The Grand Calculation of Beijing: Strategy of Indo-Pacific Dominance and Russian Subordination through Conflict
- Gabriele Iuvinale
- 1 giorno fa
- Tempo di lettura: 12 min
Two Dictators, One Throne: Strategic Synergy Between the Indo-Pacific (Taiwan) and Eurasia (Central Asia)
China's entire global strategy is driven by a cynical calculation that inextricably links the conflict in Ukraine to the ambition of dominating the Indo-Pacific, with the ultimate goal of annexing Taiwan.
On July 3, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi admitted that Beijing "cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine" because the diversion of U.S. resources in Europe is the precondition for the decisive move in Asia. This "distraction dividend" aims to facilitate the annexation of Taiwan, a crucial democracy that produces over 90% of the world's highest-end microchips, essential for the Western defense industry. The loss of this "Silicon Shield" would not only be a moral failure but a global economic disaster with a potential 10.2% contraction in global GDP in the first year alone.
In this context, Russia has been reduced to a subordinate partner: its war machine survives thanks to Chinese dual-use components and North Korean ammunition (plus 10,000 soldiers),, while its economy is under Beijing's yoke, which imposes strict limits on its energy exports. Simultaneously, China reinforces its dominance in Central Asia (Russia's historical sphere), securing uranium and gas, and extending its aggressive influence in the South China Sea to supplant the United States and the Five Eyes nations. The challenge for the West is to avoid repeating the errors of "poor management" committed in Ukraine and establish a credible defense strategy for Taiwan.
Two Dictators, One Throne: The Latent Contention Between Moscow and Beijing
From an “eternal friendship” based on mistrust to a “mutually beneficial cooperation” in which one of the partners risks submission. The official statements by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, such as the one released in Beijing on September 2, paint a picture of perfect harmony. The reality, however, is one of “ironclad convenience”: a pact dictated by necessity, cemented by suspicion, and dominated by a crucial question that neither leader will ever dare to ask aloud: who is using whom?
This distrust is not merely tactical; it is rooted in history. The two giants share a land border of 4,250 km, the longest in the world, which was the scene of bitter conflicts, particularly the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 over the control of disputed islands along the eastern frontier. Although most of the demarcation was settled with subsequent agreements, including the 2004 deal that led to the cession of some islands to China, Beijing's drive to "mark its territory" and revisit old maps continues to signal the clear limits of this "unlimited friendship," keeping a latent tension alive. The memory of these annexations, which occurred in the 19th century by Tsarist Russia, which seized nearly two million square kilometers of Chinese territory, including the port of Vladivostok, remains vivid in the collective memory of the Chinese. Although Vladimir Lenin had promised to return the territory, Joseph Stalin reneged on that promise. Historically, relations between the leaders were marked by contempt: Stalin considered Mao Zedong a "four-penny communist," while Mao despised Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, viewing the Soviet Union as "revisionist" and "social-imperialist."
This alliance, beyond managing its complex internal dynamics, projects a double-edged strategic message to the outside world, yet it rests on a fundamental weakness: despite the rhetoric, "neither Russia nor China can afford to completely abandon the West," on which they still rely for crucial markets and advanced technologies. This internal tension fuels Beijing's cynical opportunism, transforming the war in Ukraine into a strategic asset for its own ascent.
The Taiwan Imperative: The Core of Chinese Strategy and the Global Order
China's entire strategic calculus—and its relationship with Russia—is fundamentally tied to its ultimate ambition: unification with Taiwan. Taiwan is the "sole pacing threat" for the United States and represents the existential flashpoint for the 21st-century global order.
Taiwan's Critical Role: The Silicon Shield
Taiwan's importance transcends military geography; it is the indispensable technological choke point of the global economy. The island is the world's leading producer of advanced semiconductors, commonly referred to as the "Silicon Shield." This shield is vital because Taiwan manufactures over 90% of the world's highest-end microchips, which are essential not only for consumer electronics but also for the defense industry of the United States and the broader Western military complex.
