The Price of Chinese Wind: European Competitiveness and Strategic Risks in the Rise of Ming Yang
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 27 giu
- Tempo di lettura: 18 min
Key Points
Aggressive Expansion in Critical Sectors: Chinese wind giant Ming Yang Smart Energy has entered the European market starting with Italy (Taranto, future Med Wind project with plans for local production in Taranto and Brindisi—cities crucial for the Italian Navy and NATO), then solidifying its presence in the UK (Scotland) and Germany (Waterkant project, currently under security review).
Alleged Deep Ties to the Chinese State and PLA: Ming Yang isn't just a commercial entity; it has structural connections with the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party, including the founder's military background and the alleged integration of PLA veterans into key positions.
The Threat of China's National Intelligence Law (NIL): This law mandates that all Chinese entities and individuals, even abroad, cooperate with Beijing's intelligence services. This legal obligation turns installed technology into a potential vector for espionage and sabotage, thanks to its dangerous extraterritoriality.
Multiple Risks to Energy Security: Concerns range from the potential presence of "kill switches" and undisclosed remote access devices (in both wind turbines and solar inverters) to critical dependence on Chinese supply chains, the risk of sensitive data theft and espionage, and the political leverage China can exert through its influence on vital infrastructure.
Devastating Economic Impact on European Industry: Massive Chinese state subsidies distort the market, enabling "dumping" practices that threaten the survival of European manufacturers (e.g., Siemens Gamesa, Vestas) and jeopardize industrial autonomy and jobs in the renewables sector.
Evolving but Growing European Awareness: While Germany has adopted a targeted action plan on cybersecurity and dependency reduction, the UK has received direct warnings from the US (including from President Donald Trump) and is considering restrictions. Italy is using its "Golden Power" to protect national interests. The EU has launched subsidy investigations, and Lithuania has legislated on remote access to inverters, highlighting a growing, though not yet fully coordinated, response.
Broad Infiltration into European Infrastructure: Concerns extend beyond Ming Yang, with Chinese energy giants acquiring significant stakes in key companies and projects across several European countries (e.g., CTG in EDP, State Grid in CDP Reti in Italy), solidifying a strategic presence.
Need for a Cohesive European Strategic Vision: The investigation concludes by emphasizing Europe's imperative to balance climate goals with national security, investing in its own industry, strengthening regulation, and building alliances to safeguard its energy and digital sovereignty long-term.
Ming Yang Smart Energy, a Chinese wind energy giant, is expanding into Europe, raising questions and concerns, particularly regarding potential national security and industrial risks. While the company establishes itself with significant projects in the UK, Germany, and Italy, authoritative voices, including from the US administration, are warning about its ties to Beijing and the possibility of espionage or sabotage. This growing concern is fueled by a broader context of Chinese civil-military integration and recent discoveries of vulnerabilities in Chinese-made energy components.
Ming Yang's Conquest of Europe: From Apulia to Scotland
Ming Yang's European journey actually began in Italy, a significant detail often overlooked. In 2021, the company entered the European offshore wind market with the Taranto project, Italy's first offshore wind farm (now operational). Here, Ming Yang supplied its MySE 3.0-135 turbines, replacing the initially planned Senvion technology. This initial investment in Italy paved the way for rapid expansion.
Shortly after delivering the Taranto wind turbines in October 2021, Ming Yang announced it had secured a second offshore wind contract in Europe for a floating wind project that would use the company's 11 MW hybrid drive model. Its presence then solidified in the United Kingdom, where in December 2021, the UK Department for International Trade (DIT) and Ming Yang Smart Energy signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a proposed investment in a blade manufacturing factory, a service center, and potentially a turbine assembly factory in the UK. Currently, the UK has made it clear that further Chinese involvement in its energy sector is politically untenable, even buying back a Chinese stake in a nuclear power project. Further steps in the UK include the company's trading on the Shanghai segment of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in July 2022, and Hexicon selecting Ming Yang as the preferred turbine supplier for its 32 MW TwinHub floating offshore wind project in September 2022. In 2023, the strategic partnership with Opergy Group further reinforced Ming Yang's goal of accelerating the development of UK offshore wind projects. Ming Yang is also reportedly being considered as a preferred supplier for the Green Volt project in Scotland, said to be Europe's first large-scale commercial floating wind farm.
