The Guarantor of Last Resort: Beijing's comprehensive strategy for Iran's survival

The publication of the report “Tightening the Net: China's Infrastructure of Oppression in Iran” by Article 19 has brought to light the decisive role of Chinese technology in the repression of the Iranian protests that broke out at the end of last year. In particular, the document describes how Beijing provided Tehran not only with the regulatory model, but also with the technical infrastructure necessary to impose an almost total information blackout, isolating the civilian population by blocking satellite connections and controlling the network.

On September 2, 2025, President Xi Jinping met with Iranian President Pezech Ziyan at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing during the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit. Photo by Xinhua

However, limiting our observation to this final event would be reductive. Intelligence data collected between 2023 and 2025 shows that the Iranian regime's survival is the result of a deep support structure built by China. This structure has three interconnected levels: a parallel financial system to circumvent sanctions, direct supply of materials for the war industry, and strategic cooperation against the West. What manifested itself in 2026 as digital repression is, in fact, the collapse of a systemic alliance that provided Iran with the economic and military resources to resist external pressures and stifle internal dissent.

To understand the strength of the repressive infrastructure described by Article 19, it is necessary to analyze the economic foundations laid in previous years, in particular the mechanism that has allowed Iran to maintain its state operations despite international isolation.

Evidence that emerged in October 2025 revealed the existence of a complex barter system, called “Oil-for-Infrastructure,” which rendered Western sanctions ineffective. According to reconstructions, China institutionalized the purchase of Iranian oil through small independent refineries, known as “Teapots,” avoiding direct transactions in dollars that would have alerted global financial circuits. Payment for these supplies, which in 2024 alone generated a value of approximately $8.4 billion, was not made through currency transfers, but through the construction of major infrastructure projects in Iran by Chinese state-owned giants. This flow of resources acted as an artificial lung for Tehran's economy, providing the implicit liquidity needed to finance security apparatus and, above all, military programs.

The military sector represents the second level of this strategic integration, characterized by a technological osmosis that has transformed commercial relations into a de facto alliance, defined in June 2025 as a "silent axis." Objective data indicate that Beijing's support has gone well beyond the civilian sphere, entering directly into the military supply chain. It has been documented that China supplied Iran with massive quantities of ammonium perchlorate and sodium perchlorate, chemical components essential for the production of solid propellant used in ballistic missiles, including the Kheibar Shekan carriers used in attacks against Israel. Added to this was the use of the Chinese Beidou satellite navigation system, which substantially increased the accuracy of Iran's missile arsenal. The depth of this collaboration was already apparent in May 2024, when evidence emerged regarding the Alabuga factory in Russia, where Iranian-designed drones were being assembled using Chinese components and African labor, demonstrating a well-established triangular logistics chain.

The escalation resulting from this military buildup led to a breaking point in June 2025, when regional tensions erupted into open conflict. The military response by the United States and Israel, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, represented a violent external shock to the regime. This event had two consequences: on the one hand, it shifted the conflict to the realm of cyberwarfare, with targeted cyberattacks against Western infrastructure; on the other, it weakened the government's grip on Iranian society, creating the preconditions for the popular uprisings at the end of the year. It was at this juncture that China's strategy came full circle, moving from military support to direct protection of the regime.

The crackdown described in the February 2026 report therefore appears to be the final piece in this strategy. Faced with the risk of post-war internal collapse, Tehran has activated the "Digital Silk Road" technologies provided by Beijing. The effectiveness in blocking 80% of traffic to external satellite networks such as Starlink and the implementation of widespread digital surveillance were not improvised emergency measures, but the application of protocols and tools that China had transferred to its ally precisely to ensure the political stability necessary for the pursuit of its strategic and energy interests in the region. Ultimately, logical analysis of events shows that China acted as Iran's guarantor of last resort, first providing the economic means to survive, then the weapons to strike, and finally the technology to repress.