Submarine Connectivity in Europe: A Delicate Balance between Development, Market, and National Security
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 16 giu
- Tempo di lettura: 12 min
The European regulator recently published an in-depth analysis on the state of domestic networks in Europe, highlighting emerging challenges in a landscape of increasing international connectivity. In this context, particular attention has been focused on the crucial importance of submarine cables, true pillars of global connectivity. At the core of concerns is the need to balance infrastructural development with the protection of competition, preventing a few large operators from monopolizing essential infrastructure.
The BEREC Report on Submarine Cable Connectivity in Europe
The BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications) has conducted a detailed analysis of submarine cable connectivity in Europe, recognizing its crucial importance for the resilience and security of the continent's digital infrastructure.
The latest and most relevant document currently under public consultation is the "Draft BEREC Report on submarine cables connectivity in Europe", approved during BEREC's 63rd plenary meeting on June 5, 2025. This report specifically focuses on domestic submarine cables in BEREC member countries.
The report provides a comprehensive overview of domestic submarine cable connectivity in Europe. Domestic fiber optic submarine cable networks, an integral part of the global electronic communication network (ECN) infrastructure, are fundamental to the world economy. They play a key role in maintaining a robust global network infrastructure that supports the seamless functioning of the internet and electronic communication services (ECS), essential for, among other things, scientific cooperation, territorial cohesion, and digital inclusiveness. For its drafting, BEREC collected detailed information from its members through a dedicated questionnaire.
Distribution and Regulation of Domestic Submarine Cables
Data collected by BEREC shows that out of 27 countries with direct access to the sea, only 15 have submarine cable segments connecting national cable landing stations (CLS). These 15 countries have a total of 323 operational domestic submarine cables. The length of these segments varies significantly: from less than 1 km, for short connections like those between nearby islands or straits, to over 1,500 km, as in the case of cables connecting the Azores archipelago to mainland Portugal, the Canary Islands to Spain, or French overseas territories to mainland France.
BEREC has observed the use of submarine cables even over short distances (less than 20 km), preferred over microwave links due to the high capacity and reliability of fiber optics. Furthermore, in areas with complex topographies such as Norwegian fjords, submarine cables serve as a valid alternative to terrestrial fiber.
Geographically, most segments are deployed in the Mediterranean Sea (around 41%) and the Atlantic Ocean (38%), while approximately 16% are in the Baltic Sea. Significantly, only 12% of domestic submarine cables are part of international systems, highlighting their primary function for internal European connectivity.
The report also focuses on the ex-ante economic regulation policies adopted for these systems. Six National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) – Croatia, France, Greece, Iceland, Portugal, and Spain – have conducted market analyses including domestic submarine cables. These analyses led to the regulation of submarine cables, designating an operator with significant market power (SMP). Of these six NRAs that regulate or have regulated submarine cables, four (Croatia, Greece, Iceland, Portugal) still maintain this regulation. Conversely, France (in 2017) and Spain (in 2024) chose to deregulate the sector. This change reflects growing confidence in competitive market dynamics and the need to contain costs, while acknowledging the risk that deregulation might compromise widespread accessibility in more isolated or less profitable geographical areas.
Challenges and Trends: Aging Infrastructure and Investment Needs
Among the emerging challenges and trends identified, a major concern is the obsolescence of a large portion of the infrastructure. Almost one-third of submarine cable systems are between 10 and 25 years old, and 14% have been operational for over 35 years. This age factor could soon impact future capacity, making their renewal urgent. This is particularly true for sparsely populated areas like islands, where private investments are rarely justified by future revenues.
The replacement of existing submarine cable systems is crucial. From a political and economic perspective, ensuring territorial continuity and maintaining these connections is essential, especially in areas where no alternatives to electronic communication services (ECS) exist. The renewal and subsequent capacity transfers by wholesale clients require careful regulatory analysis. Conditions offered by new cable providers (prices, terms, redundancy conditions) must be evaluated, along with their ability to facilitate the entry of other operators, thus expanding consumer choice. Further regulatory clarification on the applicability of national electronic communications law to new cables may also be necessary, especially if the new infrastructure is the sole means for retail operators to compete in remote and sparsely populated areas.