The expansion also reached Germany. In July 2024, Luxcara signed a preferred supplier agreement with Ming Yang Smart Energy for the Waterkant offshore wind project in the German North Sea, where the German clean energy asset manager plans to install Ming Yang's 18.5 MW wind turbines. However, national security concerns are tangible: the German Ministry of Defense (BMVg) is currently reviewing the approval process for the "Waterkant" offshore wind farm, operated by Waterkant Energy GmbH and German investor Luxcara, for reasons of "security for national and alliance defense." The BMVg has until May 26 to submit an official statement, and a recent German report urged Germany to block Chinese suppliers from ongoing and future wind energy projects.
Beyond these specific cases, available information indicates that Ming Yang has primarily consolidated its presence in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany regarding offshore wind projects in Europe.
The Italian Case in Detail: Med Wind and Strategic Investment
In Italy, in July 2024, Renexia, developer of Italy's first offshore wind farm (Beleolico in Taranto), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ming Yang Smart Energy and Minister Adolfo Urso from the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy (MIMIT). This agreement is particularly significant as it foresees not only the supply of wind turbines but also the production of Ming Yang wind turbine blades directly in Italy.
The planned investment is EUR 500 million for the creation of a new Italian-Chinese company that will manage turbine production nationwide. This new entity will initially focus on manufacturing key components for the Med Wind project, the largest floating offshore wind farm in the Mediterranean. Renexia explained that it chose Ming Yang's 18.8 MW model, an option that will reduce the total number of turbines from 190 to 148. This will lead to a decrease in both environmental impact and maintenance costs, a key factor for the project's sustainability.
Ming Yang was also chosen for its ability to ensure delivery by the first half of 2026, the timeframe by which Renexia plans to begin installation work for the first of the four phases of the 2.8 GW Med Wind project. The new company, a joint venture between Ming Yang and Renexia, commits to identifying a suitable manufacturing site, in agreement with the government, within 90 days. This production hub is expected to create approximately 1,100 jobs, a point highlighted by MIMIT as crucial for Italian industrial development.
The Med Wind project, with an installed capacity of 2.8 GW, is proposed to be built off the coast of Trapani, approximately 60 kilometers from the Italian coast, at a site covering 850 square kilometers. Once fully operational, the floating wind farm will be able to generate about 9 TWh of electricity per year, equivalent to the energy needs of 3.4 million households, and the energy produced will be transmitted and distributed directly to Sicily. On August 8, Renexia also presented the project's Environmental Impact Study, following a series of environmental and feasibility studies.
It's important to note that Ming Yang is also planning to establish a production site in Brindisi for the manufacturing of power cables to connect offshore wind farms to the electricity grid. Both Taranto and Brindisi are crucial Italian cities for the activities of the Italian Navy and NATO, which adds another layer of complexity and sensitivity to the security concerns.
Who is Ming Yang Smart Energy: A Colossus with Deep Roots
Ming Yang Smart Energy Group Limited (also known as Mingyang Wind Power Group Limited) is not a marginal player in the global energy landscape. Founded in 2006 and headquartered in Zhongshan, Guangdong Province, China, the company has rapidly established itself as one of the world's leading wind turbine manufacturers and renewable energy solution providers. It is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (and, since 2022, on the Shanghai segment of the London Stock Exchange), attesting to its economic stature and its ability to attract international investment.
Ming Yang's core business revolves around the design, manufacturing, sales, and service of wind turbines, with a strong emphasis on offshore technologies, where it has become a recognized leader in developing high-power turbines and floating solutions. The company is also active in wind and solar project development and energy management services.
However, like many large Chinese enterprises, the nature of its ownership and its relationships with the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are under scrutiny. While formally a private company, the Chinese economic context makes it difficult for any large entity to operate without a significant degree of state influence or control. Often, these companies benefit from government subsidies, privileged access to capital, and strategic directives that align with Beijing's geopolitical objectives. This blend of corporate and state interests is a primary source of concern for Western countries.
