The New African Chessboard: U.S. and China in Struggle for Influence - Report

U.S. concerns grow: China replicates Western military training and strengthens its presence in Africa with dual-use aid and infrastructure, as highlighted by AFRICOM General Michael Langley

Africa has become the silent battleground of a growing strategic competition between the United States and China.

The United States is expressing growing concern about Chinese military influence in Africa, with AFRICOM General Michael Langley pointing out that Beijing is replicating Western training programs and providing substantial military aid.

Indeed, China trains African soldiers not only to confront external enemies, but, as highlighted by Paul Nantulya and Heitman, to “oppress and oppose its own people,” promoting a “party-army model” loyal to the CCP.

An estimated 50 of the 54 African countries regularly participate in Chinese “politico-military education.”

At the same time, China is expanding its port presence, with 231 commercial ports planned by 2025, many of them dual-use civil-military, such as the Djibouti base. These investments are aimed at facilitating access to African resources and exporting manufacturing capacity, although growing anti-Chinese sentiments are emerging due to alleged worker abuse, collusion with criminals, and illegal mining practices, particularly in the strategic lithium sector, as evidenced by cases in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the DRC. Despite the criticism, the positive impact of Chinese infrastructure in Africa makes it difficult for African governments to distance themselves from Beijing.

GettyImages

China's Military Strategy: From "Active Defense" to Global Projection

China's military strategy, defined as "active defense," has undergone a profound transformation in recent decades. Historically focused on defending national territory and operating in "near sea waters," the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its strategic concept to include safeguarding national sovereignty and security far beyond its immediate borders. This evolution reflects a clear ambition to achieve "world-class military" status, signifying a fundamental redefinition of China's national security interests, extending them globally. It's not simply about defending existing borders, but about protecting expanding economic interests and projecting influence into distant waters. China's military expansion in Africa is not episodic; it's part of a broader strategy to achieve its long-term goals. These include the aim of becoming a "world-class military" by 2049, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. This entails vigorously strengthening "global maritime support capabilities" and enhancing global naval base construction. The overarching strategy aims to secure critical resources and control key trade routes, thereby establishing a framework for long-term strategic dominance.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been at the forefront of this strategic reorientation, initiating substantial modernization programs. These include a significant increase in the number of ships and the development of a robust and self-sufficient domestic defense industry. This modernization aligns with a long-term vision for naval growth, exemplified by Admiral Liu Huaqing's three-phase plan, which aims for the deployment of a global navy, including aircraft carriers, by 2050. Consistent investment in advanced naval platforms and the explicit goal of developing blue-water capabilities underscore a deliberate strategic progression from a purely defensive and territorial approach to one that encompasses global interests and power projection.

The Nexus Between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's Military Objectives

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast global infrastructure and investment project involving over 150 countries, is explicitly recognized as a strategic tool to strengthen China's military reach and geopolitical influence. The initiative's dual-use infrastructure, encompassing ports, railways, and digital networks, significantly enhances China's power projection capabilities and secures vital global supply lines. These investments also create potential footholds for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), providing logistical access and operational flexibility in strategically important regions. The integration of the Maritime Silk Road with China's asserted control over the South China Sea and its BRI ports creates a "contiguous belt of influence" that extends its reach across vital maritime corridors. This aims to radically alter the global balance of power by reducing dependence on U.S.-patrolled sea lines of communication and challenging the effectiveness of traditional blockade strategies. The explicit goals of insulating itself from U.S. maritime influence and diversifying supply routes reveal a strategic objective to mitigate vulnerabilities and assert greater control over global trade and resource flows, thus reshaping the international power structure.

