The New Geopolitical Game: De-dollarization, BRI and Chinese Military Advantage on the Russian Side

China and Russia, while presented as an equal partnership, are evolving into an asymmetric interdependence that favors Beijing. The conflict in Ukraine has become a strategic opportunity for China, which is exploiting it to distract the United States and the West, gaining a "distraction dividend" to pursue its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Russia, isolated by sanctions, has become a supplier of discounted energy and a crucial market for Chinese goods. China, in turn, provides Moscow with a financial and technological lifeline. This dynamic has accelerated de-dollarization and strengthened China's financial resilience, while the expansion of Chinese influence is seen in key areas such as the Arctic and Central Asia, where China is actively redefining the routes of its "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), consolidating its position in regions traditionally dominated by Moscow. This Chinese strategy is described as a "calculated gamble" aimed at a multipolar global order more favorable to Beijing's authoritarian interests, even at the expense of Russia's long-term strategic autonomy.

MOSCOW, RUSSIA - MAY 9 (RUSSIA OUT) Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, look at Russian officers during the wreath laying ceremony to the Unknown Soldiers' Tomb, marking the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi's Germany, May 9, 2025 in Moscow, Russia. President Putin has welcomed Chinese Leader Xi Jinping in Moscow for a four-day visit centred aroind Russia's 'Victory Day' celebrations, commemorated the end of the World War II. The trip marsk Xi's eleventh trip to Russia since becoming president. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images)

Strategic Synergy and the Management of China's Trilemma

The partnership between China and Russia is based on a deep strategic synergy, despite the differences in their approaches. Russia has pursued a strategy based on ideology and military force to challenge the unipolar order. Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Conference in 2007, in which he criticized a world with "a single center of power," marked Russia's transition from "fascination" with the West to "disappointment". The intervention in Georgia in 2008 was a move to "contain NATO forces" and protect strategic oil pipelines. Likewise, the 2022 operation in Ukraine was described as the only way to guarantee Russia's security. Russia seeks to promote cooperation based on "mutual respect" and to reform institutions like the WTO and the IMF.

On the other hand, China has used its growing economic power to influence the world order. This strategy has manifested through a series of economic initiatives and successes. China boasts the largest GDP in the world, both in terms of exchange rates ($30.3 trillion) and purchasing power parity ($31.6 trillion). China's international trade volume reached $3.6 trillion in 2022. The yuan has surpassed the euro as the second most used currency in global trade payments via SWIFT, and China is making agreements to conduct oil and gas transactions in yuan. China has also established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a potential competitor to the IMF and the World Bank to finance projects in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Strategic Advantage and Asymmetric Interdependence

The conflict in Ukraine has transformed this collaboration into an asymmetric relationship, with China holding a clear advantage. The most explicit benefit for China is the diversion of U.S. resources and attention from the Indo-Pacific. The words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who admitted that Beijing "cannot afford for Russia to lose the war" to keep the United States focused on Moscow and Kyiv, confirm this strategy. This situation gives China "strategic maneuvering room" to pursue its regional objectives.

Economic interdependence between China and Russia has reached record levels since the invasion. Total trade volume hit $190 billion in 2022 and $244.8 billion in 2024. China has become the main buyer of discounted Russian energy, importing significant volumes of oil (with an average 11% discount), gas (with a 50% increase in 2022), and coal (with a 20% increase in the same year). In return, China is the main supplier of industrial equipment and dual-use components to Russia, essential for its war machine. This has created a "captive market" for China, which strengthens its economic influence over Moscow and increases its resilience against future Western pressure.

This dynamic has also accelerated de-dollarization. Russia has embraced the Yuan for trade payments, which now accounts for 75% of its trade with China and 25% of its transactions with other countries. Its share in Russian import payments increased from 4% to 23% in 2022. The yuan has even surpassed the euro as the second most used currency in global payments via SWIFT, proving its growing weight.

However, before the start of the war in Ukraine, there was already an "overall trust deficit" and "divergent foreign-policy priorities" between the two countries. China was annoyed that Russia prioritized the Western market for its energy exports and was reluctant to allow a significant Chinese presence in its oil industry. At the same time, Russia was uncomfortable with the idea of becoming a simple "raw-material supplier" for the Chinese economy. These historical frictions show the complex nature of the relationship even before the conflict in Ukraine.

