NUCLEAR HEGEMONY ALERT: China's "Lunar Loading" Scheme and the 2036 Strategic Overmatch - Analysis

The current competition in space is no longer just about landing, but about establishing a permanent and self-sufficient technological dominion. China’s approach, cemented through the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) in partnership with Russia, rests on an indisputable pillar: nuclear fission energy. This strategic decision is not merely a scientific aspiration, but the key to resolving the logistical and energetic bottlenecks of the long lunar night, enabling the industrialization of the Moon. Beijing’s plan is a robust power architecture, defined by advanced engineering solutions that grant it a decisive logistical and temporal advantage over competitors. China has solved the crucial problem of launch safety by adopting the "Lunar Loading" Scheme (installing nuclear fuel on the surface) for the TFE reactor, a maneuver that ensures intrinsic sub-criticality and reduces system mass (WANG Zheng et al., 2024). The infrastructure is built on a Scalable, Modular DC Grid with high reliability, managed by Energy Routers for Energy Mutual Aid. Crucially, this base is not just for the Moon; it is the strategic technological springboard for the future exploration of Mars and Jupiter (NIU Chang-Lei et al., 2020), confirming the dual-use nature of the project. The ultimate risk for the United States and the Artemis partners is not technological defeat, but the irrevocable consolidation of Chinese operational dominance over strategic lunar sites by 2036, a temporal advantage exacerbated by the fact that the US goal of installing a reactor by 2030 is deemed "unrealistic" due to the lack of a 15-ton payload lander.

Conceptual map of the international lunar research station - Credit photo: ZHANG Hui, DONG Keqi, YAO Wei. Progress and Prospect of Energy Technologies on Lunar Scientific Research Station[J]. Journal of Deep Space Exploration, 2024,

1. China’s Advantages and Militarization Scenarios

China’s power infrastructure is conceived for longevity, scalability, and dual-use, with clear long-term military implications.

1.1 Timelines and Temporal Advantage

China is aggressively pursuing its schedule, exploiting the logistical lag of its adversaries.

China and Russia have set the goal of completing the Lunar Nuclear Power Plant by 2036 (with projections anticipating the start of the fission phase around 2033). This timeframe is critical: nuclear energy is the only source capable of sustaining the station throughout the long lunar night (≈14 Earth days), an essential requirement for human survival and industrial operation.

Arriving first means establishing de facto dominance over the most valuable sites, particularly the Permanently Shadowed Areas (PSAs), which hold water ice, the key resource for ISRU and propellant production.

1.2 Militarization and Dual-Use of the Lunar Base

The capability to produce high power (up to the MW range) continuously has clear Dual-Use (civilian and military) implications and serves as the bridge to power projection in space.

• Infrastructure and Control: A nuclear base provides the energy needed for industrialization (producing oxygen and metals), but the identical infrastructure can support long-range surveillance systems or act as a refueling and logistical support platform for future interplanetary military missions. The grid architecture is explicitly designed to meet the needs of future large-scale lunar bases (XIA Yan et al., 2022). A reactor like the Molten Salt design, engineered for a 20-year lifespan (LIU Kunming et al., 2025), guarantees the longevity required for geostrategic commitment.

• Space Propulsion and Logistical Superiority: The investment in fission reactors is the direct prerequisite for Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) and Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP). As highlighted in the study (ZHU Anwen et al., 2017), the combination of large space nuclear power and electric propulsion will be the strategic development vector, enabling faster interplanetary travel and significantly larger payloads.

Remote Tactical Advantage: The Wireless Transmission technology (targeting 400 W over 1 km), though designed to charge rovers, is a crucial military asset: it guarantees the tactical autonomy of resources and the theoretical possibility of remotely powering or disabling uncabled systems. Moreover, controlling ISRU itself (the production of propellant from the water resource) transforms the Moon from a remote scientific destination into a service station and logistical factory for any future deep space operation, solidifying the strategic asset.

2. Chinese Technological Advantage

China’s energy strategy is based on the engineering resolution of historical mass and safety problems, aiming to achieve a high-power and diversified system that is fully adaptable to the lunar environment (ZHANG Hui et al., 2024).

2.1 Focus A: The "Lunar Loading" Scheme (Safety and Logistics)

The critical issue for nuclear launch is Special Criticality Safety, the guarantee that the reactor won’t activate accidentally in a terrestrial accident.

• The Revealed Solution: China, in its Single-Cell Thermionic Fuel Element (TFE) reactor project (≥40 kWe), has opted for the Lunar Loading Scheme (Yue Mian Zhuang Liao Fang An, 月面装料方案). In the study conducted (WANG Zheng et al., 2024), it is detailed that only about 88% of the core’s nuclear fuel is pre-loaded before launch from Earth, with the remaining 12% (19 TFE elements) designed to be installed by astronauts on the lunar surface.

Integrated Technical Benefits: This operation not only ensures the reactor is intrinsically sub-critical at launch (eliminating heavy safety rods), but it also optimizes the radial power distribution within the core through fuel partition loading. The resulting high power uniformity (non-uniformity value of 1.18) translates directly to lower thermal stress on materials and significantly greater operational longevity.

2.2 Focus B: Operational Resilience (Long-Life and Smart Grid)

The ability to sustain base operations with high efficiency relies on integrating high power and long-term autonomy.

