Revival of the Algerian port of El-Hamdania: China's relentless expansion in North Africa and the risks for the Mediterranean

The recent revival of the El-Hamdania megaport project in Algeria is just the starting point for a broader and more ruthless Chinese strategy. Beijing's advance in North Africa, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and the doctrine of “civil-military fusion,” aims to establish “strategic footholds” that combine economic control with military potential. Engagement in projects such as the port of Tobruk in Libya and concessions in Egypt give China direct leverage over the Mediterranean, posing serious risks to the sovereignty and security of regional nations. The overall picture reveals the inaction and failure of Western policies, which are unable to counter this unstoppable advance

Algeria has recently restarted the project to build the El-Hamdania megaport in Cherchell, a move that symbolizes the country's ambition to consolidate its economic sovereignty and reposition itself as a key commercial hub in the Mediterranean. Built in partnership with the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), this project is not an isolated event but the latest piece in an unstoppable Chinese strategy to weave a port network that merges economic and military interests throughout North Africa. With a total of 231 commercial ports in Africa, Chinese companies are present in over a third of the continent's maritime trade hubs. This is a significantly greater presence than anywhere else in the world; for comparison, Latin America and the Caribbean host 10 Chinese-built or operated ports, while Asian countries host 24.

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This expansion is based on a geostrategic logic defined by the Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China's strategic priorities for foreign ports are outlined in its Five-Year Plans. The current plan speaks of a "connectivity framework of six corridors, six routes, and multiple countries and ports" to promote the Belt and Road's construction. Specifically, three of these six corridors pass through Africa, touching East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia. China's focus on African port development has been facilitated by the "Go Out" strategy (外展策略 走出去战略), a government initiative that provides state support, including substantial subsidies, to state-owned companies to conquer new markets, especially in developing countries.

The Strategic Vector of North Africa: Geopolitics and Control

North Africa is a front of primary importance for China, given its crucial position between Europe and the rest of the continent. China's interest is not limited to individual concessions but aims to create a corridor of influence and control that crosses the entire southern Mediterranean. The Five-Year Plan articulates a vision to transform China into a "strong maritime country." A term that frequently appears in Chinese strategic analyses is "overseas strategic strongpoint" (海外战略要地), which refers to foreign ports with particular strategic and economic value.

• Algeria: The El-Hamdania project, with an estimated cost of between $3.5 and $5.1 billion, will be Algeria's first deep-water port. With a capacity of 25 million tons of goods per year, it aims to reduce dependence on European hubs like Tangier and Valencia. However, Algeria risks creating a new strategic dependence on China. The control of such a crucial infrastructure raises questions about the risks of control and potential use for intelligence purposes. Ports in Algiers and Oran also indicate Chinese expansion.

• Libya: China has intensified its commitment in Libya, exploiting the country's fragmentation to position the port of Tobruk, controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, as an essential pillar of the BRI. China's interest goes beyond commerce: Beijing proposes a $10 billion refinery, an integrated logistics hub, and the upgrading of the Al-Adem airport for dual civilian and military use. These projects reflect the "civil-military fusion" (军民融合) doctrine and represent a direct threat to Europe's energy security and geopolitical autonomy.

• Egypt: Egypt is a key element, with the Suez region identified as one of the Five-Year Plan's priority maritime corridors. A striking example of the civil-military fusion strategy is the 38-year concession that the state-owned Chinese company Hutchison Ports obtained from the Egyptian Navy to manage a terminal at the Abu Qir naval base. Chinese expansion is also present in the ports of Alexandria, El Dekheila, and Port Said.

• Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania: Morocco, strategic between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, is also part of China's power projection. The PLA Navy has made port calls in Casablanca, highlighting China's ability to use civilian infrastructure to support its presence. Chinese expansion is also indicated in the port of Tanger-Mediterranean. Tunisia is mentioned in the Chinese Five-Year Plan as part of a BRI corridor, with the ports of La Goulette and Rades indicating expansion. Similarly, Chinese expansion is present in the Mauritanian ports of Nouadhibou and Nouakchott.

