NSR Operations: Assessment of Chinese and Russian Capabilities for Projection and Control of Arctic Militarization

The accelerated melting of Arctic ice is triggering a profound redefinition of global trade routes and geopolitical balances. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), also known as the Northeast Passage (NEP), which stretches along the Siberian coast of Russia (Eluosi - 俄罗斯), is asserting itself as a vital strategic corridor. This route offers an alternative to traditional routes through the Suez Canal, drastically reducing distances between Asia and Europe. For example, the standard Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia is 21,000 km long, while the NSR is only 13,000 km, cutting travel time by more than half. The potential of this route is not only economic but also addresses urgent security needs, providing an alternative to southern routes increasingly subject to geopolitical tensions and piracy risks.

Pavel Volkov/Izvestia

For China (Zhongguo - 中国), the Arctic is one of the "new frontiers" of development and a formal element of its national security strategy. In the 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, China defined itself as a "near-Arctic state" (jinbei-ji guojia - 近北极国家). The "Ice Silk Road" (Bing shang silu - 冰上丝绸之路) initiative and the recent establishment of a joint venture between Russia, via the state company Rosatom, and the Chinese shipping company NewNew Shipping, for the development of the NSR, represent the culmination of this strategy, a "pact of necessity" accelerated by Moscow's (Moskva - Москва) isolation following the Ukraine conflict.

The opening of the first China-Europe container express route, with a transit time of only

18 days from the port of Ningbo (Ningbo Gang - 宁波港) to the United Kingdom (Yingguo - 英国), marks a crucial operational phase.

Civilian Intelligence: Geoeconomic and Technological Analysis

1. Geoeconomic Relevance and Trade

The NSR is becoming a vital commercial artery for China, a country where over

60% of trade volume depends on maritime transport. The route offers a travel time reduction of around 40% compared to the Suez route, with estimated fuel consumption savings of 25-35% per trip. The NSR's value, if open year-round, could save Chinese companies over $10 billion annually in transport costs. The NEP is particularly advantageous for high-value-added goods and the "New Three Pillars" (Xin sanyang - 新三样) of Chinese exports (photovoltaic components, energy storage batteries, and electric vehicles).

• According to the China Report Hall (Zhongguo Baogao Dating - 中国报告大厅), Chinese cargo ship (Zhongguo huochuan - 中国货船) traffic through the North Sea Route is projected to increase by approximately 40% by 2025 compared to the previous year.

• Between January and August 2025, the number of Chinese-owned cargo ships transiting the route already reached 120% of the total of the previous year, transporting high-value goods like LNG, metal ores, and electromechanical products.

• NSR cargo traffic grew to 31.5 million tons in 2019.

2. Infrastructure Development and Dependence

Sino-Russian cooperation is materialized in vast infrastructural projects. Russia (Eluosi - 俄罗斯) is investing about 1.8 trillion rubles (around $21 billion) until 2035 to build 50 icebreakers and ice-class ships, modernize ports, and create an orbital satellite constellation. The goal is to increase NSR capacity to 100 million tons by 2026 and 200 million tons by 2030. China (Zhongguo - 中国) provides technology, capital, and labor, exemplified by the supply of modules for the Arctic LNG 2 project.

• China has a 10% stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project (via CNPC), with another Chinese company (CNOOC) owning another 10%.

• Russian ports along the NSR are largely from the Soviet era and urgently need modernization. Chinese northern ports, such as Dalian (Dalian Gang - 大连港), Tianjin (Tianjin Gang - 天津港), and Qingdao (Qingdao Gang - 青岛港), are positioning themselves as international shipping and financial centers to support the NSR's development.

Schematic Diagram of Arctic Shipping Routes, with the Northern Sea Route (NSR) depicted as the Northeast Passage Image Source: World Shipping

3. Navigation Strategies and Criticalities

NSR navigation, though growing, presents significant challenges. Non-ice-class vessels (OW) like the NewNew Star (231 meters long), the largest container ship to navigate the Russian Arctic route, operate with mandatory Russian icebreaker assistance, underscoring continued reliance on Moscow's technology.