Should China succeed in taking control of Taiwan, the economic consequences would be catastrophic:
Global Economic Collapse. A disruption (or destruction) of Taiwan's fabrication plants (fabs) would paralyze global supply chains for years, causing a technological and economic disaster comparable to the 2008 crisis or worse, with a potential 10.2% contraction in global GDP in the first year alone.
Decisive Military Advantage. China would gain control over the most advanced chips, securing a decisive technological advantage while simultaneously severing the supply necessary for modern U.S. and allied defense systems,, thereby fundamentally weakening the West's military-industrial base.
Strategic Synergy: The Ukraine Distraction and Taiwan's Defense
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is not incidental to the Taiwan threat; it is a geopolitical instrument. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi admitted, the conflict must be prolonged to keep U.S. strategic resources "fixed" in Europe. This stance is clear: China does not want either Russia or Ukraine to achieve a decisive victory and prefers that the conflict be prolonged for as long as possible. This prevents the U.S. from executing a focused military "pivot to Asia," allowing China to accelerate its own modernization and its "gray zone" tactics against Taiwan unimpeded. Joint Sino-Russian military exercises near the Taiwan Strait have forced the U.S. Department of Defense to revise its defense plans.
The Contest for the South China Sea
China's ambition extends beyond Taiwan to dominate the South China Sea (SCS), which serves as a crucial strategic extension of the Taiwan issue. Beijing aims to supplant the maritime presence of the U.S. and its allies, including the Five Eyes nations. By aggressively asserting sovereignty over nearly 80% of the SCS and deploying "gray zone" tactics (such as the new ten-dash line), China seeks to control vital maritime trade routes (over 30% of global trade transits the SCS) and effectively push U.S.-led alliances (like the QUAD and AUKUS) out of its claimed sphere of influence.
Chinese Support for the Russian War Machine: A Tactical Asset
Beijing continues to support Moscow's war and considers Russia an indispensable strategic partner. Russia could not continue its war without the ammunition supplied by North Korea (plus 10,000 soldiers) and without the semiconductors, machinery, electronic devices, and other dual-use parts and components supplied by China.
Since the invasion in February 2022, Sino-Russian relations have intensified. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $245 billion, more than double the 2020 figure. China has replaced Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea as the main supplier of automobiles, machinery, and a wide range of industrial and consumer goods.
A Two-Faced Message: Defiance and Seduction
This Sino-Russian axis, beyond the conflict, projects a strategic message with two distinct audiences.
Defiance to the West
"For the West, the message is an unequivocal warning." High-level summits and joint military maneuvers are a show of force, intended to communicate that any attempt to isolate Russia has failed. The message is clear: the unipolar era is over. The joint objective is to counter the global hegemony of the United States and its allies, build a new security architecture based on non-Western principles, and reform existing global economic and financial institutions.
This growing military alignment is evident in joint naval exercises in the Pacific and the Baltic Sea, explicitly aimed at balancing the naval presence of the United States and its allies. Furthermore, coordinated claims over global maritime routes – such as China's assertion of authority in the South China Sea and Russia's declaration of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a "unified national transport communication" – indicate a common front against Western doctrines of international navigation.
Seduction of the Global South
"For the Global South, the message is an invitation, a seduction." Through platforms like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) —where China has taken on a leading role, hosting the Tianjin summit —China and Russia present themselves as leaders of an alternative to the Western model. They offer "development without political strings," promoting the construction of an "equitable and orderly multipolar world" and "inclusive economic globalization that benefits all". The idea of creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), based on "Confucian principles of good governance" and potentially financed by China's vast foreign exchange reserves, is a concrete alternative offered to developing nations, aimed at asserting Chinese economic leadership and protecting its investments from potential escalation with the United States.
The Chinese Calculus: Russia as a Subordinate Partner
Although on February 4, 2022, two weeks before the invasion, Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping signed a declaration proclaiming an "unlimited friendship", in reality, the alliance is by no means unlimited. For China, trade with Russia was far lower than with the United States, amounting to $582.9 billion in 2024, and with the European Union, amounting to $739 billion in 2023.
