The geopolitics of critical minerals: between American resilience to be built and recent Chinese concerns

On December 12, 2025, in Washington, the United States marked a decisive turning point in the geopolitics of raw materials by inaugurating the "Pax Silica Initiative." This U.S.-led program, which brought together strategic partners including Japan, Israel, Australia, Singapore, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea, is not merely a technical agreement. It represents the proclamation of a new geopolitical consensus: economic security is national security. The stated goal is to build a "secure, prosperous, and innovation-driven silicon supply chain" that is resilient and autonomous from Beijing’s influence. Through this initiative, the American administration aims to secure access to semiconductors, artificial intelligence infrastructure, additive manufacturing, and logistics, responding to a trade management strategy that utilizes Section 232 and 301 tariffs, along with the principle of reciprocity, to rectify trade deficits and level a playing field long dominated by the People’s Republic of China.

Throughout 2025, the Trump Administration accelerated this decoupling through a series of targeted bilateral agreements described in recent trade reports. These include:

1. United States–Australia Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths

On October 20, 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Albanese signed the United States–Australia Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths at the White House. Key elements of the agreement include joint project selection for mining, processing, and refining critical minerals and rare earths. Use of both governments’ financing tools with an emphasis on defense, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing uses. The hope is that it will encourage large U.S. equity stakes and offtake arrangements in Australian projects, including rare earths and battery minerals. It offers U.S. manufacturers an alternative source for rare earths and battery metals that still enjoys tariff advantages over China under the Section 301 regime. It also indicates to markets that Australia is the preferred Pacific hub for critical-mineral-to-magnet and battery value chains serving the U.S.

2. United States–Japan Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths

On October 27–28, 2025, the U.S. and Japan signed a Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing, accompanied by broader trade and technology “prosperity” announcements. The framework commits both countries to coordinated investments, stockpiling, and trade measures to secure critical minerals. It builds on the 2023 U.S.–Japan critical minerals agreement that made Japanese EV-related minerals eligible under U.S. clean-vehicle tax credits. Japan is developing as a processing and technology hub, with the U.S. providing political cover and demand guarantees. It encourages joint investment in third-country mining projects (particularly in Southeast Asia and Africa) that can ship into both markets without Chinese processing. Finally, the private sector may locate refining, magnet manufacturing, and cathode production in Japan or the U.S., rather than in China.

3. United States–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade & Export-Control Alignment

On October 26, 2025, the U.S. and Malaysia signed a Reciprocal Trade Agreement, framed as part of a broader set of Southeast Asian deals. This accord commits Malaysia to provide detailed information on industrial subsidies and to address distortive mechanisms. It strengthens Malaysia’s position as a rare-earths and advanced-materials processing hub aligned with U.S. export-control policy, potentially capturing activity that might otherwise have gravitated toward China-centric complexes. U.S. firms may see it as an incentive to route some processing steps through Malaysia to maintain compliance with both U.S. export controls and any future Section 232 critical-mineral rules.

4. U.S.–Thailand MoU on Diversifying Critical-Minerals Supply Chains

A White House MoU with Thailand on cooperation to diversify global critical-minerals supply chains describes a joint agenda on exploration, extraction, processing, and recycling of critical minerals and rare earths. It positions Thailand as a prospective downstream processing and recycling hub serving both Japanese and American manufacturers. It also adds secondary supply for recycled magnets and battery materials, to deal with potential Section 232 duties constraining primary processed minerals.

5. Critical Minerals Framework with Saudi Arabia

In November 2025, during a high-profile visit by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia concluded a Critical Minerals Framework as part of a broader economic, defense and AI package. The framework is described as channeling Saudi capital into U.S. (and allied) critical-mineral projects and aligning long-term strategies for supply chains needed in civil nuclear, energy transition, and defense. It could generate tens of billions of dollars in Saudi investment in U.S. and third-country critical-mineral projects, moving beyond oil-and-gas finance. It also gives the U.S. another large-scale financier to counter Chinese funding of resource-rich states, particularly in Africa and Asia.

