Not Just Europe: Croatia Insists on Police Cooperation, Yet Another Beijing Pawn in Its Global Design - When Will States Realize It's a Dangerous Deception?

The persistent dispatch of Chinese police officers to countries like Croatia for "joint patrols," such as the one that took place in July 2025 (and before), is yet another brazen evidence of a global infiltration strategy by Beijing, far beyond mere cooperation. These seemingly innocuous agreements conceal a network of clandestine "police stations" and transnational spying operations and repression of dissent. While China shamelessly denies it, the U.S. is already running for cover with concrete indictments (such as those in Manhattan) and proposed legislation to impose sanctions and restrictions to counter such abuses, buoyed by the shocking revelations of former spies. On the contrary, states that sign such understandings demonstrate a dangerous and inexcusable strategic blindness, becoming complicit with a regime that aims to project its authoritarian control globally. This undermines the sovereignty and rule of law of others. It is a clear and present threat that governments must recognize and counter as a matter of urgency, before the price they pay is the loss of their own freedoms.

The image presented is one of friendly cooperation, of joint patrols aimed at tourist safety. The reality, however, is far more sinister. The deployment, on July 16, of a team of eight Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) agents to Croatia for a month-long joint patrol, far from being a harmless exchange, is yet another blatant manifestation of Beijing's aggressive and unacceptable global expansion of policing activities. This isn't cooperation; it's infiltration. While the MPS cynically attempts to brand these operations as a "vivid demonstration of friendship" and a guarantee of safety for Chinese tourists, the true objective is the projection of authoritarian influence that tramples on the sovereignty of host nations.

There's no reciprocal advantage, no equitable gain for the states that enter into these agreements; the benefit is almost exclusively Beijing's, as it consolidates its global control and interests. Governments that accept such agreements assume unacceptable risks to their national security, opening the door to a subtle and pervasive threat. These activities not only facilitate the transnational repression of dissent—an aberrant practice widely denounced by the NGO Safeguard Defenders as early as 2022, which revealed the existence of over 100 unofficial Chinese "police stations" abroad—but also throw wide open the doors to systematic espionage operations. This is an inherent and inescapable danger, considering Chinese laws that compel every citizen to collaborate with the state intelligence apparatus. Despite overwhelming evidence and growing international condemnations, an alarming number of states, including European Union members, persist in signing or maintaining agreements with Chinese law enforcement, revealing a worrying strategic blindness and irresponsible conduct that borders on complicity.

Chinese "Police Service Stations" Abroad: A Trojan Horse for Transnational Repression and Espionage

Between 2016 and 2022, four local Chinese public security bureaus reportedly established as many as 102 "police service stations" in 53 countries across North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. These stations, presented as tools to provide administrative services to Chinese citizens abroad, have been the subject of investigations by authorities in numerous countries, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, following reports from the NGO Safeguard Defenders. These concerns have been amplified by evidence of foreign interference operations and intimidation of critics of the Chinese regime abroad.

A prime example of this clandestine operation emerged in April 2023, when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted two New York residents, "Harry" Lu Jianwang, 61, and Chen Jinping, 59, on charges of operating an illegal police station in the heart of Manhattan's Chinatown on behalf of a provincial branch of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping were accused of working for the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in violation of the Espionage Act. In December 2024, Chen Jinping pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government. Lu Jianwang, however, pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial. As early as April 2023, the FBI had described the case as an example of China's "brazen activities" on U.S. soil. Although the Chinatown office presented itself as a non-profit organization supporting Chinese-Americans, federal prosecutors in Brooklyn, who handled the case, stated that it "appeared to have a more sinister use." Prosecutors declared that the secret police station was established by Chinese counter-intelligence agents to harass and intimidate dissidents residing in the United States. U.S. Attorney Breon Peace stated: "Today, a participant in a transnational repression scheme who worked to establish a secret police station in the heart of New York City on behalf of the national police force of the People's Republic of China pleaded guilty to conspiring to act as an illegal agent." He further added: "We will continue our efforts to protect the rights of vulnerable people who come to this country to escape the repressive activities of authoritarian regimes." Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen stated that "the actions of the People's Republic of China go far beyond the bounds of acceptable conduct among states," emphasizing how Beijing "established a secret physical presence in New York City to monitor and intimidate dissidents and those who criticize its government." U.S. Attorney Breon Peace reiterated that such a police station "has no place in New York City — or in any American community," highlighting the defendants' role in locating a Chinese dissident residing in the U.S. and obstructing investigations by deleting communications. The FBI confirmed that the MPS attempted to "export repression and subvert the rule of law" of the United States. Investigations revealed that Lu Jianwang had a long-standing relationship with Chinese law enforcement and that, since 2015, he had been tasked with repressive activities on U.S. soil, including participating in counter-protests during President Xi Jinping's 2015 visit and attempts to coerce fugitives to return to China, including through threats of violence. The deletion of communications between Lu, Chen, and MPS officials, discovered by the FBI, further highlighted the clandestine nature and manipulative intentions of these operations.

