo Bioworks, stated that China's BGI, the world's largest genomics company, has now reached parity with U.S. companies in gene sequencing.
Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence: The Chinese Accelerating Factor
China's recent success in fundamental biotechnological capabilities, including AI-driven drug discovery platforms and biomanufacturing, indicates it could soon surpass the United States. Artificial intelligence is accelerating this tipping point. Using tools like Google's DeepMind's AlphaFold, scientists have predicted hundreds of millions of complex 3D protein structures, providing a deeper understanding of biology in drastically reduced timeframes (what once took months or even years can now be done in a weekend). Thanks to AI, along with gene editing tools like CRISPR, scientists will soon be able to create materials from scratch, prevent diseases at the genetic code level, and develop more resilient crops and livestock.
China will likely follow the same strategy with biotechnology that it has adopted with other strategic technologies: first, it steals; then, it expands; once it conquers the market, it strangles it. An example was China's block of U.S. access to gallium and germanium at the end of 2024, jeopardizing U.S. semiconductor production with significant economic risk. However, the economic risk of losing the biotechnology competition is much greater, and if that happens, the United States may never be able to catch up with Beijing. Time is running out; we're talking about just a few more years.
China's Power in AI-Driven Biotechnology
While the United States' advantage was once considered unassailable, China has emerged as a power in AI-driven biotechnology. For instance, the CEO of Chinese tech giant Baidu also founded BioMap, a life science and AI company with offices in Beijing, Suzhou, Hong Kong, and Palo Alto. BioMap announced the first life science AI foundational model to reach over 100 billion parameters, calling it the largest of its kind. In 2024, BioMap signed an agreement with the Hong Kong Investment Corporation, a government-owned fund, to launch a bio-computing innovation acceleration program in Hong Kong, aiming to develop the local biotechnology ecosystem. This and other biotech companies use AI to design biological products, then collaborate with China's leading biotechnology manufacturer, WuXi AppTec, to produce them at scale across its global network of facilities. WuXi AppTec, which has allegedly transferred U.S. intellectual property to the Chinese government, produces essential ingredients for widely used drugs treating leukemia, lymphoma, obesity, and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The integration of AI into biotechnology is a fundamental driver of China's strategy to become a scientific and technological superpower. With massive investments, extensive data availability, and strong government support, China is reshaping the landscape of drug discovery, diagnostics, and healthcare globally.
Strategy, Investments, and Implications Under Xi Jinping: A Detailed Summary
In recent years, China has embarked on an ambitious transformation, evolving from a low-cost global manufacturing power to an innovative leader in high-value-added sectors. Among these, biotechnology emerges as a strategic battleground and a fundamental pillar of Beijing's ambitions under President Xi Jinping. The goal is not only to achieve self-sufficiency but to dominate the global landscape of biotechnology research and development. The driving force behind this rapid ascent is a long-term strategic vision, integrated into national plans that outline directions and investments. The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) plan, launched in 2015, identified biotechnology as one of the ten key sectors where China must achieve global leadership. It's not just about producing more, but about producing better: the emphasis is on quality, innovation, and the creation of internationally recognized Chinese brands, with the aim of reducing reliance on foreign technologies and products and establishing China as an innovation hub. Biotechnology is consistently present as a priority sector in China's Five-Year Plans; for example, the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) focused on modernizing agriculture through biotechnologies and developing innovative drugs, while the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) further reinforced this direction, promoting industrial biotechnologies for innovation in agriculture, energy, and manufacturing, and pushing for the integration of biotechnology and artificial intelligence. In particular, the 14th Chinese Five-Year Plan listed biotechnology, including synthetic biology, as one of seven science and technology fields where the CCP will concentrate resources and strategic planning. According to some estimates, China's central, provincial, and local governments have collectively invested over $100 billion in research and development (R&D) in the life sciences field. Government support has also been essential for some of China's leading synthetic biology companies, including BGI, which received substantial regulatory support from the government shortly after its founding in 1999 and continues to receive subsidies.