The BRI is considered a cornerstone of President Xi Jinping's foreign policy and was incorporated into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution in 2017, underscoring its profound strategic importance. This initiative serves as a comprehensive and integrated platform for China's "major country diplomacy," effectively blurring the lines between economic development, resource security, and military expansion. This allows China to establish a "Sinocentric sphere" by leveraging economic dependencies to gain geopolitical and military advantages. The explicit assertion that the BRI strengthens military reach and power projection, coupled with its status as a foreign policy pillar, indicates a deliberate strategy to build influence and access incrementally, rather than through overt military means, thereby reshaping global dynamics.

The opaque financing mechanisms and exploitation of local corruption associated with BRI projects often obscure the PRC's true intent, posing significant counter-intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) challenges for other nations. The sheer scale and adaptability of the BRI present a "generational challenge" for U.S. planners, requiring a radical rethinking of existing strategies. For Western powers, a key challenge lies in distinguishing between legitimate commercial initiatives and dual-use military applications, and in formulating responses that do not inadvertently alienate partner nations in Africa and the Middle East. Navigating this complex scenario requires a deep understanding of China's integrated economic and military strategy.

The Growth of China's Military Footprint

The United States observes China's rapid rise in Africa with concern. General Michael Langley, head of Africa Command (AFRICOM), has highlighted how Beijing is replicating and surpassing Western military training programs, such as the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET). China doesn't just offer training; it actively provides weapons and military equipment, especially to Sahelian countries, many of which are now led by military governments turning away from Western allies.

This strategy is part of Beijing's broader plan to strengthen defense ties. President Xi Jinping has pledged to train 6,000 African soldiers and invite 500 young officers to China within three years, supported by approximately $139 million in military aid. In July 2023, China and the African Union (AU) agreed to "strengthen military cooperation to ensure peace and stability in Africa and beyond," with China supporting the strengthening of the African Standby Force (ASF) and collaboration in counter-terrorism.

Chinese influence is deep: 94 senior Mozambican officers, including General Lagos Lidimo (former chief of defense in Maputo), have trained in Nanjing. Similar courses have been attended by officers in Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Thousands of African military officers will receive training at facilities managed by the CCP's Central Military Commission in 2024 alone.

The Changing Role of the United States and American Military Presence in Africa (2025)

As China accelerates, U.S. military training in Africa is stable or declining. Former ambassadors like David Shin note that while both countries train African officers, China's numbers are growing exponentially. Experts warn that Chinese involvement, coupled with the presence of Russian private militias, could weaken the U.S. role.

A crucial difference between Western and Chinese training was highlighted by Heitman: "The U.S., for example, trains African soldiers to deal with external enemies. China trains African soldiers to, in effect, oppress and oppose their own people." Paul Nantulya expanded on this distinction, emphasizing that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) adheres to the principle of "absolute party control over the army": "the party commands the gun." This view transforms the military into a "political force," loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than to the constitution or the government. Nantulya's research indicates that 50 of 54 African countries regularly participate in Chinese "political-military education."

Although a senior South African National Defense Force officer preferred training at West Point, deeming it "by far superior," he admitted that "the simple fact is that China offers more training opportunities than anyone else." With the decline of democracy in Africa, the Chinese "party-army model" is becoming increasingly attractive to "survival-focused" regimes.

As of 2025, the American military presence in Africa, primarily managed by US Africa Command (AFRICOM), is characterized by an approach that, while maintaining a relatively "light" footprint in terms of permanent troops compared to other regions, is very active in terms of training, cooperation, and targeted operations. The American strategy is not based on large troop deployments, but rather on a limited number of personnel (around 6,500 AFRICOM members across the continent) who work closely with African armed forces. The goal is to strengthen local capabilities and promote "burden sharing," encouraging African partners to take greater responsibility for their own security. Key activities include large-scale joint exercises such as African Lion 2025 (AL25), the largest annual military exercise in Africa which in 2025 involved over 40 nations and 10,000 soldiers in Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia, focusing on power projection and interoperability. Similarly, Justified Accord 2025 (JA25) is AFRICOM's largest exercise in East Africa, with approximately 1,300 personnel from over 15 countries in Kenya, Djibouti, and Tanzania, aimed at strengthening responses to regional threats and humanitarian crises. Flintlock 2025 focuses on special operations to combat terrorism, while the "Express" series (Obangame Express and Cutlass Express) enhances maritime security and counters piracy.

