Taiwan: Beyond the Military Threat, Beijing's Other Cards - Analysis

The question of Taiwan remains one of the most delicate and unpredictable points on the global geopolitical stage. At the heart of this intricate scenario is Xi Jinping's ambitious dream: the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," a goal to be achieved by the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2049. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this rejuvenation is inextricably linked to unification with Taiwan.

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Is an Invasion Imminent? Conflicting Perspectives

When, or if, China might take military action against Taiwan is a topic that divides analysts. Some, looking at the link between national rejuvenation and the "resolution" of the Taiwan issue, speculate an invasion around 2050.

Others, however, predict more imminent action, perhaps by 2035. This is because they believe that by then, the PLA (People's Liberation Army) will be "substantially and sufficiently modernized" to fight and win a regional war against an advanced military. Then there are those who foresee a "dangerous decade" already underway, especially for Taiwan, where Beijing's power over the island is peaking, making military action more probable in the short term.

Behind these theories lies the idea that Beijing would only attempt annexation when it feels strongest, or to prevent the island from forever slipping out of its military reach. Interestingly, some observers note that, even if the Chinese economy were to slow down, Beijing would likely continue to increase its military coercion against Taiwan. The Pentagon, for its part, has identified a possible military conflict with China as "the sole pacing threat," with Taiwan at the heart of this potential confrontation.

Beijing's Strategies: From Force to Hybrid Pressures

Many experts agree that specific "events" could act as a fuse for an invasion. Beijing has stated that any move towards Taiwan's independence would trigger an attack. Another point of friction is Taiwan's refusal to reaffirm the "1992 Consensus," an informal agreement on "one China" that Beijing interprets as a pro-independence stance by the Democratic Progressive Party.

Taiwan's refusal to engage in negotiations for political unification could also push Beijing to act. Hong Kong's loss of autonomy, with the end of the "One Country, Two Systems" model, has made the idea of integration with mainland China increasingly unpopular among Taiwanese, further fueling tensions.

No less worrying are Beijing's escalating military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, which could accidentally lead to incidents or an involuntary escalation. A shift in U.S. policy, perhaps by approving Taiwan's independence or ruling out U.S. assistance in an emergency, could alter Beijing's calculations.

Finally, some analysts suggest that a legitimacy crisis for the CCP (such as an economic downturn or a failed leadership succession) could prompt Chinese leaders to use a Taiwan invasion to bolster nationalist support for the regime. Similarly, Beijing might view a U.S. crisis (for example, a conflict on the Korean peninsula or in Ukraine) as an opportunity to seize.

A distinctive element of the PLA's more recent strategies is the intensification of encirclement and isolation operations around the island. 

Starting in 2022, and with a clear acceleration in 2023 and 2024, Chinese military exercises around Taiwan have become increasingly frequent, complex, and provocative. These are no longer just shows of force but genuine "dress rehearsals" simulating a maritime and air blockade.

In 2024, for instance, Chinese military aircraft incursions across the Taiwan Strait's median line reached a historic peak, surpassing any previous year. These activities not only test the PLA's regional control and joint containment capabilities but also aim to establish a "new normal" of Chinese military presence in the area, reducing Taiwan's and its allies' reaction times in the event of real action. Recent exercises have involved an impressive number of aircraft and ships, with some Chinese Coast Guard vessels even crossing Taiwan's 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone for the first time. This suggests an intent to develop more sophisticated, hybrid invasion plans that combine military tactics with maritime law enforcement, making the distinction between exercise and military action almost imperceptible.

The Non-Military Option: The "Hong Kong Model" for Taiwan

Beyond military coercion, China might attempt to annex Taiwan through non-military means, replicating and adapting its actions in Hong Kong. The basic idea is to progressively impose Beijing's control, eroding Taiwan's autonomy without resorting to a full-scale invasion.

The "One Country, Two Systems" principle, which was meant to guarantee Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, including civil liberties, an independent legal system, and democratic rights, has been gradually dismantled. This occurred through several strategic moves:

• Imposition of the National Security Law: In 2020, Beijing imposed a National Security Law on Hong Kong, bypassing the local legislature. This law broadly criminalized acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces, swiftly stifling dissent and drastically limiting civil liberties.

• Electoral Reform: Hong Kong's electoral system was reformed to ensure that only "patriots" (i.e., individuals loyal to Beijing) could hold public office, effectively excluding the democratic opposition.

• Pressure on Information and Civil Society: Independent media outlets were shut down, journalists and activists arrested, and civil society organizations forced to disband or operate under severe restrictions.

For Taiwan, a similar approach could involve a combination of escalating economic pressures, political infiltration, disinformation campaigns, and a "gray zone" or quasi-blockade aimed at strangling the island's economy and international connectivity without firing a shot. The goal would be to wear down internal resistance and the Taiwanese public's confidence in their ability to remain independent, making unification with China the only viable path. However, unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan enjoys a fully democratic government, an autonomous military, and strong international support, making a "peaceful" annexation through coercive methods far more complex and uncertain.

A Steep Price: The Risks of an Invasion for Beijing

Despite the PLA's growing military capabilities and constant pressure on Taiwan, a decision to use force would carry enormous risks for Beijing—risks that should not be underestimated.

First and foremost, military inexperience. The PLA, despite significant budgets and advanced technologies, hasn't fought a war since 1979 and could fail its first real test in decades. A failed invasion, or even a chaotic outcome, would pose a severe threat to the CCP regime's legitimacy and stability, undermining public trust in the leadership.