The Chinese Port Network in Africa: Economics and Military Security

Chinese companies dominate the entire port development, from finance to construction, management, and equity ownership. Large conglomerates like the China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) and its subsidiary China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) win contracts as main contractors and award subcontracts. This is the case with the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria: CHEC handled construction, obtained funding from the China Development Bank (CDB), and acquired a 54% stake in the port, which it manages under a 16-year lease. China earns up to $13 in commercial revenue for every dollar invested in ports. A company that holds a concession contract can control access, determine pier assignments, and offer preferential rates, raising clear concerns about sovereignty and security. Chinese companies hold operational concessions in 10 African ports. The trend to privatize to improve efficiency has favored this scenario, as delays in African ports are estimated to increase handling costs by 50% compared to global rates.

The Chinese advance is further strengthened by a growing military projection. The development of the port of Doraleh, in Djibouti, long publicized as a purely commercial initiative, was expanded in 2017 to host the first Chinese overseas naval base. It is widely speculated that China could replicate this model. Of the 78 ports with Chinese involvement, 36 have hosted port calls or military exercises by the PLA.

PLA Navy Port Calls:

• North Africa: Casablanca (Morocco).

• Rest of Africa: Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Gentil (Gabon), Tamatave (Madagascar), Maputo (Mozambique), Tincan (Nigeria), Pointe-Noire (Republic of the Congo), Victoria (Seychelles), Durban (South Africa), and Simon's Town (South Africa).

PLA Military Exercises:

• East Africa: Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Doraleh (Djibouti).

• West Africa: Lagos (Nigeria), Durban (South Africa).

African Ports with Chinese Involvement

• North Africa:

  • Algeria: Algiers, El Hamdania, Oran.

  • Egypt: Abu Qir (Naval base), Alexandria, El Dekheila, Port Said.

  • Morocco: Tanger-Mediterranean, Casablanca.

  • Mauritania: Nouadhibou, Nouakchott.

  • Tunisia: La Goulette, Rades.

• Rest of Africa:

  • West Africa: Angola (Luanda, Lobito, Namibe, Cabinda), Cabo Verde (Mindelo, Alto Do Bandim), Cameroon (Douala, Kribi, Lolabé), Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan), Gambia (Banjul), Gabon (Gentil, Libreville, Owendo), Ghana (Atuabo, Takoradi, Jamestown, Tema), Guinea (Conakry, Kamsar), Guinea-Bissau (N'diago), Equatorial Guinea (Bata, Fernão Dias), Liberia (Black Johnson Port), Nigeria (Akwa Ibom, Bakassi, Calabar, Gelegele, Apapa/Lagos, Tincan Island, Lekki), Republic of the Congo (Pointe Noire), São Tomé and Príncipe (Mole), Senegal (Saint Louis), Sierra Leone (Freetown, Pepel), Togo (Lomé).

  • East Africa: Comoros (Multiple ports), Djibouti (Damerjog, Djibouti City, Doraleh, Ghoubet, Tadjourah), Eritrea (Massawa, Sheikh Ibrahim, Haidob), Kenya (Lamu, Mombasa), Madagascar (Antsiranana, Ambodifotatra, Tamatave), Seychelles (Victoria), Somalia (Multiple ports), Sudan (Port Sudan), Tanzania (Tanga, Bagamoyo, Maruhubi, Dar es Salaam, Mtwara).

  • Southern Africa: Mauritius (Port Louis), Mozambique (Beira, Gaza, Maputo), Namibia (Walvis Bay), South Africa (Richards Bay, Durban, Simon's Town).

Western Responsibilities: Geopolitics and Inaction

Western policies have so far proven insufficient and a failure in containing this advance, which continues to reshape global supply chains and trade flows. The absence of a cohesive policy and Europe's internal fragmentation have created a vacuum that Beijing is ready to fill. Public discussions rarely address the sovereignty or security aspects of these port developments. This scenario highlights a lack of political will on the part of Western powers and the countries bordering the Mediterranean to act proactively to safeguard their interests.