The United States continues to conduct targeted counter-terrorism operations, particularly against groups like al-Shabaab in Somalia and ISIS-Somalia, with numerous airstrikes in Somalia often in coordination with the Somali federal government. Bases and cooperation sites are strategically positioned: Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti remains the hub of U.S. operations in Africa, hosting around 4,000 personnel and serving as a crucial hub. Despite the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Agadez base in Niger in 2024, the United States is exploring new options for drone intelligence and reconnaissance operations in the coastal strip of West Africa (e.g., Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo). The Simba airport hub in Manda Bay, Kenya, is another important installation. In total, AFRICOM has a network of about 34 military installations, including 14 main bases and 20 secondary ones, more or less visible, in countries such as Somalia, Niger, Kenya, Mali, and Cameroon. There is a clear shift in emphasis in AFRICOM's message, moving away from traditional "governance and development" rhetoric to emphasize the need for African partners to take greater responsibility for their own security, promoting "independent operations" and "burden sharing." This aligns with a push by the Trump administration (though it's 2025, the strategic imprint may reflect earlier decisions or continuity) towards a leaner, more lethal approach, with a focus on homeland defense and a reduced military footprint abroad. In summary, the U.S. military presence in Africa in 2025 is dynamic and flexible, focused on strengthening African partners' capabilities through exercises and training, and conducting targeted operations against terrorist threats, all while maintaining a contained but strategically positioned physical footprint.

China's Port Expansion in Africa: A Strategic Project

A significant concern surrounding China's extensive port development in Africa is the possibility of converting commercial ports to military activities. China's development of the Port of Doraleh in Djibouti, initially presented as a purely commercial initiative, was expanded to host a naval facility in 2017, serving as a model for potential future arrangements elsewhere on the continent. Chinese state-owned enterprises are active players – as builders, financiers, or operators – in approximately 78 ports in 32 African countries. Many of these ports possess specifications that allow them to berth People's Liberation Army Navy vessels or host them for port calls. Beyond direct development, Chinese companies also handle military logistics at numerous African ports; for instance, the Chinese state-owned enterprise Hutchison Ports holds a 38-year concession from the Egyptian Navy to manage a terminal at the Abu Qir naval base.

While concrete data on further confirmed military bases beyond Djibouti remains limited, evidence suggests a broader strategy. Of the 78 African ports with Chinese company involvement, 36 have already hosted PLA port calls or military exercises. This demonstrates that these ports possess the necessary design characteristics to support Chinese naval flotillas, making them potential candidates for future PLA naval bases. Port Sudan, strategically located along the Red Sea, has attracted significant Chinese commercial and geopolitical interest, facilitating access to this vital maritime corridor. China's extensive investments in dual-use port infrastructure across Africa, particularly along the Red Sea, represent a deliberate "co-located commercial and military infrastructure strategy." This strategy provides Beijing with plausible deniability, progressively expanding its logistical options and potential basing locations, creating a network of access points that could be militarized in a crisis. The consistent involvement of Chinese companies in port development, coupled with documented PLA naval activity at these facilities, strongly suggests a systematic effort to establish military access under the guise of commercial ventures. This allows for the creation of latent capabilities and pre-positioning of logistical support without overt military declarations.

Why is China investing so heavily in port construction in Africa? Africa is rich in resources, but backward infrastructure prevents effective export. Especially in terms of maritime transport, capacities are insufficient. The construction of these infrastructures brings enormous economic benefits to China itself. It allows for stable and lasting political cooperation with mineral-producing countries, increasing the potential for resource supply, reducing procurement costs, and increasing bargaining power in the international market. Furthermore, it enables China to accumulate technology and experience and to export its production capacity, given that domestic infrastructure is now saturated.