These plans are not mere declarations of intent but detailed roadmaps with measurable goals and allocated resources. The real driver behind China's biotechnological growth is the impressive flow of capital and direct government support. China has dramatically increased its R&D spending, even surpassing the United States in some sectors in terms of volume, with massive funds allocated to basic research, the establishment of cutting-edge laboratories, and the support of innovative projects in both public and private sectors. The country has created a dense network of dedicated biotechnology zones (e.g., Shanghai Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park, Wuhan Bio-City), which offer a favorable ecosystem: tax incentives, first-rate infrastructure, business incubators, and access to skilled talent, acting as catalysts for innovation and attracting domestic and international companies. One of the main pillars of China's strategy is the "recalling" of Chinese scientists and researchers who have studied or worked abroad, known as "sea turtles" (海归, hǎiguī), through programs like the "Thousand Talents Plan" that offer advantageous economic conditions, prestigious academic positions, and research funding, facilitating knowledge transfer and accelerating internal innovation.
China's commitment is reflected in concrete progress and areas of specialization. China is a pioneer in the application of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, boasting the highest number of ongoing clinical trials worldwide that use CRISPR to treat diseases such as cancer (e.g., multiple myeloma, esophageal cancer) and HIV; despite ethical controversies (such as the "CRISPR baby" case), China has demonstrated remarkable speed in translating basic research into clinical applications. With its vast population, China is accumulating enormous genetic databases, fundamental for the development of precision medicine, with substantial investments in genomics, bioinformatics, and personalized drug development, and companies like BGI (Beijing Genomics Institute) among the largest genomic sequencing organizations in the world. While historically China has dominated in generic drug production, there's a strong push towards the research and development of innovative and biological drugs, with Chinese pharmaceutical companies gaining market share and international recognition, and a growing number of new molecular entities and biologics in clinical development. Food security is a national priority, and China is investing heavily in research on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and crop genetic improvement technologies to increase yield, pest resistance, and stress tolerance, aiming to reduce reliance on agricultural imports. There's a growing interest in integrating Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) with modern biotechnologies, with research focusing on the identification, characterization, and scientific validation of bioactive compounds found in traditional herbs and formulations, with the goal of developing new drugs based on ancient principles. Finally, China is emerging as a competitive player in the advanced medical device sector, from diagnostic imaging systems to robotic surgical equipment, with its enormous pool of engineers and government support fueling this growth.
Acquisition of Foreign Intellectual Property and Security Implications
As part of China's efforts to become a global leader in the sector, Chinese companies and researchers have also sought access to foreign expertise. Beijing has long been adept at acquiring intellectual property abroad, both through legal channels (like mergers and acquisitions) and illegal ones (like theft). In some cases, foreign company acquisitions by Chinese companies have led to significant advancements in Beijing's synthetic biology capabilities. In 2017, ChemChina, a state-owned company, acquired Syngenta, a Swiss agrochemical company, for $43 billion; it was China's largest acquisition of a foreign company ever.
Beijing knows how to leverage intellectual property acquired abroad through state-backed entities. It has happened that a multinational invented a key drug, a Chinese national champion like WuXi AppTec expanded through acquisition, and the CCP can now control the global supply chain. China achieved this milestone through massive investments in its domestic biotechnology sector, including a 400-fold increase in R&D spending in the biopharmaceutical sector over the last decade. National champions like WuXi AppTec have greatly benefited from this type of government support. With 38,000 employees and nearly $6 billion in revenue in 2023, WuXi AppTec has become the biotechnology equivalent of Huawei. In 2024, an industry trade group surveyed U.S. biopharmaceutical companies and found that 79% of these companies depend on WuXi AppTec and other China-based companies for at least part of their manufacturing. With advances in precision medicine, such dependence is likely to only increase.
In June 2024, the U.S. government called for an investigation into Chinese biotechnology companies, including GenScript Biotechnology Co. and its affiliates, due to national security concerns and the potential transfer of U.S. intellectual property to China. The U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition expressed concerns that GenScript might disclose U.S. intellectual property to China.
In November 2024, Canada discovered that the Beijing government and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) managed to penetrate a maximum-security laboratory, the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg with biosafety level 4, which handles the world's most dangerous viruses and pathogens. According to allegations, "Not only was sensitive information and materials transferred to regime-run labs in Beijing, but government scientists were also secretly collaborating with top PRC military officials in biotechnology, biological weapons, and bioterrorism."
