The New Map of Trade: Russian ports, Chinese investments, NSR, and the reshaping of global balances

Gabriele Iuvinale
1 ora fa
Tempo di lettura: 14 min

Geography, Geopolitics, and Economics: An In-Depth Analysis

The interaction between Russia and China in the maritime and port sector is not an isolated phenomenon, but the tangible manifestation of a strategic partnership that, while not a formal military alliance, has been defined as "without limits." Following the invasion of Ukraine and the consequent isolation from Western markets, Russia has accelerated its "pivot to the east," rendering itself increasingly dependent on China as an economic partner and a buyer of its energy resources. In parallel, China, in a strategically calculated move, is leveraging this dependence to consolidate its own economic and security ambitions, particularly through the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The question of how many Russian ports are "managed" or "participated in" by Beijing, while numerically limited, reveals the profound nature of this cooperation: a pragmatic model where China offers capital and commercial demand in exchange for crucial access to alternative routes and infrastructure that ease the pressure on its internal logistics network. This report analyzes the geopolitical context, the selective role of Chinese investments, and Russia's vast strategy for modernizing its ports, highlighting an intricate game of interdependencies and mutual benefits, but also the risks and challenges that arise from it.

A Selective and Calculated Partnership

The analysis of the People's Republic of China's involvement in the maritime ports of the Russian Federation reveals a dynamic that goes beyond the simple buying and selling of infrastructure. It is not a widespread network of acquisitions, but rather a selective and highly targeted collaboration, with specific projects that reflect a deep alignment of strategic interests between the two countries, reinforced by the declared "no-limits partnership" and Moscow's international isolation.

The available information contradicts the idea of a massive Chinese presence with direct management, and instead reveals a series of pragmatic and targeted agreements. The partnership, described as "without limits," translates into a pragmatic and calculated approach in the maritime sector that focuses on two main cases: a proposed financial participation and a strategic concession for commercial transit.

The Geopolitical Context: The Logic of the "Pivot to the East" and the "Polar Silk Road"

To understand the "why" behind these investments, it is essential to frame the geopolitical and economic situation of Russia and China.

Starting with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, even more so, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has been progressively cut off from Western markets due to international sanctions. In this scenario, China has emerged as the key economic, commercial, and technological partner. Bilateral trade has reached a historic record of approximately $240 billion in 2024, with China becoming the main buyer of Russian oil and gas, providing vital economic support that helps finance the Kremlin's war efforts. The "pivot to the east" for Russia is therefore not an ideological choice, but a strategic imperative for its economic survival. The granting of access to ports and infrastructure projects is the price Moscow must pay to secure Beijing's support.

At the same time, China is pursuing its own global port strategy, an integral part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is manifested through stakes in dozens of ports in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These investments are seen as a strategic move for intelligence gathering on commercial flows, the potential disruption of maritime trade, and the pre-positioning of assets. China's involvement in Russian ports fits perfectly into this vision, but with a specific objective: the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which offers a shorter and safer alternative to the Suez Canal for trade between Asia and Europe. Climate change has made the Arctic a more navigable route, and China, recognizing its potential, has shown a strong interest in developing the so-called "Polar Silk Road." Russia, which controls most of the route and needs capital and technology, offers access in exchange for a partnership that allows it to develop its Arctic infrastructure.

Detailed Analysis of Chinese Involvement in Russian Ports

China's involvement is not limited to a simple use of Russian ports but is part of a complex strategy that aims to solve Beijing's internal logistical problems and strengthen its own supply chains. China's engagement in Russian ports is motivated by the need to relieve pressure on China's overloaded internal railway network, which struggles to transport goods from its northeastern regions to its southern regions, and to address congestion at the port of Dalian, which is no longer sufficient to handle the increase in cargo volumes. For this reason, China is strategically investing in creating logistics infrastructure and deep-water areas, particularly along the "Primorye 1" and "Primorye 2" routes.