What great opportunities can these ports offer? At the national level for Beijing, this will enable smoother trade with more countries, transforming resource potential into local development potential and offering greater economic development opportunities for neighboring countries. For example, the Port of Doraleh in Djibouti, managed by Chinese companies, is connected to Ethiopia by the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, making it the main seaport for this landlocked country.

To the west of Doraleh port is the Chinese global support base in Djibouti, which provides logistical support to the Chinese Navy's escort fleet in the Gulf of Aden. The Chinese military port is also located there. Finally, it is crucial to emphasize that all commercial ports have a dual civil and military use. This conference specifically highlighted the dual use of Chinese commercial ports and navy, including military use.

A Broader Chinese Military Commitment in Africa

China's comprehensive approach in Africa extends beyond arms sales and includes increased military cooperation through training programs, technology transfers, and joint exercises. Between 2017 and 2022, China provided $100 million in military aid to African nations, and in the same period, it exported three times more weapons to sub-Saharan Africa than the United States. Chinese troops have also used Chinese-built naval and land facilities for their exercises, such as the Kigamboni naval base in Tanzania and the Awash Arba technical war school in Ethiopia.

These activities strengthen China's presence in regions such as East Africa, potentially compromising U.S. interests and future naval operations. Deepening military ties could enable China to deploy naval and air assets in key positions to protect its Indian Ocean trade routes and critical resources like oil in the event of a future conflict. Chinese military exercises with African states, such as "Peace Unity-2024" with Tanzania and Mozambique, represent another area of military cooperation with significant strategic consequences for the United States and its allies. China's comprehensive military engagement in Africa (arms sales, aid, training, exercises), often intertwined with BRI investments, creates a multilayered framework for long-term strategic dominance and resource security. This strategy aims to cultivate dependence and influence, potentially enabling future military access or support along critical maritime corridors, even in the absence of overt bases beyond Djibouti. The combination of extensive infrastructure investments through the BRI and growing military cooperation, including the use of Chinese-built facilities for PLA exercises, reveals a cohesive and long-term strategy to protect resources, control trade routes, and build deep relationships that could provide future military leverage and access across the continent.

The Strategic Repositioning of the United States and New Global Dynamics

A significant event in this dynamic is the announced withdrawal by the U.S. Department of Defense on April 25, 2024, of most of its troops from Niger. Niger has been a key security partner for the United States in the Sahel region, hosting the largest U.S. drone base in West Africa at Agadez, built for over $100 million and used for counter-terrorism.

After 9/11, the primary motivation for U.S. military deployment in Africa was to combat terrorist forces. However, some Chinese military commentators suggest that the concentration of U.S. military force in Africa could accelerate the transfer of troops to the West African coastal region. This is because U.S. officials believe that Russia and China, and the African countries aligned with them, now pose a greater risk to U.S. interests than terrorist organizations.

The U.S. military strategy in Africa is therefore gradually shifting from counter-terrorism to great power competition. The Biden administration has proposed a "decade-long strategy for preventing conflict and promoting stability" for the West African coastal region. In January 2024, the U.S. military began negotiations with West African countries such as Ivory Coast, Benin, and Ghana to host drone bases. In March 2024, coinciding with the repeal of the military agreement between Niger and the United States, the U.S. State Department pledged to transfer military assistance from the Sahel to the West African coast to support the counter-terrorism capabilities of countries in the region.

According to Beijing military expert Li Hai, the withdrawal from Niger, although mandatory, aligns with a broader strategic adjustment by the United States in Africa. However, Peter Fan, former U.S. special envoy for the Sahel issue, warns that the withdrawal will result in the loss of "strategic military assets difficult to replace" for the United States and its allies.