The gap between the two economies is enormous. In 2025, Russia's nominal GDP will be $2.135 trillion, while China's will reach $21.643 trillion. China's per capita GDP surpassed Russia's as early as 2020.
Russia is eager to export more oil and gas to China, through the pipeline called Power of Siberia 2. But China is reticent. Beijing wants to diversify its imports as much as possible, limiting Russian supplies to a maximum of 30% of its gas needs and 20% of its gasoline needs. Its massive investments in renewable energies further reduce its dependence on imported fossil fuels.
This asymmetry is reflected in trade: Moscow represents only a negligible part of the Chinese market, with 70% of its exports consisting of raw materials and energy products.
Chinese opportunism is evident: in 2022, major Chinese investments in Russia stopped because Chinese companies feared secondary sanctions from the United States. According to Russian bankers, by the summer of 2024, 98% of Chinese banks had stopped accepting direct payments from Russian companies. They are forced to rely on third parties, which entails additional costs and delays.
The Kremlin's Dilemma: Sovereignty versus Survival
Many Russians are concerned about this imbalance. A recent survey conducted by the Levada Center in Russia found three main fears: annexation of territory by Beijing, Russia's growing economic dependence, and a military conflict. The Center's report stated that there was a risk that Russia would become totally dependent on China and become its vassal. Beijing could set its own terms and close the door at any time, just as the United States and Europe have done.
Vladimir Putin faces an existential dilemma. Russian analysts themselves recognize that the country must transition from its oil and gas-based model to a high-tech economy. But the war and sanctions have closed the door to the West, raising the fatal question: "who will provide Russia with the technology to modernize?"
If the answer is China, Moscow's dependence will become total and irreversible. Russia could not continue its war without the dual-use components supplied by China. In June 2025, it was reported that Russia will train approximately 600 Chinese soldiers using tactics learned directly from the war in Ukraine, a knowledge transfer that solidifies China's access and influence over Russian military doctrine. Accepting the role of "junior brother" is the price Moscow must pay for survival, cementing its reduced strategic autonomy.
The Core Contention: Central Asia, the Throne of Distrust
"It is in Central Asia—the vast territory traditionally considered Russia's historical sphere of influence—that the alliance's cracks risk becoming fractures."
Russia can maintain its great-power status in this region only if it emerges victorious from the war in Ukraine; a stalemate or defeat would leave a power vacuum that Beijing is already poised to fill.
Economic Dominance and Resource Seizure
The economic balance is decisively swinging toward China. Recent engagements, such as the Astana Summit in May 2025, resulted in 58 agreements worth nearly $25 billion, positioning China as the "undisputed economic overlord" in Central Asia. Trade turnover between China and Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian trading partner, increased by 8.9% in the first ten months of 2025, reaching $39.755 billion.
Crucially, China is securing long-term access to strategic resources, effectively diminishing Russia's energy leverage:
Uranium and Nuclear Energy. Kazakhstan, which possesses about 20% of the world's uranium reserves, is partnering with China's CNNC for its first nuclear power plant. This move secures a reliable supply for Beijing's massive reactor construction plan and grants it immense influence over the global nuclear fuel cycle.
Oil and Gas. China is accelerating the development of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (Line D) and has provided substantial loans to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to guarantee future supplies, offering a concrete alternative to Russian pipelines and challenging Russia's traditional energy transit role.
Critical Minerals. China is extending its resource security strategy to Central Asia to ensure stable access to critical minerals and rare earths, essential for its high-tech industries.
Bypassing Russia: Alternative Transport Corridors
The war in Ukraine has provided an undeniable impetus to accelerate the development of transport corridors that bypass Russian territory, granting China greater logistical resilience and independence:
The Middle Corridor (TITR). The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) has seen its strategic importance soar. Traffic on the TITR increased by 62% in 2024, with container transport up by 170%. This multimodal route effectively bypasses Russian bottlenecks and sanctions risk.
CKU Railway. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway, scheduled to begin construction in July 2025 (estimated cost $8 billion), is set to cut freight transport times from China to Europe by 7-10 days, offering a more direct land bridge.