Arkhangelsk: Chinese Capital for the Arctic Route

The case of the port of Arkhangelsk represents the only documented example of direct Chinese financial participation. The Chinese shipping company NewNew Shipping Line, which has already launched a commercial route on the Northern Sea Route, has shown explicit interest in investing up to $2.52 billion in the construction project for a deep-water port in Dvina Bay. In exchange for this significant investment, the Chinese company would acquire a 30% stake in the project. The investment aims to secure a physical and operational foothold for Beijing's "Polar Silk Road." The total cost of the project is estimated at $4.72 billion, and its completion is expected by 2032. The goal is to create a new terminal with a potential capacity of 25 million tons per year by 2040, allowing for the docking of larger vessels and year-round containerized traffic through the Arctic.

Vladivostok and the Primorye 1 Route

China's involvement in Vladivostok takes a different, but no less strategic, form. China has obtained authorization from the Russian government to use the port as a transit hub for internal trade, connecting the northeastern provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang with the southern regions of the country. This agreement allows goods to travel by land to Vladivostok and then by sea to southern China, significantly reducing transport costs and times. The agreement has strong symbolic and geopolitical value, given that Vladivostok (formerly known as Haishenwai) was ceded by the Chinese Empire to Russia in 1860. The reopening of this port for Chinese internal commercial purposes symbolizes a profound shift in the power dynamics between the two nations. Russia, while maintaining full sovereignty over the crucial naval base for its Pacific Fleet, grants essential commercial use to Beijing. The port of Vostochny, a deep-water port near Vladivostok, also serves as another important access point for Chinese goods arriving in the Russian Far East, operating within the same logic of enhancing cross-border connectivity.

Posyet, Slavyanka, and Zarubino: The Hubs of the Primorye 2 Route

In addition to Vladivostok, China is turning its attention to the small port towns of Posyet, Slavyanka, and Zarubino, which are part of the Primorye 2 route. These port towns, located in the Khasansky District, are the subject of significant expansion plans. The proposed port of Bolshoe Zarubino, in particular, could greatly increase cargo capacity, consolidating the role of these ports as crucial hubs for trade between China's northeastern provinces and Russia, and ensuring greater economic and supply chain security for Beijing.

Novorossiysk: The Commercial Ties that Bypass Sanctions

Beyond development projects, China maintains a purely commercial presence in other Russian ports. One example is Novorossiysk, on the Black Sea, where COSCO Shipping, one of China's largest state-owned shipping companies, has a local office. There is no indication that COSCO holds a stake or management role in the port. Its presence is aimed at providing shipping and logistics services to support bilateral trade, and following the invasion of Ukraine, it was one of the few shipping companies to continue operations in Russia, effectively bypassing the blockade by other Western companies.

Moscow's Autonomous Vision: A Vast Port Development Plan

As a complement to this partnership dynamic, Russia is pursuing its own vast maritime infrastructure development plan. The Russian government has approved a comprehensive infrastructure development plan that provides for the construction of 17 new sea terminals by 2036. The order approving the plan was signed on August 29, 2025, and was made public on September 8, 2025. These new terminals, which will be built in various ports across the country, will have a total cargo handling capacity of more than 200 million tons per year. The largest number of terminals, four in 2027 and five in 2028, will be commissioned between 2027 and 2028. In particular, the Far Eastern regions will receive the largest number of new port capacities.

Specific projects within this development plan include:

The Baltic Shipyard's marine terminal in St. Petersburg - 5 million tons per year (2027).
The terminal for transshipment of liquefied petroleum gases and stable gas condensate in the seaport of Sabetta - 9.7 million tons (2027).
The bulk cargo terminal in the seaport of Posiet - 10 million tons per year (2027).
The container terminal in the seaport of Posiet - 500 thousand TEU (2027).
The Coalstar coal terminal in the Eastern seaport - 17 million tons (2028).
The universal terminal in the area of Cape Nagleynin in the seaport of Pevek - 1.96 million tons (2028).
The terminal for transshipment of liquid chemical cargoes and mineral fertilizers in Ust-Luga - 8 million tons (2028).
The container terminal in Vladivostok - 322.9 thousand TEU (2028).
The Nikolskoye terminal in the seaport of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky - 0.015 million tons per year (2028).
The "Primorsky Metallurgical Plant" terminal - 2.1 million tons per year (2029).
The "Port Elga" coal terminal in the seaport of Vanino - 30 million tons (2029).
The "Seaport Aurora" oil loading terminal - 10 million tons (2029).
The "Seaport Aurora" coal terminal - 25 million tons (2030).
The "Ust-Luga" universal terminal - 24.3 million tons (2030).
The grain terminal in the seaport of Vysotsk - 4 million tons (2030).
The offshore transshipment complex for liquefied natural gas in Ura Bay in the seaport of Murmansk - 20.4 million tons per year (2032).
The marine oil loading pier in Ulysses Bay in Vladivostok - 0.55 million tons (2036).