The Alleged Connections with the Chinese Government and the People's Liberation Army (PLA): The Legal Mandate to Cooperate
The alleged connections of Ming Yang with the Chinese government and the CCP are not always as direct and transparent as with state-owned enterprises, but they are omnipresent in the Chinese economic model and fall within China's strategy of civil-military integration.
Subsidies and Political Support: China's renewable energy sector has been heavily subsidized and promoted by the government as part of its industrial development and energy security strategy. Companies like Ming Yang have benefited from this favorable environment, including tax incentives, preferential loans from state banks, and support in export policies. This support isn't without strings attached; companies are often required to cooperate with state directives.
Party Influence and Alleged PLA Ties: Chinese law mandates the presence of CCP "cells" within companies, both state-owned and private, tasked with ensuring that company operations align with Party policy. Adding to this are personal connections: Ming Yang Group founder and chairman, Zhang Chuanwei, reportedly joined the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978, applying for CCP membership at 18. A Chinese-language profile and interview posted on the Guangdong Department of Veterans Affairs website state that "the Ming Yang Group Party Committee... has entrusted important tasks to retired soldiers, placing them in important frontline positions, key projects, and assault tasks." This alleged civil-military integration in the renewable energy sector is part of China's broader strategy to use new energy technologies for military purposes and enhance national energy security.
The Obligation to Cooperate with Intelligence (NIL) and its Extraterritoriality: Beyond company committees, the Chinese National Intelligence Law (NIL) is a crucial and often underestimated element. This law, particularly Article 7, compels all Chinese individuals and entities, whether within China or abroad, to support and cooperate with state intelligence operations, both civilian and military. The inherent danger of this provision lies precisely in its extraterritoriality: the law remains effective even within foreign states. This means that, regardless of the individual managers' intentions or the corporate structure, a Chinese company like Ming Yang can be legally obligated to provide sensitive data, system access, or any other assistance requested by Chinese intelligence services, even when operating on European soil. This legal framework transforms potential cooperation into a mandatory requirement, exponentially increasing the risks of espionage and potential sabotage for host countries.
"Made in China 2025" Strategy and Critical Infrastructure: Renewable energy falls within the strategic objectives of "Made in China 2025." The promotion of national champions like Ming Yang for technology export and market share acquisition in European critical infrastructure aligns perfectly with this ambition.
Alleged Indirect Ties: It's not uncommon for senior executives in private companies to have backgrounds in the military, intelligence services, or the Party. These connections, even if not formalized in operational roles, can influence decisions and foster cooperation with the state apparatuses. Some sources, including German government defense think tanks, have warned that allowing Chinese companies like Ming Yang to supply wind energy equipment carries technological, political, and supply chain risks due to their alleged ties to the Communist Party and the military.
Impact on European Competitiveness: An Economic and Strategic Battle
Beyond the direct national security implications, the aggressive expansion of Chinese companies in the renewable energy sector raises profound concerns about the competitiveness and survival of European industry. European wind turbine manufacturers, such as Siemens Gamesa, Vestas, and Enercon, once undisputed leaders in the global market, are now facing unsustainable pressure.
This scenario is largely due to unfair trade practices, including massive state subsidies granted by the Chinese government to its companies. Such subsidies allow Chinese manufacturers to offer wind turbines and other components at significantly lower prices than their European competitors. This "technological dumping" policy distorts the market, making it difficult for European companies, which do not benefit from similar support, to compete effectively. The result is a slow but inexorable erosion of market shares and a potential loss of manufacturing capacity and technological know-how in a strategic sector for Europe's energy transition.
Reliance on a single production hub, moreover, one outside Europe and with opaque governance models, not only compromises the resilience of supply chains in the event of geopolitical or health shocks but also undermines the goal of European strategic energy autonomy. The loss of an internal manufacturing industry means losing skilled jobs, innovation capacity, and ultimately, control over the future direction of one's own energy transition.
