Xi and the PLA: the long shadow of doubt over absolute control
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 1 ora fa
- Tempo di lettura: 8 min
Key Points
Doubts on Xi Jinping's Absolute Control over the PLA: Despite years of power consolidation, recent events suggest Xi's authority over the armed forces might no longer be unconditional.
Extensive Purges at Military's Apex: A significant wave of purges has impacted high-ranking PLA officers, including Central Military Commission (CMC) members, with cases of sudden disappearances and investigations into figures once considered loyal to Xi.
Weakening of Xi's Inner Circle: Many removed officials were previously promoted by Xi himself. Speculation indicates figures close to another CMC Vice Chairman, Zhang Youxia, are gaining influence, potentially at Xi's expense.
"Rising Corruption" and Need for Constant Control: Xi's admission that corruption remains widespread and is increasing in his third term points to a continuous struggle for loyalty, undermining the perception of monolithic control.
National Security Reforms Aimed at Centralization: Xi systematically reorganized the security system, centralizing command and control (e.g., via the CNSC and reformed CMC) and subordinating paramilitary forces (PAP) directly to Party control.
Upcoming Military Appointments as Crucial Test: Appointments expected around August 1st and the outcome of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee (slated for late August to mid-October) will be decisive indicators of the true extent of Xi's power.
Military Parade: External Projection vs. Internal Uncertainty: The upcoming September parade will project an image of strength and unity, but its domestic purpose might be to mask or counterbalance internal tensions and leadership uncertainties.
Xi Jinping's power over China's national security system, with a specific focus on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is under intense scrutiny. While Xi has meticulously built a vast control apparatus, the escalating purges within the military leadership and recent signs of internal turmoil raise serious questions about the stability and absolute nature of his authority.1 Current challenges to his control will be examined first, followed by a historical overview of how Xi consolidated his power.
Current Challenges to Xi Jinping's Control and Signs of Potential Erosion
Despite a decade of power consolidation, recent dynamics within the CCP and the PLA indicate a phase of profound realignment, suggesting a potential erosion of Xi Jinping's unconditional authority over the Party's armed wing. The scale and nature of the ongoing purges, in particular, cast doubt on the solidity of his control.
The anti-corruption campaign, though presented as a tool for internal cleansing, is now perceived as an operation to reassert Xi's authority.2 Paradoxically, it may also reveal the fragility of his power.
Key indicators of this uncertainty include:
Dramatic Events at the Military Apex: Recent significant events are shaking the military leadership.3 On June 2, the sudden disappearance of Xu Qiliang, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), was reported. This follows the prolonged public absence since March 11 of He Weidong, the other CMC Vice Chairman and considered a highly trusted figure by Xi, amid rumors of an investigation. These incidents come after the prior removals of key CMC members like Li Shangfu and Miao Hua. Should He's absence be officially confirmed, the effective number of CMC members would drop from seven to just four, highlighting a leadership vacuum and a potential crisis of confidence.
Large-Scale Purges and Signs of Distrust: The sheer scale of the purges is striking, with estimates indicating over 100 high-ranking officers, nearly a hundred of whom hold general rank, incarcerated in the last year alone – a number sufficient to form a military company. The resort to establishing or expanding hundreds of specialized detention centers nationwide underscores the systemic nature of these operations.
Striking at Xi's Inner Circle: A particularly telling aspect is that many of the high-ranking officials removed in the past year were previously promoted by Xi himself. Furthermore, the latest wave of purges appears to have largely targeted figures considered "loyalists" to the leader, with vacant positions presumably filled by elements close to Zhang Youxia, the other CMC Vice Chairman. This dynamic has fueled serious speculation that Zhang has gained significant control over the armed forces, even suggesting he may have "stripped Xi Jinping's power" last year. Some observers go as far as to hypothesize that Xi, while nominally retaining his position, may have become a mere "rubber stamp," having lost effective control over the CCP's highest power base – the military.
Internal Contradiction on Corruption: In his third term, Xi himself acknowledged in January 2025 that corruption, despite years of intense efforts, remains pervasive and is even on the rise. This admission undermines the perception of monolithic control and reveals a continuous struggle for loyalty and power, indicating that the drastic reforms and purges haven't eliminated the root causes or internal resistance.
Xi Jinping's Consolidation of Power Over Time: Building an All-Encompassing Control Apparatus
Since his ascension, Xi Jinping has systematically dismantled dispersed power mechanisms and constructed a centralized national security architecture.4 His aim was to centralize authority under himself and the Party, while enhancing China's capacity to respond to crises.
Structural Reorganization and Absolute Control over Party and State
"Holistic Concept of National Security": Xi broadened the definition of security far beyond traditional defense to include areas like food security, epidemic control, cybersecurity, and public finance.5 This approach expanded his purview across a wide range of sectors.