This plan demonstrates that, while welcoming Chinese investments in key sectors, Russia maintains its own development strategy, particularly in the Far Eastern regions, which are crucial for its "pivot" towards Asia. Other recent and specific developments highlight this strategy of control and autonomous development:

The Center for the Development of Port Infrastructure acquired a 25% stake in SDS-Ugl in the capital of the commercial port of Lavna, near Murmansk, increasing its stake to 95%, with the remaining 5% held by the State Transport Leasing Company.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in July 2025 prohibiting foreign ships from entering Russian ports without the consent of the FSB, the federal security agency.
The commercial port of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky was nationalized by a decision of the Leninsky District Court in Vladivostok in May 2025, following a lawsuit by the Prosecutor General's Office for the confiscation of property obtained in violation of anti-corruption legislation.
In July 2025, Norilsk Nickel announced an investment of 21.5 billion rubles in the development of the port of Dudinka, aiming to increase its cargo turnover to 5 million tons per year by 2030.
The new port of Lavna near Murmansk was officially commissioned and began commercial activity in March 2025, with total investments of over 87 billion rubles.

2024 Port Traffic Data and Developments

As a testament to Russia's resilience and ambition in the maritime sector, the country's ports showed significant growth in container traffic in 2024. According to Mortsentr-TEK, the total volume of containers handled in Russian ports has reached 5.591 million TEU, with an increase of 12.7% compared to the previous year.

The ranking of the top 10 Russian ports by container handling in 2024 is as follows:

Vladivostok: 1.645 million TEU (+8.3%)
Great Port of St. Petersburg: 1.374 million TEU (+31.3%)
Novorossiysk: 1.066 million TEU (+6.5%)
Vostochny: 547 thousand TEU (-14.4%)
Kaliningrad: 252.7 thousand TEU (+49.2%)
Nakhodka: 150 thousand TEU (2.4 times increase)
Korsakov: 143.6 thousand TEU (-0.2%)
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: 108.9 thousand TEU (-2.6%)
Magadan: 80.9 thousand TEU (+3.3%)
Dudinka: 64.2 thousand TEU (+0.5%)

Growth dynamics were evident in several sea basins: the Baltic basin has recorded a significant increase of 34.5%, while the Far Eastern basin, while maintaining the largest volume with 2.687 million TEU, has grown by 4.6%. The Arctic basin saw a 17.7% increase to 193.8 thousand TEU.

These data are supported by a series of new openings and acquisitions that took place in 2024:

In December 2024, the marine terminal in Pionersky in the Kaliningrad region, which cost 7.4 billion rubles to build, began regularly receiving ships.
In early October 2024, the universal terminal Lugaport, which cost 90 billion rubles, received its first Post-Panamax class vessel.
In September 2024, the new specialized port Sukhodol was launched in the Far East, at a cost of 51.8 billion rubles. The infrastructure, which has its own railway line, is dedicated to small and medium-sized coal companies.
In April 2024, the port of Korsakov on Sakhalin was purchased by Russian businessman Sergei Shishkarev.
The construction of a new universal port in Murmansk for 20 billion rubles was announced to be completed by 2028.
In 2024, 400 billion rubles were allocated for the construction of seaports in Russia by 2030, with 100 billion from federal funds and 300 billion from private investors.

The Financing Question: Who Pays for the Russian Port Network?