Concrete Risks of Espionage and Sabotage for Europe
The integration of Chinese technology into European critical energy infrastructure raises serious concerns regarding espionage, sabotage, and strategic dependence. "We know that China believes there is value in placing at least some elements of our core infrastructure at risk of destruction or disruption," said Mike Rogers, former director of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Undisclosed "Kill Switches" and Remote Access (Wind and Photovoltaic):
Concern is growing in Western countries, particularly in Europe and the United States, that Chinese-made wind farm components and Chinese-owned shares in energy infrastructure may pose national security risks, including the risk of sabotage.
The issue extends significantly to the photovoltaic sector. Recent reports indicate the discovery of unauthorized communication devices, not listed in product documentation, embedded within some Chinese solar inverters. Similar devices, including cellular radios, have also been found in batteries from several Chinese suppliers in recent months. These "rogue" components provide additional, undocumented communication channels that could allow firewalls to be circumvented remotely, with potentially catastrophic consequences for grid stability.
The European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC), the association representing the continent's solar power manufacturers, has issued a serious warning: remote software access to European photovoltaic inverters, particularly those from China, presents significant cyber vulnerabilities, including sabotage. For this reason, the ESMC called not only for a general ban on the import of inverters from China into all European Union (EU) member states but also for the immediate adoption of an "Inverter Security Toolbox," a risk monitoring and mitigation system similar to that created by the EU in the telecommunications sector with 5G cellular network technology.
A study by the consultancy firm DNV, "Solutions for PV Cyber Risks to Grid Stability," highlights how an attack on just 3 GW of inverter capacity could have "significant implications" for the European electricity grid. The document warns that almost 70% of all photovoltaic inverters installed globally in 2023 will come from Chinese producers, with Huawei and Sungrow alone already controlling remote access to 168 GW of PV capacity in Europe. By 2030, this figure is expected to exceed 400 GW, equivalent to the output of 150-200 nuclear power plants.
Previously, in 2023, the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI) raised the alarm about the vulnerabilities of solar panel inverters, stating that "none of the nine inverters tested met the standard" of cybersecurity. In early April 2025, researchers from the IT security company Forescout discovered 46 vulnerabilities in solar inverters from three major vendors, two of which (Sungrow and Growatt) are based in China, and one (SMA Solar Technology) in Germany. 80% of vulnerabilities disclosed in solar power systems over the past three years were classified as high severity or critical, indicating serious systemic security weaknesses that could impact grid stability, utility operations, and consumer data privacy. Vulnerabilities include information leaks, buffer overflows, and flaws in website code, with Growatt inverters being particularly exposed due to fundamental weaknesses in the company's cloud platform. Attacks on Sungrow and SMA inverters, though more complex, still exploited fundamental security flaws, such as hardcoded login credentials and stack overflow vulnerabilities.
Supply Chain Dependence:
China dominates the manufacturing of many critical components for renewable energy infrastructure, including wind turbines, inverters, and rare earth elements essential for magnets. This heavy reliance on Chinese suppliers creates a significant vulnerability, as disruptions to the supply chain or the inclusion of malicious components could compromise energy security.
Espionage and Data Harvesting:
Experts warn that Chinese-made wind turbines could be equipped with sensors that allow for espionage, potentially tracking naval ships, submarines, and aircraft. Access to the control systems of wind and solar farms could also allow for the harvesting of sensitive data.
Political Leverage and Economic Coercion:
Chinese ownership or significant stakes in critical energy infrastructure give Beijing potential leverage for political influence or economic coercion. In a high-tension scenario, this could lead to deliberate delays in projects, disruption of energy supplies, or passive interference with grid stability.
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities:
The increasing connectivity and digitization of wind and solar energy systems, while making them more efficient, also expand their attack surface for cyber threats. State-sponsored actors could exploit vulnerabilities to disrupt operations, steal data, or cause system shutdowns.
China’s Legal Mandate for Espionage (Extraterritoriality):
The real danger is China's National Intelligence Law (NIL). As specified, this law imposes a legal obligation on all Chinese individuals and entities in China, or Chinese nationals abroad, to assist and cooperate with state intelligence operations, both civilian and military. The extreme danger of this provision lies precisely in its extraterritoriality: the norm remains fully effective even within foreign states. This means that, regardless of the will of individual executives or the corporate structure, a Chinese company operating in Europe can be legally obligated to provide data or system access, making its technology a potential vector for large-scale espionage or sabotage, regardless of its corporate intent. Companies like Huawei, the world's largest inverter manufacturer, have already been banned from US telecommunications networks precisely because of these deep security concerns stemming from the NIL's mandate.
