Cyber-Totalitarianism or Necessary Evolution? Analysis of the 2025 Amendments to China's Cybersecurity Law between CCP Leadership and Mega-Sanctions

On October 28, the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress voted to approve the decision to amend the Cybersecurity Law, which will come into effect on January 1, 2026.

This regulatory revision comes amid growing global technological and ideological competition. Digital sovereignty has become a crucial battleground, with major powers vying to assert control over cyberspace and data flows.

The People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is pursuing an all-encompassing national security strategy that considers technological security a key pillar for the country's development and modernization. In this scenario, the CSL, alongside the Data Security Law (DSL) and the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL), serves as an essential tool to:

• Assert Sovereignty over Cyberspace. The Chinese government aims for total control over the cyber domain, deeming it vital for internal stability and external projection.

• Manage Technological Competition. Particularly with the United States, by imposing stringent requirements such as data localization and security reviews for the procurement of network products and services, to protect its critical infrastructure and promote self-sufficiency in strategic sectors like Artificial Intelligence (AI).

• Strengthen Internal Control. The legislation seeks to curb online activities that might threaten national security, national honor, national interests, and those that attempt to overthrow the socialist system, implementing a robust surveillance and control mechanism backed by advanced technologies and a comprehensive sanctions framework.

The 2025 revision is a direct response to the new landscape and evolving needs of cybersecurity , focusing specifically on the governance of emerging technologies like AI and the reinforcement of legal liabilities. The amendments underscore the urgency of consolidating central power and standardizing the regulatory framework, which has grown more complex following the introduction of the DSL and PIPL in recent years.

On October 28, the 18th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress voted to approve the decision to amend the Cybersecurity Law, which will take effect on January 1, 2026.

Analysis of the 2025 Amendments and the Amplification of CCP Power

The amendments adopted on October 28, 2025, and effective from January 1, 2026, are not merely technical updates. They explicitly and implicitly strengthen the CCP's grip on cyberspace, significantly amplifying its powers in terms of control, sanctions, and repression.

Enhanced Control and Party Leadership

The most politically significant amendment is the addition of a new Article 3, which explicitly establishes the supremacy and political orientation of the CCP's leadership:

• New Article 3. "Cybersecurity work must adhere to the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, implement the overall concept of national security, coordinate development and security, and promote the building of a powerful cyber-nation."

This article legally formalizes the Party's leadership in all cybersecurity matters, integrating the CSL into the broader "overall national security" framework guided by the CCP. The original 2016 text lacked such a direct and explicit reference to the Party's leadership.

Furthermore, a new Article 20 is introduced, focusing on the governance of the most strategic emerging technology: Artificial Intelligence (AI).

• New Article 20: The State supports research on AI basic theories and key technologies like algorithms, promotes infrastructure construction, and, crucially, improves ethical standards and strengthens risk monitoring, assessment, and security supervision of AI.

This insertion clarifies that the State not only promotes AI development but also ensures its governance and supervision, mandating that technological advancement aligns with the "ethical standards" and security objectives of the Party, preventing deviations that could threaten ideological stability or national security.

Increased and Tiered Financial Penalties

The amendments introduce a multi-tiered sanctions system, drastically increasing the fines for the most severe violations, particularly for Critical Information Infrastructure Operators (CIIOs) and for data management offenses.

General Liability for Network Operators (Revised Article 61, formerly 59)

• The fine for refusing to make corrections or for failures resulting in harm to cybersecurity is increased from a maximum of RMB 100,000 (Article 59, 2016) to a maximum of RMB 500,000 for the operator, and up to RMB 100,000 for the directly responsible personnel (Revised Article 61, par. 1).

  
  

Severe and Maximum Penalties for CIIOs (Revised Article 61, par. 3)

The amendment introduces a scale of penalties based on the severity of the consequences:

• Serious Harm (e.g., mass data leakage, loss of partial critical function): Fines between RMB 500,000 and 2,000,000 for the operator, and up to RMB 200,000 for the responsible personnel.

• Especially Serious Harm (e.g., loss of main critical function): Fines between RMB 2,000,000 and 10,000,000 for the operator, and up to RMB 1,000,000 for the responsible personnel.

These new maximum sanctions, especially the RMB 10 million ceiling, far exceed the RMB 1 million maximum previously stipulated in the 2016 law for CIIOs (Article 59, par. 2). This tiered system grants the competent departments greater discretion and more potent financial power to punish violations.

Penalties for Selling Non-Compliant Products (New Article 63)

A new penalty is introduced against the sale or provision of critical network equipment and specialized cybersecurity products that have not been security-certified or tested, stipulating:

• Confiscation of illegal gains and fines between RMB 20,000 and 100,000, or between 1 and 5 times the illegal gains if they exceed RMB 100,000.

This ensures that only State-approved products and services meeting mandatory standards can be sold, strengthening State control over the technological supply chain.

Increased Repression and Operational Control

The amendments significantly enhance the tools for repression and control over network operator operations and published information.

Network Usage Control and Operational Interventions

• Amendment to Article 64 (formerly Article 61). The power to order a suspension of operations or cancellation of licenses for failing to require real identity information from users is expanded to include the closure of "applications" (应用程序) in addition to websites.

This formal update extends the power of repression and censorship to a key communication medium in the Chinese digital age (mobile apps), demonstrating the regulatory framework's adaptation to newer technologies.

Expanded Repression of Prohibited Information (Revised Article 69)

• The penalty for an operator's failure to adopt corrective measures (e.g., stop transmission, delete, retain records, and report) regarding prohibited information is also drastically increased. The maximum fine for the operator rises from RMB 500,000 (Article 68, 2016) to RMB 2,000,000.