The report highlights that in certain situations, public funding may be necessary to ensure the connectivity of national territories, as private sector business models may not allow for the recovery of substantial investments. Almost one-fifth of the domestic submarine cables analyzed in this report benefited from public funding. Therefore, public funding instruments, such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), are vital for achieving connectivity goals, ensuring the security, and facilitating the renewal of aging submarine cables. Significant investments not only address obsolescence but can also stimulate competition, as demonstrated by the entry of operators from other sectors (e.g., electricity) who install fibers in cables or lease capacity to third parties.
Most submarine cables are deployed by ECN operators who use them for their own network connections and operations, but in most cases, they also offer wholesale connectivity to others, either through leased lines or dark fiber rental. Independent ("wholesale-only") providers primarily aim to offer trunk communication services or lease dark fiber to other players, including public or state initiatives for territorial development. These cases account for almost 20% of the surveyed submarine cable segments.
Finally, some of the most recent infrastructures are equipped with SMART submarine cables, featuring sensors to measure temperature, tectonic plate movement, and monitor marine fauna and flora. Investing in these technologies is crucial not only for detecting heating trends but also for early detection of natural disasters like tsunamis and earthquakes, thereby ensuring a more secure and reliable network. Specific plans and funding mechanisms will therefore be instrumental in fostering territorial cohesion, digital inclusiveness, investment security, and strengthening the EU's capabilities in submarine cable connectivity.
Towards Greater Resilience and Security: Collaboration and Innovation
Providing reliable connections with no degradation of service, even if a particular cable is damaged, is essential, especially in sensitive political contexts and hybrid warfare scenarios with increased potential for cable sabotage. This may call for stricter physical and logical resilience requirements and cost-efficiency, which could be necessary to attract multiple retail telecom operators or providers from other economic areas (like power) to peripheral regions. Fiber exchange agreements are also good practice to increase reliability, as seen in the Balearic Islands where different operators exchange fibers in their submarine cables to ensure redundancy and enhanced resilience.
Submarine cable security at the EU level must be addressed multilaterally. The challenges posed by threats such as hybrid warfare in recent years require collaboration among various stakeholders – governments, industry, and academia – to enhance the resilience of these critical infrastructures. Aligning the incentives of these stakeholders is fundamental to achieving this common goal. Science Monitoring And Reliable Telecommunications (SMART) technologies, integrated into submarine cables, can play an important role in enhancing security, reliability, and redundancy. Equipped with sensors, these cables enable real-time monitoring of connection health and status, ensuring early detection of potential issues. This capability is vital for maintaining uninterrupted services, particularly for critical infrastructure that relies on robust data transmission. By integrating artificial intelligence and machine learning, SMART cables can predict and prevent failures, thus offering a more secure and reliable communication network.
Earlier, on December 7, 2023, BEREC approved the draft of the "Draft BEREC Report on the general authorisation and related frameworks for international submarine connectivity." This report aims to clarify the general authorization and related frameworks applicable to international submarine connectivity, proposing solutions to promote investments and strengthen the EU's geostrategic position. It outlines the applicability of the electronic communications regulatory framework to international submarine cable systems1 and illustrates the powers and experience of national regulatory authorities. It also identifies other applicable national administrative authorization procedures and gathers information on initiatives undertaken at European and national levels to promote global submarine connectivity.
A virtual BEREC workshop held on September 21, 2023, gathered market operators' views on international submarine connectivity in the EU. Discussions focused on competition, market dynamics, challenges in installing and operating submarine cables (including aspects of resilience, security, and sustainability), and expectations regarding the evolution of regulatory frameworks. While the EU institutional model is generally considered business-friendly, the need to simplify and harmonize national policies and obligations emerged, given the absence of an integrated regulatory regime for submarine cables at the national level.
Overall, BEREC's reports and activities demonstrate a continuous commitment to monitoring and adapting the regulatory framework, ensuring that submarine cable infrastructures in Europe are resilient, secure, and capable of supporting the growing demand for international connectivity in a fair and competitive market.