An element that further highlights the growing complexity of global dynamics and Africa's role is the discovery, made by Ukraine in 2024, of a factory producing Iranian-designed drones using Chinese components and labor from East Africa. This facility in Russia, which relies on Iranian logistical and design networks, Chinese components, and labor from East Africa, is believed to provide Moscow with a long-term advantage in drone warfare.

Benin: A Case Study of Chinese Influence in West Africa

In 2024, China further consolidated its presence in Africa by donating howitzers and other weapons and equipment to the armed forces of Benin to help them combat terrorism. Benin, a country with a population of approximately 13.4 million, is facing a growing terrorist threat in its northern border areas with Burkina Faso and Niger. Analysts from the Oslo Peace Institute highlighted that these arms donations by Beijing are a clear demonstration of strengthening military cooperation, aimed at fostering mutually beneficial relations and promoting long-term economic and political exchanges between China and Africa.

Cooperation between China and Benin intensified last September when Benin's President Talon visited China, and the two countries announced the establishment of a strategic partnership. Relations between Benin and Niger became strained after the military coup in Niger last July. However, Beijing's influence helped unblock the situation: on May 15, 2024, a Chinese delegation, including a representation from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), met with President Talon, and four days later (May 19), a ship carrying one million barrels of crude oil from Niger was cleared to sail from the port of Seme, Benin, bound for China.

China has long sought to strengthen military cooperation with African countries by donating or selling military equipment, as well as providing funding for training and infrastructure, including military aircraft. Observers believe that Beijing views the donation of weapons and equipment as a cost-effective way to build trust between the Chinese and other countries' armed forces, while promoting strategic cooperation.

According to a 2022 study by the Oslo Peace Research Institute, over the past 20 years, China has provided military assistance to a total of 47 African countries, with Zimbabwe and Angola receiving the majority of weapons and training. Currently, China is one of the main arms suppliers to the African continent, offering a wide range of equipment, including light and small arms, armed drones, heavy equipment such as armored vehicles and tanks, naval vessels, high-performance aircraft, and missile systems.

Furthermore, according to data collected by the Boston University's Center for Global Development Policy, from 2000 to 2022, Beijing granted loans worth $30 billion to eight African countries to ensure the supply of military equipment and improve the military infrastructure of these countries' armies.

Beijing's "Silent Ideological War" in Africa

China's "conquest" of Africa, which began in the 1950s, is considered a fundamental part of Beijing's "silent war" against the West. As early as 1965, Mao Zedong's China was seen as a threat, accused of a "chauvinistic and racist policy similar to Nazism." China's strategy aimed to incite parties to recruit revolutionary agents and to uplift underdeveloped countries under Chinese leadership, influencing world politics and forming a monolithic bloc in international institutions.

This historical vision is reflected in China's current actions. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, an ultra-Maoist and ultra-nationalist, China aims to build a "modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious" by 2049, the centenary of the People's Republic of China, by reconfiguring the world order from a Sinocentric perspective.

China's influence in Africa is now pervasive, extending to almost all aspects of African societies, from agriculture to natural resources, from trade to logistics. China controls about 12% of African industrial output, and Chinese companies have captured almost 50% of the African construction market.

The CCP began solidifying ties with Africa in the 1950s, providing liberation movements with weapons, money, and "political" and military education. This history laid the groundwork for the current penetration into modern African economies, and many of the current African leaders, or their fathers, were trained in China. China's desire to extract minerals often compels it to solidify ties with authoritarian African regimes.

The CCP is establishing itself as a significant military presence in Africa, holding regular training exercises with continental armies and navies. It has established 61 Confucius Institutes in 46 African countries, educational centers designed to counter Western ideals of democracy and promote Chinese culture and language. Beijing has also built a "Leadership School" in Tanzania, where party officials instruct African leaders on anti-democratic governance methods.

The Xi Jinping regime is encouraging some of Africa's major economies, including South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, to "de-dollarize," meaning to move away from the U.S. dollar as a trade currency and begin using Chinese currency.