Centralization of Command and Control:
The Central National Security Commission (CNSC), chaired by Xi, became the most powerful body for coordinating strategic planning and crisis response, staffed by personnel from both civilian and military agencies.6
The 2015 reform of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was a crucial step. The five pre-existing General Departments, often sources of power and corruption, were abolished and replaced by 15 new functional sections (seven Departments, three Commissions, and five directly affiliated Agencies). This shortened the chain of command and made various functions directly accountable to the CMC, and ultimately to Xi.
Control over the People's Armed Police (PAP) was transferred from the Ministry of Public Security (a state organ) to the CMC (a Party organ) in 2018, solidifying its paramilitary nature and direct subordination to the Party.7 The China Coast Guard (CCG) was also brought under PAP control.8
Xi reduced the influence of competing bodies like the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission by demoting its leader.
"The Party Commands the Gun": The PLA, as the CCP's armed wing, serves the Party directly, not the state.9 Xi's appointment as CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman in 2012, and PRC President in 2013 marked the first time all three top positions were held by a single individual, cementing his formal control over the armed forces.10 The principle of the "Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces" has been consistently reasserted, with strengthened Party Committees and political commissar systems within the PLA.11 Military promotions now strictly emphasize "political standards" and "political quality."
Consolidation Through Purges and Loyalists: Anti-corruption campaigns served as a primary tool to eliminate rivals and consolidate power.12 High-profile figures like Zhou Yongkang, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou were purged.13 Simultaneously, Xi strategically placed trusted individuals – "double experts" with strong political and military credentials – in key roles as his "guardians" and "eyes and ears" within the vast bureaucracy. The elimination of presidential term limits in 2018 further cemented his position.14
Operational Reorganization for Efficiency
Beyond power centralization, Xi's reforms also aimed to make the security apparatus more efficient and responsive:
Inter-agency Coordination: The CNSC was crucial for improving coordination and information sharing among security agencies.15
Force Integration: The PLA's updated command system enables greater integration of forces across different services, enhancing combat readiness and coercive capacity in peacetime. New formations like the Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistics Support Force facilitate wartime operations.
PAP Specialization: The PAP was streamlined to focus on internal security, public order, and maritime security, with specialized units (e.g., Mountain Eagle) for various operational environments.16
Emergency Management: The creation of the Ministry of Emergency Management (2018) consolidated competencies from various agencies for more effective responses to natural disasters and other crises.17
Leadership Reshuffle and Upcoming Appointments: A Decisive Test of Continued Power
Military appointments, traditionally announced before Army Day on August 1, will be a crucial indicator of the state of Xi's control. In such a volatile context, these promotions are not mere administrative procedures but reflect internal power balances.
The confirmation of new CMC members will require approval by the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Committee. This session is already viewed as a "major struggle" between pro-Xi and anti-Xi factions. While precise dates haven't been officially announced, speculation points to two possible periods: between August 27-30, or between October 13-16. If the Plenum doesn't occur before August 1, key appointments might be delayed or announced unconventionally, depending on the outcome of this power struggle. The opacity of the CCP's decision-making processes suggests that internal battles are far more intense than externally perceived, placing the Party and its armed forces in a precarious situation.
The Military Parade: An External Show of Force with Complex Internal Subtext
In stark contrast to these internal turbulent dynamics, China is preparing to host a grand military parade in September 2025, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.18 This event, designed to showcase the PLA's modernity and strength, is undoubtedly a clear projection of force and cohesion on the international stage. However, staging such a display of grandeur amidst deep internal purges might also serve domestic purposes. It could be an attempt to project an image of unwavering stability and control to reassure the population and Party elites themselves, seeking to mask or counterbalance narratives of internal friction and a potential weakening of Xi's power.
Conclusions and Outlook
Recent events in China strongly suggest that Xi Jinping's control over the PLA may not be as absolute as previously believed. Despite his meticulous construction of a vast, centralized security apparatus and reforms aimed at consolidating his power, the scale and nature of the ongoing purges – now affecting even his inner circle and officials he himself promoted – indicate significant internal challenges.19 The acknowledgment that corruption is "on the rise" in his third term, despite years of effort, undermines the perception of monolithic control and reveals a continuous struggle for loyalty and power. The security system reforms, though designed to centralize control under Xi, now also appear to reflect the need for constant vigilance and repression to maintain internal order.
The appointments expected around August 1, and especially the outcome of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee (slated for late August to mid-October), will be decisive tests. The nature of these decisions and the figures who emerge will clarify whether Xi Jinping has managed to re-establish undisputed power over the PLA, or if his authority over the CCP's armed wing remains a terrain of continuous negotiation and consolidation amidst heightened surveillance and control.