Second, the economic consequences would be catastrophic. A large-scale conflict, right at the epicenter of fragile global supply chains, would shatter the pillars of economic growth and stability that underpin the CCP's rule in China. Consider the impact on the electronics sector: an invasion would paralyze the Chinese industry, which relies heavily on Taiwan for semiconductors (in 2020, 35.3% of China's chip imports came from Taiwan). It would disrupt production networks and inflict incalculable damage. Rebuilding Taiwan's capacity in the global semiconductor supply chain would be a monumental undertaking.

Compounding this would be the inevitable international sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries, which would deprive Beijing of the necessary resources to sustain production. Finally, there's always the inherent risk of an uncontrolled military escalation.

Non-Military Deterrents: The "Silicon Shield" and Trade Routes

The Quincy Institute for International Affairs, an influential U.S. think tank, has highlighted three main reasons why a forceful unification of Taiwan would be extremely difficult for the CCP. These non-military factors represent a powerful deterrent:

1. Taiwan's key role in global semiconductors: Taiwan is the world's leading producer of semiconductors, with TSMC holding 67.1% of the global chip market in Q4 2024 and manufacturing almost all of the most advanced chips. This dominant position, known as the "Silicon Shield," is irreplaceable, not just for its market share but also for its unique supporting infrastructure. Semiconductors are crucial for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and robotics, and for vital sectors like energy, manufacturing, home appliances, and automobiles. A disruption of chip production in Taiwan would paralyze the global supply chain for years, causing a rapid contraction in the U.S. and Chinese economies and potentially triggering a global economic depression.

2. The strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and Luzon Strait: These waterways are vital international trade routes. A conflict would severely disrupt global trade flowing through them. In 2022, Taiwan's ports handled approximately $586 billion in trade, and an estimated $2.45 trillion in goods transited through the Taiwan Strait. Chinese ports would also be affected, with cargo ships forced to avoid the eastern coast, causing significant losses for China's economy. While global shipping routes can bypass conflict zones, China itself plays a key role in global maritime infrastructure. The impact would extend to the global shipping industry, with other ports facing immense logistical pressure.

3. China's currently weak economic situation: The Chinese economy faces internal pressures (real estate crisis, weak domestic demand) and external ones (trade war). A new global crisis, triggered by a conflict over Taiwan, would inevitably exacerbate these problems. Taiwan accounts for 60% of China's chip imports, and an attack would sever this reliance, damaging numerous sectors. Moreover, 37% of China's GDP comes from foreign trade, increasing its vulnerability to global trade disruptions. A Bloomberg Economics study estimates that an embargo would lead to a 5% decline in global GDP (China -8.9%, U.S. -3.3%). A full-scale invasion could cause global GDP to fall by 10.2%, with losses of $10 trillion in the first year alone. If Taiwan's wafer fabs were destroyed, the impact would be even more severe, with a global economic depression lasting over a decade and a permanent rupture in trade relations between China, the U.S., and the EU.

Considering the growing trade dependence of the Global South and BRICS countries (including giants like Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, UAE, and Iran) on Taiwan and the Luzon Strait—a dependence that even surpasses that of G7 nations—a conflict would cause a diplomatic disaster for Beijing, which is actively courting these nations.

The U.S. Response: Elbridge Colby's "Denial Theory"

In the face of these scenarios, the United States is redefining its strategy. For Washington, action is increasingly oriented towards the "denial theory," championed by figures like Elbridge Colby, who, since April 2025, serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, making him the Secretary of Defense's principal advisor on strategic and defense matters. Previously, Colby was a key architect of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted the Pentagon's focus to the rising Chinese military threat.

Colby's denial theory argues that the primary objective for the United States should not necessarily be victory in a conflict with China, but rather denying China's victory. In other words, the U.S. and its allies should focus on making a Taiwan invasion so costly and difficult for Beijing that it either deters them from the outset or makes the outcome uncertain and victory impossible to achieve. This translates into:

• Strengthening Taiwan's defense capabilities: Equipping Taiwan with asymmetric weapons, such as mobile anti-ship and anti-air missiles, mines, and cyber warfare capabilities, that can inflict significant damage on an invader even with inferior forces. The idea is to turn Taiwan into a "porcupine," difficult to swallow.

• Positioning allied forces: Deploying U.S. and allied forces in the region to quickly intervene and support Taiwan's defense, thereby increasing the costs and risks for the PLA.

• Economic and diplomatic deterrence strategies: Raising awareness of the global economic costs of a conflict and coordinating a robust international diplomatic and sanction-based response that would make it unsustainable for Beijing to hold any territorial gains.

Colby's approach and that of other strategists aim to alter Beijing's calculations, making the military option so prohibitive that it leads them to reconsider their plans. "Denial" isn't about destroying China, but about defending the international order and American and allied interests by making it clear that aggression won't pay off.

The PLA's Capabilities: Where Do We Stand?

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has indicated since 2018 that Beijing possesses a military "option" on Taiwan, confirming in its 2020 report that this includes a "large-scale amphibious invasion." Lonnie Henley, a former U.S. DOD intelligence officer for East Asia, stated that since 2020, the PLA has developed the initial capabilities to invade Taiwan and win against potential intervention by U.S. forces.

While assessments may vary, there is broad consensus in the United States that the PLA is rapidly acquiring invasion capabilities. In March 2021, then-Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, testified before Congress that the PLA could be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027.

In this complex scenario, predicting China's future behavior with certainty is impossible. However, the picture of Beijing's growing military capabilities and potential triggers, balanced by the enormous risks an invasion would entail—whether military or through a gradual coercion strategy—and by the United States' determination to pursue an aggressive "denial" strategy, makes the Taiwan issue one of the hottest and most uncertain flashpoints in future geopolitics.