Xinjiang Hub. Xinjiang has been transformed into a "golden corridor," with over 16,000 China-Europe freight trains transiting through its border ports in 2024, reinforcing China's role as the primary commercial gatekeeper in the region.
The fundamental question remains: "Will Putin be willing to allow China to become the hegemonic superpower in Central Asia, losing control over territories he still considers part of the former Soviet Union?" History teaches that "two dictators cannot rule together" over the same space. The escalation of Chinese dominance is inevitably narrowing the scope of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), setting the stage for an inevitable geopolitical confrontation.
Taiwan's Role in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics
This section provides a detailed analysis of Taiwan as the focal point of the Sino-American challenge.
Hybrid Threats and the "Gray Zone" Tactic
China has escalated its "gray zone" operations (actions below the threshold of open conflict) to erode Taiwan's sovereignty without triggering a declared war. Examples include the massive use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and "quasi-blockade" operations.1
The Kinmen Method. This tactic involves the use of Chinese Coast Guard vessels (now under the direct control of the Central Military Commission chaired by Xi Jinping) to conduct "law enforcement patrols" in Taiwan's claimed waters. Such actions, often performed with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) deactivated, aim to normalize the Chinese presence, challenge Taipei's effective control, and demoralize the population, approaching as close as 4 kilometers from the Kinmen coast. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense has identified this as an attempt to "internalize the Taiwan Strait".
New Amphibious Logistics. The accelerated production of special water-bridge landing barges (Shuiqiao class) is seen as a "catalyst" that shortens the timeline for an invasion. These barges are designed to bypass Taiwan's fixed defenses, making the entire coastline, including rocky areas, vulnerable and threatening the island from all sides.
The "Strategy of Denial"
Faced with this threat, the United States is adopting the "Strategy of Denial" , championed by strategists like Elbridge Colby. This doctrine, fundamental to U.S. defense planning, argues that the primary objective is not to defeat China in a conventional war, but to deny Beijing a quick victory over Taiwan. This means concentrating resources to make an invasion so costly and uncertain as to deter China from attacking in the first place.
Conclusion
In summary, the Sino-Russian alliance is not a monolithic bloc but a constantly evolving strategic battlefield, rife with contradictions. It is a tense game in which Putin is betting on his current survival, while Xi is betting on his ability to shape Russia's future to his advantage. The success of this pact will depend not only on external pressure but also on the ability of Moscow and Beijing to manage their increasingly evident conflicts of interest, particularly as China's cynical opportunism pushes Russia toward increasing economic and geopolitical subordination.
Strategic Imperative: Learning from Ukraine to Defend Taiwan
The West's response to the Ukraine conflict—while demonstrating unity—was characterized by strategic hesitation and reactive policies. This perceived "tepid reaction" to the invasion of a sovereign state has raised concerns that the Chinese Communist Party might be emboldened, viewing the consequences as manageable if it decides to move to take Taiwan.
The imperative for the West is to ensure that the "poor management" of the Ukraine crisis is not repeated in the defense of Taiwan, a flourishing democracy. The defense of Taiwan is not just a moral commitment to democracy; it is a non-negotiable economic necessity for global stability and Western security. The loss of the "Silicon Shield" would devastate global industries, including the U.S. defense sector, which relies on Taiwan for over 90% of its high-end chips.
Therefore, the alliance between Russia and China highlights a clear strategic synergy of risk. Russia acts as the distraction in the West, while China prepares for the decisive move in the East. The ultimate test of the 21st-century order will be whether the West can overcome its structural vulnerabilities and establish a credible "Strategy of Denial" (such as strengthening Taiwan's asymmetric warfare capabilities and securing its own supply chains) to deter Beijing, demonstrating unequivocally that aggression in the Pacific will not pay.
Susan Miller
Former Assistant Director of China Mission Center, CIA
Miller spent 39 years at CIA as an operations officer, serving nine tours
abroad, two as a Case Officer, one as Deputy Chief of Station and six
tours as Chief of Station. She also served as assistant director of several
mission centers at the Agency.