• The NSR is fully ice-free for about 20-30 days a year. The powerful nuclear icebreaker

  Arktika (class LK-60Ya), commissioned in October 2020, is capable of breaking through 3-meter thick ice.

• Current climate models (like CMIP6) tend to underestimate actual navigability, requiring improvements in Sea Ice Thickness (SIT) prediction for route planning and risk management.

• The Chinese Coast Guard (Zhongguo Haijing - 中国海警) entering the Arctic Ocean not only measures hydrological data but, more importantly, aims to demonstrate

  administrative law enforcement jurisdiction, accumulating data for future routes and asserting qualification to seek a share of the region when a future Arctic Treaty is signed.

Image source: Ningbo Release

Military Intelligence: Control, Deterrence, and Covert Collaboration

1. Russian Militarization and the Arctic as the "Fifth Military District"

Russia views its military presence in the Arctic as a top national security priority, vital for the credibility of its nuclear deterrence.

• Strategic Deterrence. The Arctic provides Russia with its only unrestricted access to the high seas, vital for its strategic naval forces as an integral part of its nuclear triad. The Northern Fleet (Bei fang hai jun - 北方海军) was upgraded to the "Fifth Military District" in June 2020, with command authority over all military forces in the Arctic region.

• Deployments and Armaments. Russia has invested heavily in reactivating Soviet-era bases. Over 400 military infrastructures had been built in the Arctic by 2019. Air defense missile systems like Tor, Pantsir, and S-400 have been deployed. The Kinzhal hypersonic missile underwent its first Arctic test in November 2020

• Icebreaker Power. Russia possesses the world's largest icebreaker fleet (nearly 50 units, including 4 nuclear-powered ones), essential for year-round navigation and military projection.

The map shown by Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan. It shows all the installations that Russia has built (or is building) in the Arctic.

2. Chinese Infiltration and Security Operations

China (Zhongguo - 中国) projects its influence through a strategy of military and law enforcement actions.

• Force Projection. Recent missions by the Chinese Coast Guard (Zhongguo Haijing - 中国海jing - 中国海警) into the Arctic Ocean, reaching waters near Alaska (Alasijia - 阿拉斯加), showcase the intent to extend administrative jurisdiction and establish a legal precedent for future claims. The Coast Guard ships are heavily modified ex-PLAN frigates.

• Hybrid Military Cooperation. Joint military exercises, such as the strategic exercise "Ocean 2024," which involved the Chinese Navy (Zhongguo Haijun - 中国海军) and the Russian Navy in areas adjacent to the Arctic, highlight increasing integration. The Chinese research icebreaker Xue Long 2 (Xuelong 2 - 雪龙 2) visited Murmansk in September 2024.

3. Dual-Use Risk and Submarine Sabotage

Sino-Russian cooperation relies on civilian infrastructure with dual-use capabilities, serving both commercial and military purposes, a risk closely monitored by Western intelligence.

• Sabotage Concerns. A particularly high risk concerns the integrity of submarine cables. The NewNew Polar Bear container ship, operated by a Sino-Russian company, was suspected of sabotaging the Balticconnector gas pipeline in the Gulf of Finland.

• Strategic Alternatives. China is exploring a river-maritime route through Siberian rivers to connect Asia to the Arctic Ocean, bypassing the Bering Strait and potential US interference. This includes cooperation on the Tumen River (Tumen Jiang - 图们江), which would provide China's northeastern provinces with direct access to the Sea of Japan (Riben Hai - 日本海), freeing China from the "Malacca dilemma" and dependence on southern routes.

  
  

Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures

Western nations and NATO face a rapidly evolving Arctic where traditional cooperation is yielding to competition. The failure of Arctic climate models to fully capture navigability dynamics and the meager resources of the US (only two heavy polar-class icebreakers, one unseaworthy) create a "soft underbelly" in defense against China and Russia. To counter this trend, the US and its allies must strengthen their navigation capabilities (icebreakers), modernize Arctic port infrastructure (e.g., Nome, Alaska), and consolidate diplomatic ties with all Arctic nations. The Arctic is now a battleground where control of routes, resources, and information will determine who holds the strategic advantage in the coming century.