The Strategic Importance of Submarine Cables for the EU [and Italy]
Submarine connectivity is of crucial importance to the European Union, serving as the backbone for its digital economy and society. Europe and Italy have recognized the strategic, economic, and political importance of these digital infrastructures. As highlighted in a European Commission note, submarine cables carry over 98% of global telecommunications traffic and play a fundamental role in the resilience and security of digital connectivity.
Last December, the Commission announced the allocation of a €142 million tranche to 21 cable projects (including Sparkle's), part of a planned billion euros. With the signing of these 21 grant agreements, the EU has brought the total funding to €420 million under the first digital work program of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF Digital).
The Commission emphasizes that "CEF Digital places the security of this critical infrastructure at its core, ensuring that all CEF grant beneficiaries are EU-controlled entities and that the cables to be deployed are built with secure technology. Almost all funded cables are equipped with large geographical sensors to monitor nearby activities and early warning systems to protect the infrastructure itself." Backbone networks, including submarine cables, are considered critical infrastructures that ensure high-capacity connectivity and enhance the resilience and security of digital connectivity.
How Submarine Cables are Connected and Where They Run
Submarine cables are primarily fiber optic cables that transmit data as light pulses. They are laid on the ocean floor by specialized ships. Their construction includes protective layers of steel wire, polyethylene, and waterproofing materials to withstand the harsh marine environment. Along their route, every 40-80 kilometers, there are signal repeaters to amplify light pulses and ensure faithful data transmission over long distances.
Cable routes are carefully planned, avoiding geological obstacles such as underwater mountains and trenches. The length of a cable is often greater than the direct distance between two points to bypass such obstacles or adapt to the seabed's topography.
Global submarine cable maps, such as those provided by TeleGeography, show a vast network spanning the world's oceans and seas. In Europe, these cables are vital for connections between the continent and its islands, as well as for transoceanic links. The Mediterranean Sea is a particularly critical area, with numerous cables connecting Europe to Asia and Africa. Many of these pass through strategic "choke points," making them potentially vulnerable.
EU Policies for Submarine Cable Security
The European Union has recognized the strategic importance and vulnerability of submarine cables and has adopted various policies to strengthen their security and resilience. One key initiative is a Joint Communication to strengthen the security and resilience of submarine cables, which adopts a comprehensive resilience cycle approach, including:
Prevention: Intensifying security requirements and risk assessments, as well as prioritizing funding for the development and deployment of new "smart cables" that increase network redundancy and resilience.
Detection: Improving threat monitoring capabilities across all maritime basins (such as the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea) to create a comprehensive situational awareness that enables rapid alerts and effective responses.
Response and recovery: Enhancing the efficiency of the EU-level crisis framework for rapid action in the event of incidents impacting submarine cables and increasing repair capacity, including through the establishment of an EU reserve for cable-laying ships.
Deterrence: Increasing the costs for malicious actors aiming to sabotage these infrastructures, also through tools to qualify, demonstrate, formally attribute, and sanction sabotage actions.
In February 2024, the European Commission published the first "Recommendation on secure and resilient submarine cable infrastructures," encouraging Member States to conduct regular stress tests, improve information sharing among2 themselves, and enhance cable maintenance and repair capabilities.
Furthermore, in the White Paper on how to master Europe's digital infrastructure needs and the Recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructures, the Commission outlined actions to assess and improve coordination between the Union and its Member States regarding the security and resilience of existing and future submarine cable infrastructures. This includes mapping cables and related risks.
CEF Digital Calls: Support and Strategic Innovation
CEF Digital is one of the funding instruments mentioned in the Recommendation to support the implementation of strategic cable projects. Projects funded under the third call series of CEF Digital aim to strengthen global connections between Europe and Africa (e.g., the Medusa Africa or Canalink-Morocco projects), the Middle East (like the BlueMed East project), and Asia (Arctic connectivity). The funding also intends to reinforce connections between Member States in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Baltic Sea, and continental Europe (including Central and Eastern Europe).
New projects will also support connectivity in outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, such as in the Pacific Ocean (e.g., the NUANUA project), the Caribbean (e.g., the BCA project), the Canary Islands (e.g., the PENCAN-X project), and the Azores-Madeira area (e.g., the Atlantic CAM – CM project).