China's massive infrastructure projects in Africa over the past two decades, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have helped the country access the rare earth minerals that have driven its economic growth. While presented as a development program, many analysts see the BRI as China's attempt to gain political and economic influence over 150 developing nations and access to wealth and resources.

The Race for Minerals and Geopolitical Implications

China has made significant investments in African mining and mineral extraction industries, especially in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. Chris Maroleng, an international affairs analyst at Good Governance Africa, stated that China's greatest success in Africa has been to establish itself as a "mining giant," securing access to metals and minerals that would otherwise be increasingly unavailable. Maroleng stressed that, unlike the United States and Western nations that "preached democracy and human rights," Beijing "saw African countries and ruling elites as true partners for development," interested in minerals without worrying about internal governance.

Unlike Western companies, China has invested in African metal and mineral industries despite political instability, conflict, and corruption. Since the mid-2000s, many multinational mining companies have sold their interests in Africa to China. A prime example is the case of cobalt in the DRC. In 2016, several American companies failed to maintain their cobalt mines in the DRC, and China quickly gained control. China Molybdenum bought a controlling stake in Tenke Fungurume, a huge copper and cobalt mine, for $2.65 billion in 2016, and another stake for $1.14 billion in 2019. This gave the "United States' greatest geopolitical enemy almost total control of one of the world's most strategically important minerals."

The conflict-ridden DRC is the world's richest country in terms of natural resources, with untapped deposits of raw minerals estimated at over $24 trillion. According to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, the DRC produces three-quarters of the world's cobalt, a metal used in "numerous diverse commercial, industrial, and military applications, many of which are strategic and critical." It is indispensable for the production of batteries for electric vehicles, computers, and mobile phones, and in "superalloys" for vehicle parts, modern weapon systems, and gas turbine engines. Some physicists suggest that in the future, cobalt could be used to make "dirty nuclear bombs."

A 2020 study by Andrew Gulley of the USGS found that most artisanal cobalt production in the DRC was processed by Chinese companies or exported to China. From 2000 to 2020, demand for cobalt in battery production grew 26-fold, with 82% of this growth occurring in China, and Chinese cobalt refinery production increased 78-fold.

Shirley Hargis, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, stated that the U.S. failure to maintain its stake in the cobalt sector resulted in the loss of "decades of financial and diplomatic investment." China now owns most of the DRC's large industrial cobalt mines. "Demand for metals and minerals like cobalt is skyrocketing, and of course China and Russia are smiling. They have unlimited access to minerals and cheap labor," Hargis said, adding that "they have political influence over many African governments. There are huge governance problems in Africa. They use all this to their advantage." Russia, in turn, has employed thousands of mercenaries across the continent to protect mineral resources, including illegal mining operations.

Toby Shapshak, a South African tech expert, attributed the situation in the DRC to "decades of U.S. neglect" of Africa's importance and its minerals. Although the Biden administration is trying to correct the mistakes, "it may be too late because much of Africa seems already committed to Beijing and Moscow." The U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, published by President Joe Biden in August 2022, acknowledged that the continent has the minerals needed to power the modern world.

Nii Simmonds, a senior fellow at the GeoTech Center in Washington, emphasized that "the next industrial revolution will be based on critical minerals and rare earths," many of which, like coltan, are strategic for defense and for modern technologies such as satellites, semiconductors, fiber optics, CAT scans, electric vehicle batteries, and smartphones. China has a "near monopoly" on these critical materials, holding 90% of the global market, much of which is imported from Africa. This monopoly could easily disrupt global supply chains for semiconductors and electric vehicles in the future.

Research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington has focused on the prospects for the United States to become more involved in African mining sectors, to diversify global supply chains and reduce reliance on a single nation or region. The African continent holds approximately 85% of the world's manganese, 80% of platinum and chromium, 47% of cobalt, 21% of graphite, and 6% of copper.