• A higher-level penalty is introduced for cases resulting in "especially serious influence" or "especially serious consequences", with fines between RMB 2,000,000 and 10,000,000 for the operator and up to RMB 1,000,000 for responsible personnel, along with orders for suspension/closure/revocation.

This severe escalation of sanctions for inadequate content surveillance and management places a much greater financial burden and pressure on companies to act as the State's executive arm for censorship.

Review of Cross-Border Data and Product Procurement

• Revised Article 67 (formerly Article 65) concerning the procurement of unapproved products by CIIOs no longer refers merely to a failed security inspection (Article 65, 2016), but to using network products or services that have not undergone security review or failed the security review.

This shifts the focus from a mere technical check to a national security review (Article 35 of the original law), reinforcing the State's power to block procurements that could threaten national security. Revised Article 71 (incorporating former Article 66) maintains and consolidates the punishment for storing and providing cross-border data without the necessary authorization.

Personal Information Protection An Expanded Sphere of Control

Chapter IV of the 2016 CSL, titled "Network Information Security," was foundational, establishing the first clear principles for the protection of personal information collected and managed by network operators. Its revision is crucial for understanding how the CCP has refined its control mechanisms within a more mature digital governance framework, aligned with subsequent laws.

The 2016 Regulatory Context Articles 41, 42, and 43

The 2016 CSL, as a framework law, addressed privacy relatively concisely but established key principles of transparency and consent.

• Article 41 (2016). Mandated network operators to collect and use personal information based on the principles of legality, propriety, and necessity. Crucially, it required publishing rules and explicitly stating the purposes, means, and scope for collection and use, and obtaining the consent of the data subject.

• Article 42 (2016). Prohibited network operators from disclosing, tampering with, or destroying collected personal information. It stipulated that, absent the data subject's consent, operators must not provide personal information to others, except if the information was processed to be unidentifiable.

• Article 43 (2016). Imposed a security obligation, requiring operators to adopt technical and other necessary measures to prevent personal information from leaking, being destroyed, or lost. It also required immediate remedial measures, prompt notification to users, and reporting to competent departments in case of an incident.

These articles, while forming the initial regulatory basis, were generic and allowed for ambiguity in company practices. This gap was comprehensively addressed by the introduction of the PIPL (Personal Information Protection Law) in 2020, which detailed every aspect of data protection.

The 2025 Revision New Article 42 and Harmonization

The 2025 revision (Revised Article 42, formerly 40) intervenes in this chapter to harmonize the CSL with the PIPL, particularly by strengthening the aspects of legal compliance and operational accountability for data security incidents. The amendment itself is brief but significant:

• Revised Article 42, Paragraph 2: "Network operators shall comply with the provisions of this Law and the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China, the Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China and other laws and administrative regulations when handling personal information."

The incorporation of the PIPL and the Civil Code into the CSL's general duties signals that the comprehensive standards set by the PIPL are now formally integrated under the broader umbrella of cybersecurity and the national enforcement framework.

• Focus on Incident Accountability: The steep sanctions introduced by the revised Articles 61 and 69 for especially serious harm resulting from improper data handling (which includes the leakage of personal information) constitute a crucial control mechanism. A mass personal data leak is now categorized as a major national security-related incident, punishable by fines up to RMB 10,000,000.

• Connection to Data Security Law (DSL): The revised CSL reinforces the management of important data (重要数据) and cross-border transfers (出境) of personal information. The amendments regarding the procurement of network products and cross-border data transfer are strictly linked to personal information security from a national security perspective.

In essence, while the PIPL defines individual rights and processing rules, the revised CSL ensures that the national security apparatus has the tools and financial penalties to enforce compliance and data integrity, treating the handling of personal data as a national security issue rather than merely a consumer protection matter.

The CCP, through the expanded sanctions and the compliance obligations with new standards (Article 20 on AI and ethical management), increases its ability to direct the use and processing of personal data by every network operator, effectively compelling them to serve State security interests.

Conclusion A More Explicit and Costly Power

The comparison between the 2016 Cybersecurity Law and the 2025 amendments demonstrates a clear trend toward the explicit and substantial strengthening of CCP power over Chinese cyberspace.

The changes are not just technical updates; they are a political declaration solidifying the Party's leadership in all aspects of cybersecurity (New Article 3) and aim to frame strategic technology like AI within the ideological and national security structure. The mandate to build a powerful cyber-nation under the CCP's leadership leaves no room for neutral interpretations of cyberspace's role.

The amplification of financial penalties, with the introduction of fines up to RMB 10 million for the most severe damage, provides the government with significantly more potent financial and coercive tools to ensure network operator compliance, particularly for CIIOs. The increased penalties for failing to manage content and their extension to mobile applications (New Article 64) solidify the role of companies as executive arms of State censorship.

Finally, on the personal information front, the revised CSL, while not superseding the PIPL, reinforces it through State coercion and national security. Personal data, and important data in general, are now protected not just to safeguard individual rights, but primarily to protect State interests. Failure to adopt adequate security measures becomes a financially punishable crime on an unprecedented scale, with the explicit threat of sanctions against foreign entities (Revised Article 77, formerly 75) engaging in activities harmful to PRC cybersecurity, which can include the freezing of assets.

In summary, the 2025 reform significantly enhances State control, transforming the CSL into a more powerful and costly pillar of the Chinese digital governance system, centralizing decision-making, sanctioning, and repressive power in the hands of authorities under the ultimate direction of the Chinese Communist Party.