6. U.S.–Indonesia Trade Agreement and Lifting of Mineral Export Restrictions

A July 2025 U.S.–Indonesia trade deal is explicitly linked to removing Indonesian restrictions on exports of critical minerals to the United States, including nickel, copper and bauxite, in exchange for lower U.S. tariffs (19% instead of a threatened 32%) and broader market access. It ensures access to Indonesian nickel for U.S. buyers, while Indonesia maintains export bans and restrictions targeting other markets. U.S. companies will be able to bypass China-controlled smelters, potentially altering the economics of EV battery material sourcing.

7. U.S.–China One-Year Trade Package on Rare Earths and Tariffs

On November 1, 2025, the White House announced a one-year U.S.–China economic and trade agreement under which China. The accord suspends and could lead to elimination of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals. It removes retaliatory tariffs imposed in response to U.S. measures and expands market access for U.S. agriculture, including soybeans. The U.S. suspended Section 301 maritime/shipbuilding tariffs and eased shipping-related fees for Chinese vessels. The opening of rare-earth and magnet markets benefits the U.S. and the EU. , which separately welcomed China’s 12-month suspension of rare-earth export controls. The one-year term of the agreement provides only a temporary reprieve, not a strategic reversal of Chinese control so firms will continue to diversify supply in case controls return in 2026.

8. U.S.–Korea “Technology Prosperity Deal” and Trade Agreement

A technology-focused framework with South Korea announced in late October and fleshed out in mid-November 2025 includes cooperation on AI, semiconductors, shipbuilding and critical minerals, alongside Korean investment commitments of roughly $150 billion in U.S. shipbuilding and other sectors. The U.S. hopes the large Korean conglomerates will invest in processing, battery manufacturing and cathode/anode plants in the U.S. and allied countries, leveraging Section 301 and potential 232 outcomes. Coordinating export controls and investment screening with Korea may impact China’s access to high-end Korean technology needed to exploit critical-mineral advantages.

9. Latin American “Reciprocal Trade Frameworks”

In November 2025, the White House announced trade frameworks with Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala, largely focused on reciprocal tariff cuts, non-tariff barrier reduction, and digital-trade disciplines. Argentina is home to major lithium resources and growing copper projects. By improving broader U.S.–Argentina trade relations and reducing tariffs U.S. firms may increase investment in Argentine minerals projects. The frameworks set precedents for conditional tariff reductions, which could later be tied to critical-mineral investment or export-control cooperation. The primary significance of the agreements is strategic: locking key Latin American partners into the U.S. “reciprocal framework” leading to critical-mineral deals in the future.

However, as the West constructs this new ecosystem, market realities highlight how China’s technological primacy is as pervasive as it is structurally vulnerable. Recent developments from the Chinese front provide a striking example of this dichotomy. On November 10, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in Beijing approved, with strict restrictive conditions, the formation of a joint venture between the Chilean state-owned companies CopperCorp and Chemical for lithium management in the Salar de Atacama. During a press conference on December 16, spokesperson Wang Qiuping defined lithium as the "white oil" of the new energy era, explicitly admitting that while China holds an absolute advantage in processing lithium salts, its upstream resources remain a "weak point" and its dependence on imports cannot be ignored.

This admission unveils the face of a power that, despite controlling approximately 90% of global rare earth refining and maintaining global dominance in key sectors like alumina, stands on "feet of clay." Dependence on imports forces Beijing to use antitrust tools and "behavioral remedies" to attempt to discipline foreign extractive flows it does not directly control, fearing that sovereign agreements in third nations—or nationalistic shifts like those seen in Chile—could stifle its domestic refineries.

To legally fortify this position, China recently enacted a new Rare Earth Law, which centralizes every stage of the supply chain under strict state control. This legislation codifies mineral exploitation as a matter of national security, imposing rigid export controls and sanctions on any entity deemed to jeopardize the state’s interest, responding tit-for-tat to Western technological restrictions and tariffs.

China's structural vulnerability is further reflected in its complex relations with Myanmar, where political instability and internal conflicts constantly threaten the supply of heavy rare earths. Without stability in mining, the monopoly on refining becomes a blunt weapon. The new geo-economics of critical supply chains is therefore an area prone to systemic shocks, including those resulting from sudden nationalistic policies.