A crucial aspect of these investments is security: all CEF grant beneficiaries are EU-controlled entities, and the cables to be installed must be built with secure technology. In addition to ensuring the secure transmission of terabytes of data per second, almost all funded cables include SMART technologies, which act as large geographical sensors to monitor nearby activities, serving as early warning systems to protect the infrastructure itself.
The second CEF Digital work program 2024-2027 allocates an additional €542 million to co-finance backbone connectivity projects, meaning that the Union's investment plans in these critical infrastructures within the current financial framework will amount to almost €1 billion.
The Growing Threat to Submarine Cable Security
According to a new analysis by the China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI), China and Russia are intensifying sabotage operations against submarine cables, and the United Kingdom, despite being a key hub in the Euro-Atlantic infrastructure with 60 submarine cable systems landing there, is unprepared to face this growing threat. A CSRI report analyzed 12 incidents of alleged submarine cable sabotage between January 2021 and April 2025. Of the 10 cases where a suspicious vessel was identified, eight were directly linked to China or Russia through flag state registration or company ownership.
The report suggests that the involvement of "shadow fleet" commercial vessels in these incidents is consistent with China and Russia's broader "grey zone" strategy, a space between war and peace, aimed at coercing adversaries while minimizing the chances of an open response. Activity patterns, such as Chinese vessels involved in suspicious incidents in the Baltic Sea and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggest possible coordination between Moscow and Beijing in attacking submarine cables.
An estimated 99% of intercontinental data transmission occurs via these vital systems, which are critical for civilian and defense infrastructures. Without submarine cables, much of the global economy – from international banking to cloud computing, from virtual communications to global logistics – would cease to function.
The UK, given its central role, risks becoming a frequent target for future sabotage operations. However, a document presented by the British government to the joint parliamentary committee on national security strategy admitted limited capabilities in monitoring commercial maritime traffic around submarine cables. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology's report noted that "the UK has limited capabilities for monitoring general maritime traffic and commercial traffic, as coastal radar covers only about 22% of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the UK." The high volume of maritime traffic makes it difficult to identify every instance of anomalous maritime activity.
Andrew Yeh, CSRI Executive Director and report author, stated: "Submarine cables underpin prosperity and security in the digital age. We cannot afford to be naive in the face of the unprecedented threat that China and Russia's 'grey zone' operations pose to the UK's undersea infrastructure." He added that while well-equipped to handle conventional threats, the UK's defense infrastructure is "woefully inadequate to protect against grey zone tactics," urging strengthened monitoring and surveillance capabilities and collaboration with partners like Taiwan.
The recent strategic defense review already acknowledged that submarine cables were becoming an increasingly vulnerable maritime sector. Baltic NATO countries, meeting in January, pledged to boost patrol missions after several telecommunications and power cables were cut in the Baltic Sea in recent months, with experts and politicians accusing Russia's "shadow fleet" of sabotage.
To address these threats, NATO established a new Submarine Critical Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels (February 2023) to bring together stakeholders and improve public-private coordination. In July 2023, at the Vilnius Summit, NATO allies established a Maritime Centre for Subsea Critical Infrastructure Security under the Alliance's Maritime Command in Northwood, UK. In October 2023, after the first incident, NATO defense ministers approved a new Digital Ocean Vision, an initiative aimed at improving underwater surveillance.
Last December, at a summit of Nordic and Baltic leaders in Sweden, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposed a joint naval policing program among Baltic Sea countries to protect their submarine infrastructure from external security threats. This program would run in parallel with an existing Baltic air policing mission. However, states are well aware that any protection measure must be closely linked to deterrence: no military patrol can cover all submarine infrastructure.
Implications for the Future
The European regulator's analysis, the increasing focus on submarine cables, significant investments through CEF Digital, and awareness of growing security threats underscore the importance of a proactive and holistic approach to ensure that the telecommunications market in Europe remains dynamic and innovative, benefiting both businesses and consumers. The balance between the need to invest in new infrastructure, prevent monopolies, and protect critical networks is a complex but crucial challenge for the continent's digital development. The recommendations and directives from the regulator, alongside submarine cable policies and international cooperation, will be fundamental in shaping future connectivity and security strategies in Europe.
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