Biotechnology as a CCP Weapon and Genomic Data
According to official U.S. sources, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will use biotechnology as a weapon. China is already using genomic surveillance to identify, track, and control Uyghur Muslims, part of a vast system of genocide perpetrated through technology. The Chinese government has long prioritized collecting human genomic data. A 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimated that Beijing possesses genomic data for 140 million people, the largest dataset of its kind in the world. In addition to its own citizens, it has also collected human genomic data abroad. In 2018, an apparently unscrupulous Chinese scientist produced genetically modified babies, and after being briefly imprisoned, he has already returned to the laboratory. Now, with its military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, the CCP aims to use biotechnology-based troops (calling this human-machine collaboration "intelligent warfare") to make the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a "world-class army" by 2049. Drone warfare will seem bizarre if, in a few years, we face genetically modified PLA super-soldiers, with human and artificial intelligence fused together.
Restrictions on Investing in China and Lack of Reciprocity
While Beijing places strict limitations on sharing Chinese health data with foreign companies or researchers, Chinese entities have gained access to health data in many countries, including the United States, through investments in companies like 23andMe, sales of gene sequencing equipment and services, and partnerships with universities and hospitals. China does not offer reciprocity. In fact, its regulations on human genetic resources prohibit foreigners from collecting, storing, using, transferring, or exporting human biological samples obtained in China. Conversely, all foreign entities are obligated to initiate a collaboration with a Chinese partner, and such collaboration must be approved by the Office of Human Genetic Resources Administration, which is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology. While many countries regulate access to citizens' medical data and genetic information, Chinese regulations are significantly more stringent and involve greater procedural hurdles, and international researchers have expressed concern that these limits risk slowing down scientific research.
What to Do? The Need for a Western Awakening
To slow China's progress, the West needs to open its eyes to Beijing's biotechnological ambitions. It's crucial to defend intellectual property and biotechnological data from state-sponsored Chinese corporate espionage, even if it means rejecting an enticing investment. Chinese state-owned companies can no longer be treated as ordinary competitors in the domestic market, even if it means resorting to more expensive alternatives.
Final Recommendations: The West's Response to China's Biotech Challenge
The preceding analysis has outlined the speed and depth of China's advancements in biotechnology, driven by massive state investments and integration with artificial intelligence. The implications for world order, security, and the economy are profound and demand a strategic and cohesive response from the West. Merely acknowledging the threat is no longer enough; it's imperative to act decisively and with foresight.
Here are the final recommendations for addressing the Chinese biotechnology challenge, with a specific focus on how private companies can protect themselves in this complex environment.
1. Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection and Sensitive Data Security
IP theft and unauthorized access to sensitive data, particularly genetic information, remain critical threats. Since 2015, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under General Secretary Xi Jinping, has enacted and integrated various laws and regulations concerning national security, cybersecurity, and data privacy. These measures significantly broaden government surveillance over domestic and foreign companies (including Italian ones) operating in China. Beijing views inadequate government control over information within its borders—and its outward flows—as a national security risk.
General Risk Framework: The adoption of these regulations presents several risks:
They provide the government with a broader legal basis for accessing and controlling data held by foreign companies in China.
Such companies may face sanctions for engaging in traditional commercial activities now deemed espionage by Beijing, or for conduct perceived as assisting foreign sanctions against China.
This regulatory framework can compel Chinese citizens employed locally by foreign companies (including Italian ones) to aid the CCP's intelligence efforts.
Laws and Their Implications:
UPDATE TO THE ANTI-ESPIONAGE LAW (2023): Promulgated on April 26, 2023, and effective July 1, 2023, this revised law significantly expands the scope of espionage. It notably introduces an erga omnes obligation to cooperate with state intelligence, even for entities (citizens, businesses, organizations, etc.) residing outside national borders. This means all individuals and legal entities affected by the Anti-Espionage Law become a potential extension of Chinese state intelligence. The law's broad and vague definition of "national security interests" and related "documents, data, materials, or objects" creates significant legal uncertainty for foreign companies, journalists, academics, and researchers, as virtually any information could be deemed relevant to national security.
CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY REPORTING LAW (2021): Effective July 2021, the "Regulations on the Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products" impose stricter rules for disclosing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in China. These include restrictions on researchers publicly revealing bug details before a vendor can issue fixes, and mandatory disclosure of bug details to state authorities within two days of reporting. This regulation allows Chinese authorities to potentially exploit system flaws before they are publicly known. It also warns of penalties for non-compliant vendors, vulnerability collection platforms, and researchers who abuse unpatched vulnerabilities.
PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION LAW (PIPL) (2021): Effective November 1, 2021, the PIPL codifies privacy rights for Chinese citizens. It obliges domestic and foreign companies (including Italian ones) to comply with its provisions. While seemingly similar to the EU's GDPR, its ambiguities and extraterritorial scope, rooted in national security interests, could make it a much stricter data privacy law. It limits companies' ability to collect and retain personal data in China and authorizes the Chinese government to collect personal data for actions deemed to be in the public interest.
ANTI-FOREIGN SANCTIONS LAW (2021): Approved on June 10, 2021, the AFSL signals China's willingness to counteract foreign sanctions. It authorizes Beijing to take action against individuals or entities that implement or assist foreign sanctions against China. The law's broad definition of "assistance" creates uncertainty for foreign companies, potentially forcing them to comply with Chinese regulations over those of their home country, risking legal repercussions.
DATA SECURITY LAW (DSL) (2021): The DSL establishes a framework for classifying data collected and stored in China based on its potential impact on Chinese national security, regulating its storage and transfer accordingly. Violations carry financial penalties, business suspension, and license revocation. The law expands the CCP's access and control over companies and data within China, increases China's ability to control outward data flows, and imposes stricter penalties on China-based enterprises (including Italian ones) for non-compliance.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LAW (NIL) (2017): Adopted in 2017, the NIL mandates that all Chinese organizations and citizens collaborate with the government on security matters. Its broad applicability means that all Chinese group subsidiaries, even those outside China, could be subject to the NIL. It also applies to all types of companies established in China, regardless of ownership, and to all Chinese citizens, potentially even when residing outside China. This law creates "affirmative" legal obligations for companies and individuals to provide access to or cooperate with Chinese intelligence agencies, potentially compelling locally hired Chinese citizens in foreign companies to assist in intelligence efforts.
CYBERSECURITY LAW (CSL) (2017): Promulgated on November 7, 2016, and effective June 1, 2017, the CSL aims to establish a uniform cybersecurity and data protection regime in China. It imposes basic data protection and cybersecurity obligations on network operators, provides a regulatory framework for critical information infrastructure (CII) operators, establishes a cybersecurity review mechanism for network products and services that could risk national security, and mandates pre-sale certification requirements for critical network equipment. The law also requires data collected within network operations to be protected and stipulates a wide range of penalties for non-compliant companies. A key implication is the requirement for companies, including foreign ones operating in unspecified "critical sectors," to localize certain types of data within Chinese borders and make it accessible to intelligence services.
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2015): Adopted on July 1, 2015, this law states that "security" must be maintained across all fields, from culture to education to cyberspace, centralizing national security control under a specific agency. It obliges all Chinese citizens and private organizations to assist the central government and intelligence services on security matters when ordered. This can compel locally hired Chinese citizens within foreign companies (including Italian ones) to assist in investigations that might expose operational elements of foreign companies and/or citizens.
For Private Companies (Enhanced Protection):
Deep Due Diligence on Partners: Conduct extremely thorough due diligence on all potential partners, investors, and suppliers, particularly those based in or linked to China. This must go beyond financial checks to include their governmental affiliations, track record on IP, and compliance with Chinese national security laws.
Geographic IP Strategy (Excluding China for Sensitive IP): Instead of registering sensitive patents and core trade secrets in China, focus on securing and rigorously defending IP in jurisdictions that offer robust legal protections and where your core markets reside. For critical, proprietary technologies, consider if operating or holding IP in China is an acceptable risk given the legislative landscape.
Robust Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) and Contracts: Utilize detailed, legally binding NDAs and comprehensive contracts for all external collaborations (suppliers, research partners, employees, consultants). Ensure these agreements explicitly address IP ownership and data handling, and seek legal counsel on their enforceability in relevant jurisdictions outside of China.