Hargis stated that to secure vital resources for Western supply chains and national security efforts, the United States should "incentivize and strengthen collaborative private sector partnerships with African countries that share democratic values and the rule of law." However, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh, a lecturer in international relations at Wits University in Johannesburg, noted that by insisting on these values, the United States "would close a lot of doors," given the situation in countries like the DRC or Zimbabwe.

Despite the challenges, the United States is making progress in accessing African rare earth mineral reserves, particularly through Washington's Lobito Corridor Project, a future 1,000-mile railway that will cross Angola and the DRC. Candice Moore, a U.S.-Africa relations specialist at Wits University, stated that the United States is building this railway to Angola's largest port on the Atlantic "because they are locked in competition with China for African rare earth minerals." The project will also help win "hearts and minds" by stimulating growth, trade, and investment.

China's Missteps and Growing Anti-Chinese Sentiment

Simmonds stated that the West should "capitalize" on China's "missteps" in Africa. He emphasized that China does not encourage its multinationals to invest where added value can be created or to open research or production centers in Africa. "Beijing instead focuses primarily on mineral extraction. Western countries can gain an advantage over Chinese competition by capitalizing on these shortcomings in Chinese investments and offering a more attractive partnership model," he stressed.

There is also a growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa following accusations over the years of labor abuses by Beijing's companies and even collusion with criminals. Security and intelligence analysts have reported that Chinese mining companies are collaborating with organized criminal groups, terrorists, and corrupt government officials to operate illegal mines in Africa and effectively steal precious minerals and metals. Several foreign and African diplomats have reported increasing tensions between Beijing and some African administrations, due to the evolving situation and the presence of Chinese criminals in their countries.

"There is clear evidence that Chinese mining companies have funded Islamic militants to disrupt legitimate mining activities in several African nations," said Jasmine Opperman, a security consultant at the University of Pretoria. "Apparently, when legal mining companies leave due to violent terrorist attacks, Chinese mining companies, sometimes backed by mafia-like groups, move in and take control of the mines," said the former South African intelligence agent.

David Ndii, a Kenyan economist and founder of the Institute of Economic Affairs of Kenya, stated that African governments are often "very naive when dealing with China," not understanding that Beijing's goal is to "dominate the market and the supply chain of key resources." He added that China is "a predator, not a partner" and that Africa must be "more assertive towards China."

The complex and dynamic interaction between the United States, China, and African countries will continue to define the continent's future and its global implications.

Donald Trump's American Stance in Africa

Donald Trump's policy in Africa, aimed at containing China's rise, is articulated through an "America First" strategy and a transactional approach. It focuses on strategic competition for critical minerals, considered essential for modern technologies, seeking to counterbalance Chinese influence in resource-rich countries like the DRC through initiatives such as the Energy Resource Governance Initiative (EGRI). The administration actively promotes U.S. private trade and investment, rather than humanitarian aid, envisioning greater use of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to incentivize American companies, excluding collaborations with Chinese entities and considering tax benefits. Targeted bilateral trade agreements are also pursued. At the diplomatic and military levels, the United States closely scrutinizes Chinese military cooperation, including port access and arms trade, and may apply countermeasures to African governments that engage militarily or logistically with Beijing, exerting pressure to reduce reliance on Chinese financing and infrastructure. Despite the rhetoric of "malign Chinese influence," the effectiveness of such condemnation in disengaging African states is variable. This posture is accompanied by a reduction in foreign and humanitarian aid, favoring a more transactional approach that views Africa primarily through the lens of competition with China and American domestic priorities. Nevertheless, some analysts suggest that this competition could offer African countries the opportunity to diversify their partnerships and negotiate more favorable terms, strengthening African agency and intra-African trade to reduce dependence on external powers. In summary, Trump's policy in Africa is predominantly oriented towards economic and strategic competition with China, focusing on resource control and U.S. private investment, with less emphasis on the traditional aid-based development agenda.