Russia's ambitious infrastructure development plan, which includes the construction of 17 new terminals, raises a crucial question: in a context of sanctions and rising military costs, can Russia finance these colossal projects alone? The analysis suggests a hybrid model in which Russian state funding is supplemented, and in some cases made possible, by strategic Chinese capital and investment.

The Kremlin's Contribution

The Russian government has allocated significant federal resources for the development of its fleet and maritime infrastructure. An investment of over 500 billion rubles (about $6.2 billion) over six years has been announced to support shipbuilders and shipowners. This budget is earmarked for the construction of more than 1,600 ships by 2036, with priority given to vessels for the Northern Sea Route and the North-South transport corridor. While Russia is trying to expand its domestic production capabilities, it admits the need to attract investors to achieve these ambitious goals. The Kremlin's financial commitment to modernizing the maritime sector is a clear reaction to sanctions, but its long-term sustainability is called into question by economic difficulties.

Dependence on China and the Logic of Co-production

International sanctions have significantly limited Russia's ability to access Western financial markets and key technologies. This economic pressure has pushed Moscow into an increasing dependence on Beijing, which has become an "irreplaceable" economic and technological partner. A clear example of this dynamic is the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Although a preliminary agreement has been signed, China has not yet finalized the terms (price and delivery times), maintaining significant negotiating power and demonstrating that its support is not unconditional, but strategically calculated.

In the port sector, this logic translates into selective collaboration, where China directly finances projects that serve its long-term interests:

Direct investments in port infrastructure: The Chinese company NewNew Shipping Line has offered to invest up to $2.52 billion in the deep-water port of Arkhangelsk in exchange for a 30% stake. The investment aims to secure a physical and operational foothold for Beijing's "Polar Silk Road."
Financing of related projects: A consortium including the Chinese company CNPC has provided $12 billion in loans for the Yamal LNG project, which is centered on the port of Sabetta. The Chinese state-owned Silk Road Fund has also acquired a stake in the project. In addition, a subsidiary of the state-owned giant China Poly Group has invested $300 million in a coal terminal in Murmansk.
Development of cross-border logistics infrastructure: As evidence of the Chinese approach, China is building a dry port in the city of Suifenhe, on the border with Russia's Primorsky Krai region, with an investment of about $17 million. This project, while located on Chinese territory, is entirely dedicated to facilitating trade with Russia, improving cross-border logistics flows.

In summary, while Russia's port development plan is primarily financed with federal funds, Russia is actively seeking and welcoming Chinese capital for the most strategic and capital-intensive projects, especially in the Arctic. The Kremlin's isolation and economic difficulties make it a necessary partner for Beijing, but in an asymmetric negotiating position that increasingly benefits China, which gains access to the resources and routes it needs without assuming full control and risks of the Russian infrastructure network.

The Northern Sea Route: The Core of the Maritime Partnership

The common thread linking all port cooperation projects between Russia and China is the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). This Arctic route offers a significantly shorter maritime path between Asia and Europe compared to traditional routes through the Suez Canal, reducing the distance by about 8,000 km and transit times by nine to fourteen days, with significant cost and time savings.

Cooperation between the two countries for the development of this navigation route has also been formalized through a joint venture between the Russian company Rosatom, which oversees route traffic, and the Chinese company NewNew Shipping. This operational partnership is a joint response to global challenges, from climate change making the route more accessible to geopolitical crises making traditional passages insecure, such as the attacks in the Red Sea. The partnership on Arctic ports is the operational materialization of this long-term strategy. Russia has geographical control and sovereignty over the route, while China has the capital, technology, and commercial demand, creating a synergy that strengthens the interests of both nations.

Arctic Navigation Data and Risks (2025 Season)

A recent report from the Norwegian Center for High North Logistics (CHNL) provided an updated picture of traffic halfway through the 2025 shipping season. Between June and the end of August, 52 transit voyages were recorded, with a total volume of 1.3 million tons of cargo, an increase compared to the 48 voyages in the same period last year. The vast majority of these flows originated or were destined for Russia and China. Only a few selected voyages were destined for South Korea, which aspires to a more important role in the future.