Advanced Cybersecurity and Data Segmentation: Implement state-of-the-art cybersecurity measures, including advanced encryption for sensitive data, multi-factor authentication, continuous threat monitoring, and regular backups. Critically, segment data infrastructure, ensuring that highly sensitive R&D, strategic IP, and personal data of non-Chinese citizens are stored on servers outside of China and are not accessible from within the country's networks. Train all staff on the risks of phishing, social engineering, and state-sponsored cyber-espionage.
Strict Internal Access Controls and Employee Screening: Limit access to sensitive information to only strictly necessary personnel. Implement rigorous background checks for employees, particularly those with access to IP or data, and regularly review their access privileges. Educate staff on the implications of Chinese national security laws and the potential for forced cooperation.
Resilient Supply Chain Diversification: Actively work to reduce reliance on single-source suppliers in China for critical components, APIs, reagents, and biotech equipment. Diversify your supply chain through partnerships with trusted entities in allied countries to mitigate risks of disruption or coercive measures.
Legal Counsel and Risk Assessments: Regularly consult with legal experts specializing in Chinese law and international IP law to understand the evolving regulatory landscape and its specific implications for your business. Conduct periodic risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities and adapt your protection strategies.
2. Promote Domestic Innovation and Strategic Self-Sufficiency
To compete effectively, the West cannot merely defend itself; it must accelerate its own innovative capacity.
Massive R&D Investments: Governments must significantly increase public funding for basic and applied research in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and AI, focusing on areas with high dual-use potential (civilian and military). Creating a robust and diverse research ecosystem is fundamental.
Talent Training and Retention: Invest in training skilled scientists, engineers, and bioinformaticians. Create conditions that attract and retain top talent, preventing "brain drain" to rival nations.
Develop Resilient Supply Chains: Reduce reliance on foreign manufacturers, particularly Chinese ones, for critical active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), reagents, materials, and biotech equipment. Incentivize domestic production and diversify supply sources through partnerships with allied countries.
Foster Academic and Industrial Collaboration: Encourage the creation of centers of excellence, public-private partnerships, and research consortia that can accelerate the translation of scientific discoveries into concrete applications.
3. Recalibrate Economic Relations and Partnerships
A more critical and strategic approach to economic interactions with China in the biotechnology sector is necessary.
Review Inbound and Outbound Investments: Implement more stringent screening mechanisms for Chinese investments in Western biotech companies, especially those that develop critical or dual-use technologies. Simultaneously, assess the risks associated with Western investments in China, particularly when these could inadvertently contribute to Beijing's military or surveillance capabilities.
Principle of Reciprocity: Demand genuine reciprocity in market access, data sharing, and scientific collaborations. If China imposes severe restrictions on foreign operators, Western countries should consider similar measures to protect their own interests.
Collaboration with Allied Countries: Strengthen alliances with nations that share the same democratic values and strategic interests in the biotechnology sector. Share intelligence, coordinate R&D policies, and harmonize regulations to create a united front.
4. Address Ethical and Biosecurity Implications
The acceleration of biotechnologies requires a robust ethical and biosecurity framework, essential for maintaining public trust.
Develop Global Ethical Standards: Promote international discussion and the adoption of stringent ethical standards for human genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and the use of AI in biology.
Strengthen Biosecurity and Biodefense: Invest in the prevention, rapid detection, and response to potential biological threats, whether natural, accidental, or malicious. This includes developing rapid vaccines and therapies, and enhancing pandemic early warning systems.
Transparency and Accountability: Encourage transparency in research and development, especially in areas with potential dual-use implications, and promote accountability for the ethical use of technologies.
The biotechnology competition is no longer a distant concern but a reality that is redefining global power. Ignoring or underestimating it would mean ceding a decisive strategic advantage to an adversary that has demonstrated the will to exploit these technologies for its own purposes. The time to act is now, both at the governmental level and for individual private companies.
Final Thoughts: Given the intricate web of national security laws in China and the escalating global competition, what are the most critical steps Western governments and private biotech firms must take in the next 12-24 months to safeguard their innovation and strategic advantage?
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