European and Global Reactions: Towards a Common Strategy
Facing these growing concerns, several countries are already taking action or considering measures to mitigate these risks.
Germany: A Cohesive Action Plan for Energy Security
Germany, traditionally cautious but heavily reliant on wind energy, has been among the first to move clearly. In 2024, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) issued a package of measures aimed at ensuring a level playing field between European and international wind turbine manufacturers, specifically mentioning Chinese suppliers in some instances. This five-point action plan, discussed and agreed upon on October 16 with representatives of European manufacturers and suppliers, includes:
Cybersecurity and Data Security: The BMWK plans to expand the list of companies that must meet cybersecurity requirements, including all those that effectively control and access wind turbines. The use of specific IT components in wind turbines will be inspected and tested.
Fair Competition Conditions: The Ministry will support the European Commission in effectively using existing EU-level instruments, such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), under which the European Commission has already launched an investigation into Chinese wind turbine suppliers in April 2024.
Reducing Dependence on Critical Components: Given the reliance on over 90% of permanent magnets (essential for turbines) from China, the plan includes a sector roadmap by the end of 2024 or early 2025 to progressively reduce this dependence.
Financing Production Ramp-up: To increase the capacities and competitiveness of European wind turbine manufacturers, the BMWK estimates that approximately EUR 16 billion in hedging and guarantee instruments will be needed by 2030, to be addressed with a new support program for financial guarantees provided by KfW. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is also presenting a complementary offer.
Review of Project Financing: The plan envisages a review of financing provided by EU and German banks and financial institutions (such as KfW, EBRD, EIB) for projects using Chinese technology, to ensure there is no risk of undermining national and/or European industrial policy interests, distorting fair competition, and non-compliance with ESG standards.
WindEurope, the European wind energy industry organization, welcomed the German government's decision, acknowledging that Chinese wind farm manufacturers were gaining initial orders in Europe.
United Kingdom: A More Pragmatic Approach, but with Growing Warnings
The United Kingdom has demonstrated a more pragmatic approach, aiming to attract investment and create jobs. However, warnings from the US administration and alignment with security concerns have led to a clarification that further Chinese involvement in its energy sector is politically untenable. This has included buying back a Chinese stake in a nuclear power project, indicating a willingness to reduce dependence. It is in this context that direct reports from high-level US officials, such as former President Donald Trump, also fit, having warned the London government about the risks arising from excessive reliance on Chinese technologies and investments in strategic sectors, including energy.
Italy: Strategic Opportunity and the Need for Vigilance
Italy, as we've seen, played a pioneering role in opening its doors to Ming Yang with the Taranto project and now with the ambitious Med Wind. The decision to attract production to Italy responds to a clear need for industrial development and job creation (1,100 projected). However, the Med Wind project and the presence of production sites in strategic areas like Taranto and Brindisi, crucial for the Italian Navy and NATO, make the application of the "Golden Power" instrument fundamental. The Italian government will have to impose strict conditions on cybersecurity, data access, and governance to balance economic opportunity with the protection of national interests.
The Role of the European Union: Towards a Common Strategy
At the European Union level, awareness of the risks associated with technological and infrastructural dependence on non-EU actors, particularly China, is growing. The EU is strengthening cybersecurity through directives like NIS2 and the framework for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Screening). A significant action is the investigation launched in 2024 by the European Commission into Chinese wind turbine suppliers in Spain, Greece, France, Romania, and Bulgaria, due to suspicions of Chinese state subsidies that could distort competition and lead to the collapse of the domestic industry. It should be noted that China has already dominated the photovoltaic industry in Europe and is aggressively expanding its presence into other markets, including electric vehicles. Nevertheless, the limited production capacity in offshore wind supply chains globally forces European wind farm operators to turn to Chinese manufacturers.