• Long-Term Autonomy: Concepts like the Heat Pipe Molten Salt Reactor (analyzed by LIU Kunming et al., 2025), designed for 100 kWe requirements, are explicitly engineered to operate at full power for 20 years without the need for refueling, a decisive factor for autonomy.

• Strategic Necessity for Deep Space Exploration: The development of the space nuclear reactor is a fundamental requirement for China’s future deep space missions, including the exploration of the lunar polar region, small celestial bodies, Mars, and, crucially, Jupiter (NIU Chang-Lei et al., 2020). This positions the ILRS not as an end, but as the technological launching pad for external solar system dominance.

• The Modular DC Grid (Structure): The grid utilizes a hierarchical management system (LIU Yihong et al., 2022) that enables Energy Mutual Aid (能量互濟). For nocturnal thermal support, the system integrates heat storage using lunar soil (regolith) (ZHANG Hui et al., 2024).

• Research Priority (Overcoming Inefficiency): China is well aware of the inefficiencies of current energy systems. Research focuses on optimizing the power-to-mass ratio and reducing performance degradation. This includes overcoming the low yield of radioisotope RTGs and the necessity to improve the efficiency of thermo-electric conversion to reduce the total system mass.

3. Risks, Limits, and Countermeasures (Strategic Outlook)

3.1 Risks for Opposing States

• Risk 1: Temporal and Logistical Dominance (US): The US goal of installing a 100 kWe reactor by 2030 is deemed unrealistic due to the lack of a ≥15 ton payload lander (Kathryn Huff).

• Risk 2: Normative Hegemony: China is building an ecosystem based on its own standards (DC grid, wireless transmission). ILRS partner countries will be compelled to adopt these standards, expanding Chinese influence.

• Risk 3: The Shared Technical Bottleneck: The space nuclear race is hampered by the engineering difficulty of developing new materials capable of withstanding the extremely high temperatures needed for efficient nuclear-to-electric conversion (Ta Kung Pao, 2025).

3.2 Program Limits and Vulnerabilities

• Operational EVA Risk: The Lunar Loading Scheme shifts the risk from launch to operation. Manual handling of nuclear fuel by astronauts in an extreme environment introduces major complexity and radiological risk during Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA).

• Diversification (Selection Complexity): The extensive research into diversified reactor concepts (Molten Salt, Liquid Metal Cooled, Gas Cooled) suggests that the definitive design is not yet crystallized, increasing complexity in the final selection and technological maturation phase (ZHU Anwen et al., 2017).

3.3 Countermeasures and Strategic Recommendations

1. Closing the Logistical Gap (Priority 1): Acknowledge that the problem is transport. Focus R&D efforts on accelerating the availability of a high-payload lander (≥15 t).

2. Tactical Neutralization: Fund targeted programs for long-range wireless power transmission and dynamic conversion (Stirling) to counter China's operational advantages in PSAs.

3. Standards Diplomacy: Utilize the Artemis Accords framework to promote Western safety and operability standards, countering the potential Chinese hegemony over ILRS grid and logistics standards.

4. Global Competitive Context

The potential for Chinese infrastructural overshoot has triggered an immediate and concerned reaction from global space powers, leading to strategic re-alignments.

• United States (Artemis Program): The goal of deploying a 100 kWe reactor by 2030 is deemed unrealistic because of the missing lander capable of transporting the cargo. The concern is that the US, focusing solely on the nuclear technology, is ignoring the crucial logistical bottleneck.

• Europe (France/Italy): France’s Framatome and Italy’s ENEA signed an MoU to jointly develop a lunar fission reactor. This partnership aims to create autonomous nuclear capability focused on new materials, fuel research, and the use of additive manufacturing (3D printing) for critical reactor components.

• Russia (Roscosmos): Has signed a cooperation memorandum with the CNSA for the construction of the lunar nuclear power plant, providing technological and diplomatic support to China for the ILRS.

In summary, the reaction of the Western bloc indicates the consensus that the future of space depends on nuclear power, but logistics and industrial maturation remain the actual bottlenecks that China is exploiting to its advantage.

Bibliography

1. NIU Chang-Lei, LUO Zhi-Fu, LEI Ying-Jun, et al., Review of Advanced Power Source Technology for Deep Space Exploration, 2020, Beijing Institute of Spacecraft System Engineering / Shanghai Institute of Space Power-Sources.

2. XIA Yan, HUANG Wen, FENG Yu, et al., A High-reliability and Scalable Lunar Surface Power Distribution Network Frame Vision Based on Micro-nuclear Reactor, 2022, Beijing Institute of Spacecraft System Engineering / Hunan University.

3. ZHANG Hui, DONG Ke-Qi, YAO Wei, Progress and Prospect of Energy Technologies on Lunar Scientific Research Station, 2024, China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), Qian Xuesen Laboratory of Space Technology.

4. WANG Zheng, SUN Zheng, HOU Cheng, et al., Study on Lunar Reactor Core Scheme with Singe-Cell Thermionic Fuel Element, 2024, China Institute of Atomic Energy.

5. LIU Kunming, LIN Ming, LI Rui, et al., Conceptual design of a lunar surface heat pipe molten salt reactor, 2025, Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences / University of Chinese Academy of Sciences.

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