The unsettling inner workings of these secret police units and their modus operandi in hunting down dissidents abroad, including in Australia, were unveiled by a former spy, identified only as "Eric," in an in-depth investigation by the "Four Corners" program. Eric, who worked for 15 years (from 2008 to early 2023) as an undercover agent for the Political Security Protection Bureau, or First Bureau, of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), described this unit as "the darkest department of the Chinese government," capable of acting outside the law against those who oppose the CCP. The investigation revealed how Eric's unit operated globally to surveil, abduct, and silence party critics, particularly President Xi Jinping. Eric recounted how his superiors tasked him with hunting dissidents worldwide, using elaborate cover stories to gain their trust and lure them into countries where they could be abducted and repatriated to China. The investigation also uncovered a spying operation on Australian soil just last year and the secret return of an Australian resident to China in 2019, without the approval of local authorities. Holden Triplett, former head of the FBI's Beijing office, described the MPS as an organization that presents itself as a police force but whose primary task is to "protect the status of the party," meaning to maintain absolute control. Under Xi Jinping, this control has become even tighter, extending to monitoring and repressing anyone, both within China and in the diaspora, who might threaten the party's control.

The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS): Instruments of Control and Power Projection

To fully understand the scope and implications of this global expansion, it's crucial to know the main entities involved in China's internal security and external projection. Chinese internal security forces primarily consist of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), the PLA (People's Liberation Army), and the Militia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies on these forces to address challenges ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic issues to terrorism and natural disasters.

The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) leads the Civilian National Police, which serves as the frontline force for public order. The MPS's key mission includes internal law enforcement and "maintaining social security and order," with tasks including anti-riot and anti-terrorism operations. The MPS also oversees local police forces and handles border control. In recent years, Chinese police, under the guidance of the MPS, have conducted armed patrols and possess increasingly advanced capabilities, such as SWAT teams (for high-risk operations) and "smart city" surveillance systems.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the primary civilian intelligence and counter-intelligence service. Its missions consist of protecting national security; ensuring political and social stability; implementing the State Security Law and related laws and regulations; protecting state secrets; conducting counter-espionage and investigating organizations or individuals within China who carry out or direct, support, or assist others deemed harmful to national security. Coordinating the work of both ministries, i.e., the MPS and the MSS, is the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee, which is tasked with formulating policy proposals, overseeing the implementation of the Party's internal security agenda, and ensuring political loyalty among public security officials.

Historically, China began building its international police cooperation network with an emphasis on combating cross-border crime and internal security. As early as 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded by China and Russia, announced plans to combat cross-border drug crimes. In 2006, a joint working group was established with Russia for cooperation in border areas. In 2009, a protocol was signed with Myanmar for cooperation in border areas. The scope of this cooperation has expanded over time, including agreements with Afghanistan on police cooperation to combat cross-border crime in 2010.

A Detailed List of Countries Involved in Chinese Police Cooperation

Here is a list of countries with which China has established police cooperation agreements, with dates and current status when specified:

• Greece: Judicial assistance agreement.

• Russia: Joint working group for cooperation in border areas (2006); Agreement to cooperate on international information security, including exchange of officials and information (2017).

• Myanmar: Protocol for cooperation in border areas (2009); Commitment to strengthen law enforcement and security cooperation (2017).

• Afghanistan: Police cooperation agreement to combat cross-border crime (2010); Economic and security agreement (2012); Police and security cooperation agreement (2021).

• Jordan: Technical cooperation agreement on public security and civil defense (2012).

• South Africa: Police agreement (2012).

• Fiji: MOU on police cooperation (2012); China begins sending police officers to assist the national police force with 3-6 month rotations (2015); China sends the first police liaison officer (2022); Altered police agreement to exclude Chinese forces from operating within the Fijian force (2024). (Agreement modified)

• Croatia: Police cooperation agreement (2012); MOU on joint police patrols during tourist season (2017); First joint patrol (2017).

• Ukraine: Cooperation agreement (2012).

• Angola: Agreement to jointly combat transnational organized crime and send Chinese police officers for assistance (2012).

• Serbia: Police cooperation agreement (2012); First joint patrol with China (2018); China sends police teams to conduct joint patrol missions (2023).

• Tanzania: Police cooperation agreement (2012).

• Laos: Commitment on deeper law enforcement and security cooperation (2015).

• Switzerland: Agreement on the identification of suspected Chinese citizens with irregular stays in the country (2015).

• Cambodia: Law enforcement and security cooperation agreement (2015).

• Bulgaria: Police cooperation agreement (2016).

• Italy: First joint patrol with China (2016); Halts joint police patrols with China (2024). (Agreement terminated/suspended)

• Panama: Letter of intent for police cooperation (2017).

• Philippines: Agreement to cooperate against transnational crime (2017).

• Kazakhstan: Cross-border security cooperation, including exchange of law enforcement officers (2017).