A concrete step towards mitigating these risks was taken in Lithuania, where in November 2024, legislators adopted a unique law, effective May 1, 2025. This regulation aims to limit the ability of Chinese inverter manufacturers to remotely access the country's solar and wind plants with a power exceeding 100 kW, thereby strengthening cybersecurity. While existing Chinese-made equipment will not be banned, operators will need to ensure their systems meet the new safety standards.
Beyond Europe: Concerns in the United States
In the United States as well, Department of Energy officials are investigating the potential threats posed by Chinese-made equipment in renewable energy infrastructure. Legislative efforts are underway to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers for sensitive infrastructure. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress's independent oversight agency, lends credibility and corroboration to concerns first raised in Congress by Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ) that offshore wind turbines pose serious threats to national security and aviation and maritime safety by interfering with radar systems. The GAO report states that "wind turbines can reduce the performance of radar systems used for defense and maritime navigation and safety in several ways. These include reducing detection sensitivity, obscuring potential targets, and generating false targets." While no state has enacted an outright ban on Chinese solar and wind farms, there is growing concern at both the federal and state levels about the IT security risks associated with foreign-made technology in critical infrastructure. Several states have introduced or approved laws to ban or limit the use of Chinese technology in government agencies, and the debate is also extending to energy infrastructure.
Broader Chinese Infiltration into European Energy Infrastructure
The concerns are not limited to wind turbines. Chinese state-owned enterprises have acquired significant stakes in European wind, solar, and hydro companies and projects, embedding themselves not just as investors but as long-term players with growing strategic relevance. A landmark example was China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) buying a 22% stake in Energias de Portugal (EDP) in 2011. Through this stake, CTG gained influence over EDP’s extensive wind, solar, and hydro portfolio across Europe and beyond—securing both access to markets and opportunities for technology transfer that align with Beijing’s broader industrial ambitions.
In Italy, through State Grid Europe Limited (SGEL), China joined CDP Reti at the end of November 2014, acquiring 35% of the shares. CDP Reti is an investment vehicle that manages investments in major strategic Italian companies such as Snam (gas pipelines), Terna (power lines), and Italgas (gas distribution). Chinese power giants have historically taken stakes in wind farms across at least nine European countries, not only to diversify portfolios but also to absorb operational expertise, particularly from Europe’s global leaders in the offshore wind energy sector. For instance, China General Nuclear (CGN) purchased wind farms in the UK and France via its CGN Europe Energy subsidiary, a move that offered it a seat at the table in Western energy management and regulatory systems. These deals have made Chinese firms not just financial participants but key minority shareholders and joint venture partners, which can provide soft leverage in policy-relevant sectors over time.
Future Prospects and the Need for a European Strategic Vision
Europe faces a complex and rapidly evolving challenge. While the ecological transition is an urgent imperative, the growing technological and economic dependence on external state actors, particularly China, raises fundamental questions about the Continent's sovereignty and strategic resilience. The experience with Huawei in 5G, and now the advance of companies like Ming Yang in the wind sector and the discoveries of vulnerabilities in solar inverters, teach that security cannot be taken for granted when dealing with suppliers linked to states with divergent economic and political models.
The stakes are high: it's not just about fair competition or data protection, but about Europe's ability to control its vital infrastructure and ensure its energy security in an increasingly tense geopolitical landscape. It is imperative that Europe develops a long-term strategic vision that goes beyond individual national reactions. This implies:
Strengthening Domestic Industry: Investing massively in research and development and European production capacity to reduce dependence on critical external components and foster the emergence of national and pan-European champions across all renewable sectors.
Strict and Coordinated Regulation: Implementing rigorous and harmonized cybersecurity and transparency standards at the EU level for all technologies used in critical infrastructure, with mechanisms of verification and independent audits.
Enhanced Investment Screening: Fully utilizing existing instruments, such as the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, to evaluate investments in strategic sectors with utmost caution.
Energy Diplomacy and Alliances: Collaborating closely with reliable partners globally to build more resilient and diversified supply chains.
Ultimately, the Ming Yang case is a crucial test. Europe's ability to balance climate ambitions with the need to protect its vital interests will depend on the political will to act with foresight and cohesion, transforming the challenge of dependence into an opportunity to strengthen its strategic and technological autonomy.
Commenti