Military Collaboration and Access to Technology

Collaboration between Russia and China extends beyond the economy, manifesting in growing military and technological cooperation with far-reaching strategic implications. In recent years, the Chinese and Russian governments have intensified their ties, with China serving as an economic lifeline for Russia in the face of Western sanctions for the invasion of Ukraine.

The joint "Sea-2025" naval exercises began in the waters near the Russian port of Vladivostok. The two sides conducted "joint underwater rescue operations, anti-submarine operations, air and missile defense, and maritime combat". Four Chinese ships, including the missile destroyers Shaoxing and Urumqi, participated in the exercises along with Russian ships. After the exercises, the two countries conducted naval patrols in the "relevant waters of the Pacific". Vladivostok, the largest base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, was chosen for its strategic importance, facilitating cooperation and direct access to the ocean. Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, reiterated that these exercises are part of the annual military cooperation and are not directed against third countries. In addition to "Sea-2025," there have been exercises like "North-Joint 2024" and "Marine Security Belt 2025" with Iran, demonstrating growing coordination.

China provides Russia with essential components, so much so that about 80% of the critical electronics used in Russian drones are of Chinese origin. Russia is also training about 600 Chinese soldiers with tactics learned from the conflict, focusing on tank warfare, artillery, and air defense. China is thus acquiring real-time intelligence and captured Western technology from the Ukrainian battlefield. Ukrainian intelligence reports indicate that Beijing is supplying Russia with gunpowder and artillery.

Geopolitical Expansion and Influence in Key Areas

While Russia is focused on its European front, China is actively expanding its influence in regions traditionally under Moscow's control. The Arctic has become a key area of interest for both countries. Russia's isolation has made China a "suitable partner" for its Arctic plans, granting it unprecedented access and influence in the region to develop its "Polar Silk Road".

Central Asia, a traditional sphere of Russian influence, is becoming the focal point of Chinese expansion. Bilateral trade with the five Central Asian countries increased by 116% between 2013 and 2024. China is investing in key infrastructure projects, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), whose traffic increased by 62% in 2024, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with a cost of $8 billion, which will reduce transport times to Europe by 7-10 days. Furthermore, Beijing offers low-cost nuclear energy projects in Kazakhstan (for example, $2.8 billion for a 1 GW reactor), creating a "technological dependence" that replaces Russian influence.

Divergent Strategies and the View of Europe and NATO

The divergences in the perception of the role of the European Union and the different strategic challenges of China and Russia lead to distinct strategies to counter U.S. influence. Russia, which feels under a direct existential threat due to NATO expansion, has adopted an aggressive military posture to defend its "vital space" and has a narrow circle of allies. Consequently, Moscow expresses a pessimistic view on the future of the European Union, considering it in decline and with little chance of becoming a "significant pole". China, on the other hand, while recognizing Russia's economic vulnerability, has adopted a more flexible and diversified approach, based on its vast economic influence and extensive global diplomatic network. In this context, Beijing maintains a more pragmatic view of the EU, defining it as an "important pole" in a multipolar world, useful for balancing U.S. hegemony.

Conclusions: A Calculated Gamble with Risks and Advantages

The Sino-Russian partnership, while not an unlimited formal alliance, is a "higher-level" strategic relationship that challenges the existing international order. China is demonstrating a pragmatic and cautious approach. Although it has never denounced the war in Ukraine or called for the withdrawal of Russian troops, and is suspected of providing support to Moscow, China insists it is a neutral party. European leaders, however, have asked China to use its influence to pressure Russia to end the war. Its support is sufficient to sustain Russia without sacrificing its own strategic autonomy or incurring severe Western sanctions.

This calculated gamble will have lasting consequences, but Russia's growing dependence on China represents a significant long-term risk to its autonomy. Russia could see its strategic independence diminish, consolidating its role as a junior partner in a relationship increasingly defined by Beijing's opportunistic agenda.