The cargo flows along the route are mainly composed of natural resources and containers. Thirteen tankers have transited, carrying about 5.5 million barrels of oil, mostly destined for China. It has been noted that some of these ships lack ice protection, a significant risk factor in Arctic waters. In addition, two tankers from the so-called "shadow fleet" have departed from the Barents Sea bound for China. Solid bulk cargo traffic (iron, coal) amounted to about 290,000 tons, with all voyages taking place between Russian and Chinese ports or within Russia. Container transport is also growing, with 10 recorded voyages connecting Chinese ports such as Shanghai and Qingdao with Russian ports like St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk. However, a new Chinese container transport service to major Western European ports (Rotterdam and Hamburg) is scheduled to start in September.

One of the main problems highlighted is the traffic imbalance, with a strong tilt in the eastbound direction from Russia to China. The analysis shows that only 3% of the total cargo volume traveled in the opposite direction.

Furthermore, the report raises serious concerns about safety and compliance with sanctions. Shipping expert Norvard Kjerstad has noted a growing number of ships without ice-class designation navigating the route, increasing the risk of accidents. The case of the tanker Mires, a "zero ice-class" vessel that obtained permission from Moscow to navigate the route without icebreaker escort, is an example of this trend. The tanker is on the sanctions lists of Ukraine and the United Kingdom, and Ukrainian authorities consider it part of the "shadow fleet" that evades sanctions. The expert Ksenia Vakhrusheva from the environmental organization Bellona stressed that Russian authorities tend to neglect environmental risks and that some shadow fleet ships navigate with their AIS systems turned off. The potential transport of sanctioned or dual-use goods along the route, although difficult to prove, remains a concrete concern.

Table 1: Overview of Chinese Involvement in Russian Ports

Ports	Chinese company	Type of Involvement	Details of the Agreement	Strategic Relevance
Arkhangelsk	NewNew Shipping Line	Proposed shareholding arrangement	Proposal to invest up to $2.52 billion for a 30% stake in a deep-water port project.	Key staging point for the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
Vladivostok	Chinese Government/GACC	Strategic use/Concession	Authorization for use as a transit port for internal trade from Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces.	Reduced transport costs/times; geopolitical symbolism in the partnership.
Novorossiysk	COSCO Shipping	Commercial presence/Services	Office for providing shipping and logistics services.	Maintenance of commercial flows between Russia and China, bypassing international sanctions.

Table 2: Comparison between the Northern Sea Route and Traditional Asia-Europe Routes

Route	Distance (approx.)	Travel Time (approx.)	Key Advantages	Disadvantages/Constraints
Northern Sea Route (NSR)	14,000 km (Dalian-Rotterdam)	-9 days (compared to Suez)	Reduced distance; shorter transport times; lower costs; alternative to the Red Sea.	Climatic constraints; need for icebreaker ships; Russian passage rights; high insurance costs.
Via Suez Canal Route	22,000 km (Dalian-Rotterdam)	Varies, but 9-14 days longer	Consolidated route; fewer climatic constraints; advanced port infrastructures along the route.	Bottlenecks; geopolitical risks (e.g., Red Sea); high toll costs; waiting times.

Conclusions

The answer to the initial question, "how many Russian ports are managed or participated in by China?", is that China does not hold a vast network of control. Its direct involvement is limited to a single proposed participation project (Arkhangelsk) and a strategic concession for the use of a key port (Vladivostok), in addition to the commercial presence of fundamental players like COSCO. This absence of generalized control should not be interpreted as a lack of interest, but as a reflection of a targeted strategy and a partnership that balances mutual interests.

The nature of these agreements is not one of hostile acquisition, but of a calculated partnership. China provides the capital and commercial demand, while Russia offers access to critical routes and resources, while maintaining sovereign control over its own infrastructure. This cooperation represents an example of how economic and strategic interests can forge a de facto alliance, even in the absence of a formal military alliance and unconditional trust between the parties. Russia, due to its isolation, is forced to grant access to sectors it would once have jealously guarded, while China leverages this opportunity to diversify its trade routes in an increasingly volatile global context.