• Argentina: Agreement for the purchase and expansion of cooperation on police technologies (2017).

• Mongolia: Law enforcement and security cooperation agreement (2018).

• Tajikistan: Law enforcement cooperation agreement (2021).

• Egypt: Law enforcement agreement (2021).

• Bangladesh: Law enforcement training agreement, establishment of a joint working group, and exchange letter on police equipment (2021).

• Vietnam: Law enforcement cooperation agreement (2021).

• Ecuador: Police cooperation agreement (2021); Agreement to build and equip 106 community police units (2021).

• India: Commitment to strengthen law enforcement and security cooperation (2021).

• Kiribati: Requests police assistance from China (2022).

• Solomon Islands: Nine Chinese police liaison officers arrive to train police in anti-riot strategies (2022); Allows Chinese police officers to be stationed on the Islands (2023).

• Ethiopia: Ethiopia-China Law Enforcement Cooperation Center established (2023).

• Hungary: Police cooperation agreement (2024).

• Uzbekistan: Enhanced security cooperation agreement (2024).

Controversies and International Reactions: Clandestine "Police Stations" and Dangers to Democracy

The expansion of China's global police presence has raised increasing concerns. In 2022, an investigation by the NGO Safeguard Defenders revealed that China had established over 100 unofficial "police stations" abroad. These centers, which ostensibly serve as administrative support for Chinese communities, have been accused of being involved in illegal transnational repression of dissent against Beijing. The purpose of the presence of Chinese police stations abroad is twofold: China intends to protect its overseas investments while safeguarding its political interests through influence on local law enforcement. These clandestine operations undermine the principles of sovereignty and the rule of law, and have generated international alarm.

Many countries are concerned about the role these stations play in transnational repression. In 2022, a Chinese dissident in the Netherlands reported receiving a call from service station personnel asking him to return to China. This and other cases indicate that some stations are involved in "persuade to return" operations, where police and prosecutors in China convince or threaten suspects abroad to return to China to face trial, often without the cooperation of host states. A Safeguard Defenders report indicates another case where Qingtian prosecutors and police collaborated with a Madrid station to convince a fugitive in Spain, wanted for pollution-related offenses, to return to China. The Dutch and Spanish cases suggest that some stations are collaborating with Chinese law enforcement to intimidat Chinese people abroad.

To further counter these threats, in March 2025 Representative Ashley Hinson (R-IA) and Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) introduced the Expel Illegal Chinese Police Act of 2025 (HR2127/S.49). This pending legislation aims to impose financial sanctions and visa restrictions on entities and individuals who operate Chinese police stations in the United States, including Chinese law enforcement officials and individuals associated with the United Front Work Department and their family members. The bill is co-sponsored by the Chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, John Moolenaar (R-MI), who reiterated how these stations represent "a direct threat to our national security and undermine the rule of law in the United States," while Senator Cotton added that "no foreign government has the right to operate secret police stations on American soil," emphasizing how the CCP's actions "undermine international norms and human rights."

Despite international reactions, the picture remains unclear. Although some countries have acted to close these clandestine locations, it's not entirely clear how many of the 102 identified stations are still operational. China, for its part, has often denied their existence or redefined them as mere administrative "service centers," claiming that, following the COVID-19 pandemic, many operations were moved online to mask their true nature. The same opacity characterizes information about the personnel at these locations: it's not always clear who runs them, whether the personnel are paid, and what their actual involvement in police activities is. This reticence is also evident in cases where individuals associated with these stations have denied their involvement or even filed lawsuits against investigative authorities, as happened in Canada, further complicating efforts to shed light on these networks.

However, it would be naive to believe that merely closing these stations solves the root problem. Chinese transnational repression is a far broader and more structured phenomenon. Beijing has a documented history of harassing and intimidating Chinese citizens and diaspora members abroad, including activists, human rights lawyers, protestors, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and students. Many of these operations occur independently of the service stations, including through sophisticated digital forms. Therefore, even if the last of these stations were to be closed, Beijing's persistent threat to its critics and to the sovereignty of others would remain intact.

To effectively counter this foreign interference, robust legal instruments are needed, such as foreign agent registries, already adopted in the United States and Australia and in the process of being created in Canada. However, their effectiveness depends on rigorous oversight, adequate funding, and competent personnel capable of identifying interference without resorting to racial profiling. Democracies cannot afford to underestimate the threat. A multi-faceted and evidence-based policy approach is essential. Governments must prioritize gaining the trust of victims of Chinese state intimidation, whose reports have too often been ignored. This requires targeted training for law enforcement, immigration authorities, and intelligence agencies to recognize and effectively respond to the threat of transnational repression, including its digital forms. Governments should also collaborate with affected communities to provide support to victims, including information on how to document cases of transnational repression. Only through such incisive measures will democratic states be able to demonstrate their firm resolve in the face of Beijing's aggressive campaigns of foreign interference and transnational repression.